Allied Fighting Efffectiveness in North Africa and Italy (original) (raw)
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Raffaello Cei and Giovanni Palermo both served in the Italian military forces during the Second World War. Following battles against Allied forces in Libya, both men became prisoners of war in the Union of South Africa. While thousands more Italian captives had similar experiences to those of Cei and Palermo, this article looks at the memoirs of these two men with the aim of enriching our understanding of the Italian forces' range of lived war experience, specifically that of battle and capture in 1941 and 1942.
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The formation of 6 South African Armoured Division (6 SA Armd Div), during February 1943, afforded the Union Defence Force (UDF) the chance to expand its military capabilities to that of armoured warfare. An armoured division further offered South Africa the opportunity to equip the UDF with modern fighting equipment and to master the art of combined warfare. Actual deployment in Italy differed vastly from the training which the division received in North Africa, for Italy was arguably, largely “untankable”. The Division’s first battle occurred at Celleno, on 10 June 1944, where it was able to “prove” itself by securing its first victory. As far as secondary sources are concerned, the Battle of Celleno is only superficially covered. Primary sources are however abundant, thus adding to the rich history which is available on the Division. This article analyses the Battle of Celleno, fought by 11 SA Armoured Brigade, in the context of the notion of “first battles”. Emphasis will be placed on the training received prior to deployment, the Battle of Celleno, the lessons that were learned by the division at Celleno, and the way these influenced future operations in Italy. The Division’s combined-arms approach is also evaluated, with specific emphasis on changing patterns of leadership, command, and employment of the Division after Celleno. Keywords: Union Defence Force; Italy; 6th South African Armoured Division; 11th South African Armoured Brigade; First battles; Celleno
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The 1941 orders-of-battle and strengths of the Allied forces in The East African Campaign (June 1940-November 1941). Based, mostly, on the official British, South African, Indian and French histories of that campaign, but, also, on the indispensable, unofficial, history of the King's African Rifles, Chris Kempton's study of the Indian Army and the Supplements to the London Gazette referring to the operations on that forgotten theatre of war. Additionally, important information is given into the East Africa Force/East African Command orders-of-battle (Sudan and Kenya mostly), not necessarilly directly involved in the campaign.
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