The Fact of Freedom: Reinholds Theory of Free Will Reconsidered (original) (raw)
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European Journal of Philosophy
Contrary to Reinhold's theoretical discussion of Kant's philosophy, his practical critique and its underlying action theory and theory of freedom have been neglected in scholarship. In my paper, I shall reconstruct Reinhold’s practical philosophy after Kant. For that purpose, I will concentrate on the so-called “Reinhold’s Dilemma,” which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of evil actions in Kant. I show how Reinhold tried to escape this dilemma by introducing an elaborated action theory and theory of individual freedom. I shall argue that Reinhold’s account of freedom to act according and against the moral law is not best understood in terms of freedom of indifference, but rather in terms of a freedom to balance reasons on the basis of first and second-order volitions. I shall also discuss Kant’s attempt to escape Reinhold’s Dilemma in his late Metaphysics of Morals. Finally, I will evaluate Reinhold’s systematic siginificance by relating his theory of individual freedom with recent conceptions of volitional self-determination.
“Practical reason is not the will”: Kant and Reinhold's dilemma
European Journal of Philosophy, 2019
Contrary to Karl Leonhard Reinhold's theoretical critique of Kant's philosophy, his practical critique has been almost unknown. In my paper, I shall reconstruct Reinhold's practical philosophy after Kant. I will concentrate on the socalled Reinhold's dilemma, which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of immoral actions in Kant. Also, I shall explain how Reinhold tried to escape this dilemma by introducing a new action theory and by sharply distinguishing between reason and will. Finally, I shall evaluate Reinhold's practical significance by relating his conception of individual freedom to recent theories of volitional self-determination. 1 | INTRODUCTION Karl Leonhard Reinhold's philosophy is especially known as a prominent link between Kant and German idealism (Henrich, 2003). In his Elementary Philosophy (Elementarphilosophie), Reinhold attempted to give a new account of the principles of consciousness that unify Kant's entire critical philosophical system. He can be regarded as one of the first of "Kant's early critics" to develop an "idealist" conception of transcendental philosophy by means of a "systematic spirit" (Henrich, 2003, p. 127-139). But Reinhold also developed a profound practical philosophy by dealing with Kant's moral philosophy, concerning most notably his theory of practical reason, will, freedom, and autonomy. Contrary to his theoretical critique, this practical critique and its underlying action theory and theory of freedom have been neglected in scholarship. 1 Recently, however, there has been growing interest in the so-called Reinhold/ Sidgwick problem or Objection R/S, 2 which concerns our freedom to act against the moral law. Reinhold's philosophical contributions to this problem have not yet been reconstructed from a systematic point of view. What is important about Reinhold's account is that he aims to develop a positive conception of our freedom to act immorally that differs in crucial regards from Kant's asymmetrical account. For Kant's theory seems to imply that we are only free to act in a morally good way, to which Henry Allison has referred as Kant's "reciprocity thesis" (Allison, 1986). In my paper, I will shed light on Reinhold's practical philosophy after Kant and its historical and systematic significance. First, I outline Kant's conception of autonomy and the relation between the faculties of pure practical reason
"There is No Will without Choice": Reinhold and Fichte on Autonomy after Kant
In my paper I will concentrate on the so-called "Reinhold's Dilemma," which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of evil actions in Kant. I shall explain how Reinhold and Fichte tried to escape this dilemma by developing a conception of individual volitional self-determination and by distinguishing between reason and will. Finally, I shall evaluate Reinhold's and Fichte's significance in practical philosophy by relating their conception of individual freedom to more recent theories of volitional self-determination.
Reinhold and Fichte on Autonomy after Kant
In my paper I will concentrate on the so-called " Reinhold's Dilemma, " which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of evil actions in Kant. I shall explain how Reinhold and Fichte tried to escape this dilemma by developing a conception of individual volitional self-determination and by distinguishing between reason and will. Finally, I shall evaluate Reinhold's and Fichte's practical significance by relating their conception of individual freedom to more recent theories of volitional self-determination.
Freedom Immediately after Kant
European Journal of Philosophy, 2019
Kant's effort to defend the coexistence of transcendental freedom and natural necessity is one of the crowning achievements of the first Critique. Yet by identifying the will with practical reason in his moral philosophy, he lent support to the view that the moral law is the causal law of a free will-the result of which, as Reinhold argued, left immoral action impossible. However, Reinhold's attempt to separate the will from practical reason generated difficulties of its own, which Maimon was quick to point out. By identifying freedom with indifferent choice, Maimon argued, Reinhold had no resources to explain why a free will acts at all. My aim in this article is to show how Fichte's theory of freedom seeks to reconcile these two commitments: The key lies in what I call Fichte's Genetic Model, according to which indifferent choice is the original condition of the will, but a condition we must actively overcome.
2006
Contemporary debates in moral philosophy have primarily been focused on meta-ethical questions about the justifi cation of morality, disregarding the ease with which perfectly justifi ed norms are displaced by non-moral considerations. 1 Given the scope, magnitude, and inventiveness of human wrongdoing, this philosophical trend seems utterly misguided. The challenge does not lie so much in how to justify morality, but in understanding how perfectly justifi ed judgments are so easily disregarded by self-serving calculations. 2 Kant's doctrine of radical evil has much to tell us about this. Against the widespread tendency to explain evil in terms of the pernicious power of natural inclinations, Kant believed that evil represented "an invisible enemy, one who hides behind reason and hence [is] all the more dangerous" (R 6: 57). The enemy is invisible, for "no matter how far back we direct our attention to our moral state, we fi nd that this state is no longer res integra " (R 6: 58n.). And it is exceptionally dangerous, for the corruption in question is self-imposed: "genuine evil consists in our will not to resist the inclinations when they invite transgression" (ibid.). Since this type of volition rests on a maxim, and maxim formation in Kant always takes place under the constraints of