Glaucon's Challenge (original) (raw)

Philosophy as the practice of musical inheritance: Book II of Plato's Republic

Epoché, 2007

Philosophy is often taken at its core to be an argumentative appeal to our own native capacity to judge the truth without bias. I claim in this paper that the very notion of unbiased truth represents a particular interest, viz., the interests of the political as such: the city. My thesis is that Socrates' city in speech in Book II of the Republic exposes the injustice concealed at the core of demonstrative philosophy, and on this basis he goes on to offer an account of philosophical education based on a notion of musical inheritance.

Competition, Imagery, and Pleasure in Plato’s Republic, 1–9

2013

In this paper, I interpret the Republic’s “parallel” imagery of a contest between the lives of the most just and most unjust men as indicating that book 9’s two pleasure arguments are the culmination of the dialogue’s refutation of Thrasymachus’ sophistry. I take this strategic function of the pleasure arguments as the primary explanation as to why Socrates designates the account of the just man’s pleasure the "most severe defeat of the unjust man." In exposing my thesis, I challenge Richard Kraut's claim that the pleasure arguments have little significance to the dialogue's argument, and I suggest that my argument strengthens Daniel Russell's thesis that book 9's pleasure arguments complete Socrates' notion of the just soul.

Compulsion to Rule in Plato's Republic

Apeiron, 2013

Three problems threaten any account of philosophical rule in the Republic. First, Socrates is supposed to show that acting justly is always beneficial, but instead he extols the benefits of having a just soul. He leaves little reason to believe practical justice and psychic justice are connected and thus to believe that philosophers will act justly. In response to this problem, I show that just acts produce just souls. Since philosophers want to have just souls, they will act justly. Second, Socrates’ alleged aim is to demonstrate that justice is beneficial, but philosophers, who have to give up a life of philosophy to rule, actually appear to be harmed by ruling. I explain that, since the founders of the city justly command them to rule, philosophers cannot, in fact, obtain a better life, and so ruling does not harm them. Third, it seems incongruous that philosophers, who should, as just people, jump at the opportunity to rule Kallipolis, must be compelled to rule. I show that Plato carefully constructs an educational system that produces rulers who do not want to rule, since such rulers alone will rule best.

Socrates’ Proto-Liberal Feminism: Toward a Rereading of the Republic with a View to Necessity

Guided by Socrates' treatment of "necessity" (ἀνάγκη), 1 a concept that has so far received inadequate attention in Plato, in this paper I develop a rereading of the politics of Plato's Republic in which Socrates emerges as the first theorist of a regime founded on individuals' needs and aptitudes -a proto-liberal. 2 Moreover, this proto-liberalism extends to a strong feminism. Socrates prioritizes the proper treatment of women in his pursuit of justice.

How Should I be? A Defense of Platonic Egoism

There has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist. Over the past few decades, however, some scholars have challenged this reading. While Rational Egoism appeals to many ordinary folk, in sophisticated philosophical circles it has fallen out of favor as a general and complete account of the nature of reasons for action. I argue that while the theory of practical rationality that is often equated with rational egoism-a view that I call 'Simple-Minded Rational Egoism'-is neither plausible nor endorsed by Plato in his Republic, there is a more complex version of Rational Egoism to which Plato is indeed committed. Moreover, such a conception of practical rationality is not vulnerable to the standard set of objections that contemporary philosophers have made against Rational Egoism.

Who's Happy in Plato's Republic?

Plato’s Republic suggests that everyone is better off being just than unjust, yet scholars have disputed whether Plato actually proves it. It is especially unclear whether the Republic shows that non-philosophers are better off being just. I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Plato knowingly offers no convincing proof of this, though it is reasonable to infer from the text that Plato genuinely believes it. Thus, the Republic comes to light as a complex piece of protreptic rhetoric: offering an exhortation (‘Be just!’) while withholding the rational basis for that exhortation—thus provoking philosophic inquiry rather than concluding it.

The Sorcerer's City: Truth and Disguise in Plato's Republic

Plato is known as the theorist of universal ideas, yet he writes dialogues about particular situations; he is known as the philosopher who wishes to expel the poets, yet he writes philosophical dramas; he is known as the seeker of unchanging truth, yet he seems to argue for the appropriateness and necessity of the ‘noble lie’ in his greatest work, Republic. This study is an attempt to harmonize the contradictions between these different portraits of Plato through an analysis of the drama of Republic. The concept of truth is given special attention: how it is defined and in what way Plato’s Socrates pursues it. What emerges from the dialogue is a distinction between factual and moral truth; moral truth, or truth in the soul, is less a matter of statements than of virtues. The ‘noble lie’ is not only compatible with moral truth, but even encourages it; rather than being an instrument of political control, it is a poetic device which Socrates uses to foster the love of justice in his interlocutors against tyrannical passions. The arguments for the expulsion of the poets are ironic and highly qualified; while they alert readers to the possible dangers of poetry, they reach out towards a reconciliation of poets and philosophers. The account of children’s education in Book II-III presents the arts as no less than indispensable. Lastly, a brief response is given to a question raised in the dialogue: whether a god would ever appear in a form other than divine, i.e. in disguise. This seems impossible when the attributes of divinity are considered in isolation, but it is argued to be at least possible, desirable and ethically irreproachable when the needs and follies of humanity are taken into account.

As Happy As Can Be: How Republic's Philosophers Fare Best by Ruling

2010

Many scholars hold that in Plato's Republic philosophers who rule suffer in terms of philosophical activity. This view is based largely on Socrates' silence on the matter in response to a complaint from Glaucon. Yet two major themes of Republic maintain that philosophers who act justly and rule do not suffer in terms in philosophy: (i) with respect to the material goods and physical security which are pre-requisites for philosophical activity, philosophers benefit from the support of the city, and (ii) rule by inferior people is inimical to philosophy. I develop these two themes, disarm in passing the evidence for thinking that the philosophers are worse off, and consider four types of non-ruling philosopher -"spontaneous", "besotted" "wealthy" and "deceitful" philosophers. None of the four fares better in terms of philosophical activity than ruling philosophers. 2 Parenthetical references are to Republic unless otherwise stated. Translations are from Grube, revised by Reeve (1992).