Growing Reliance on Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Case Study of US, Russia and Pakistan (original) (raw)
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Nuclear doctrines and stable strategic relationships: the case of south Asia
Behind every doctrinal decision that states have to make—especially in relation to nuclear weapons—are two basic questions: one, at the substantive level, what kind of role it envisages for (in this case) nuclear weapons in meeting the country's most important security challenges; and two, with how much clarity and specific-ity, or conversely ambiguity, should the doctrine be expressed. Well-thought-out nuclear doctrines are ideally founded on a strong conception about the role, purposes and limitations of nuclear weapons, how those weapons fit into the pursuit of a country's grand strategy, and a set of core beliefs and ideas about the operationalization of the weapons to reflect a sound balance of all these different facets. The potential for nuclear instability is greatest where a doctrine reflects either a lack of strategic thought or some kind of strategic drift in conceptualizing how nuclear weapons feature within a country's grand strategy, or where there is a clear mismatch between the security challenges faced by a state and the kind of role it assigns to nuclear weapons. The choice between ambiguity and clarity often feeds into this dynamic. Ambiguous doctrines, when they reflect either kind of strategic uncertainty noted above, can be a source of dangerous miscalculation and inadvertent escalation of tensions. This is especially true in new nuclear states that lack experience with respect to the limitations of nuclear weapons. Yet new nuclear states also tend not to state their doctrines unequivocally, relying on ambiguity to maximize the deterrent effects and political utility of their nascent nuclear forces. Ambiguity, then, may be a short-term necessity, but in the longer term can end up being counterproductive. Against the background of the dilemmas presented by the doctrinal and posture choices of nuclear states, this article offers a discussion of nuclear doctrines, and their significance for war, peace and stability in what is possibly the most active nuclear region in present times—south Asia. The cases of India and Pakistan are offered to show the challenges new nuclear states face in articulating and implementing a proper nuclear doctrine. It is argued here that the nuclear doctrines and postures of both India and Pakistan are problematic from a regional security perspective, but for somewhat different reasons. In India's case, newer challenges and a lack of strategic focus have led to increasing ambiguity in a doctrine that at its inception suggested both a certain level of clarity and
Challenges in Nuclear Posture and Deterrence from Pakistan’s Perspective
National Security Journal, 2021
India and Pakistan are engaged in a nuclear arms competition with new technologies and systems that have a direct bearing on their respective doctrines and nuclear postures. The statements by senior Indian leadership over the past few years throw into question the viability of India’s no-first-use posture and have placed further stress on the deterrence relationship between these two regional adversaries. India’s efforts to explore space for a limited war in a nuclearised environment have encouraged Pakistan to introduce remedial measures in the form of short-range ballistic missiles. These are part of its full spectrum deterrence, which aims to deter an entire spectrum of conventional and nuclear threats. India’s work to operationalise its second-strike capability, acquisition of ballistic missile defences and development of hypersonic weapons could undermine regional strategic stability. These efforts require countermeasures on the part of Pakistan to ensure deterrence stability b...
2008
Another major conclusion of this study is that although nuclear weapons could have destabilizing consequences in certain situations, on net they have reinforced national security and regional stability in Asia. It is possible to argue that fledgling and small nuclear arsenals would be more vulnerable to preventive attacks; that the related strategic compulsion for early use may lead to early launch postures and crisis situations; that limited war under nuclear conditions to alter or restore the political status quo can intensify tensions and carry the risk of escalation to major war; that inadequate command, control, and safety measures could result in accidents; and that nuclear facilities and material may be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These are legitimate concerns, but thus far nuclear weapons have not undermined national security and regional stability in Asia. Instead, they have ameliorated national security concerns, strengthened the status quo, increased deterrence domin...
An Analysis of Indo-Pakistan Nuclear Doctrines
2016
This study explores the dynamics of nuclear politics in Indo-Pakistan relations. The events after the nuclearization of South Asia aroused an extensive discussion about the basic reasons of countries becoming nuclear. Deterrence idealists have put forward the Nuclear Peace Theory advocating that nuclear arms make war terribly expensive and evade conflict among atomic opponents and thus generate constancy among them. Deterrence cynics have debated that the new nuclear-powered countries would not be able to accomplish the rudimentary requisites for deterrence stability as they would be disposed to defensive and preventive war tactics, construct susceptible atomic weaponries that would disposed to illicit usage. While discussing both stability and instability of nuclear weapons, the intellectuals disregard the importance of nuclear doctrines of the nuclear states which can cause deterrence disappointment or guaranteeing its strength. The author has used primary and secondary data. The ...
Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
2022
Deterrence theory (Morghan 2003; Brodie 1946) rightly suggests two scenarios of nuclear deterrence. First, when stable strategic equilibrium is achieved, it preserves peace and maintains stability. It diminishes the security dilemma, raises the threshold of nuclear use and the possibility of peace increases. States behave rationally; asymmetry goes down, and consequently, the probability of war decreases. Second, when deterrence becomes unstable, the nuclear threshold declines, asymmetry increases, and the probability of deterrence failure and war increase. Peace then becomes precarious and chances of nuclear employment become high. The second scenario is of growing concern in South Asia.