Boundary conditions on unconscious thought in complex decision making (original) (raw)
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
Testing the Advantages of Conscious vs. Unconscious Thought for Complex Decisions in a Distraction Free Paradigm * In this study we test predictions from Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT) that unconscious thought will lead to better decision making in complex decision tasks relative to conscious thought. Different from prior work testing this prediction, we use a method of manipulating conscious and unconscious thinking that is free from distraction. Specifically, we use a 3-week protocol to experimentally induce adverse sleep and circadian states, both of which should reduce deliberative, conscious thinking and therefore increase the relative importance of more automatic unconscious processes. Our findings fail to support UTT predictions and instead coalesce with other replication attempts that cast doubt on the superiority of unconscious processing in complex decision making.
Does unconscious thought improve complex decision making?
Psychological Research Psychologische Forschung, 2009
In a recent study, Dijksterhuis et al. (Science 311:1005, 2006) reported that participants were better at solving complex decisions after a period of unconscious thought relative to a period of conscious thought. They interpreted their results as an existence proof of powerful unconscious deliberation mechanisms. In the present report, we used a similar experimental design with an additional control, immediate condition, and we observed that participants produced as good (and even descriptively better) decisions in this condition than in the "unconscious" one, hence challenging the initial interpretation of the authors. However, we still obtained lower performances in the "conscious" relative to the "immediate" condition, suggesting that the initial result of Dijksterhuis et al. was not due to the action of powerful unconscious thought processes, but to the apparent disadvantage of further conscious processing. We provide an explanation for this observation on the basis of current models of decision making. It is Wnally concluded that the beneWt of unconscious thought in complex decision making is still a controversial issue that should be considered cautiously.
Walden manuscripts, 2012
Theories abound about how conscious and subconscious processes interact, both subjectively and neurochemically, in order for people to make their decisions. I demonstrate that no physical mechanism need exist for distinguishing between conscious and non-conscious processes (or rational vs. non-rational, explicit vs. implicit, etc.), and that the entire matter can be more easily and accurately explained in terms of more-or-less autonomous personality perspectives’ competing with each other. I present the idea that the so-called “unconscious processes” can be viewed as conscious, each in its appropriate context, just as a ‘fact’ (e.g., “all celestial bodies revolve about the earth, which is flat”) becomes a myth from a different perspective. Therefore, my hypothesis can be stated as: Decisions are made from greater or lesser integrations of personal perspectives; i.e., how much one is in touch with himself, or whether a person’s character has enough room in it to ruminate from conflicting viewpoints. In order to do this, I redefine ‘consciousness’ and “the unconscious” in a more useful way than has been hitherto, and demonstrate why meaningful and useful decisions cannot be made from what has erroneously been referred to as “the conscious state.”
Unconscious processing of information in dynamic decision-making–an experimental approach
2008
The purpose of the paper is to investigate the effects of unconscious versus conscious ways of making decisions in a dynamic decision-making task. An experimental setting is used to study this question; three experimental groups are distinguished: immediate decision-making (only limited time for cognitive processing), considered decisionmaking (time for conscious processing), and distracted decision-making (time for unconscious processing). As experimental stimulus, a simulator based on the Kaibab Plateau model is employed. Although more than 100 subjects have been tested so far, group differences are not significant for most data examined. Implications comprise the improvement of the experiment in order to derive at more substantial results. The value of the paper lies in the fact that it connects to a recent discussion in psychology and transfers it into a domain in the core interest of the system dynamics community: decision-making in situations with dynamic complexity.
Judgment and decision making
Nature Commentary about the Study: http://www.nature.com/news/unconscious-thought-not-so-smart-after-all-1.16801 Are difficult decisions best made after a momentary diversion of thought? Previous research addressing this important question has yielded dozens of experiments in which participants were asked to choose the best of several options (e.g., cars or apartments) either after conscious deliberation, or after a momentary diversion of thought induced by performing an unrelated task. The results of these studies were mixed as some found that participants who had first performed the unrelated task were more likely to choose the best option, whereas others found no evidence for this so-called unconscious thought advantage (UTA). The current study examined two accounts of this inconsistency in previous findings. According to the reliability account, the UTA does not exist and previous reports of this effect concern nothing but spurious effects obtained with an unreliable paradigm. I...
Unconscious influences of, not just on, decision-making
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2014
To what extent do we know our own minds when making decisions? Variants of this question have preoccupied researchers in a wide range of domains, from mainstream experimental psychology (cognition, perception, social behavior) to cognitive neuroscience and behavioral economics. A pervasive view places a heavy explanatory burden on an intelligent cognitive unconscious, with many theories assigning causally effective roles to unconscious influences. This article presents a novel framework for evaluating these claims and reviews evidence from three major bodies of research in which unconscious factors have been studied: multiple-cue judgment, deliberation without attention, and decisions under uncertainty. Studies of priming (subliminal and primes-to-behavior) and the role of awareness in movement and perception (e.g., timing of willed actions, blindsight) are also given brief consideration. The review highlights that inadequate procedures for assessing awareness, failures to consider artifactual explanations of "landmark" results, and a tendency to uncritically accept conclusions that fit with our intuitions have all contributed to unconscious influences being ascribed inflated and erroneous explanatory power in theories of decision making. The review concludes by recommending that future research should focus on tasks in which participants' attention is diverted away from the experimenter's hypothesis, rather than the highly reflective tasks that are currently often employed.
Expertise Effects on Immediate, Deliberate and Unconscious Thought in Complex Decision Making
In this study we examined the claim that unconscious thought would lead to better choices in complex decision making than immediate and deliberate thought. We doubted whether this would also be true for experts in a domain. Participants were students and experienced real-estate agents with expertise in choosing between houses. In three problems, differing in difficulty and/or task requirements, participants decided upon the best house by rank-ordering and evaluation. No support was found for beneficial effects of unconscious thought, neither for experts, nor for students. In line with our hypothesis we found that experts could take advantage of deliberate thinking in complex decision making. They were also better than students in immediate choices. These results corroborate other studies that question the generalizability of the deliberation-without-attention hypothesis, and provide further evidence that it is helpful to deliberately think when making complex decisions. The advice is to rely on experts or to build expertise, instead of leaving thinking to the unconsciousness.
Judgment and decision making
According to the deliberation without attention (DWA) hypothesis, people facing a difficult choice will make a better decision after a period of distraction than after an equally long period of conscious deliberation, an effect referred to as the unconscious thought advantage (UTA). The status of the DWA hypothesis is controversial, as many studies have tried but failed to replicate the UTA. Here, we report a series of experiments that sought to identify the conditions under which the UTA can be replicated. Our starting point was a recent meta-analysis that identified the conditions under which the UTA was strongest in previous studies. Using a within-subjects design and a task that met each of these conditions, we failed to replicate the UTA. Based on closer inspection of previous methods and findings, we then examined some additional factors that could be important for replicating the UTA, including mental fatigue and choice complexity. This was to no avail, as the results reveale...
Is the unconscious, if it exists, a superior decision maker?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2014
To what extent do we know our own minds when making decisions? Variants of this question have preoccupied researchers in a wide range of domains, from mainstream experimental psychology (cognition, perception, social behavior) to cognitive neuroscience and behavioral economics. A pervasive view places a heavy explanatory burden on an intelligent cognitive unconscious, with many theories assigning causally effective roles to unconscious influences. This article presents a novel framework for evaluating these claims and reviews evidence from three major bodies of research in which unconscious factors have been studied: multiple-cue judgment, deliberation without attention, and decisions under uncertainty. Studies of priming (subliminal and primes-to-behavior) and the role of awareness in movement and perception (e.g., timing of willed actions, blindsight) are also given brief consideration. The review highlights that inadequate procedures for assessing awareness, failures to consider artifactual explanations of "landmark" results, and a tendency to uncritically accept conclusions that fit with our intuitions have all contributed to unconscious influences being ascribed inflated and erroneous explanatory power in theories of decision making. The review concludes by recommending that future research should focus on tasks in which participants' attention is diverted away from the experimenter's hypothesis, rather than the highly reflective tasks that are currently often employed.