Generics as default? Comparing the acquisition of universals and generics in Spanish (original) (raw)
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Language Learning and Development
This paper reports an experiment that investigates interpretive distinctions between two different expressions of generalization in Spanish. In particular, our aim was to find out when the distinction between generic statements (GS) such as Tigers have stripes and universally quantified statements (UQS) such as All tigers have stripes was acquired in Spanish-speaking children of two different age groups (4/5-year-olds and 8/9-year-olds), and then compare these results with those of adults. The starting point of this research was the semantic distinction between GS and UQS in that the former admit exceptions, unlike the latter. On the other hand, several authors have observed a Generic overgeneralization effect (GOG) consisting in allowing for UQS to be felicitous in the face of exceptions, thus proposing that this "error" stems from GS being defaults (simpler, more easily learned and processed). In the current paper we aimed to test the "Generics as Default" (GaD) hypothesis by comparing GS and UQS in three different age ranges. Our data show that, overall, the accuracy of GS is greater than the accuracy of UQS. Moreover, we also confirm a hypothesized interaction between age and NP type (GS vs UQS). Further, we present several data points that are not predicted by the GaD, including an observed decline in the accuracy of GS in the older group of children as well as in adults, and that children fail at rejecting statements that are not considered to be true generalizations.
Journal of Semantics
Generic generalisations (e.g. 'tigers have stripes', 'ducks lay eggs') refer to a characteristic property of a kind. Recently, the generics-as-default view has posited that we have a bias towards interpreting universally quantified statements as generic. Evidence offered for this view is the Generic Overgeneralisation (GOG) effect, which refers to the documented tendency of participants to misinterpret a quantificational statement like 'all ducks lay eggs' as if it were a generic and thus accept it as true, even though they know it is false. Across two experiments in English and Greek we systematically addressed the relevance of context and quantifier domain restriction for this kind of behaviour. Participants judged generic majority characteristic statements like 'tigers have stripes' or statements with universal quantifiers with different sensitivity to quantifier domain restriction preceded by one of three levels of context (neutral, contradictory and supportive). We found that context significantly affected the rates at which participants accepted universally quantified statements. Our results demonstrate that quantifier domain restriction is a viable alternative explanation for a significant proportion of the judgements of universally quantified statements that have been called GOG errors.
Lingua, 2011
This study examines NPs in generic environments cross-linguistically. According to the semantic literature, NPs obtain generic readings from two sources: characterizing sentences (Lions are dangerous) and kind-reference (Dodo birds are extinct). English, Spanish and Brazilian Portuguese are known to differ in the types of NPs (definite vs. indefinite; singular vs. plural) that are allowed in the two types of environments, but there is disagreement in the literature concerning (i) the status of bare (article-less) NPs in generic environments in Brazilian Portuguese; and (ii) whether singular and/or plural generics are restricted to canonical kinds cross-linguistically. The broader goal of this paper is to use experimental methodology to resolve these disagreements; the more specific goal is to test the theoretical proposal of Dayal (2004), which makes testable predictions for the distribution of generic NPs cross-linguistically. The results of Acceptability Judgment Tasks with native speakers of English, Spanish, and Brazilian Portuguese provide support for Dayal's proposal that plural generics cross-linguistically denote kinds, while definite singular generics denote taxonomic entities. These findings highlight the value of experimentally testing the predictions of semantic theories, and pose questions for further research.
Generic and Universal Generalisations: Contextualising the 'Generic Overgeneralisation' Effect
In this study, we focused on the Generic Overgeneralisation (GOG) effect (Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg 2011) and tested the relevance of context and an explanation based on quantifier domain restriction for the pattern of judgement data observed. Participants judged generic majority characteristic statements like tigers have stripes or statements with universal quantifiers that have different sensitivity to context ('all', 'all the', 'each') preceded by one of three levels of context: a) neutral, where the information in the context does not interact with the truth value of the critical statement, b) contradictory, where it presents an exception which should rule out a universally quantified statement, and c) supportive. Our results suggest that proponents of the generics-as-default view ruled out context prematurely and that in fact context is a viable alternative explanation for much of the so-called GOG effect.
A new look at the 'Generic Overgeneralisation' effect
While generic generalisations have been studied by linguists and philosophers for decades, they have only recently become the focus of concentrated interest by cognitive and developmental psychologists, who propose the generics-as- default view. In this paper we focus on the ‘Generic Overgeneralisation’ (GOG) effect proposed by Leslie and colleagues and the native speaker judgments that have been used to support it, and by extension, the generics-as-default view. We take a step back to look at the history of the GOG effect in order to contextualise it. We review existing experimental evidence and discuss four non-mutually exclusive explanations for the GOG effect: ignorance, subkind interpretation, atypical behaviour of all and quantifier domain restriction. We conclude that a closer look at the semantics and pragmatics of generics and universal quantifiers may provide a more nuanced explanation for the pattern of judgment data than that proposed by the generics-as-default view.
Theory-based considerations influence the interpretation of generic sentences
Language and Cognitive Processes, 2010
Under what circumstances do people agree that a kind-referring generic sentence (e.g., ‘Swans are beautiful’) is true? We hypothesised that theory-based considerations are sufficient, independently of prevalence/frequency information, to lead to acceptance of a generic statement. To provide evidence for this general point, we focused on demonstrating the impact of a specific theory-based, essentialist expectation – that the physical features characteristic of a biological kind emerge as a natural product of development – on participants’ reasoning about generics. Across three studies, adult participants (N=99) confirmed our hypothesis, preferring to map generic sentences (e.g., ‘Dontrets have long tails’) onto novel categories for which the key feature (e.g., long tails) was absent in all the young but present in all the adults rather than onto novel categories for which the key feature was at least as prevalent but present in some of the young and in some of the adults. Control conditions using ‘some’- and ‘most’-quantified sentences demonstrated that this mapping is specific to generic meaning. These results suggest that generic meaning does not reduce to quantification and is sensitive to theory-based expectations.
Generics Are a Cognitive Default: Evidence From Sentence Processing
Cognitive Science, 2011
Generics Are a Cognitive Default: Evidence From Sentence Processing Meredith Meyer (mermeyer@umich.edu), Susan A. Gelman (gelman@umich.edu), and Sarah M. Stilwell (stilwell@umich.edu) Department of Psychology, 530 Church Street Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1043 USA Abstract sentence Dogs have four legs as Most dogs have four legs, sets quantified by most similarly do not equate to the referents of generics. Consider, for instance, that although Sharks attack swimmers is often judged as acceptable, Most sharks attack swimmers is not. Generics are thus not reducible to quantifiers conveying statistical prevalence (e.g., Cimpian, Gelman, & Brandone, 2010). Noting these sorts of distinctions, most semantic analyses impute qualitative differences between generic and quantified reference (Carlson, 2010; Leslie, 2008) and reject earlier quantificational analyses treating generics as if they contained implicit quantification (e.g., Clark, 1973). Generics instead are kind-referring (Carlson, 2010), a...
Cognitive Science, 2014
Generic statements express generalizations about categories and present a unique semantic profile that is distinct from quantified statements. This paper reports two studies examining the development of children's intuitions about the semantics of generics and how they differ from statements quantified by all, most, and some. Results reveal that, like adults, preschoolers (a) recognize that generics have flexible truth conditions and are capable of representing a wide range of prevalence levels; and (b) interpret novel generics as having near-universal prevalence implications. Results further show that by age 4, children are beginning to differentiate the meaning of generics and quantified statements; however, even 7-to 11-year-olds are not adultlike in their intuitions about the meaning of most-quantified statements. Overall, these studies suggest that by preschool, children interpret generics in much the same way that adults do; however, mastery of the semantics of quantified statements follows a more protracted course.
The Magic of the Generic: A Critique of the Studies on Generic Sentences
2018
Generic sentences (eg. Birds fly or Cows have four legs) have always posed a challenge to the classical calculi of logical semantics as they do violate truth conditions in the sense that they allow exceptions. A generic cannot be rendered flawed in spite of the fact that there are birds like emu and ostrich who do not fly and there are cows who do not have all the four legs. Hence it is interesting to enquire as in how the generics are computed in human mind. Linguists of various hues have enquired into the semantics of generics. This paper presents a critique of the major theoretical proposals put forth by linguists on the nature of these generics. This article refrains from providing a conclusive answer to the question but provides cues about the salient issues concerning the theorization of the semantics of generic sentences.
Are Lions Green?: Child L2 Learners' Interpretation of English Generics and Definite Determiners
Languages, 2017
The aim of this small-scale study (22 participants) was to analyze how L1-Spanish L2-English children interpret English noun phrases (NPs) by taking into consideration two variables: children's age and amount of input. These two variables were studied in relation to children's developmental tendencies and language transfer. Children begin with an innate predisposition for the generic interpretation, which leads them to incorrectly interpret some specific NPs. In contrast, transfer from the L1 explains the incorrect mapping between NP and interpretation in adult L2 speakers. We examined 22 L1-Spanish L2-English children and a control group of L1-English children on their interpretation of English NPs through an online task. Results revealed that L2 children's interpretations significantly differ from the interpretations of the control group. We propose that like L1 children, child L2 learners will have to overcome their natural predisposition to interpret NPs as generic. However, child L2 learners must also overcome transfer effects from their L1. Additionally, results seem to suggest that the amount of input plays a role in learners' interpretations. We propose that children who receive similar amounts of input in their two languages become aware of the differences faster, particularly in the forms where there is no overlapping between the languages (i.e., bare NPs).