2 articles in Melvyn Dubofsky, ed., Oxford Encyclopedia of American Economic, Business, and Labor History. 2 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. (original) (raw)
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THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN FINANCE AND THE BANKING ACT OF 1933
Industrial organization and corporate governance varies considerably across developed countries. The most measured comparisons are between the U.S., Germany, and Japan. One of the more notable differences in forms of corporate governance relate to the role of financial institutions. In Germany and Japan, large and powerful financial institutions play an active role in monitoring corporate decisions. These institutions, predominantly commercial or universal banks, accomplish this through seats on the Board of Directors as representatives of both creditor and shareholder interests. In the U.S. financial institutions are fragmented by legislation and regulation. Commercial and investment banks, trust companies, mutual funds, and pension funds are all severely constrained in their ability to monitor firm behavior. The general proposition of this paper is that the laws and regulations that have shaped American finance are rooted in the political process. More simply, politics has, to a significant extent and a variety of ways, shaped finance. A political theory of American finance has been advanced by Roe (1991) where he identifies legislation and regulations that have directly affected the activities of U.S. financial institutions. One of the most significant pieces of legislation, the Banking Act of 1933, or Glass-Steagall, is the case study analyzed in this paper. My intention is to show how politics has helped to shape finance through a legislative history of Glass-Steagall. The political process can be seen as a function of group interests played out through the political structure. This paper identifies and evaluates these group interests in shaping the different parts of the bill and also shows how unfolding historical events affected the final outcome of the legislation. By this analysis this study hopes to provide one link in the chain of a more comprehensive political theory of American finance with its implications for comparative corporate governance, industrial organization and economic performance.
Economic History Seminar Summary, 2018-2019, James Curtis Jr
Curtis Jr (2019) provides summaries from the 2018-2019 Washington Area Economic History Seminar, WAEHS, hosted by American University, Washington DC USA, and George Mason Univeristy, Arlington VA USA. Curtis Jr (2019) provided three exhibits for each of the four seminars, i. the flyer from American University Department of Economics, ii. the paper abstracts, with the theme of Economic History, from presenters invited from colleges and universities throughout the USA, and iii. the summaries of the seminar provided by Curtis Jr (2019). The attendees included, i. college/university faculty, ii. federal government economic researchers, and iii. private sector economic history researchers. REFERENCES Abad, Leticia ad Noel Maurer," The Long Shadow of History, The Impact of Colonial Labor Institutions on Economic Development in Peru",, Washington Area Economic History Seminar, Washington, American University, April 23, 2019. Curtis Jr, James E., The 19th Century US Economic History of Land, Property & Wealth Owners, https://www.scholars-press.com/, OmniScriptum/Scholars' Press, European Union, Released April 2019, pp. 1-117, 118-128. Curtis Jr, James E., The 19th Century US Economic History of Land, Property & Wealth Owners, Edited, Education Foundation Prelimiary Paper Series, 2019, pp. 1-160. Curtis Jr, James E., Institutional and Agency Effects on the Status of Free Blacks: Synthesizing Asymmetrical Laws and Social Conditions with Asymmetrical Economic Outcomes, Economic History and Labor" International Journal of History and Scientific Studies Research, http://ijhssr.org/v1-is-4.html/, Vol. 1, Iss. 4, No. 1, August 2018, pp. 1-18. Geloso, Vincent, Vadim Kufenko, Alex Arsenault Morin, Monopsony and Industrial Development in Nineteenth Century Quebec: The Impact of Seigneurial Tenure", Washington Area Economic History Seminar, Washington, American University October 20, 2018. Jaworski, Taylor and Walter Hanlon, "Spillover Effects of IP Protection in the Inter-war Aircraft Industry" Washington Area Economic History Seminar, Virginia, George Mason University, March 20, 2019. White, Eugene N. "Censored Success: How to Prevent a Banking Panic, the Barings Crisis of 1890 Revisited" Washington Area Economic History Seminar, Washington, American University, September 2018.
Labor, Finance, Counterrevolution: Finally Got the News at the End of the Short American Century
This article revisits the crisis of the American automotive industry and Fordist industrial labor in the late 1960s and early 1970s through the lens of the radical African American labor organization at the heart of that industry. By way of an analysis of the film Finally Got the News (1970), it considers the activities of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers in order to reexamine the dynamics of transition between industrial and financial capitalism as they are captured in this crisis of Detroit at the end of the “American century.” It argues that struggles around labor management in the crises of the Keynesian era implicitly foretold strategies of financial control in our present.
The Journal of Economic History, 2001
This paper presents a detailed accounting of the sources of African-American economic progress in the labor market over the twentieth century. We examine the received literature and demonstrate the sensitivity of conclusions stated in it to choices of samples used to measure wages and to specifications of earnings functions. We present a quantitative assessment of the contributions of migration, schooling choices, schooling quality, and social activism to both absolute levels and relative levels of African-American earnings.
United States Financial History
United States Financial History, 2021
The history of US finance—spanning from the republic’s founding through the 2007–2008 financial crisis—exhibits two primary themes. The first theme is that Americans have frequently expressed suspicion of financiers and bankers. This abiding distrust has generated ferocious political debates through which voters either have opposed government policies that empower financial interests or have advocated proposals to steer financial institutions toward serving the public. A second, related theme that emerges from this history is that government policy—both state and federal—has shaped and reshaped financial markets. This feature follows the pattern of American capitalism, which rather than appearing as laissez-faire market competition, instead materializes as interactions between government and private enterprise structuring each economic sector in a distinctive manner. International comparison illustrates this premise. Because state and federal policies produced a highly splintered co...