Plato and the Trinity - an action-theoretic interpretation (original) (raw)
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Aspects of Plato's political thinking
The conditions of life that nowadays, in the era of globalization, are shaped intensively raise the question of re-approaching the platonic thought. The long course covered by the mechanistic account of the nature, the world and the human being, has driven to the separation of science (ἐπιστήμη) from philosophy and to the splintering off of knowledge (γνώση).
[This paper is based on my BA thesis (2014) written under supervision of prof. Vytautas Ališauskas at Vilnius University.] The paper explores Plato’s Statesman in the perspective of its philosophical unity and autonomy. The relevance of this approach arises from the problem posed by the traditional readings of the Statesman – the developmental and unitarian. Both methods interpret the Statesman in the context of Plato’s major political dialogues of, the Republic and the Laws, thus preventing the exposing of the internal theoretical coherence of the dialogue. Hence this paper focuses on the analysis of the main political themes of the dialogue – conflict, statesmanship, and political knowledge – and their relations to each other. By discussing the emergence of the political and its importance for conceptualizing political practice, as well as by indicating the structural elements of statesmanship, the author of the paper argues that the Statesman contains a coherent and internally completed political theory.
Review Article — Plato and Democracy
Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought, 2004
Although its title may suggest a narrowly focused study of Plato's attitude to democracy this book is, in fact, a comprehensive examination of his political philosophy with substantial sections devoted to the Republic, to the Politicus and Timaeus-Critias and to the Laws. In these Samaras develops a distinctive interpretation not just of Plato's views on democracy but of his political philosophy as whole. One major theme concerns questions of unity and development with reference particularly to the relationship between the Republic and the Laws. Samaras rejects unitarian interpretations, which, he thinks, treat the Laws as a mere appendix to the Republic. However he sees a fundamental continuity in Plato's thought, which he calls 'a dynamic unity', that is, 'a unity within which development stands in a discernible relation to the philosopher's previous position' (p. 1). Fundamental to this interpretation is a fairly conservative reading of the metaphysics and epistemology of the Republic. Plato distinguishes between forms and sensible particulars in terms of the degree to which they really exist. Only knowledge of the forms can legitimise political power. The 'ontological transcendence of the forms' thus supports the 'unchallengeable rule of the Guardians' (p. 105), who have perfect knowledge and (as a consequence) perfect virtue. According to Samaras, Plato never abandoned his belief in transcendent forms, but from the Politicus onwards he revised his views in important respects. Because he now doubted the possibility of finding anyone with the knowledge required of an ideal ruler, he became an advocate of strict obedience to written laws. These do not replace the wisdom of the philosopher but are imitations of the truth which enable the common people to govern themselves in the best way that is practically possible. At the same time Plato abandoned his view that an understanding of the forms is essential for virtue and, with it, his Socratic belief that virtue is one. He came to hold that true opinion could be an acceptable substitute for knowledge and could form the basis for a certain
The unity of the soul in Plato's Republic
Plato and the Divided Self
In Book Four of Plato's Republic, Socrates divides the soul. He argues that 1 because one thing cannot do or undergo opposites in the same respect, in the same relation, and at the same time, some cases of psychological conflict can only be explained by supposing that the soul is actually more than one thing. But Socrates does not deny that the soul is a unity. Rather, he holds that the soul, like so many entities, is both a many and a one. He refers to the divisions as parts of the soul, and 2 even when he ascribes actions and attitudes to a part of the soul, he also ascribes them to the whole soul (esp. 439a-b, 439d). Although few souls enjoy the unity that virtue earns, every human soul possesses an unearned unity. 3 4 I thank the organizers of the Toronto conference and the editors for including me. I also thank Jennifer Whiting for the paper on which I commented in Toronto and Devin Henry for the opportunity to present a successor to those comments at the University of Western Ontario. Finally, I thank those who offered helpful comments on the successor, especially Verity Harte and John Mouracade in Ontario, and Clerk Shaw, Rachel Singpurwalla, Eric Wiland, and the editors by correspondence. For the Republic, I cite the text of Slings 2003, and translations are mine, though I have 1 borrowed heavily from Grube's translation, as revised by Reeve, which appears in Cooper 1997. Socrates calls the divisions εἴδη, γένη, and μέρη: εἴδη in 435c1, 435c5, 435e1, 439e1, γένη in 2 441c6, 443d3, μέρη in 442b10, 442c4, 444b3 (cf. 577d4, 581a6, 583a1, 586e5). He also refers to the whole soul in 436b2 (cf. σύνθετον at 611b5-7). For earned unity, see especially 443d-e. That it is rare follows from these three points: virtue 3 requires knowledge (442c), knowledge requires philosophy (474b-480a), and philosophy is rare (491a-b). I discuss an apparent exception (554d) in the last section. 4 2 What explains this unearned unity? How do reason, spirit, and appetite constitute a single whole? This question has received little attention. My first aim here 5 is to establish that it is an important puzzle, and my second is to venture an answer. 2. The importance of the soul's unity My question is in part mereological. Plato assumes that my reason, spirit, and appetite constitute a complex unity, and that my reason, spirit, and appetite together with your spirit do not. What explains which psychological elements constitute a whole soul and which do not? The interest of my question, however, is not exclusively mereological, and Socrates' talk of "parts" and "wholes" does not exhaust the reasons for asking it. Plato needs to explain the unearned unity of the soul. First, if the soul is, for all that he can explain, three distinct entities, then he cannot account for the felt unity of consciousness. As Descartes puts it, "When I consider the mind, or myself insofar as I 6 am merely a thinking thing, I am unable to distinguish any parts within myself; I understand myself to be something quite single and complete." In the Republic, 7 Socrates does not address this unity of consciousness directly, but he assumes that a human agent is somehow aware of what every part of his or her soul thinks and feels. Unless the human agent is something over and beyond the parts, it is somehow composed of the parts. How? Second, if Plato cannot explain the unity of the soul, then he cannot treat the whole soul as the locus of moral responsibility. Socrates speaks as though our ordinary practices of praise and blame correctly take the same agent to be responsible whether he pursues wisdom, reacts angrily, or seeks a yummy dinner (cf. 436a8-b4, quoted But see Aristotle De an. I 5 411b5-7, Archer-Hind 1882, 124, and Lorenz 2006, 38-40. Some 5 scholars offer a principled excuse: they maintain that the soul is a simple unity with three different kinds of psychological states and activities that are mere conceptual parts (e.g., Shields 2001). I argue against this reading in §3 below.
Plato's Theory of the Justice in the Ideal State: Function and class.
There are numerous interpretations of Plato's theory of justice as it relates to the ideal state, deeply intertwined with his political philosophy. This complexity makes understanding his interlocking ideas challenging, as he seeks to construct a theory of the ideal state. Plato's philosophy of justice, particularly in its political dimension, emphasizes integration as a fundamental factor in grasping his theory. This paper aims to elucidate the original concept of justice in Plato's state by delving into the roots of the Republic, analyzing its historical context. Plato's predictions reflect values and truths connected to politics and philosophy, emphasizing integration as essential to understanding his theory of justice, which lies at the core of his philosophy. This essay compares the relationship between the functions and class structure of the state. Plato classifies human nature into three components: reason, courage, and appetite, which correspond to three major classes in the state. The ruling class, educated in philosophy, governs the state. The military class, characterized by courage and strength, defends the state, while the professional class manages the everyday affairs of governance. Plato's theory posits functional specialization across all classes as fundamental to his ideal state. In essence, while Plato's imagined city may lack historical existence, it holds significant relevance in the realm of speculative human thought. Keywords: Justice. State. Function. Class. Rulers. Guardians. Producers.