[with Fabian Lüscher and Julia Richers], Nuclear Technopolitics in the Soviet Union and Beyond – an Introduction, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 66/1 (2018), pp. 3–19 (1st page in lieu of abstract) (original) (raw)
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Nuclear Technopolitics in the Soviet Union and Beyond – An Introduction
Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 2018
Nuclear energy epitomises the ambiguity of high modernity like no other technology. In the history of the Soviet Union, it played an exceptionally prominent role, initially accelerating its ascent to superpower status and bolstering its visions of the future, but eventually hastening its demise in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. There can be little doubt that without nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would not have been able to consolidate its hard-won victory in World War II and to achieve superpower status. In a massive effort that combined domestic research in nuclear physics with the knowledge of captive German scientists and intelligence about the American Manhattan project and drew on the resources of the country's military-industrial complex and the Gulag system, the Soviet Union developed its own atomic bomb in record time and tested its first nuclear device in 1949. By 1953, it was also in possession of the hydrogen bomb and had thus achieved technological parity with the United States. 1 In fact, with the successful test of the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile in 1957, the Soviet Union had taken the lead in developing a powerful launch vehicle to deliver thermonuclear warheads across the globe. No less important-in ideological terms even more so than in economic ones-was the Soviet Union's civilian nuclear programme. Soviet atomic scientists advocated harnessing the atom's power for electricity generation as early as the late 1940s, 2 and the CPSU was quick to realise the economic and propagandistic potential of nuclear power. 3 Only one year after the detonation of their first H-bomb, and in response to Dwight D. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace speech, Soviet nuclear scientists connected the world's first nuclear power plant to the grid in Obninsk near Moscow. While the quantity of energy produced was negligible, the amount of publicity it generated for the Soviet state was enormous. 4 Soviet propaganda could now juxtapose the belligerent capitalist atom of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with its seemingly peaceful socialist twin, eager to serve the
Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju [Annual of Social History], XXVIII, no. 3, 2021
This paper traces the early period of the Yugoslav nuclear program, in which the biggest problem was finding uranium. With only a handful of trained geologists and prospectors, the solution was found in the employment of German experts. This was a global trend at the time, and as this paper shows, was not reserved for great powers. Relying on the expertise of German scientists, Yugoslavia managed to raise the first postwar generation of geologists, who eventually found uranium and started its exploitation on several locations in the country, most notably in Kalna (Serbia) and Žirovski vrh (Slovenia).
Acknowledgement We would like to thank ALLAH almighty who has given us strength to complete this assignment. We'd like to thank to our parents for their unending love & prayers. We also would like to thank our teacher in completing this task & to giving us chance to learn from the given topic.
When Did (and Didn't) States Proliferate? Chronicling the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
Research Assistant at the Middlebury Institute- Writer Philipp Bleek First Joint Paper between Harvard and the Middlebury Institute The primary purpose of the paper is to present a well-documented set of coding data to support the burgeoning quantitative literature on the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation. The intent is to help to build consensus among nuclear proliferation researchers on the timing and extent of nuclear proliferation activities across the nuclear age, as well as more clearly identify where and why some scholars may differ on certain junctures of that history. This paper codes behavior, provides rationales and documentation for the codings, highlights plausible alternate codings where relevant, and identifies discrepancies between its codings and those of other scholars. The paper should also be a useful reference for scholars, students, and others looking for succinct and well-documented summaries of the proliferation activities of various states.
Nuclear Energy in the Twentieth Century: New International Approaches
Nuclear energy represents one of the most controversial issues in contemporary history and politics, and raises either vehement opposition or unconditional support. On the one hand, the use of nuclear technology in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War shaped postwar discussions about the use of nuclear power, while at the same time influencing the balance of power between the two superpowers and relations inside the Atlantic bloc and with Third World countries. On the other hand, the same technology that raised fears of a potential nuclear conflict -and therefore of a Third World War and of a total annihilation of mankind -also became the object of widespread beliefs in the possibility of producing an unlimited, clean and effi-cient source of energy. This apparent contradiction between the hopes and fears of nuclear power was declined differently in different national contexts, but characterized most countries in the post-World War II period. For many, including Italy, the «nuclear euforia» of the 1950s and 1960s was strongly linked to the lack of energy resources. For others, such as Third World countries, access to nuclear power became a way of overcoming the technological gap with the developed world, and establishing their place in the international arena. In all cases, debates about nuclear policies intersected in complex ways with wider discussions about modernization and international relations 1 . Over the last twenty years, scholars have devoted an increased attention to the study
Nuclear Energy in Russia: From Future Technology to Cultural Heritage
2016
Nuclear energy is not just a utility technology, it is also a resource for political and cultural power. In this article I discuss the changes of the political and societal meanings of nuclear energy in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, as nuclear power left the laboratories, plants and factories and entered a very different symbolic space: the museum. Heritage and cultural memory scholars are acutely aware that the past is often invoked and retrospectively constructed in order to shape the future. Accordingly, I posit that the creation of Russian museums of nuclear energy can be understood as a way of forging a particular path to the future.
Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market
International Security, 2019
The evolution of the nuclear market explains why there are only nine members of the nuclear club, not twenty-five or more, as some analysts predicted. In the absence of a supplier cartel that can regulate nuclear transfers, the more suppliers there are, the more intense their competition will be, as they vie for market share. This commercial rivalry makes it easier for nuclear technology to spread, because buyers can play suppliers off against each other. The ensuing transfers help countries either acquire nuclear weapons or become hedgers. The great powers (China, Russia, and the United States) seek to thwart proliferation by limiting transfers and putting safeguards on potentially dangerous nuclear technologies. Their success depends on two structural factors: the global distribution of power and the intensity of the security rivalry among them. Thwarters are most likely to stem proliferation when the system is unipolar and least likely when it is multipolar. In bipolarity, their prospects fall somewhere in between. In addition, the more intense the rivalry among the great powers in bipolarity and multipolarity, the less effective they will be at curbing proliferation. Given the potential for intense security rivalry among today's great powers, the shift from unipolarity to multipolarity does not portend well for checking proliferation.
Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin
In addition, he has published numerous articles and working papers, including those in SIPRI Yearbook chapters, Arms Control Today, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He has co-authored (with Dr. Norris) the article on ``Nuclear Weapons'' in the 1990 printing of The New Encyclopedia Britannica (15th edition).