How to study consciousness as a natural phenomenon - An interview with Tim Bayne (original) (raw)

The Science of Consciousness: Where It is and Where It Should be

2007

This excellent book is aptly titled. It presents a closely argued analysis of the current state of consciousness studies and suggests a strategy of investigation, which the author believes is necessary to establish a robust science of consciousness. Before he introduces the details of his framework for a ...

Consciousness and the natural method

Neuropsychologia, 1995

‘Consciousness’ is a superordinate term for a heterogeneous array of mental state types. The types share the property of ‘being experienced’ or ‘being experiences’—‘of there being something that it is like for the subject to be in one of these states.’ I propose that we can only build a theory of consciousness by deploying ‘the natural method’ of coordinating all relevant informational resources at once, especially phenomenology, cognitive science, neuroscience and evolutionary biology. I'll provide two examples of the natural method in action in mental domains where an adaptationist evolutionary account seems plausible: (i) visual awareness and (ii) conscious event memory. Then I will discuss a case, (iii), dreaming, where I think no adaptationist evolutionary account exists. Beyond whatever interest the particular cases have, the examination will show why I think that a theory of mind, and the role conscious mentation plays in it, will need to be built domain-by-domain with no a priori expectation that there will be a unified account of the causal role or evolutionary history of different domains and competences.

The Nature of Consciousness. A book chapter.

Combs, A. (2015). The nature of consciousness. In Jennie A. Davis, and Daniel Pitchford (Eds.). Stanley Krippner: A Life of Dreams, Myths, and Visions; Essays on his Contributions and Influence (pp. 21-40). Colorado Springs, CO: University Professors Press.

A Natural Science Approach to Consciousness

Journal of Integrative Neuroscience, 2010

We begin with premises about natural science, its fundamental protocols and its limitations. With those in mind, we construct alternative descriptive models of consciousness, each comprising a synthesis of recent literature in cognitive science. Presuming that consciousness arose through natural selection, we eliminate the subset of alternatives that lack selectable physical phenotypes, leaving the subset with limited free will (mostly in the form of free won't). We argue that membership in this subset implies a two-way exchange of energy between the conscious mental realm and the physical realm of the brain. We propose an analogy between the mental and physical phases of energy and the phases (e.g., gas/liquid) of matter, and a possible realization in the form of a generic resonator. As candidate undergirdings of such a system, we propose astroglial-pyramidal cell and electromagnetic-field models. Finally, we consider the problem of identification of the presence of consciousness in other beings or in machines.

Toward a model of consciousness: philosophical problems and questions guiding a way forward

Journal of Nonlocality, 2014

In spite of millennia of introspection, research and debate, there is still no compelling evidence for any single model of consciousness . Nor is there agreement on how to define consciousness, what constitutes a rigorous model of consciousness, and what research methods are most appropriate or productive when investigating consciousness. Current science relies on biological models of brain function as metaphors for describing what consciousness does and cannot confirm postulated causal relationships between discrete functional brain states and specific characteristics or subjective "states" of consciousness. The absence of a strong conceptual framework for thinking about consciousness, together with intrinsic limitations of contemporary research methods and technologies, have resulted in numerous un-testable hypotheses concerning the general nature of consciousness and a paralyzing lack of consensus on research priorities and methods , despite the fact that "mind" and "brain" have supplanted genetics as the next great scientific challenge for the international community -see the Human Brain Project in the EU and the BRAIN Initiative in the US (http://www.nih.gov/science/brain).

A NATURAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

Communication and Cognition, 2001

ABSTRACT (first two sentences added for 2013 upload) This paper focuses on the ontology and intentionality of conscious states (what conscious states are and what they represent). It also gives a critique of reductive physicalism. Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the ‘mantle of science,’ it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to naturalise consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. This paper introduces such a model and how it construes the nature of conscious experience. Within this model the physical world as perceived (the phenomenal world) is viewed as part of conscious experience not apart from it. While in everyday life we treat this phenomenal world as if it is the “physical world”, it is really just one biologically useful representation of what the world is like that may differ in many respects from the world described by physics. How the world as perceived relates to the world as described by physics can be investigated by normal science (e.g. through the study of sensory physiology, psychophysics and so on). This model of consciousness appears to be consistent with both third-person evidence of how the brain works and with first-person evidence of what it is like to have a given experience. According to the reflexive model, conscious experiences are really how they seem.

The Phenomenon of Consciousness from an Inter and Multidisciplinary Perspective

Journal of Social Sciences, 2021

Contemporary science, in recent decades, reflects intensely on the phenomenon of consciousness. This fact is due to the accelerated development of cognitive sciences, biological and physical sciences, neuroscience, which have achieved certain successes in researching the problem of mind-body, consciousness. However, what is strictly required is the issue of the possibility of a scientific theory of consciousness, which would apply a new research methodology. The most recent approaches in this direction substantiate the need for research from a phenomenological structural perspective, which explains consciousness as a phenomenon determined by the subquantum level. Structural-phenomenological theory holds that this level is a profound reality regulated by specific principles and laws that make consciousness possible.

A biological account of consciousness

Recent studies of cognition had put forward a number of hypotheses about the nature of consciousness, regarded now as being the central phenomenon in the relationship between the mind and the world. Theories put forward by Edelman, Baars, Rosenfield, Dennett, Varela and others emerged simultaneously with a common idea: in order for us to acquire a better understanding of cognition, a biological and psychological approach to consciousness is not only possible but necessary. In this dissertation I will examine two of these hypotheses and argue that the relationship between them can provide a mechanistic and biological account of how our brains generate mental content. In the first part of my dissertation I will discuss a naturalistic approach to consciousness, arguing that at the present moment, considering this phenomenon an empirical construct is our best alternative. In the second part of the present work I will analyse the way in which some key aspects of the two theories are supported by experimental evidence and what are the problems encountered. In the last part I will argue in favour of the idea that the relationship between the two theories can offer us a better understanding of consciousness and dispose of several problems articulated by philosophers of mind like subjectivity and phenomenal experience, or qualia.