Stepping out of the "enclave": public activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the quest to regain social authority in the 1980s (original) (raw)
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Sociološka luca - Montenegrin Jouranal for Sociology, Godina XIII, 2019
After the fall of communism in 1989 religious communities has across Eastern Europe been rebuild and revived. The same development can be seen in Montenegro where both traditional and new religious groups has flourished. This development could be called a desecularization of the former communist societies. This paper investigates the revival of one of the major religious groups, the branch of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), in Montenegro in order to track and identify the development in the particular community after the fall of communism. The purpose of the investigation is to discuss, if the revival of SOC has led to a desecularization of the Montenegrin society in the same manner, as the case is for Serbia.
The Church, the Nation, and the State: The Serbian Orthodox Church After Communism
Orthodox Churches and Politics in Southeastern Europe (ed by Sabrina Ramet), Palgrave, 2019
My chapter focuses on the role the Serbian Orthodox Church has played in Serbian politics since 1989, but especially since 2000, with the end of the authoritarian rule of Slobodan Milošević. Centering the discussion on four principal dimensions that capture the Serbian Church's influence in this period-nationalism, conservatism, homopho-bia, and religious intolerance-this chapter pays special attention to two main social and political fault lines in post-2000 Serbia and the Church's central role in them: the status of its LGBTQ community and the continuing contention over Kosovo's secession. The chapter concludes that the SOC continues to serve as a political force in Serbian society-a foundational source of Serbian national identity and an organization deeply immersed in contemporary Serbian politics. It is a Church that is deeply conservative, opposed to change, and primarily interested in preserving its status and privilege in Serbian society.
Anthropology of East Europe Review Vol. 30, No. 2, fall 2012 (39-58)
"This paper is the result of research into the road towards and the road from institutional Orthodoxy and the experiences of four individuals, mutual acquaintances, who in the 1990s found “refuge in a search for meaning of life” in the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC). However, towards the end of the 2000s, they decided to abandon institutionalized religion and to move from the so-called theological-ecclesiastic model of Christian religiosity to an alternative model which negotiates between Christianity as doctrine and non-religious life-styles and “life philosophies”, as they are colloquially termed. Once torn between the conservativeness of institutional Orthodoxy and the modernity of their social environment (friendship groups, networks of people with similar interests, etc.), the four former members of the SOC declare that the SOC today is a community that has problems integrating cosmopolitan worldviews and is incapable of dealing with modernity and the diversity of contemporary society."
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The purpos of this paper is a clarification of the terms and proceses of desecularization and modernity, wich are inevitable when one regards religious changes in modern postindustrial societies, as well as in postsocialist ones. Empirical reasrches confirm that even the most secular Western Europe does not have a homogenus religious society. In the second part of the paper the autores will use key empirical research in an attempt to show revitalisation of religion in Serbia as well. The nineteen-nineties brought war, crisis and transition, but they also brought a functional change for the Serbian Ortodox Church. This paper will address some of these changes: 1) religion is not just a personal thing any more, it assumes a certain place in the public sphere; 2) a new law of religious freedom (2006) changed the legal status of religious communities; 3) religious centers and temples are being rebuilt and built; 4) religions have gained their place in the media (public and private), and...
Serbian Orthodox Church as a Political Actor in the Aftermath of 5 October 2000
Politics and Religion, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1, issue 2 , 2008
This study tackles the place and role of the Orthodox Church in Serbian society, state, and political life after October 5, 2000. Owing to its present “symphony” with the state, the church now offers a new ideological framework and value-system for state institutions such as the armed forces and public education. This new role of the church is particularly emphasized in the current legislation. One could probably refer to the “etatization” of the Serbian Church, with some negative consequences for non-traditional religious communities. The relations with the Macedonian and Montenegrin Orthodox churches have also been discussed in this context. In post-Milošević Serbia, religious rights and freedoms have been considerably extended, but there is still a great deal of arbitrariness, even completely partial interpretations of the church-state relations. In the concluding section, this article deals with the church's traditionalist perception of society as narod (the people), with some recommendations as for the possible cooperation between the church and civil society in Serbia.
Serbian Orthodox Church: Between Traditionalism and Fundamentalism
Fundamentalism in the Modern World (vol. 1: Fundamentalism, Politics and History: The State, Globalization and Political Ideologies), ed. by Ulrika Mårtensson et al, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011
This chapter deals with the recent oscillations within the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) between traditionalism and fundamentalism. After the political changes in Serbia that took place in the aftermath of October 2000, SOC has assumed much more prominent political and religious roles in the Serbian society. The new “symphony” with the state has enabled the church to exert an unprecedented symbolical and normative influence, offering a new framework of ideology and values for the state institutions and public education system. This political and ideological shift, sometimes labeled as the process of clericalization, is very conservative in its character. On the one hand, it is founded on a vague concept of svetosavlje, the ideology of the leading SOC theologians since the mid-20th century. The projection of a golden medieval past, the “Kosovo testament” (cult of martyrdom), and the myth of St Sava - the greatest Serbian saint, resemble, to a certain extent, Sunni Salafism and the Shiite cult of Ali and the myth of Karbala, i.e. the historical defeat that turned into a “heavenly triumph”. On the other hand, the recent experience with the wars of the 1990s, an international isolation and the delayed process of accession to the EU, gave rise to a specific “Masada complex” and a self-righteous attitude with occasional messianic and eschatological overtones and ethno-nationalist references to territory and people (especially in the context of the Kosovo problem). Monoculturalism (accompanied by an “organic” view of the state, church and society) and the opposition to secularism, civil society, enlightenment, ecumenism and religious and social pluralism, are only some of the elements of this new religious-political agenda of SOC. The para-clerical organizations acting under the auspice of the SOC, and supported by its Information Service, openly advocate the formation of an “Orthodox public opinion.” Moreover, the program of de-secularization of the Serbian society has recently been announced from a high position in the church hierarchy. It seems as if this new political agenda has been based on religion, but its true aims are trans-religious: they tackle the future course of development of the Serbian society and hinder the process of democratization and accession to the EU. Such a shift to a monistic, archaic, “testamentary” pattern was probably best exemplified by the Draft of the National Program of the Serbian Youth for the 21st Century, proposed and adopted in 2004. Typologically, this recourse to traditionalism and conservatism within the SOC - largely embraced by the highest state officials and embedded in a joint religious-political concept of “conciliar unity” or sabornost – might also be observed in the context of religious fundamentalism. What we have in mind here, in the first place, are the following features: 1. The return to the fundamental principles, to the origin, or something that has been corrupted in the course of time. The SOC representatives, for example, often express their fear from the destruction of the “true faith” through their open resistance to secularization of the modern (Western) world. Instead of initiating a dialogue with that world, the SOC opts for an official condemnation of secularization. 2. Exclusiveness in interpretation: fundamentalism is against hermeneutic pluralism, because it leads, as it were, to cognitive and value relativism. Instead, fundamentalism prefers the dualistic, Manichean rhetoric (Us-Them, God-Satan, Friends-Foes). An essential feature of fundamentalism is its resistance to pluralism in interpretation, whereas its hermeneutic monism leads to sectarian exclusiveness. The rigid adherence to only one interpretation of a phenomenon may eventually turn a hermeneutic problem into a serious political or even military issue. Concerning the SOC, one could refer to its fear of re-interpretation of Christianity and ultimate “demise” of Orthodoxy in its encounter with the more pluralistic and ecumenical discourse and dialogue. 3. Resistance to (Western) secularization and the rejection of a secular world-view. The Enlightenment poses a special “threat” to any fundamentalism. Taking into account that the two greatest Serbian theologians, Nikolaj Velimirović and Justin Popović, held an unreservedly anti-Western position in their works, it would be worthwhile to explore the current stance of the Serbian theologians regarding Europe, European Union and the West in general, seen as the historical, political and religious-metaphysical Other. 4. Fundamentalism is often a product of the political, social and economic crisis, or a response to a crisis situation. In Serbia, such conditions were created after the assassination of the former PM Zoran Djindjić and the subsequent suspension of the reform and transition of the Serbian society. The SOC public discourse in this latest period has ranged from the scandalous speech at Djindjić’s funeral, to the direct public defense of the persons indicted of war crimes (in some clerical circles they are still glorified as patriots and heroes). 5. In an ideological sense, the fundamentalist ideas are directed against science and secular public education, although in practical terms fundamentalism often takes advantage of modern science and technology. Apart from the introduction of the confessional, denominational religious education in public schools in 2001, I will refer to some more recent tendencies of the SOC School of Theology to interfere with the plans and programs of other schools within the University of Belgrade. 6. The spirit of ecumenism, dialogue and tolerance is alien to fundamentalism and often its greatest opponent. One may include here the SOC reservation towards initiating a more productive dialogue and reconciliation with other religious communities in the Balkans within various ecumenical organizations and initiatives. Besides the general literature on fundamentalism, religion and globalization (e.g. Marty-Appleby, B. Parekh, O. Roy, P. Beyer, A. Meddeb, K. Kienzler, T. H. Eriksen et al.), the more specific sources for this study include the public statements of the SOC clergy, the theological works of Nikolaj Velimirovic, as well as the Orthodox youth organizations’ documents, their periodicals and internet presentations. The supporting documents also include the Law on the Churches and Religious Communities (2006), the statements of the Serbian Minister of Religious Affairs and statements of other conservative politicians. Keywords: Serbian Orthodox Church, ethno-nationalism, ideology, de-secularization, traditionalism, conservatism, sabornost, myth, testament, martyrdom, crisis, instrumentalism, civil society, public sphere
Current religious changes in Serbia and desecularization
Filozofija i drustvo, 2006
For the contemporary Serbian sociology of religion it is evident that the process of desecularization has been present on the social scene of Serbia in the last fifteen years. Sociologists have provided arguments for this claim based on data gathered in Serbia during this period. The religious changes in question have been empirically recorded in all aspects of attachment to religion (mainly Eastern Orthodoxy) and the church (Serbian Orthodox Church), that is, in aspects of religious identification, doctrinal beliefs and religious behaviour. Certain political subjects and social scientists feel that social life in Serbia is getting increasingly, and that religion and church are exerting influence within social fields they are not supposed to, if Serbia is to become a secular, democratic state. The paper analyzes some major conditions of the clericalization of the Serbian society.