"There is No Will without Choice": Reinhold and Fichte on Autonomy after Kant (original) (raw)
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Reinhold and Fichte on Autonomy after Kant
In my paper I will concentrate on the so-called " Reinhold's Dilemma, " which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of evil actions in Kant. I shall explain how Reinhold and Fichte tried to escape this dilemma by developing a conception of individual volitional self-determination and by distinguishing between reason and will. Finally, I shall evaluate Reinhold's and Fichte's practical significance by relating their conception of individual freedom to more recent theories of volitional self-determination.
European Journal of Philosophy
Contrary to Reinhold's theoretical discussion of Kant's philosophy, his practical critique and its underlying action theory and theory of freedom have been neglected in scholarship. In my paper, I shall reconstruct Reinhold’s practical philosophy after Kant. For that purpose, I will concentrate on the so-called “Reinhold’s Dilemma,” which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of evil actions in Kant. I show how Reinhold tried to escape this dilemma by introducing an elaborated action theory and theory of individual freedom. I shall argue that Reinhold’s account of freedom to act according and against the moral law is not best understood in terms of freedom of indifference, but rather in terms of a freedom to balance reasons on the basis of first and second-order volitions. I shall also discuss Kant’s attempt to escape Reinhold’s Dilemma in his late Metaphysics of Morals. Finally, I will evaluate Reinhold’s systematic siginificance by relating his theory of individual freedom with recent conceptions of volitional self-determination.
“Practical reason is not the will”: Kant and Reinhold's dilemma
European Journal of Philosophy, 2019
Contrary to Karl Leonhard Reinhold's theoretical critique of Kant's philosophy, his practical critique has been almost unknown. In my paper, I shall reconstruct Reinhold's practical philosophy after Kant. I will concentrate on the socalled Reinhold's dilemma, which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of immoral actions in Kant. Also, I shall explain how Reinhold tried to escape this dilemma by introducing a new action theory and by sharply distinguishing between reason and will. Finally, I shall evaluate Reinhold's practical significance by relating his conception of individual freedom to recent theories of volitional self-determination. 1 | INTRODUCTION Karl Leonhard Reinhold's philosophy is especially known as a prominent link between Kant and German idealism (Henrich, 2003). In his Elementary Philosophy (Elementarphilosophie), Reinhold attempted to give a new account of the principles of consciousness that unify Kant's entire critical philosophical system. He can be regarded as one of the first of "Kant's early critics" to develop an "idealist" conception of transcendental philosophy by means of a "systematic spirit" (Henrich, 2003, p. 127-139). But Reinhold also developed a profound practical philosophy by dealing with Kant's moral philosophy, concerning most notably his theory of practical reason, will, freedom, and autonomy. Contrary to his theoretical critique, this practical critique and its underlying action theory and theory of freedom have been neglected in scholarship. 1 Recently, however, there has been growing interest in the so-called Reinhold/ Sidgwick problem or Objection R/S, 2 which concerns our freedom to act against the moral law. Reinhold's philosophical contributions to this problem have not yet been reconstructed from a systematic point of view. What is important about Reinhold's account is that he aims to develop a positive conception of our freedom to act immorally that differs in crucial regards from Kant's asymmetrical account. For Kant's theory seems to imply that we are only free to act in a morally good way, to which Henry Allison has referred as Kant's "reciprocity thesis" (Allison, 1986). In my paper, I will shed light on Reinhold's practical philosophy after Kant and its historical and systematic significance. First, I outline Kant's conception of autonomy and the relation between the faculties of pure practical reason
The Fact of Freedom: Reinholds Theory of Free Will Reconsidered
The Concept of Will in Classical German Philosophy, 2020
K.L. Reinhold advocates a theory of free will as the capacity to choose for or against the moral law. Reinhold's theory has often been accused of being psychologistic due to its alleged appeal to empirical facts of consciousness. This paper argues that instead of merely positing free will as a fact of consciousness, Reinhold provides an argument for free will as a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This sheds new light on the development of the concept of will in the wake of Kant's practical philosophy. In his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy Volume II, K.L. Reinhold presents a theory of free will in the spirit of Kant's own theory, though with an emphasis on choice, viz. our capacity to choose for or against the moral law. Scholarship on Reinhold has been growing and free will has been a popular topic among recent scholars. Reinhold's theory is often criticized for being psychologistic.1 Faustino Fabbianelli claims that Reinhold had difficulty "extricating himself from a psychological conception of freedom, because his discussion remains grounded in mere 1 Exceptions to the psychologistic interpretation of Reinhold's theory of free will are Martin Bondeli and Jörg Noller. Bondeli denies that Reinhold's theory "transforms moral freedom into a kind of psychological dependence" (Bondeli 2001, p. 248) and recognizes that Reinhold argues for freedom as a necessary condition for our awareness of the moral law as binding upon us (Bondeli 2018, pp. 529-530). Noller acknowledges that Reinhold's theory concerns the "entire use of freedom" and that Reinhold's attempt to realize Kant's theory through first-order "volitional tendencies" structured in drives does not necessarily imply that Reinhold's theory merely concerns "moral psychology" (Noller 2015, p. 226).
Freedom Immediately after Kant
European Journal of Philosophy, 2019
Kant's effort to defend the coexistence of transcendental freedom and natural necessity is one of the crowning achievements of the first Critique. Yet by identifying the will with practical reason in his moral philosophy, he lent support to the view that the moral law is the causal law of a free will-the result of which, as Reinhold argued, left immoral action impossible. However, Reinhold's attempt to separate the will from practical reason generated difficulties of its own, which Maimon was quick to point out. By identifying freedom with indifferent choice, Maimon argued, Reinhold had no resources to explain why a free will acts at all. My aim in this article is to show how Fichte's theory of freedom seeks to reconcile these two commitments: The key lies in what I call Fichte's Genetic Model, according to which indifferent choice is the original condition of the will, but a condition we must actively overcome.
The Scope of Autonomy: Kant and the Morality of Freedom
Autonomy is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy with deep roots in the history of the subject. However, there is still no agreed view about the correct way to formulate an account of autonomy that adequately captures both our capacity for self-determination and our responsiveness to reasons. In this book I develop a theory of autonomy that is Kantian in orientation but which engages closely with recent arguments about agency, morality, and practical reasoning.
Beyond indifferentism and intelligible fatalism: Reinhold and Fichte on moral imputability
In this paper, I will present important contributions to Reinhold's Dilemma by lesser-known post-Kantian philosophers such as Johann August Heinrich Ulrich, Johann Heinrich Abicht, and Carl Christian Erhard Schmid, which influenced Reinhold and Fichte. I shall explain how Reinhold and Fichte tried to escape Reinhold’s Dilemma by developing a conception of individual volitional self-determination and by distinguishing between reason and will. Finally, I shall evaluate Reinhold’s and Fichte’s significance in practical philosophy by relating their conception of individual freedom to more recent theories of volitional self-determination.
From Autonomy to Heautonomy: Reinhold and Schiller on Practical Self-Determination
Idealistic Studies, 2020
In this paper, I will shed light on Karl Leonhard Reinhold's and Friedrich Schiller's conceptions of practical self-determination after Kant. First, I outline Kant's conception of freedom as autonomy. I then explain the so-called "Reinhold's dilemma," which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of evil actions, which arises from Kant's theory of autonomy. I then show how Reinhold and Schiller tried to escape this dilemma by developing an elaborated theory of individual freedom. I will argue that Reinhold's and Schiller's symmetrical account of freedom to act according and against the moral law is not to be confused with freedom of indifference but can be reconstructed in terms of practical self-determination on the basis of first-order desires and second-order volitions.