Skepticism as a Way of Life (original) (raw)
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Neo-Pyrrhonism: a contemporary version of skepticism
Sententiae, 2023
When one engages in philosophizing, one usually has a critical attitude towards accepted ideas. Philosophy is, among other things, a way to scrutinize widespread prejudices; it is an investigation of the reasons one has both for and against certain general, basic, and important beliefs; it is a critical attitude towards dogmas of all kinds: religious, political, ethical, among many others that permeate human life. Rationality and critical spirit go hand in hand. This critical attitude is directed not only to other people's dogmas, but also those in our own thinking. Many are hidden, and it takes a lot of effort to identify and eradicate them. One should not have certain beliefs one has not assessed in the first place. This rational, critical investigation is, perhaps, philosophy most important contribution to human life, an attitude that is indeed necessary for our time. Anti-dogmatism is what animates most people that look for philosophy to improve their own way of thinking and living their everyday lives. As soon as one starts philosophizing, however, this critical spirit is often lost. Instead of questioning those dogmas that permeate everyday life, the new born philosopher immediately takes skepticism as his target. The "true philosophy" is now conceived as that which overcomes the skeptical challenge. If a philosophy does not stand this challenge or, worse, if it leads to skepticism, then it is rejected or even considered refuted. It seems that the critical spirit is at least partially extinguished by the very activity that should promote it most. Antidogmatism is converted into anti-skepticism [Aikin 2010: 172-176]. How did this happen? Historically speaking, Descartes' first Meditation (and his answer to his methodical doubt) and Hume's excessive skepticism (and his mitigated skepticism as a solution to his doubts) turned skepticism into a main worry in doing philosophy. For both of them, the first philosophical task is to answer those skeptical doubts, and tradition followed them. In contemporary analytical philosophy. G. E. Moore [1959], with his defense of common sense and his proof of an external world, set the same agenda: philosophy has not only to resist the skeptical attack, but to refute skepticism. Those who seek philosophy quickly learn that they should try to prove that the world exists, that there are other minds (or, rather, people), that the future will resemble the past, that the past exists and so on and so forth. These are the problems that they have to solve, they take the problems for granted, and think their task is to answer them. Since no one has
Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, 2011
The most significant feature of ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism was its reliance on disagreement. This aspect of skepticism has been widely neglected in contemporary discussion on skepticism, and indeed had hardly been mentioned until it became a hot topic quite recently. Even now, the skeptical power of disagreement is not fully appreciated. At most, it is thought to warrant suspension of belief in very restricted circumstances, 1 which is in sharp contrast to ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism, which appeals to disagreement in inducing the global suspension of belief.
Skepticism, Unconvincing Anti-skepticism, and Politics
This chapter is a contribution to the recovery of the importance of the ancient skeptical tradition for early modern and contemporary political thought. It makes a case for the position that skeptics can live their skepticism, and that they can, moreover, live a skeptical politics. If this case is right, then it is an answer to arguments to the effect that « the skeptic cannot live his skepticism 1 ». If it is right, it belongs in a growing literature suggesting that not only was skepticism once a viable epistemological, political, and ethical stance, but that it may still be one 2 .
THE ANCIENT SCEPTIC ATTITUDE AND DISAGREEMENT
KRITERION (Revista de Filosofia. Publicación de: Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da UFMG), 2023
It is argued that a philosophical “sceptic attitude”, found originally in the Socratic approach and arguably in the Pyrrhonist’s treatment of disagreement, should be taken to be an epistemically positive attitude in the sense that it fosters a serious philosophical examination of what is taken to be true, without entailing the radical scepticism often associated with it. We argue that if the two sides of a disagreement are equivalent (at that moment, given the evidence available), it doesn’t require one to consider the disagreement as undecidable without qualification and so to suspend judgment indefinitely. If this is so, we claim, the Pyrrhonian disagreement-based position will be significantly restricted as a form of scepticism and should instead be seen as promoting an epistemically propitious sceptic attitude.
2016
INTRODUCTION Since Antiquity the scope of skeptical doubt was already a controversial issue for ancient Pyrrhonians; however, textual evidence suggests that for them, skeptical doubts were directed exclusively towards disputes between philosophers, particularly in relation to the problem of determining the nature of good and bad things. But regarding everyday beliefs, Pyrrhonians assented to appearances as the rest of us (cf. Sextus Empiricus, PH. 1.7 and 1.23-4).1 Sextus makes it explicit that a doxastic conception of human agency, where knowledge was a necessary condition for action, was commonplace among philosophers.2 Descartes (HR 219-220) also affirmed that skeptical doubt was possible only in philosophical inquiry but not in everyday life, where action results more relevant than truth. In the Treatise (1.4.57) Hume warned against a clash of intuitions regarding the skeptical
The Ways of Scepticism (Then and Now)
Iris, 2009
The following essay outlines the principal arguments presented by the sceptical tradition, from its explicit beginnings in Greek philosophy down to a variety of contemporary forms of scepticism. The discussion takes its point of departure from an analysis of the original sceptical tropes that were directed against the "Dogmatists," focussing particularly on the "Modes" of Aenesidemus and Agrippa. The principal part of the essay is dedicated to an elucidation of the nature and status of "beliefs" with a view to comparing ancient, modern, and contemporary types of scepticism. Far from re-endorsing the ideal of a life without beliefs as a model for human happiness, modern and contemporary varieties of scepticism offer a description of human historical experience that is indeed based on beliefs. From this point onwards, the actual power of scepticism -represented by a lineage that includes Montaigne, Hume, Goodman, and Primo Leviderives from its attempt to combine two perspectives that appear formally incompatible with one another: (i) the desire for a permanent order of things in the context of a predictable and meaning ful shared world, and (ii) a profound admiration for the human variety that is enshrined in different acts and kinds of belief.
"Ancient Skepticism: Pyrrhonism," Philosophy Compass 6 (2011): 246–258.
Philosophy Compass, 2011
Pyrrhonism was one of the two main ancient skeptical traditions. In this second paper of the three-part series devoted to ancient skepticism, I present and discuss some of the issues on Pyrrhonian skepticism which have been the focus of much attention in the recent literature. The topics to be addressed concern the outlooks of Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, and Sextus Empiricus.