Nietzsche on Truth. A Pragmatic View? (original) (raw)
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Nietzsche's Pragmatism. A Study on Perspectival Thought
De Gruyter, Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung, vol. 72, 2019
During his late period, Nietzsche is particularly concerned with the value that mankind attributes to truth. In dealing with that topic, Nietzsche is not primarly interested in the metaphysical disputes on truth, but rather in the effects that the "will to truth" has on the human being. In fact, he argues that the "faith in a value as such of truth" influenced Western culture and started the anthropological degeneration of the human type that characterizes European morality. To call into question the value of truth is therefore necessary, if one wants to help mankind to find her way in the labyrinth of nihilism. In this new addition to Nietzsche scholarship, Gori explores the origin and aim of the philosopher's late perspectival thought by merging the theoretical with the historical approach, with a special focus on the epistemological debate that influenced Nietzsche. As a result, the book provides a contextual reading of the issue that supports the idea that Nietzsche’s attitude in addressing the problem of truth is, in a broad sense, pragmatic.
Between Modern and Postmodern: Nietzsche on Truth and Knowledge
2013
This thesis examines Nietzsche’s epistemology. Its main interlocutors are two previously existing attempts to explain Nietzsche’s views on truth and knowledge. One of these interpretations I dub the ‘postmodern’ reading, held most notably by Sarah Kofman, Jacques Derrida, and Paul de Man. The other is the ‘modern’ reading of Walter Kaufmann, John T. Wilcox, and most prominently Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter. Each of these readings emphasizes one aspect of Nietzsche’s thought. The postmodern reading focuses on Nietzsche’s more radical pronouncements, and promotes a type of scepticism and subjectivism. The modern reading, by contrast, emphasizes Nietzsche’s more traditional claims, and argues that he lauds science and preserves our ability to attain truth. However, neither reading is entirely satisfactory. In what follows, I first critically examine both of these readings in detail. The first chapter highlights the major points of these two readings, as well as some issues in each...
Nietzsche and the Value of Truth
Adam Widawski, 2019
This is a postgraduate essay wherein I present Nietzsche's revaluation of the value of truth as internally consistent. In it I seek to resolve two tensions: First, between Nietzsche's critique of 'the will to truth', and the value of his own truth-seeking. Second, between Nietzsche's virtue of intellectual integrity and his positive evaluation of self-deception. I justify Nietzsche's critique on grounds of it being intentionally self-directed: the apparent contradictions in Nietzsche's argument stem from his sincere recognition of his inability to escape the very paradigm which he critiques, so there is no way for him to be exempt from his own critique. Where his greatest contribution to philosophy lies, however, is in the exposing of the unconscious metaphysical motivations which underpin the modern secular-scientific mindset.
Nietzsche's Conception of Truth and Perspectivism
The vein in Nietzsche’s account of truth pertains mostly to its value as an ideal, and the accompanying will to truth. Let us begin by recognizing that Nietzsche does not use the term ‘truth’ consistently throughout his works, or even within the same work. For him truth does not have a universal meaning or definition, on the contrary he attempts to locate the different senses that it has been traditionally employed, and proceed with his critique. Yet, it does not seem likely that Nietzsche wishes to abandon the concept of truth altogether. Rather, he is better construed as discarding particular conceptions of truth in order to make room for his own alternative conception, which he thinks is the only sustainable one. While not conforming to traditional theories of truth, he wants to reclaim truth from the exclusive labour and produce of reason. Nietzsche wants to recover and redefine truth, to bring it back within life’s bosom; his notion of truth springs from this world, from his perspective, which he does not attempt to veil. What follows is an attempt to explore these themes in what could be thought of as his genealogy of truth, and the notion of perspectivism.
Nietzsche often gives the impression that all human beliefs are false. Some scholars, like Maudemarie Clark, believe that such a “falsification thesis” is unacceptable and try to limit Nietzsche’s commitment to it, claiming that he abandons it in his very last works. Others, like Lanier Anderson and Nadeem Hussain, take it in ways that make it true and locate it in all. I argue that the view that is common to both approaches—that Nietzsche held that thesis in the first place—is unjustified. To that end, I interpret the texts where these scholars claim to find the thesis in a way that shows that they do not commit Nietzsche to it, and I offer some reasons for thinking that this is a more fruitful way of interpreting his views on the importance of truth—and falsehood—and their function in the economy of human life.
Truth as Value: Nietzsche’s Escape from Nihilism
1967
Abstract Nietzsche's conception of truth provides the foundation for his entire philosophy. To clarify his view of what it means for a proposition to be “true,” this thesis considers Nietzsche's attacks (in his writings from 1885 on) on three previous conceptions of truth.
Nietzsche's Conception of Truth: Correspondence, Coherence, or Pragmatist?
Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 2015
Nearly every common theory of truth has been attributed to Nietzsche, while some commentators have argued that he simply has no theory of truth. This essay argues that Nietzsche’s remarks on truth are better situated within either the coherence or pragmatist theories of truth than the correspondence theory. Nietzsche’s thoughts conflict with the correspondence framework because he believes that the truth conditions of propositions are constitutively dependent on our actions.
Ontological Understanding of Truth, Perspective and Morality in Nietzsche the Anti-Relativist
Aletheia: Texas A&M Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy, 2022
Nietzsche has a word to say in most of the areas of philosophy. In ontology, there is the idea of becoming, in epistemology he talks about perspectivism and truth, and his ethics has the morality of the Overman. However, although enough has been said about Nietzsche’s philosophy in general, not much emphasis has been given to how his views about perspectivism, morality, and truth relate to the ontology of becoming. The aim of this paper is to shed light on this important connection. Accordingly, first, the paper examines his ontology of becoming and contrasts it with the Parmenidean ontology of being. Later, the paper follows Nietzsche’s footsteps in deconstructing the commonsense understanding of Truth and shows how he reconfigures the truths with his perspectivism in connection with the ontology of becoming. Towards the end, it presents Nietzsche’s criticism of morality as being-in-itself that—the paper argues—follows the Parmenidean ontology of being. Finally, by emphasizing the order of value differences in some valuations, meanings, truths, and focusing on Nietzsche’s denial of nihilism, the paper argues against the claim of Nietzsche being a moral relativist.
The central thesis of this extremely well-argued book, the published version of a PHD dissertation obtained jointly from the Philosophy Departments at King´s College/University of London and the University of Durham which received high praise from such renowned professors of philosophy as David E. Cooper, Chris Long and David Owen is that Nietzsche developed in his unpublished writings, the Nachgelassene Fragmente, a concept of the will to power that constitutes a metaphysical "system" which describes the world as it is. Hence its truth does not reside in an ethical realm, that stipulates what the world should be like -but rather offers a logically consistent description and explanation of what the world is made of and what drives it. In this regard, Sorgner has identified a key area of Nietzsche-studies, where the murky waters of an ideological war around claims and counter-claims of the proto-fascist nature of this concept, exacerbated by the eponymous book edited by Alfred Bäumler and Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, were in high need of clarification by a stringently reasoned philosophical analysis on the one hand, while on the other, and perhaps more importantly, he brilliantly attempts to resolve the old dilemma of philosophers, why they should take Nietzsche´s aphorisms seriously if he disavows their claim to truth.