A Brief History and Analysis of Indonesia's Forest Fire Crisis (original) (raw)
Free related PDFsRelated papers
The Political Economy of Indonesia’s 1997 Forest Fires
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 1998
In 1997 terrible forest fires swept Indonesia. What caused these fires? President Suharto called them 'a natural disaster', primarily triggered by the drought and irresponsible indigenous 'slash-and-burn' farmers. Yet these fires were certainly not 'natural'. They were, instead, a disaster that arose naturally from the political economy of Indonesian forest mismanagement. Decades of reckless logging have left wide areas degraded and highly susceptible to fires. To 'reforest' these areas, companies lit most of the fires to clear land and establish palm oil, and to a lesser extent, rubber and industrial wood plantations. Government policies and international markets provided incentives for these companies. Corruption assisted and protected them. And indifference, low state capacity, inconsistent and weak responses, and a dry El Nino year fuelled these fires
Free PDF
Free PDF
Free PDF
Hazy Days: Forest Fires and the Politics of Environmental Security in Indonesia,
The Indonesian “haze” that engulfs Southeast Asia is a result of the burning of forests and has a detrimental effect on the health of millions of people. Indonesia is currently the third largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world. In response to the dangers posed by forest fires to national and global environmental security, the then Indonesian president publicly declared a “war on haze” in 2006 and called for the use of all necessary measures to stop the deliberate setting of fires. Although his strong “securitising” rhetoric received much public support, it is yet to produce results. The Indonesian authorities have had little success in preventing fires or prosecuting the culprits. Indonesia thus appears to be a null case – that is, a case of an unsuccessful securitisation. We argue that this unsuccessful securitisation needs to be understood against the backdrop of Indonesia’s vast decentralisation process, which resulted in certain powers being devolved from Jakarta to the provinces. We find that it is the ability of local and regional elites (often entrenched in patronage networks with plantation owners) to curtail environmental policies which explains the continuation of forest fires. With regard to securitisation theory, our findings suggest that securitising moves and audience acceptance do not necessarily lead to the successful implementation of emergency measures. It appears that there are intermediate factors – in our case mainly linked to the nature of and the distribution of power within the political regime – that impact on the success of securitisation processes.
Free PDF
With more than 237 million inhabitants, Indonesia is the world’s third-largest democracy after India and the United States. The implosion of the so-called New Order dictatorship in 1998 triggered a broad range of institutional reforms, such as the introduction of elections and various constitutional changes. This improvement of formal institutions has made further progress since 2009. In reality, however, a lack of political will means that enforcement of reform laws is weak and the quality of democracy remains low. In addition, there is no comprehensive agenda for how to address Indonesia’s many political and socioeconomic challenges. Instead, most political elites rely on vote-buying and other forms of political corruption to garner political support and influence. The image in both domestic and foreign media of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as an honest broker and committed reformer is highly exaggerated. Recently, there have been indications of a democratic roll-back.
Free PDF
Free PDF
(2016) The Epitome of Indonesia: Invisible powers of visible things
Art Review Asia, 2016
Nothing is the same, yet nothing has changed. The late president Sukarno’s vision of Indonesia continues to dominate representations of the country to such an extent that even art that critiques his vision is drawn into it. *** Art Review Asia Vol. 4/No. 3/2016 published a version of this article under the title NOTHING IS THE SAME, YET NOTHING HAS CHANGED. That version was edited without my full consent. Here is my original version.
Free PDF
2009
This quote from Theodore Friend's book Indonesian Destinies is a good place to start. [1] My wife and I lived in Indonesia most of the time from 1965-1998, when we moved back to Virginia. Since then, Soeharto has fallen and four presidents have succeeded him. The country collapsed economically and has begun to recover. Islamic extremists have decimated traditional Christian areas in Eastern Indonesia. Terrorists have bombed Bali, Jakarta, and other places. The Sumatran province of Aceh has boiled under martial law, suffer a tsunami, and has made peace with the central government. Much has happened in Indonesia, but things still stay essentially the same. Indonesians, as well as outside observers, find this difficult to explain. Perhaps this is why so few people outside of Indonesia are knowledgeable about this extraordinary and important country.
Free PDF
Free PDF
Indonesia in the 1980s: A time of transition
Asian Affairs, 1985
This paper is based on a talk I gave to the Royal Institute of Asian Affairs in London in late 1984. At that time, Suharto's 'New Order' regime (1966-98) was just 18 years old and my paper attempts to assess its achievements and challenges. Rereading it now at a distance of over 30 years brings up a certain poignancy. 'The past is a foreign country they do things differently' (Hartley 1957). But it may be of contemporary interest as many of the New Order's problems are still with us in the Jokowi era (2014-19), corruption not least.
Free PDF
