Review of Benjamin Libet, Mind Time (original) (raw)
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The Timing Experiments of Libet and Grey Walter
The neurological experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (1985) and Grey Walter (1993, in Dennett) provide evidence that our actions are caused by non-conscious brain events beyond our conscious awareness. Normally, we assume that our conscious choices lead us to do things. If these researchers have interpreted their evidence correctly, it may be that we lack free-will, for we could not control a non-conscious brain state. Libet however provides evidence that agents can “change their minds” just before performing some action. He felt that this was the elbow-room for free-will. But it may be inconsistent for him to suggest this, since his evidence indicates that there is no room for conscious choice. In this paper we discuss these results and various objections to the interpretation of the work.
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My brain made me no do it: an emergentist interpretation of Benjamin Libet
Pallarés-Domínguez, D. (2016). My brain made me not do it: an emergentist interpretation of Benjamin Libet. Journal of Applied Ethics Ramón Llull, 7, 121-141.
Recent experiments and analysis in neuroscience have reinforced the need for a deeper discussion between neurodeterminism and free will. This article identifies problems in both of these neuroethical positions. The identification of these problems will show a link between them that until now has not been broadly discussed or explained. Taking into account that human free will is not absolute but instead conditioned by various possibilities among which subjects must choose, and based on an emergentist position, this paper will attempt to draw a correlation between free will and the conscious veto, a term introduced by Benjamin Libet in his study of readiness potential. Based on this correlation, the conscious veto can be interpreted as a possibility of free will, and therefore, a new reading will be needed of Libet’s results from the emergentist perspective, not exclusively from the determinist tendencies that have predominated in previous studies.
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Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2016
This paper presents an overview of the key neuroscience studies investigating the neural mechanisms of self-initiated movements that form the basis of our human consciousness. These studies, which commenced with the seminal works of Benjamin Libet and colleagues, showed that an ensemble of brain areas — localized to the frontal and medial regions of the brain — are involved in engendering the conscious decision to commit a motor act. Regardless of differences in neuroimaging techniques, these studies commonly showed that early neuronal activities in the frontal lobules and supplementary motor areas, interpreted by some to be reflective of unconscious processes, occurred before one was conscious of the intention to act as well as the act itself. I examine and discuss these empirical findings with regard to the need to analyze the contents and stages of awareness, and devise paradigm-specific models or theories that could account for inconsistent findings garnered from different experimental paradigms. This paper concludes by emphasizing a need to reconcile the principles of determinism with the notions of free will in future development of consciousness research and theories. © The Institute of Mind and Behavior, Inc., P.O. Box 522, Village Station, New York City, New York, 10014. URL: https://umaine.edu/jmb/
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Time for consciousness intention and introspection
We ordinarily assume that we can act (in at least some cases) by consciously intending to do so. However, Wegner and Libet interpret empirical data gathered by Libet and his colleagues as showing that awareness of one’s intentions plays no role in the production of action. In this paper, I show that this interpretation of the data presupposes an act-object model of conscious intention, which is independently problematic. An alternative construes conscious intention adverbially, such that to have a conscious intention is to consciously intend. If we adopt this model of conscious intention, Wegner and Libet’s argument no longer goes through, and we can retain the claim that our conscious intentions can give rise to action.
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In this chapter a general and empirically substantiated challenge to the traditional, intentional causalist conception of action is discussed, namely that the conscious will is, allegedly, illusory, which implies that intentions do not cause actions. This challenge has been advanced by Daniel Wegner as an implication of his model of the experience of conscious will. After showing that attempts to directly falsify Wegner's illusion thesis have failed and that a real falsification will not be easily available, the challenge is answered here by criticising Wegner's model: those parts of the model which should sustain the illusion thesis are not substantiated. The rest of the model, however, should enrich our self-reflexive dealing with our desires, intentions and actions.
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There are three projects within the cognitive science of agency and consciousness that are of particular interest to neuroethics: the descriptive project, the genetic project, and the substantive project. The descriptive project is concerned with characterizing our everyday experience of, and beliefs about, agency. What is the folk view of agency? The aim of the genetic project is to give an account of the psychological mechanisms involved in constructing our experience of, and beliefs about, agency. How is the folk view of agency to be explained? The substantive project is concerned with determining the degree to which our experiences of, and beliefs about, agency are correct and to what degree they might need to be revised in light of findings from the cognitive sciences. Is the folk view of agency basically correct or does it need to be modified in fundamental ways (as “will skeptics” argue)? This entry provides an overview of recent research relating to all three projects.
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According to the traditional free will debate, research in psychology is irrelevant to the question of whether we have free will, or in any case, less relevant than research in physics about whether the universe is deterministic or not. This is a mistake. In this article I will briefly diagnose this mistake and then suggest avenues for correcting it by discussing four ways that psychological research is highly relevant to philosophical debates about free will.
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(1) In a famous series of experiments Libet has proved, many believe, that the way for human action is physiologically paved already before the conscious intention is formed. (2) A causal interpretation of these experiments which follows Libet's lines implies that even a compatibilist freedom of action and decision, as well as actions in a narrow sense, do not exist. (3) A compilation of several critiques of the experiments' interpretation, however, questions the most important parts of these interpretations, e.g. the temporal order, the nature of the conscious intention. (4) In addition, a more sophisticated picture of the work of intentions makes clear that in Libet's experiments in most cases there were no proximal intentions to flex one's finger but that these actions are intentional in virtue of the distal general intention to follow the experimenter's requests. (5) Finally, an elaboration of the role of consciousness and deliberation in decisions shows how the latter intentions can be free despite being based on unconscious processes.
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