Dialecticality and Deep Disagreement (original) (raw)
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The Methodologically Flawed Discussion about Deep Disagreement
Episteme , 2024
Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of the central debates is metaphysical, focusing on the features that make a disagreement deep. Proposals for what makes disagreements deep include theories about hinge propositions and first epistemic principles. In this paper, I criticize this metaphysical discussion by arguing that it is methodologically flawed. Deep disagreement is a technical or semi-technical term, but the metaphysical discussion mistakenly treats it as a common-sense concept to be analyzed and captured by our pre-theoretical intuitions. Since the literature on deep disagreement is subject to this fundamental confusion and deep disagreement is not a helpful umbrella term either, I propose eliminating the notion of deep disagreement from the philosophical discourse. Instead of analyzing the nature of deep disagreement, we should develop theories about different forms of disagreement, including disagreement about hinge propositions and disagreement about epistemic principles, and, in particular, a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement.
The Methodological Usefulness of Deep Disagreement
2014
In this paper I begin by examining Fogelin’s account of deep disagreement. My contention is that this account is so deeply flawed as to cast doubt on the possibility that such deep disagreements actually happen. Nevertheless, I contend that the notion of deep disagreement itself is a useful theoretical foil for thinking about argumentation. The second part of this paper makes this case by showing how thinking about deep disagreements from the perspective of rhetoric, Walton- style argumentation theory, computation, and normative pragmatics can all yield insights that are useful no matter what one’s orientation within the study of argu- ment. Thus, I conclude that deep disagreement–even if it were to turn out that there are no real-world occurrences of it to which we can point–is theoretically useful for theorists of argumentation. In this wise, deep disagreement poses a theoretical (and not, as is widely thought, a practical) challenge for argumentation theory not unlike that posed by radical skepticism for traditional epistemology.
Informal Logic, 2005
Argument-giving reasons for a view-is our model of rational dispute resolution. Fogelin (1985) suggests that certain "deep" disagreements cannot be resolved in this way because features of their context "undercut the conditions essential to arguing" (p. 5). In this paper we add some detail to Fogelin's treatment of intractable disagreements. In doing so we distinguish between his relatively modest claim that some disputes cannot be resolved through argument and his more radical claim that such disputes are beyond rational resolution. This distinction, along with some ofthe detail we add to Fogelin's treatment, sheds some useful light on the project of informal logic.
The Role of Dialectics in Defeasible Argumentation 1
Proceedings of The IEEE
In A Mathematical Treatment of Defeasible Reasoning [8], or MTDR, a clear and theoretically sound structure for a reasoning system was introduced. Since its publication other proposals have been advanced , 1], some of them containing valuable observations on this foundation. This paper presents further developments based on the MTDR framework. Two main results are shown. Firstly, several alternative implementations of MTDR were based on dialectical concepts, which needed proper formalization. Secondly, the confrontation of the resulting formalism with the above-mentioned work of other researchers has shown that some of the original de¯nitions needed to be honed to avoid fallacious reasoning.
THE LOGICAL FOUNDATION OF DIALECTIC—A SHORT OUTLINE
In the present note I try to outline the central features of my logical foundation of dialectic in the hope of making the whole idea of blending the foundations of metaphysics and dialectics with those of logic and mathematics more accessible. In bringing these subjects together not only the project of a logical foundation of arithmetic is revived but, at the same time, the ``unspeakable'' (ill-behaved) objects of the classical approach to higher order logic can be employed for a foundation of dialectic and ultimately metaphysics.
On the rational resolution of (deep) disagreements
Synthese, 2022
Disagreements come in all shapes and sizes, but epistemologists and argumentation theorists have singled out a special category referred to as deep disagreements. These deep disagreements are thought to pose philosophical and practical difficulties pertaining to their rational resolution. In this paper, I start with a critique of the widespread claim that deep disagreements are qualitatively different from normal disagreements because they arise from a difference in 'fundamental principles' or 'hinge commitments.' I then defend the following two claims: (1) All disagreements are deep to the extent that they are actual disagreements. This first claim implies, I will argue, that disagreements typically regarded as normal ('shallow') can be explained away as misunderstandings or communicative mishaps. (2) The resolution of a disagreement can be rational either through a joint experience of mutually recognized facts or through an exchange of arguments that leads to a reformulation of the disagreement that, in this new form, lends itself to a resolution through a joint experience of mutually recognized facts. I conclude with a reflection on the consequences of these two theses for the idea of deep disagreement and that of rational resolution.
The role of dialectics in defeasible argumentation
Proceedings of The IEEE, 1994
In A Mathematical Treatment of Defeasible Reasoning [8], or MTDR, a clear and theoretically sound structure for a reasoning system was introduced. Since its publication other proposals have been advanced , 1], some of them containing valuable observations on this foundation. This paper presents further developments based on the MTDR framework. Two main results are shown. Firstly, several alternative implementations of MTDR were based on dialectical concepts, which needed proper formalization. Secondly, the confrontation of the resulting formalism with the above-mentioned work of other researchers has shown that some of the original de¯nitions needed to be honed to avoid fallacious reasoning.
Formal Dialectics - Introduction.pdf
Why do the attempts we make to explain the world around us fall short? Arguments for or against the existence of God, the question of free will, and even Principia Mathematica are all examples of explanations that look solid from some points of view, but which have serious weaknesses from other perspectives. This book explores the built-in limits of reason itself by pointing out the fact that language can only be used to create incomplete systems. Philosophy, mathematics, and logic supply the groundwork for the introduction of a framing mechanism to help thinkers understand why thinking itself can sometimes fail. Known as the metadialectic, this new frame of reference allows us to evaluate different arguments in terms of their constituent parts. Students from any background interested in improving critical thinking can benefit from this study of the dialectical archetypes—as can the more traditional philosophically minded questioners, the ones of us who are motivated by a deeper desire to understand the world.
The Dialectical Tier is an Epistemic Animal
Argumentation and Inference: Proceedings of the 2017 ECA, 2018
has proposed a "two tiered" conception of argument, comprising of the illative core and the dialectical tier. This paper's two-part thesis is that (i) the dialectical tier is best understood as an epistemic requirement for argument, and (ii) once understood epistemically, the dialectical tier requirement can be defended against the leading objections.