Post-Soviet Affairs Who supported separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and popular opinion at the start of the Ukraine crisis (original) (raw)
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Who supported separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and popular opinion at the start of the Ukraine crisis
Post-Soviet Affairs, 2018
Donetsk and Luhansk are often labeled pro-Russian regions as a result of the founding of Peoples' Republics there in spring 2014. This article investigates popular opinion in Donbas before armed conflict began, to determine whether the high concentration of ethnic Russians there drove support for separatism. Analysis of a KIIS opinion poll shows that, on the one hand, ethnic Russian respondents were divided on most separatist issues, with a minority backing separatist positions. On the other hand, they supported separatist issues in larger numbers than both ethnic Ukrainians and respondents with hybrid identities. Thus, while ethnic identity does not produce polarized preferences, it is relevant in shaping political attitudes. Also, analysis of an original database of statements made by Donbas residents indicate that they were motivated to support separatism by local concerns exacerbated by a sense of abandonment by Kyiv rather than by Russian language and pro-Russian foreign policy issues. We are sick and tired of our country, of our government's policies, so we're voting for what we've been offered so far. We want order; stability; salaries; jobs …-A woman in Donetsk explaining why she is voting for independence in the sovereignty referendum in Donetsk, May 11, 2014. (RFE/RL 2014) Demands for separatism in the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine in spring 2014 emerged rapidly. Residents of Donetsk and Luhansk, who had been politically quiescent throughout the Maidan demonstrations that started the previous fall, began to participate in a series of escalating demonstrations after the ouster of Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych in late February. As events in Crimea crescendoed in early March, local activists of formerly marginal pro-Russian organizations in Donbas gained in popularity. 1 Whereas only a year earlier these groups' events consisted primarily of distributing literature to passers-by from folding tables, they now took advantage of the opening provided by Russia's annexation of Crimea. Activists forcibly seized government buildings in April and declared themselves leaders of the self-styled Peoples' Republic of Donetsk (DNR) and Peoples' Republic of Luhansk (LNR). They quickly adopted declarations of sovereignty (e.g. Declaration 2014), and in May, held referenda on state sovereignty. Support for separatism was not the dominant political opinion among residents of Donbas. Only a minority of the population-slightly less than a third of people surveyed in Donetsk and Luhanskbacked separation from Ukraine (KIIS 2014). Nevertheless, the percentage of citizens with opinions that
The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?
2016
Ukraine previously experienced significant regional political divisions, including separatism in Crimea and Donbas. However, in contrast to post-communist countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and former Yugoslavia, prior to 2014 Ukraine was able to avoid a war and a break-up. This study examines the role of separatists, the Yanukovych government, the Maidan opposition and the Maidan government, far-right organizations, Russia, the US, and the EU in the conflict in Donbas. It uses a specially commissioned survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in 2014 to analyse public support for separatism in Donbas, compared to other regions of Ukraine, and the major factors which affect such support. It concludes that all these actors contributed in various ways to the conflict in Donbas, which involved both a civil war and a direct Russian military intervention since August 2014. The study links this conflict to the 'Euromaidan', specifically, the government overthrow by means of the Maidan massacre, and the secession and Russia's annexation of Crimea. The KIIS survey shows that support for separatism is much stronger in Donbas compared to other regions, with the exception of Crimea, and that the break-up of Ukraine is unlikely to extend to its other parts.
Ukraine: More Pro-Russian Separatism to Come?
This article reviews the current situation in Donbas, a region of Eastern Ukraine where clashes between the Ukrainian army and pro-Russian separatist forces are ongoing since spring 2014. The research question is whether separatism can expand to other regions of Eastern and Southern Ukraine. By using data of census and polls, we prove that the local support for separatism in these regions is low, and that the views of Donbas are distinct from that of other Ukrainian regions.
Identity, war, and peace: public attitudes in the Ukraine-controlled Donbas
Eurasian Geography and Economics
Contrary to Russia's expectations, military intervention into Ukraine only strengthened the Ukrainian civic nation. As a number of polls demonstrate, since 2014 there is a growing trend that the vast majority of Ukrainians, also in the government-controlled areas of the Donbas, identify themselves, first and foremost, as Ukrainian citizens. Regional and local identity is not their primary choice anymore and there are clear indicators of a strong civic identity that favors a unitary Ukraine. The lack of progress for a solution of the conflict in the Donbas impacts upon Ukrainian public opinion which, in turn, puts pressure on the Ukrainian authorities: there is a wide acceptance of a diplomatic solution to the conflict and readiness for some compromises but the reintegration of the occupied territories should take place according to prewar conditions, without any federalization of Ukraine. Also, without establishing a stable security regime in the Donbas there is little support for an implementation of the political part of the Minsk-2 agreement. However, closer to the frontline, the more Ukrainians are ready for compromises. The promise of peace by new President Volodymyr Zelenskyy puts a question on what compromises his team may accept and justify in the eyes of Ukrainians.
The Separatist Conflict in Donbas: A Violent Break-Up of Ukraine?
Ukraine has experienced significant regional divisions concerning such issues as support for leading presidential candidates and political parties, foreign orientation, and attitudes towards major historical events since it became independent in 1991. Separatism in various forms manifested itself in Crimea in the first half of the 1990s and in Donbas and neighboring regions during the “Orange Revolution” in 2004. However, Ukraine was able until 2014 to avoid a violent break-up, in contrast to such post-communist countries as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and former Yugoslavia. In 2014, Crimea seceded with help of Russian military intervention, and it was annexed by Russia. Pro-Russian separatists with direct involvement of large groups of armed Russians with indirect Russian government support seized power in most of Donbas and engaged in a violent conflict with pro-government forces in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions (Donbas). The research question is as to why Ukraine has suffered a violent separatist conflict in Donbas. This study analyses the role of different actors and factors in the violent conflict in Donbas. This paper uses a brief survey, which was commissioned by the author and conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in the end of April and the beginning of May 2014, to analyze support for separatism in Donbas, compared to other regions of Ukraine, and major factors which affect such support. It compares the role of the Yanukovych and post-Yanukovych governments in Ukraine, the Russian and Western governments, political leaders of these countries, and Russian and Ukrainian paramilitary formations. This paper also compares the violent separatist conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions to other similar violent conflicts and to secessions of Transdniestria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Krajina in Croatia, Republika Srpska in Bosnia, and Kosovo in Serbia.
Constructing a Political Nation: Changes in the Attitudes of Ukrainians during the War in the Donbas
What effect did Russia’s attack have on Ukrainian society and on public opinion? And how, in turn, did changes in public opinion and in society influence Ukrainian identity and politics? This book, prepared by the School for Policy Analysis, National University of Kyiv–Mohyla Academy with the participation of the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, shows that contrary to the Kremlin’s expectations, Russian aggression has in fact led to a strengthening of the Ukrainian political nation. The book covers national and regional dimensions of changes in the attitudes of Ukrainians during the war in the Donbas: identity issues, political and party preferences, approaches to decentralization and the conflict in the Donbas, economic sentiments, changes in foreign policy attitudes toward the EU, NATO, and Russia.
The Social Bases of Support for Self-determination in East Ukraine
Ethnopolitics, 2015
This study considers how a community that supports self-rule takes shape in movements for self-determination. Examining separatism in east Ukraine, the author suggests that the formation of community boundaries is not automatic. Boundaries are not activated by preexisting ethnic or linguistic identities, or even by the appeals of political leaders who manipulate those identities. Instead, analysts should focus attention on how specific political developments contribute to alienation from the central state. Two factors contributed to political alienation in Ukraine: first, the material interest of industrial workers in preserving economic ties to Russia, and second, how nostalgia for the Soviet Union was strengthened by developments following the Orange Revolution and after the Maidan that emphasized an ethnically exclusivist Ukrainian national identity and gave voice to the ultranationalist far right in national politics.
Military conflict in South-Eastern Ukraine is an example of “hybrid warfare” in which “war for minds” is one of the key elements. Differences of Ukrainian people geopolitical orientations often are explained with respect to the region of residence, ethnic identity and native language. Previous research on the problem has three types of limitations: scale, dependent variable (orientations), and regional structures. This study aims to challenge the “on surface” view of place of residence as the key predictor of geopolitical attitudes in Ukraine. The author used excessive amount of data (2005-2015 period surveys with 378,733 cases total sample) and several combinations of dependent variables to test the effects of attitude types, changing political situation and social environment in the regions. The results of regression modeling shows that regional structure is more powerful in explaining general attitude to Russia than integration intentions. Regional differences proved to be partially explained with the level of lingualethnic heterogeneity. In general it seems that language environment has more influence than ethnic. Religious identification also remains very powerful and significant. It is claimed that cultural domain of social environment is the key to explain regional structure of geopolitical orientations in Ukraine.