Awareness of the Body "From the Inside": Identification, Ownership, and Error (original) (raw)
Related papers
Theoria et Historia Scientiarum, 2003
In this paper I argue that proprioceptive awareness (including both somatic and ecological proprioception) is primarily a form of non-perceptual awareness. This turns out to be philosophically significant in regard to what Shoemaker calls 'immunity to error through misidentification'. Although it is possible to make a mistake in identifying one's body via sense-perceptual modalities such as vision, some philosophers argue that one is immune to error through misidentification in regard to knowing one's own body by means of proprioception. If proprioception were a form of perception then it would be possible for one to proprioceptively misidentify oneself in referring to one's body. In arguing that proprioception is not a form of perception I am defending the immunity principle in this regard.
Bodily Self-Knowledge as a Special Form of Perception
Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin, 2022
We enjoy immediate knowledge of our own limbs and bodies. I argue that this knowledge, which is also called proprioception, is a special form of perception, special in that it is, unlike perception by the external senses, at the same time also a form of genuine self-knowledge. The argument has two parts. Negatively, I argue against the view, held by G. E. M. Anscombe and strengthened by John McDowell, that this knowledge, bodily self-knowledge, is non-perceptual. This involves, inter alia, rescuing from McDowell’s attack the very idea of receptive self-knowledge (of which perceptual self-knowledge is a species). On the positive side, I develop, by drawing on the work of Brian O’Shaughnessy, a detailed account of bodily self-knowledge as a special form of perception. This account spells out how this special form of perception is epistemologically mediated by sensations of a special class of primary qualities—vital-dynamic sensations as I call them—in one’s limbs.
Bodily awareness and self-consciousness
Oxford Companion to the Self (edited by Shaun Gallagher), 2011
We are embodied, and we are aware of our bodies ‘from the inside’ through different forms of bodily awareness. But what is the relation between these two facts? Are these forms of bodily awareness types of self-consciousness, on a par, say, with introspection? In this paper I argue that bodily awareness is a basic form of self-consciousness, through which perceiving agents are directly conscious of the bodily self. The first two sections clarify the nature of bodily awareness. We are aware of our bodies in many different ways. Some are conscious; others non-conscious. Some are conceptual; others nonconceptual. Some are first-personal; others third personal. The first section of this paper taxonomizes these different types of bodily awareness. Some philosophers have claimed that we have a “sense of ownership” of our own bodies. In section II I evaluate, and ultimately reject, a strong reading of this claim, on which the sense of ownership is a distinct and phenomenologically salient dimension of bodily awareness. In sections III to V I explore how bodily awareness functions as a form of self-consciousness. Section III discusses the significance of certain forms of bodily awareness sharing an important epistemological property with canonical forms of self-consciousness such as introspection. This is the property of being immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person pronoun. I explain why having the immunity property qualifies those types of bodily awareness as forms of self-consciousness (subject to two further requirements that I spell out). In section IV I consider, and remain unconvinced by, an argument to the effect that bodily awareness cannot have first person content (and hence cannot count as a form of self-consciousness). Finally, section V sketches out an account of the spatial content of bodily awareness and explores the particular type of awareness of the bodily self that it provides.
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2014
'Own-body perception' refers to the perception of one's body as one's own body. The chapter reviews various disruptions to own-body perception, including what is known about their neural correlates. It argues that it is crucial to distinguish between the sense of ownership for one's body as an object of perception-the body-as-object-and the sense of ownership for one's body as that by which and through which one perceives the world -the body-as-subject. Despite the fact that illusory own-body perception provides an excellent case for illustrating this distinction, most discussions to date of own-body perception have failed to make this distinction and apply it to the various clinical and experimental findings. The chapter summarizes one recent model of the body-as-subject, according to which the body-as-subject is based on sensorimotor integration. Finally, it uses this model to clarify the phenomenon of illusory own-body perception, and it suggests directions for future research.
The Missing Pieces in the Scientific Study of Bodily Awareness
Research on bodily awareness has focused on body illusions with an aim to explore the possible dissociation of our bodily awareness from our own body. It has provided insights into how our sensory modalities shape our sense of embodiment, and it has raised important questions regarding the malleability of our sense of ownership over our own body. The issue, however, is that this research fails to consider an important distinction in how we experience our body. There are indeed two ways in which we can be aware of our body: via observational awareness, which involves attending to the body as an object, and via non-observational awareness, where the body is given as the subject of experience and does not involve attention. The research to date has focused on the former — observational bodily awareness — and has left the latter — non-observational bodily awareness — in the dark. This is detrimental to ever formulating a complete account of how we are aware of our body. It is understandable, however, because of the inherent problem in studying non-observational bodily awareness: how would you instruct a subject to report on their unattended awareness of the body? In view to resolving this problem, I propose here a working hypothesis on the basis of research on interoception and the rubber hand illusion, and on the effect of meditation on awareness and attention. This working hypothesis can show us a way to begin studying non-observational bodily awareness, and finally build a complete theory of bodily awareness.
Bodily ownership, bodily awareness, and knowledge without observation (Analysis)
In a recent paper, Fredérique de Vignemont has argued that there is a positive quale of bodily ownership . She thinks that tactile and other forms of somatosensory phenomenology incorporate a distinctive feeling of myness and takes issue with my defense in Bermúdez of a deflationary approach to bodily ownership. That paper proposed an argument deriving from Elizabeth Anscombe’s various discussions of what she terms knowledge without observation . De Vignemont is not convinced and appeals to the Rubber Hand Illusion to undercut my appeal to Anscombe. Section 1 of this article restates the case against the putative quale of ownership. Section 2 explains why de Vignemonts’ objections miss the mark. Section 3 discusses in more detail how to draw a principled distinction between bodily awareness and ordinary perceptual awareness.
Illusory own body perceptions: Case reports and relevance for bodily self-consciousness
Consciousness and Cognition, 2010
Neurological disorders of body representation have for a long time suggested the importance of multisensory processing of bodily signals for self-consciousness. One such group of disorders -illusory own body perceptions affecting the entire body -has been proposed to be especially relevant in this respect, based on neurological data as well as philosophical considerations. This has recently been tested experimentally in healthy subjects showing that integration of multisensory bodily signals from the entire body with respect to the three aspects: self-location, first-person perspective, and self-location, is crucial for bodily self-consciousness. Here we present clinical and neuroanatomical data of two neurological patients with paroxysmal disorders of full body representation in whom only one of these aspects, self-identification, was abnormal. We distinguish such disorders of global body representation from related but distinct disorders and discuss their relevance for the neurobiology of bodily self-consciousness.