Official Islam's Involvement in Preventing Violent Extremism: Critical Insights from Morocco (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Limits of Morocco's Attempt to Comprehensively Counter Violent Extremism
After terrorist attacks in 2003, Morocco launched an ambitious and wide-ranging strategy to counter violent extremism. Intended to both target existing terror groups and address the roots of radicalization, this comprehensive strategy sought to combine security measures with efforts to improve socioeconomic conditions and promote the state’s moderate interpretation of Islam. In this Brief, Mohammed Masbah assesses this strategy and finds that, while it has been largely successful at hindering jihadi groups from operating inside Morocco over the past 15 years, it failed to prevent hundreds of Moroccans from radicalizing and joining groups fighting abroad. Masbah argues that the domination of security agencies in implementing the strategy sidelined its non-security aspects, which also suffered from being too broad, unfocused, and lacking in complementarity. As a result, Morocco seems to have failed to make sufficient progress in achieving its broader objective of fighting poverty and social exclusion. The Brief concludes by discussing the implications of the assessment for the expected return of hundreds of Moroccans who fought in Syria and Iraq with ISIS.
Community Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism: Morocco as a Case Study
Center for Global Policy, 2019
The threat posed by violent extrem- ism, from groups such as Daesh1 and al-Qaeda affiliates as well as right wing extremists in the West, requires a multi- pronged and sustainable response. Both types of extremist groups desire a world divided into existential fault lines. Both have inflicted thousands of casualties and caused senseless deaths. Prevention of violent extremism (PVE) needs to move beyond military and aggressive security measures. Unless the root causes of violent extremism are adequately addressed, violent ide- ologies will continue to metastasize via online and offline networks. A long-term solution requires a complex approach that addresses violent extremism in all its forms. Despite territorial losses in Iraq and Syria, Daesh continues to evolve its tactical and propaganda strategies to draw recruits and to further its political agenda. Through its innovative and media-savvy techniques, Daesh has offered youths an outlet for their grievances and dreams. Existing PVE programming has failed because of its one-size-fits-all approach and overemphasis on ideology. Effective programs must be community-led and designed to respond to the strengths and challenges of local circumstances. Policies to prevent violent extremism should anchor women as frontline decision makers and youths as active Policies to prevent violent extremism should anchor women as frontline decision makers and youths as active partners in peacebuilding. partners in peacebuilding. From a com- munication perspective, policy makers must reduce the emotional and rational appeals of all violent extremist groups. Based on Daesh recruitment propa- ganda analysis and extensive fieldwork in Morocco, this policy brief enriches established understandings of PVE and outlines recommendations and les- sons learned for PVE practitioners and grassroots leaders on future programs seeking effective community approaches to peacebuilding in the region.
Morocco: Country Report on National Approaches to Extremism
radicalisme , 2021
The report sets out valuable data, figures and information regarding violent extremism in their specific contexts, and provide a brief overview of the main policies, strategies and initiatives regarding Prevention/Countering Violent Extremism in the country. Moreover, it also identifies the most relevant stakeholders in the field, both as source and target of such past and current visions and actions.
Moroccan Islamists Debate the Causes of Violent Extremism
Journal of Global Initiatives: Policy, Pedagogy, Perspective, 2019
Using Moroccan sources associated with the Islamist movement, this paper outlines the theological and political challenges facing Morocco in terms of violent extremism, especially those posed by certain Wahhabi and Salafist views that reject mainstream Moroccan Islam. It outlines the state’s response to terrorism and evaluates its causes as offered by several Islamist Moroccan intellectuals.
2019
Can official Islamic institutions play a role in preventing violent extremism? Most Arab governments have granted a role to religious institutions in this regard in recent years. Yet, the cases of Lebanon, Morocco and Saudi Arabia exhibit considerable differences. In Lebanon, the role of Sunni religious institution Dar al-Fatwa is limited. Due to the weakness of state capacity and to the external interference in the country, Dar al-Fatwa is hardly able to coordinate Sunni religious activities there. The corresponding institutions in Morocco and in Saudi Arabia, however, are powerful, and also perform foreign policy roles through religious diplomacy.
Morocco – Macro-drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism
Connekt H2020, 2022
This publication reflects only the views of the author(s); the European Commission and Research Executive Agency are not responsible for any information it contains. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed).
Drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism-MOROCCO-CONNEKT H2020
2024
This publication reflects only the views of the author(s); the European Commission and Research Executive Agency are not responsible for any information it contains. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed).
State Religious Institutions in the MENA: Can They Prevent Violent Radicalization?
2020
In Egypt and Tunisia, where violent radicalization has increased in recent years, official religious institutions have been tasked by the governments with the mission of countering 'deviant' ideas by preaching 'moderate' Islam. In order for religious institutions to play a positive role in preventing violent radicalization, they should start by consolidating their status as legitimate religious actors independent of political authorities, and then compete with their ideas in a plural religious sphere, rather than impose them on Muslims as 'the true Islam'. While the EU could encourage the political regimes in both countries to ensure the independence of these religious institutions, it should engage cautiously with state religious institutions so as to not unintentionally damage their legitimacy in the religious sphere.