Does unconscious thought improve complex decision making? (original) (raw)
Related papers
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
Testing the Advantages of Conscious vs. Unconscious Thought for Complex Decisions in a Distraction Free Paradigm * In this study we test predictions from Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT) that unconscious thought will lead to better decision making in complex decision tasks relative to conscious thought. Different from prior work testing this prediction, we use a method of manipulating conscious and unconscious thinking that is free from distraction. Specifically, we use a 3-week protocol to experimentally induce adverse sleep and circadian states, both of which should reduce deliberative, conscious thinking and therefore increase the relative importance of more automatic unconscious processes. Our findings fail to support UTT predictions and instead coalesce with other replication attempts that cast doubt on the superiority of unconscious processing in complex decision making.
Boundary conditions on unconscious thought in complex decision making
2008
Should individuals delegate thinking about complex choice problems to the unconscious? We tested two boundary conditions on this suggestion. First, we found that in a decision environment similar to those studied previously, self-paced conscious thought and unconscious thought had similar advantages over conscious thought constrained to a long fixed time interval in terms of identifying the option with the highest number of positive outcomes. Second, we found that self-paced conscious thought performed better than unconscious thought in a second decision environment where performance depended to a greater extent on magnitudes of the attributes. Thus, we argue that it is critical to take into account the interaction of forms of processing with task demands (choice environments) when considering how to approach complex choice problems.
Walden manuscripts, 2012
Theories abound about how conscious and subconscious processes interact, both subjectively and neurochemically, in order for people to make their decisions. I demonstrate that no physical mechanism need exist for distinguishing between conscious and non-conscious processes (or rational vs. non-rational, explicit vs. implicit, etc.), and that the entire matter can be more easily and accurately explained in terms of more-or-less autonomous personality perspectives’ competing with each other. I present the idea that the so-called “unconscious processes” can be viewed as conscious, each in its appropriate context, just as a ‘fact’ (e.g., “all celestial bodies revolve about the earth, which is flat”) becomes a myth from a different perspective. Therefore, my hypothesis can be stated as: Decisions are made from greater or lesser integrations of personal perspectives; i.e., how much one is in touch with himself, or whether a person’s character has enough room in it to ruminate from conflicting viewpoints. In order to do this, I redefine ‘consciousness’ and “the unconscious” in a more useful way than has been hitherto, and demonstrate why meaningful and useful decisions cannot be made from what has erroneously been referred to as “the conscious state.”
Judgment and decision making
According to the deliberation without attention (DWA) hypothesis, people facing a difficult choice will make a better decision after a period of distraction than after an equally long period of conscious deliberation, an effect referred to as the unconscious thought advantage (UTA). The status of the DWA hypothesis is controversial, as many studies have tried but failed to replicate the UTA. Here, we report a series of experiments that sought to identify the conditions under which the UTA can be replicated. Our starting point was a recent meta-analysis that identified the conditions under which the UTA was strongest in previous studies. Using a within-subjects design and a task that met each of these conditions, we failed to replicate the UTA. Based on closer inspection of previous methods and findings, we then examined some additional factors that could be important for replicating the UTA, including mental fatigue and choice complexity. This was to no avail, as the results reveale...
Not Merely Experiential: Unconscious Thought Can Be Rational
Frontiers in Psychology, 2017
Individuals often form more reasonable judgments from complex information after a period of distraction vs. deliberation. This phenomenon has been attributed to sophisticated unconscious thought during the distraction period that integrates and organizes the information (Unconscious Thought Theory; Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006). Yet, other research suggests that experiential processes are strengthened during the distraction (relative to deliberation) period, accounting for the judgment and decision benefit. We tested between these possibilities, hypothesizing that unconscious thought is distinct from experiential processes, and independently contributes to judgments and decisions during a distraction period. Using an established paradigm, Experiment 1 (N = 319) randomly induced participants into an experiential or rational mindset, after which participants received complex information describing three roommates to then consider consciously (i.e., deliberation) or unconsciously (i.e., distraction). Results revealed superior roommate judgments (but not choices) following distraction vs. deliberation, consistent with Unconscious Thought Theory. Mindset did not have an influence on roommate judgments. However, planned tests revealed a significant advantage of distraction only within the rational-mindset condition, which is contrary to the idea that experiential processing alone facilitates complex decision-making during periods of distraction. In a second experiment (N = 136), we tested whether effects of unconscious thought manifest for a complex analytical reasoning task for which experiential processing would offer no advantage. As predicted, participants in an unconscious thought condition outperformed participants in a control condition, suggesting that unconscious thought can be analytical. In sum, the current results support the existence of unconscious thinking processes that are distinct from experiential processes, and can be rational. Thus, the experiential vs. rational nature of a process might not cleanly delineate conscious and unconscious thought.
Unconscious processing of information in dynamic decision-making–an experimental approach
2008
The purpose of the paper is to investigate the effects of unconscious versus conscious ways of making decisions in a dynamic decision-making task. An experimental setting is used to study this question; three experimental groups are distinguished: immediate decision-making (only limited time for cognitive processing), considered decisionmaking (time for conscious processing), and distracted decision-making (time for unconscious processing). As experimental stimulus, a simulator based on the Kaibab Plateau model is employed. Although more than 100 subjects have been tested so far, group differences are not significant for most data examined. Implications comprise the improvement of the experiment in order to derive at more substantial results. The value of the paper lies in the fact that it connects to a recent discussion in psychology and transfers it into a domain in the core interest of the system dynamics community: decision-making in situations with dynamic complexity.
Unconscious Thought Theory and Its Discontents: A Critique of the Critiques
Social Cognition, 2011
A review of Unconscious Thought Theory, its original empirical support, and the several methodological and empirical critiques that followed leads to the following conclusions: (1) the basic tenants of Unconscious Thought Theory are in harmony with recent research and theory on unconscious processes if not with the dated, "straw-man" version of the unconscious presented by its critics; (2) the several published "failures to replicate" are actually, on closer inspection, found to be a series of consistent replications of at least the equivalent quality of unconsciously made versus consciously made decisions; (3) the most recent research is showing superiority of unconsciously made decisions in more ecologically valid "real-life" judgmental situations (e.g., fairness assessments and cheater detection) for which natural selection has likely equipped us with unconsciously operating expertise, compared to the artificial situations studied by the decision theorists (which often involve numerical computations); and 4) going forward, all researchers should be open-minded about the potential contributions of both unconscious and conscious processes in complex decision making.
Unconscious influences of, not just on, decision-making
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2014
To what extent do we know our own minds when making decisions? Variants of this question have preoccupied researchers in a wide range of domains, from mainstream experimental psychology (cognition, perception, social behavior) to cognitive neuroscience and behavioral economics. A pervasive view places a heavy explanatory burden on an intelligent cognitive unconscious, with many theories assigning causally effective roles to unconscious influences. This article presents a novel framework for evaluating these claims and reviews evidence from three major bodies of research in which unconscious factors have been studied: multiple-cue judgment, deliberation without attention, and decisions under uncertainty. Studies of priming (subliminal and primes-to-behavior) and the role of awareness in movement and perception (e.g., timing of willed actions, blindsight) are also given brief consideration. The review highlights that inadequate procedures for assessing awareness, failures to consider artifactual explanations of "landmark" results, and a tendency to uncritically accept conclusions that fit with our intuitions have all contributed to unconscious influences being ascribed inflated and erroneous explanatory power in theories of decision making. The review concludes by recommending that future research should focus on tasks in which participants' attention is diverted away from the experimenter's hypothesis, rather than the highly reflective tasks that are currently often employed.
Expertise Effects on Immediate, Deliberate and Unconscious Thought in Complex Decision Making
In this study we examined the claim that unconscious thought would lead to better choices in complex decision making than immediate and deliberate thought. We doubted whether this would also be true for experts in a domain. Participants were students and experienced real-estate agents with expertise in choosing between houses. In three problems, differing in difficulty and/or task requirements, participants decided upon the best house by rank-ordering and evaluation. No support was found for beneficial effects of unconscious thought, neither for experts, nor for students. In line with our hypothesis we found that experts could take advantage of deliberate thinking in complex decision making. They were also better than students in immediate choices. These results corroborate other studies that question the generalizability of the deliberation-without-attention hypothesis, and provide further evidence that it is helpful to deliberately think when making complex decisions. The advice is to rely on experts or to build expertise, instead of leaving thinking to the unconsciousness.