The Stoics on Evil (original) (raw)

Aristotle's Legacy to Stoic Ethics

Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, 1968

In his life of Zen0 Diogenes Laertius (vii, 2; 25) makes the founder of Stoicism a pupil of Crates the Cynic, Stilpo the Megarian, Xenocrates and Polemo of the Academy, and Diodorus Cronus. The same teachers, except Diodorus, are mentioned by Numenius (Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta = SVF i, 11) and Strabo and Cicero also cite Polemo (ibid. 10 and 13). Chrysippus with such a varied formal education, but he did apparently go beyond the Stoa to hear Arcesilaus at the Academy (Diog. Laert. vii, 183-4). Peripatetics, Theophrastus, Strato and Lyco, as having any direct influence on the early Stoics. Plutarch (Comm. not. 1069e) asserts that Zen0 agreed with Aristotle and Theophrastus, a s well a s Polemo and Xenocrates, in taking q6uis and ~b K~T & p6uiv as the 'elements of happiness'. This enigmatic remark, which I will attempt to explain later, is the nearest Plutarch comes to suggesting a Peripatetic influenceand a shared one at thaton the Stoics, though Aristotle is mentioned several times in his antistoic treatises. (De fin. iii, 41) for the view that only terminology distinguished Stoic ethics from that taught in the Lyceum, and Piso, the spokesman for Antiochus (ibid. v, 74), claims essential agreement between the 'Old Academy' and the Stoics, after expounding a system allegedly based on Aristotle and Theophrastus (ibid. 9-13). But the polemic of the sceptic and the oversimplification of the eclectic have been sufficient grounds for discrediting these statements, though it remains to ask why they could have been made at all. Tradition does not credit No ancient authority mentions the Cicero, on the other hand, cites Carneades What then do we say about the antecedents of Stoicism? For Zeller, Socrates and the Cynics had the primary claim to influence Stoic ethical theory. Aristotle inspired much in logic and physics, but his influence on ethics is "restricted to the formal treatment of the material.. . and the psychological analysis of individual moral faculties" .2 and Xenocrates. Unfortunately, the ethical theories of these Academics are desperately elusive. are cited by eclectic sources not for independent moral positions but for positions which they shared with the Peripatetics. to Aristotle and give Polemo the credit are not c~n v i n c i n g .~ De fin. iv, 45, Polemone.. .a quo quae essent principia naturae acceperat (sc. Zeno). On the basis of this evidence Philippson and Brink reasonably concluded that Polemo influenced the Stoic concept of-rrpGjTa K~T & q 6 0 1 v .~ Not even so much can be said safely about Xenocrates. We should look rather to Polemo Professor Brink has recently given somewhat similar instruction^.^ In most cases they Von Fritz's attempts to explain away the references in such passages Strangely enough, he omits Cicero

Stoicism and the impossibility of social morality

ΣΧΟΛΗ, 2019

Stoic ethical theory is famously “rigorist” in the sense that it regards all kinds of generally recognized non-moral goods and evils as “indifferents” that do not influence human happiness or misery. One of the problems with rigorism is that prima facie it seems to make impossible even a rudimentary social morality, for if non-moral evils, experienced by the victims of various inhumane actions, actually do them no harm and do not contribute to their being unhappy, then why should we regard the infliction of these evils as morally wrong? In this paper I examine the question of whether such a critique of Stoic rigorism (put forward, for example, by Claudia Card in her book “The Atrocity Paradigm”) is justified. I argue that, on the one hand, one cannot find convincing counterarguments against it within Stoic tradition itself (e.g, the distinction between “preferred” and “rejected” indifferents, in my view, is of no avail for the Stoics in this case), but, on the other, the validity of this criticism depends on what we take to be the ultimate normative standard of moral evaluation. It is only valid under the assumption that some kind of “humanistic consequentialism” (as I call it here) is true. I also try to demonstrate that, if this kind of consequentialism is true, then similar criticism may be applied to many other ethical theories regardless of whether they endorse rigorism or not. (Personally, I believe “humanistic consequentialism” to be true, although I do not argue for this thesis here).

Cynicism, Scepticism and Stoicism: A Stoic Distinction in Grotids' Concept of Law

Grotiana, 2001

It is a risky enterprise to speak in general terms about 'Stoicism' or of something being 'Stoic'. Old, middle, late and neo-Stoics (Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Panaetius, Poseidonius, Marcus Antonius, Seneca and then elements in Christian and early modern authors going up to the seventeenth century) somehow seem to merge into one indistinct stream of thought. The fragmentary nature of what we know about the ancient Stoics contributes to this. However, it is somehow unavoidable to speak in shorthand, particularly when we discuss an author from within a humanist tradition like Grotius. In this paper I focus on an issue which is considered to be typically 'Stoic'. It is the distinction in Stoic ethics between the good and the evil, and of the things which in the perspective of absolute good and evil are indifferent, such as health or sickness and wealth or poverty. This characteristic distinction is in its full details and consequences itself the object of a considerable amount of uncertainty. This is mainly due to the distinction within the category of indifferent things between certain things which are 'preferred' and other things which are to be 'rejected' (and some truly indifferent things), according to the value they have. The precise relation between 'preferred' things and 'good' things has been an object of some controversy. I To mention one source contributing to confusion, according to Diogenes Laertius (7, 103), Posidonius is supposed to have held that health and wealth are among the goods and not merely among the things which are of value. This is a most important issue, for it highlights the crucial relation between the moral good and the preferred things within the category of indifferent things. For an analysis see a.o. M. Reesor, 'The indifferents in the Old and Middel Staa', Transactions and Proceedings o/the Philological Society, 82 (1951) I02-IIO; JM. Rist, Stoir philosophy (Cambridge 1969) 1-21; LG. Kidd, 'Stoic intermediates and the end for man', in: A.A. Long, Stoic problems (London 1971) 150-172. GROTIANA (New Series) vol. zZ/z3 (Z001/zOOZ) 177-196 VAN GORCUM-p.o. box 43-4900 AA ASSEN, THE NETHERLANDS 2 On the distortion of Stoic ethics which may result from conceiving of the adiaphora as intermediate between good and evil, particularly in Cicero, see Rist, Stoic Philosophy, 97-III. Ibidem: 'Ut huic obiectoni respondeatur, sciendum est non sequi iniustum ex quavis negatione iusti etiam positis iisdem circumstantiis; quemadmodum enim non sequitur, si liberalis rex dicendus est qui alicui mille talenta dederit, ideo si non dederit, illiberal em fore, ita non est perpetuum ut id quod iuste fiat, non nisi iniuste omittatur.' 8 !d., I, II, vi, 2: 'Illud lib ens agnosco, nihil nobis in Euangelio praecipi quod non naturalem habeat honestatem: sed non ulterius nos obligari legibus Christi quam ad ea ad quae ius naturae per se obligat, cur concedam non video. Et qui aliter sentiunt mirum quam sudent ut probent quae Euangelio vetantur ipso iure naturae esse illicita, ut concubinatum, divortium, matrimonium cum pluribus feminis.'

Stoic Philosophy: Its Origins and Influence

Much has been written as of late on the characteristic and influential philosophical school of thought called Stoicism which was originally founded by Zeno of Citium in Athens in the second century BCE and further fleshed out and promulgated by Cleanthes and then subsequently by his student Chrysippus, collectively referred to in modern classical studies as the Old Stoa. This work intends to try and provide a succinct overview of the philosophical tenets which were characteristic of the school in the early period as well as identify some unique contributions of the later Stoa which are represented by the Roman/Latin intellectual and politically elite such as Seneca, Cicero and the emperor Marcus Aurelius. The paper also reviews some of the earlier Hellenic philosophical traditions from which it Stoicism drew some of its primary tenets and evolved in conjunction with, as well as in the Summary provide an overview of some of the lasting contributions Stoicism has made to the development of the philosophical and theological tradition in the West. Although none of the complete writings and treatises written by the Old Stoa are extant, much of their philosophical tenets are covered by later authors and philosophers whose work is and this article draws on some of these what you might call pseudo-primary sources (in particular Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius) as well as various secondary, more contemporary sources who draw not only on these sources but also extensively from Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta which is an invaluable collection of fragments and quotations of the early Stoa composed in the early part of the 20 th century and from which much of what we know about specific tenets of at least early Stoic philosophy come from.

Stoic Virtue: A Contemporary Interpretation

Philosophers' Imprint, 2020

The Stoic understanding of virtue is often taken to be a non-starter. Many of the Stoic claims about virtue -- that virtue requires moral perfection and that all who are not fully virtuous are vicious -- are thought to be completely out of step with our commonsense notion of virtue, making the Stoic account more of an historical oddity than a seriously defended view. Despite many voices to the contrary, I will argue that there is a way of making sense of these Stoic claims. Recent work in linguistics has shown that there is a distinction between relative and absolute gradable adjectives, with the absolute variety only applying to perfect exemplars. I will argue that taking virtue terms to be absolute gradable adjectives, and thus that they apply only to those who are fully virtuous, is one way to make sense of the Stoic view. I will also show how interpreting virtue-theoretic adjectives as absolute gradable adjectives makes it possible to defend Stoicism against its most common objections, demonstrating how the Stoic account of virtue might once again be a player in the contemporary landscape of virtue theorizing.