The Methodologically Flawed Discussion about Deep Disagreement (original) (raw)
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Routledge Handbook to Philosophy of Disagreement
An examination is offered of the nature of deep disagreements, culminating in a tripartite theoretical account of their nature. The relationship between deep disagreements and hinge epistemology is then explored. It is argued that disagreements over one’s hinge commitments would seem to be a paradigm case of deep disagreement, though it is also pointed out that the very idea of hinge disagreement may be hard to make sense of on some versions of hinge epistemology. Nonetheless, insofar as there can be hinge disagreements, it is plausible that they count as deep disagreements. It is further claimed that deep hinge disagreements may be open to resolution—i.e., that accepting the existence of deep hinge disagreements doesn’t entail a commitment to there being epistemically incommensurable epistemic systems. It is finally argued that even if all hinge disagreements are deep disagreements, it is not obvious that all deep disagreements are hinge disagreements.
Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology
Synthese, 2018
This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general presuppositions of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreement over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that while most versions of hinge epistemology support pessimism about deep disagreement, at least one variety of hinge epistemology, the entitlement theory, does not.
Topoi (special issue on disagreement and argumentation) , 2018
What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments, and the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and I argue that while the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory does better than the Wittgensteinian theory on this score, the Fundamental Epistemic Principle theory nevertheless struggles to explain the variety of deep disagreement.
Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement
Topoi, 2021
In this paper we discuss three different kinds of disagreement that have been, or could reasonably be, characterized as deep disagreements. Principle level disagreements are disagreements over the truth of epistemic principles. Sub-principle level deep disagreements are disagreements over how to assign content to schematic norms. Finally, framework-level disagreements are holistic disagreements over meaning not truth, that is over how to understand networks of epistemic concepts and the beliefs those concepts compose. Within the context of each of these kinds of disagreement it is not possible for the parties to the dispute to rationally persuade one another through only offering epistemic reasons for their conflicting points of view. However, in spite of the inability to rationally persuade, we explore how it may nevertheless be possible to rationally navigate each of these varieties of deep disagreement.
The Wittgensteinian Theory of Deep Disagreement
The epistemic problem of deep disagreement is whether deep disagreements are subject to rational resolution. Pessimists about deep disagreement argue that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, while optimists deny this. In this paper, I consider the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions. I argue that while several varieties of this view do provide adequate support for pessimism about deep disagreement, not all of them do. [Please see my Synthese paper 'Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology' and my Topoi SI paper 'What is Deep Disagreement?' for the successors to this draft]
Informal Logic, 2005
Argument-giving reasons for a view-is our model of rational dispute resolution. Fogelin (1985) suggests that certain "deep" disagreements cannot be resolved in this way because features of their context "undercut the conditions essential to arguing" (p. 5). In this paper we add some detail to Fogelin's treatment of intractable disagreements. In doing so we distinguish between his relatively modest claim that some disputes cannot be resolved through argument and his more radical claim that such disputes are beyond rational resolution. This distinction, along with some ofthe detail we add to Fogelin's treatment, sheds some useful light on the project of informal logic.
The Methodological Usefulness of Deep Disagreement
2014
In this paper I begin by examining Fogelin’s account of deep disagreement. My contention is that this account is so deeply flawed as to cast doubt on the possibility that such deep disagreements actually happen. Nevertheless, I contend that the notion of deep disagreement itself is a useful theoretical foil for thinking about argumentation. The second part of this paper makes this case by showing how thinking about deep disagreements from the perspective of rhetoric, Walton- style argumentation theory, computation, and normative pragmatics can all yield insights that are useful no matter what one’s orientation within the study of argu- ment. Thus, I conclude that deep disagreement–even if it were to turn out that there are no real-world occurrences of it to which we can point–is theoretically useful for theorists of argumentation. In this wise, deep disagreement poses a theoretical (and not, as is widely thought, a practical) challenge for argumentation theory not unlike that posed by radical skepticism for traditional epistemology.
On the rational resolution of (deep) disagreements
Synthese, 2022
Disagreements come in all shapes and sizes, but epistemologists and argumentation theorists have singled out a special category referred to as deep disagreements. These deep disagreements are thought to pose philosophical and practical difficulties pertaining to their rational resolution. In this paper, I start with a critique of the widespread claim that deep disagreements are qualitatively different from normal disagreements because they arise from a difference in 'fundamental principles' or 'hinge commitments.' I then defend the following two claims: (1) All disagreements are deep to the extent that they are actual disagreements. This first claim implies, I will argue, that disagreements typically regarded as normal ('shallow') can be explained away as misunderstandings or communicative mishaps. (2) The resolution of a disagreement can be rational either through a joint experience of mutually recognized facts or through an exchange of arguments that leads to a reformulation of the disagreement that, in this new form, lends itself to a resolution through a joint experience of mutually recognized facts. I conclude with a reflection on the consequences of these two theses for the idea of deep disagreement and that of rational resolution.
The Significance of Disagreement in Epistemology
Disagreement shows up almost everywhere in our life. Whenever we meet colleagues, friends or strangers and we talk to each other, it usually won't be long until we disagree on a certain topic. We disagree on many things indeed. We disagree, for instance, on the content of an ordinary visual perception, on the division of a collective bill in a restaurant, on the location of a certain bookstore in downtown, but also on more complicated matters such as art, politics, religion and philosophy. Some of these disagreements can be dissolved rather quickly by correcting easily detectable errors or mistakes, but some of them seem to be rather stable. Among the most stable disagreements are disagreements in philosophy and especially in one of its central theoretical disciplines, in epistemology.