Voting Theory for Two Parties Under Approval Rule (original) (raw)
Related papers
On the Properties of Voting Systems
Scandinavian Political Studies, 1981
The article focuses on the problem of choosing the ‘best’ voting procedure for making collective decisions. The procedures discussed are simple majority rule, Borda count, approval voting, and maximin method. The first three have been axiomatized while the maximin method has not yet been given an axiomatic characterization. The properties, in terms of which the goodness of the procedures is assessed, are dictatorship, consistency, path independence, weak axiom of revealed preference, Pareto optimality, and manipulability. It turns out that the picture emerging from the comparison of the procedures in terms of these properties is most favorable to the approval voting.
How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting
Studies in Choice and Welfare, 2006
Approval balloting is applied to the problem of electing a representative committee. We demonstrate several procedures for determining a committee based on approval ballots, paying particular attention to weighting methods that can reduce the in¤uence of voters with extreme views. We show that a general class of voting systems based on approval ballots can be implemented through analysis of appropriate tables. A by-product of this procedure is a clari£cation of the complexity of these systems.
Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference
Studies in Choice and Welfare, 2009
Information on the rankings and information on the approval of candidates in an election, though related, are fundamentally different-one cannot be derived from the other. Both kinds of information are important in the determination of social choices. We propose a way of combining them in two hybrid voting systems, preference approval voting (PAV) and fallback voting (FV), that satisfy several desirable properties, including monotonicity. Both systems may give different winners from standard ranking and nonranking voting systems. PAV, especially, encourages candidates to take coherent majoritarian positions, but it is more information-demanding than FV. PAV and FV are manipulable through voters' contracting or expanding their approval sets, but a 3-candidate dynamic poll model suggests that Condorcet winners, and candidates ranked first or second by the most voters if there is no Condorcet winner, will be favored, though not necessarily in equilibrium.
Suitable Properties for Any Electronic Voting System
Artificial Intelligence and Law, 2007
Numerous countries are heading toward digital infrastructures. In particular this new technology promises to help support methods for elections. However, one should be careful that such an infrastructure does not hinder the voting and representation issues. On the contrary, it should support those issues and help citizens have a clearer picture of the underlying mechanisms. This paper deals with the limits of voting procedures as they are described in classical collective choice theory and reflects on ways to aggregate electronic votes stemming from various individuals that would be at the same time democratic, decisive and rational which is not feasible when candidate rankings alone are taken into account. This paper shows how electronic voting procedures could improve the situation by introducing preference-based votes.
From a toy model to the double square root voting system
2007
We investigate systems of indirect voting based on the law of Penrose, in which each representative in the voting body receives the number of votes (voting weight) proportional to the square root of the population he or she represents. For a generic population distribution, the quota required for the qualified majority can be set in such a way that the voting power of any state is proportional to its weight. For a specific distribution of population the optimal quota has to be computed numerically. We analyse a toy voting model for which the optimal quota can be estimated analytically as a function of the number of members of the voting body. This result, combined with the normal approximation technique, allows us to design a simple, efficient, and flexible voting system, which can be easily adopted for varying weights and number of players.
Constitutional Political Economy, 2023
In this paper, we propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head majority comparison, then A should still win in the election with B included (unless there is another candidate A' who has the same kind of claim to winning, in which case a tiebreaker may choose between A and A'). We call this principle Stability for Winners (with Tiebreaking). Stable Voting satisfies this principle while also having a remarkable ability to avoid tied outcomes in elections even with small numbers of voters.
The Vector-Ballot e-Voting Approach
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2004
Page 1. The Vector-Ballot e-Voting Approach ... Each of the three possesses different advantages and disadvantages wrt the basic properties of (i) efficient tallying, (ii) uni-versal verifiability, and (iii) allowing write-in ballot capability (in addi-tion to predetermined candidates). ...
3rd International Conference on Information Security and Artificial Intelligenc, 2012
In almost all forms of government, voting holds an important role in selecting the winner who could be the head of the department, state or the country. In those states in which preferential voting takes place, the selection of winner becomes a tedious task. There are many algorithms or methods available for preferential voting systems but all of them fail in at least one of the fourteen recognized criterions. Some behavioral strategies exist which can hamper the solution of the selection methods. These strategies cover all those tricks applied by the politicians around the world to increase their chances of winning the election. These tricks can be of the form of manipulation, control or bribery. In order to predict the right winner of the election, we tried to make an algorithm which make use of some the existing methods or algorithms. The algorithm takes into account the number of criterions satisfied by that particular method. It also calculates the effect of complexity of behavioral strategies and the available theorems which can diminish that effect on the selection methods. Our algorithm makes a weighted graph of all the candidates on the basis of the individual weights calculated using the above mentioned factors and then select the most preferred candidate as the winner of the preferential elections.
Assessment of Voting Situations: The Probabilistic Foundations
In this paper we revise the probabilistic foundations of the theory of the measurement of 'voting power' either as success or decisiveness. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting procedure and the voters' behavior.