The feasibility of a UN peacekeeping mission in Donbas – Views from Ukraine and Russia (original) (raw)
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UN Mission into the Donbas - New Perspectives for the Ukrainian Crisis and Conflict Management
The war in Eastern Ukraine has been ongoing for four years now, and an end is not to be seen at the moment. Since 2014 the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission has made a significant contribution to the conflict and crisis management in Ukraine. In September 2017 Russian President Putin proposed a possible UN peace mission, and the Ukrainian President Poroshenko submitted his own proposal. But can a UN mission really bring peace to Ukraine?
Perspectives on the role of the OSCE in the Ukraine crisis
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The Role of OSCE and EU Cooperation in Resolving the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
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OSCE Field Operations After The Ukraine Crisis: In Search of A New Strategy?
* Publication sponsored by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany (www.auswaertiges-amt.de) The long-standing disagreements between NATO and Russia have been left unresolved for decades. In 2014 they finally escalated into an outright confrontation on the European continent, in which most European countries are now involved. Armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, information warfare, along with a military buildup – these developments signalize clearly that European security is in danger today. If the OSCE is to resolve this crisis, there needs to be more than a high-level dialogue among the OSCE participating States on the future of European security. It could be years before such a dialogue would bring results and a way out of the dangerous confrontation would be found. Until then, this dialogue should be complemented by the OSCE’s work on the ground, through its field operations, targeted at preventing new conflicts similar to that in Ukraine. This work is particularly needed in the countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus where the lines of geopolitical confrontation are drawn today. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – over the fate of these six states a particularly intense struggle has unfolded. While they have been developing closer relations with NATO and the EU, the example of Georgia in 2008 has shown that Russia will oppose the Western influence in its neighbourhood. The more recent example of Ukraine has further demonstrated that the increasing instability in Europe puts even the states without ‘frozen conflicts’ on their territories at risk of an armed conflict that could lead to civil war and partition. The OSCE and its field operations have been slow to respond strategically to these new challenges. In contrast to the field operations in the Western Balkans, the OSCE operations in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus are much smaller and have lower budgets. Unlike the OSCE field operations in Central Asia, they do not have explicit conflict prevention mandates focusing instead on the resolution of already existing ‘frozen conflicts’. Moreover, in three of the six countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus – Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia – there is no OSCE field operations at all. This chapter will present the evidence of why the risk of new armed conflicts in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus is real. It will then argue that the OSCE should respond to the challenge by, firstly, enlarging its field operations in Moldova and Armenia, secondly, re-establishing the field operations in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, and, thirdly, tasking all field operations in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus with conflict prevention.
Peace and security in Eastern Ukraine-the case of an international peacekeeping mission
The article is about the possibility of an international military presence as an enforcement peacekeeping mission in the Ukrainian conflict in Donbas region. It starts with a short story-line of the conflict, identifying all the actors involved and what role they play in it. Analyzing the arguments behind the demand for an international peacekeeping mission and examining the circumstances in which the conflict happens the essay investigation is around the question " Can the external military presence in Donbas constitute an international peacekeeping mission? ". In order to conduct this research, we recurred to the doctrine as well as to articles and official documents and declarations to better understand the theme.
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Ukraine Conflict: Is UN peacekeeping an option
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has entered the second month but with no sign of a ceasefire yet. The flurry of diplomatic activities combined with the threat of more economic sanctions continues. Meanwhile, Poland has suggested a kind of peace mission as an interim measure. 2 Gowan, The UN Director of Crisis Group, even though has not outrightly rejected the Polish 'Peace Mission,' rightly pointed out that "There is a natural tendency in moments of crisis to raise the idea of "peacekeeping" in a vague way, much as Poland has done. In the case of Ukraine, it would be unwise to invest too much hope in the prospects for peace operations." Gowan observed that such an idea of using Blue Helmets came up earlier also in 2015 and Putin was open to the idea. Comparing the starting points for a peacekeeping mission in 2015 and now, it had a better chance in 2015 because Putin was at least open to the idea. That the Blue Helmets would be able to do something is making rounds again. Even a former Canadian foreign minister and a professor of law at the University of Ottawa Axworthy and Rock believe that the UN can use Blue Helmets to save Ukrainian lives. 3 Without being prejudiced against the probability of success of a UN peace operation, the bigger question is who is going to participate in such a mission. Given the kind of violence that the peacekeepers would be
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The article describes the formats in which the “Ukrainian question” has been discussed in various forums in the last year and defines various reasons why meetings within the format of the “normandy Quartet” was the most effective. he Ukrainian national interest considered, it analyzes the preferences and shortcomings of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements and the Declaration by the President of the Russian Federation, the President of Ukraine, the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in support of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements adopted on February 12, 2015
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Based on the lessons learned by UNTAES and other UN peace operations, one can imagine that a peacekeeping mission in the so-called “people’s republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk would require large-scale international military engagement. A significant number of UN troops and police forces would have to be deployed in the region in order for it to be successful. A simple multiplication, based on the UNTAES deployment, would lead to an estimated need of more than 50,000 troops – an enormous number of military personnel, which are not readily available.
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At the end of 2016 and early in 2017, Russia carried out a number of actions against Ukraine. The paper describes possible steps of Russia in the development of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. It is shown that there is the possibility of dividing Ukraine into three parts: a) the Eastern part-under the control of the subordinate Russia of the former president of Ukraine V. Yanukovich; b) the Central one under the control of the existing power of P. Poroshenko; and c) the Western one (which will develop towards integration into Poland, Hungary and Romania). This development of events may well satisfy all international players in the event that Russia takes the initiative to convene the "Second Helsinki Declaration" (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). The authorities in Ukraine are losing the opportunity to prevent Russia's actions, but possible actions are described in the article.