Moroccan Islamists Debate the Causes of Violent Extremism (original) (raw)

Official Islam's Involvement in Preventing Violent Extremism: Critical Insights from Morocco

The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), 2019

The Moroccan experience presents a typical case of how religion is intensively incorporated as a crucial component of a multi-pronged strategy to combat violent extremism. Morocco’s religion-based Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) strategy lies in its reliance on a well-structured religious bureaucracy that functions in line with a politically-oriented, inclusive vision using persuasive, sophisticated tools, and which supposedly operates in tandem the other socio-economic and security aspects that comprise the total national PVE strategy. Nevertheless, this religion-based strategy suffers from several challenges and deficiencies, including the ideological vision framing it, its instrumentalization to serve certain political interests, and the uncertain efficacy and effectiveness of its modes of functioning, outreach, and scope of action. In order to improve coordination between the different institutions involved in Morocco’s PVE strategy, an intergovernmental body should be created that can synergize their fragmented activities. In addition, state-run religious institutions should develop indicators to assess the impact of their activities. Finally, religious associations and scholars should be involved and provided with appropriate training to effectively contribute to Morocco’s PVE efforts.

Morocco: Country Report on National Approaches to Extremism

radicalisme , 2021

The report sets out valuable data, figures and information regarding violent extremism in their specific contexts, and provide a brief overview of the main policies, strategies and initiatives regarding Prevention/Countering Violent Extremism in the country. Moreover, it also identifies the most relevant stakeholders in the field, both as source and target of such past and current visions and actions.

Moroccan Islamism. Between local participation and international Islamist networks of influence

Morocco has been directly confronted with the violence of radical Islamist groups since the Casablanca attacks of 16 May 2003 and the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004. As these attacks were carried out by Moroccan citizens, the idea of a 'Moroccan exception' -that is, a politically moderate Arab country with 'controlled Islamists' and the absence of political violence -was shattered to pieces. Since then Morocco has implemented diff erent policies trying to counter radicalisation and prevent violent terrorist attacks, while simultaneously trying to secure the pace of political reforms.

Morocco – Macro-drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism

Connekt H2020, 2022

This publication reflects only the views of the author(s); the European Commission and Research Executive Agency are not responsible for any information it contains. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed).

The Limits of Morocco's Attempt to Comprehensively Counter Violent Extremism

After terrorist attacks in 2003, Morocco launched an ambitious and wide-ranging strategy to counter violent extremism. Intended to both target existing terror groups and address the roots of radicalization, this comprehensive strategy sought to combine security measures with efforts to improve socioeconomic conditions and promote the state’s moderate interpretation of Islam. In this Brief, Mohammed Masbah assesses this strategy and finds that, while it has been largely successful at hindering jihadi groups from operating inside Morocco over the past 15 years, it failed to prevent hundreds of Moroccans from radicalizing and joining groups fighting abroad. Masbah argues that the domination of security agencies in implementing the strategy sidelined its non-security aspects, which also suffered from being too broad, unfocused, and lacking in complementarity. As a result, Morocco seems to have failed to make sufficient progress in achieving its broader objective of fighting poverty and social exclusion. The Brief concludes by discussing the implications of the assessment for the expected return of hundreds of Moroccans who fought in Syria and Iraq with ISIS.

Salafi Jihadism, Disengagement, and the Monarchy: Exploring the case of Morocco

2019

What meanings have formerly engaged (radicalized) Salafists ascribed to their disengagement and how have they become embedded in their everyday lives? There are two narratives that can explain this question. On the one hand, there is a central inclusive narrative that suggest the institutionalization of the religious terrain in Morocco through the Institution of the Commander of the Faithful (mou'assassat imarat al mou'minine) or ICF, which allows the Monarchy to play the king-religious role as the guarantor of religion and other faiths. On the other hand, Salafi Jihadists represent the second exclusive narrative through a religious concept that has taken a violent understanding called "loyalty and disavowal" (Al Wal'a wal Bar'a) or WB. The power of this narrative lies in the ability to divide society into a near and far enemy. Put it another way, to ask how those very meanings affect their everyday lives, a change in Salafi worldview for example allows them to live lives that seemed not possible before far from violence. As a result, there is no one picture of disengagement. Disengagement happens very differently in each case. Specifically, we argue that Salafi Jihadists' disengagement has been informed, and shaped, by the meanings they attribute to their experiences in the everyday life. As such, this thesis is not about process, or pathways, or models of engagement and disengagement it is about meanings each one assigns to his or her experience. In addition to advancing theories of violent radicalization and disengagement from violence, this thesis makes a methodological contribution to the study of the meanings of disengagement through an ethnographic fieldwork in Morocco and Jordan.

Morocco’s Salafi Ex-Jihadis: Co-optation, Engagement, and the Limits of Inclusion

2017

In the wake of the political protests that erupted in Morocco in 2011, King Mohammed VI issued royal pardons in March 2011 and February 2012 to a group of prominent Salafi exJihadis, that is – Salafi Jihadis who had renounced violence. He offered to release them from prison on the condition that they either remain apolitical or participate in the legal political process. The offer was part of the monarchy’s broader effort to battle and defeat extremism. As a consequence of the pardon, several Salafi ex-Jihadi sheikhs chose to join political parties and stood as candidates for the first time in the Moroccan parliamentary elections in October 2016. Taken together, these moves reflect a major turning point in the trajectory of Moroccan Salafi Jihadism from their total rejection of the existing political system to their limited acceptance of working within it. This significant shift toward taking part in mainstream politics has been attributed by seasoned observers to the regime’s inclu...

Current Moroccan Anti-Terrorism Policy

2011

Theme: Legal, social and religious reforms shape Morocco's counter-terrorism. Though the policy has worked, in general, there have been reversals with human rights shortcomings and corruptions which affect these reforms. Returning to reform in counterterrorism should involve the Moroccan public. Summary: This paper argues that Morocco's counter-terrorism policy, which involved legal, social and religious reforms, has worked, in general. Nevertheless, there have been reversals with each policy area with human rights shortcomings and corruptions working to undermine the pace and rate of reforms. These accumulated reversals eventually fed the 20 February 2011 social movement which forced a return to more active reforms. There are certain default patterns of thought present among some in the country that could create a political opening for the convicted terrorists and their sympathisers. To help, the outside world needs to proceed in a manner that includes the Moroccan public. The Moroccan government is aware broadly of the problem and has offered a package of reforms. Analysis: Morocco follows a complex anti-terrorism policy borne largely out of the state's reactions to the events of 16 May 2003, when a group, later found to be associated with al-Qaeda, attacked a number of sites in the city of Casablanca with home-made suicide bombs, killing about three dozen people including most of their own. The terrorist attacks of that day continue to shape anti-terrorism policy, broadly speaking, although with some recent and significant modifications. The strategy adapted after 16 May 2003 included an anti-terrorism law, social assistance programmes and a reform of the religious sector. In each of these three sectors there have been both successes and failures.