Two Conceptions of Second Nature (original) (raw)

2020, Open Philosophy

The concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future.

Nature, spirit and second nature: Hegel and McDowell

Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos, 2018

Both Hegel and McDowell make use of the expression ‘second nature’. Furthermore, each philosopher is concerned to connect talk of ‘second nature’ with a larger issue: that of the relation between nature and spirit. According to McDowell, being ‘reminded’ of the perfectly familiar phenomenon of second nature is to do the work of ‘deconstricting’ the conception of nature that bald naturalists operate with. Hegel, by contrast, works in the opposite direction. For Hegel, the phenomenon of second nature is to be understood in light of a prior characterization of the relation between nature and spirit, according to which spirit is the ‘truth of’ nature. This essay attempts to get into focus the difficulties (beginning from the surface grammar of the expressions ‘nature’, ‘second nature’, and ‘first nature’) that must be sorted out before we can properly understand how each philosopher connects the topic of second nature with the wider issue of how nature and spirit are related, and to provide a sketch of the philosophical issues that must be faced once we have the difficulties clearly in view. The philosophical difficulties faced by Hegel differ from those faced by McDowell, as reflects their difference in approach. Those faced by Hegel concern how precisely to spell out the conception of nature – such that ‘spirit is the truth of nature’ – in which his conception of second nature is embedded; those faced by McDowell concern how his ‘reminder’ about second nature is to be understood in the absence of something analogous to Hegel’s attempts to spell out a conception of nature.

Second Nature, Critical Theory and Hegel's Phenomenology

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

While Hegel’s concept of second nature has now received substantial attention from commentators, relatively little has been said about the place of this concept in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This neglect is understandable, since Hegel does not explicitly use the phrase “second nature” in this text. Nonetheless, several closely related phrases reveal the centrality of this concept to the Phenomenology’s structure. In this paper, I develop new interpretations of the figures “natural consciousness,” “natural notion,” and “inorganic nature,” in order to elucidate the distinctive concept of second nature at work in the Phenomenology. I will argue that this concept of second nature supplements the “official” version, developed in the Encyclopedia, with an “unofficial” version that prefigures its use in critical theory. At the same time, this reconstruction will allow us to see how the Phenomenology essentially documents spirit’s acquisition of a “second nature.”

Subjective Mind & Nature

2018

In this analysis, I will describe the structure of Subjective Spirit in order to gain insight in the dialectical system of immersion and opposition that is considered as essential to understanding Hegel’s point of departure to understand the realm of Geist. Throughout this paper, the concepts of body and soul – and corporeity and Spirit for that matter – are conceptualised as two concepts for the sake of language differentiation. This does not imply however that they exclude each other per definition, as they imply one another in Hegel’s systematics. This position is a result of the development of the immediate relation and unity between Spirit and Nature. It is imperative to keep this in mind, as it constitutes the core to Hegel’s project in the Encyclopaedia, and in the section of Philosophy of Mind. The position Hegel develops is that the immediate unity of Spirit and Nature is made explicit, in order to reach a position wherein they are implicitly united. Specifically, this essay will be subdivided in the three dialectical parts that Hegel poses in his Philosophy of Mind to do justice to each section, and in order to see how each stage may allow for Nature to subdue in Spirit. It will provide an in-depth closed-reading of Anthropology and Phenomenology of Mind, and a short insight on Psychology. This is because the former two present a more accurate foundation on the relationship and contradictions present in Hegel’s system with regards to how Nature is involved in the realm of Mind. The latter is a dialectical union of the former two, and will thus be analysed more holistically. Finally, in the conclusion the main points will be gathered in order to portray the embeddedness of natural conditions in Hegel’s formulation of Subjective Spirit.

Second Nature and Recognition. Hegel and the Social Space

Critical Horizons, 2010

In this article I intend to show the strict relation between the notions of “second nature” and “recognition”. To do so I begin with a problem (circularity) proper to the theory of Hegelian and post- Hegelian Anerkennung. The solution strategy I propose is signifi cant also in terms of bringing into focus the problems connected with a notion of “space of reasons” that stems from the Hegelian concept of “Spirit”. I thus broach the notion of “second nature” as a bridgeconcept that can play a key role both for a renewal of the theory of Anerkennung and for a rethinking of the “space of reasons” within the debate between Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Against this background I illustrate the novelties introduced by the dialectical conception of the relation between fi rst and second nature developed by Hegel and the contribution this idea can make to a revisited theory of recognition as a phenomenon articulated on two levels. I then return to the question of the space of reasons to show the contribution the renewed conception of recognition as second nature makes to the definition of its intrinsic sociality as something that is not in principle opposed to a sense of naturalness.

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