Produced by the Institut Tunisien Des Etudes Stratégiques (ITES) Assessing the Threat Posed by Tunisian Foreign Fighters ASSESSING THE THREAT POSED BY TUNISIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS (original) (raw)
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"Transformation in Tunisia: The First Five Years", edited by Wolfgang Mühlberger , 2017
The political transition process that started in Tunisia in 2011 continues to move forward, albeit against many obstacles. Among the major challenges to the stability of the country and to the consolidation of democratic institutions and practices, terrorism is definitely the most worrisome. The Jihadist threat jeopardises Tunisian security and the country has to adopt new strategies to combat it. Among the objectives of the new counter-terrorist strategies there is certainly that of adapting to new forms of Jihadism. To do this, it is essential to understand the factors and processes that led to the radicalisation of hundreds of young people. This has to be done from both the tactical/operational and ideological points of view. In the first instance, in order to better frame the evolving strategies and objectives of Tunisian Jihadist movements it is necessary to implement an effective response from the point of view of repression. However, it is even more important to intervene on the level of prevention. To do this, the contexts in which new forms of violent extremism arise must be understood and the causes identified, so that action can be taken before the processes of radicalisation occur. Finally, there is a need to focus on de-radicalisation programmes too, to recover and reintegrate into society individuals who have previously chosen the path of extremism. In implementing a comprehensive anti-terrorist strategy, an increased coordination effort between all the stakeholders is required. On the operational level, the army, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior should coordinate with other economic and social ministries. At the political level, there is a need to clarify the responsibilities of the two major institutional actors, the Presidency of the Republic and the Prime Minister. The constitutional framework does not clearly establish the prerogatives of these two figures, thus creating a deadlock. Moreover, under this kind of institutional balance, the important issue of counter-terrorism is likely to be blocked due to any institutional clashes. Thus, the political contingency influences the effectiveness of the government action. Tunisia has to face all these challenges in order to deal with a constantly changing threat, which has deep roots in the socioeconomic context of the country. The chapter first analyses the evolution of the Jihadist threat in Tunisia, retracing the three phases that characterised the origins and development of home-grown terrorism. In the second part, it aims to give some policy indications on possible measures to be taken to fight terrorism.
Radicalisation processes in Tunisia after the Arab Spring and the Foreign Terrorist Fighters issue
Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021
This article analyses the high number of individuals who left Tunisia after the Arab Spring to join a jihadi organisation in Syria or in Iraq and it attempts to provide some explanations for this phenomenon. The analysis begins with an overview of countries in North Africa and, afterwards, it focuses on the Tunisian case. Relative deprivation theory is used to explain the radicalisation of a part of the Tunisian population. But no single explanation can depict the real situation of the Tunisian foreign terrorist fighters. For this reason, we investigated multiple motivations that anyone who left Tunisia to join the jihad was driven by. The increasing presence of a certain number of Salafi organisations, and its different strategy inside or outside the country, has also been analysed and considered as one of the possible causes of the worsening of the situation. Lately, one of the biggest threats in Tunisia is the return of foreign terrorist fighters.
Radicalization in the Marginalized Regions of Tunisia: Addressing the Root Causes
German Council on Foreign Relations, 2018
Since the 2011 revolution, jihadist radicalism has dramatically increased in Tunisia, leading the country to become one of the main centers for alQaeda and ISIS affiliates, as well as one of the largest exporters of foreign fighters in the Middle East: over 3,000 Tunisians are estimated to have travelled to Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Youth radicalization rates are among the highest in the region and the country has been the target of several terrorist attacks by young Tunisians, including attacks at the Bardo National Museum and the resort town of Sousse in 2015. Although the Tunisian government has recognized the problem of radicalization in general and youth radicalization in particular, it has often been criticized for focusing on a securitized response and the provision of counterterrorism measures. This is especially the case in the inner and southern regions of the country. However, without a comprehensive, long-term strategy aimed at addressing the structural and individual drivers of radicalization and preventing young Tunisians from succumbing to jihadist ideology, the government is likely to continue to fail in its attempts to curb the growth of radicalization.
Tunisia’s Counterterror Efforts Hampered by Weak Institutions
Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 14, Issue 4, 2017
About 800 suspected jihadists have returned to Tunisia from abroad, putting pressure on the Tunisian authorities and potentially undermining Tunisia’s political transition. The country is struggling to establish a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy and, beyond the immediate security concerns, institutional constraints are stymieing efforts to tackle domestic terror threats. Perhaps as a consequence, Tunisia has produced the highest number of foreign fighters — both in absolute terms and per capita — in the world. According to official data from the Tunisian interior ministry and the United Nations, since 2013, about 6,000 individuals left Tunisia to join jihadist groups, the majority joining Islamic State (IS) in Syria, Iraq and Libya. A further 12,000 have been prevented from travelling abroad. Recent public debate in Tunisia, however, has been focused on the issue of returning jihadists, with public opinion divided on suggestions of an amnesty for returnees.
Tunisian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018
Over the past few years, the influx of Tunisian fighters to Iraq and Syria has rendered Tunisia practically synonymous with a phenomenon that is still not well understood. This new Policy Note by jihadism expert Aaron Y. Zelin seeks to remedy this gap by quantifying the flow of Tunisian fighters, in particular the recruitment push within Tunisia from 2011 to 2013, and exploring the history of their networks in Iraq over the last decade. This study examines the motives driving Tunisia's foreign fighters, the roles they have assumed with jihadi groups in Iraq and Syria, the reasons why many have returned to Tunisia from the battlefield, and the dilemma this poses to the Tunisian state in terms of security and human rights. A deeper understanding of Tunisia's foreign fighter phenomenon will help situate the trajectory of the jihadist movement both inside and outside the country, while suggesting ways to tackle this challenging issue.
2016
The large flow of Tunisian Salafi-Jihadists to ISIS following the Jasmine revolution presented a challenge to moderation theory. How could the rise of radical groups in the country, despite clear options for political inclusion, be understood? Through an extensive comparison with the post-revolutionary developments in Egypt does this paper conclude the following: 1) Inclusion only helps to moderate socio-political agendas if the political system is viewed as a viable alternative to solve salient issues, such as socio-economic deprivation. This has not been the case in Tunisia or Egypt. 2) While the option of inclusion seems not to have hindered the attractiveness of radical Islamic thought, this research suggests that it does importantly influence the behaviour of radical movements. While the Egyptian government crackdown on Islamists has resulted in a violent insurgency, the freedom of expression and religion in Tunisia has led most salafists there to pursue peaceful means to strive for their ideological ends. As such, this essay posits that the outflow of Tunisian Jihadi has to be understood as a consequence of the circumscription of violence as a viable vehicle for political change. Salafists attracted to the idea of violent Jihad tend therefore to leave the country, presenting an explanation for the relatively large amount of Jihadi hailing from Tunisia.
Hate Speech International, 2017
Following the “Jasmine Revolution” in 2011, Tunisia held free and fair elections, rati ed a new constitution and established new democratic institutions. As other post Arab Spring societies struggled to overcome varying legacies of divisive con ict, weakened economies and ine ectual state institutions, Tunisia was hailed as a thriving democratic model for the Arab world. Tunisia has initiated a transitional justice process which has been supported and implemented by successive governments since Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was ousted from power in 2011. The transitional justice process aims to support Tunisia’s transition towards democracy by providing mechanisms to redress grievances and human rights abuses carried out under the Ben Ali and Habib Bourguiba regimes. The Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC) was established in 2014 and since late 2016, several public hearing sessions have been held where victims have given testimonials describing the atrocities committed against them by the various security apparatuses of the former regimes. Other public hearings have focused on nancial corruption under the Ben Ali regime. Yet despite Tunisia’s democratic successes, the country has become the largest single source of foreign jihadists ghting for the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria, Iraq and Libya, while several high pro le terrorist attacks have rocked Tunisia in recent years.
The Ben Guerdane Attack and Tunisia’s Tackling of Terrorism
2016
As Tunisian jihadists with Islamic State (IS) in Libya come under increasing military pressure from local and international forces, they appear to be returning home with the intention of capturing territory. That manifested itself this month in the attack on the border town of Ben Guerdane, the first IS insurgency-style attack to hit Tunisia. The Ben Guerdane attack is a worrying development for the Tunisian authorities who, while experiencing some success utilizing the security forces against domestic terrorists, still lack a comprehensive strategy to tackle radicalization.