Ukraine, Russia and the EU : Breaking the deadlock in the Minsk process (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies, 2015
The article describes the formats in which the “Ukrainian question” has been discussed in various forums in the last year and defines various reasons why meetings within the format of the “normandy Quartet” was the most effective. he Ukrainian national interest considered, it analyzes the preferences and shortcomings of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements and the Declaration by the President of the Russian Federation, the President of Ukraine, the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in support of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements adopted on February 12, 2015
Post-Crimean Twister: Russia, the EU and the Law of Sanctions
EU-Russia relations have never been simple. On the one hand, these two international actors have common values and interests. On the other, they have a conflictual relationship, which has become particularly acute after the Ukrainian crisis that started in 2014. After Ukrainian crisis, the EU and Russia have entered a new era. Unfortunately, it is an era of brinkmanship. This brinkmanship is marked, prima facie, by mutual sanctions. After 20 years of partnership and good neighborliness it sounds illogically, but it is a reality. The strategic nature of the EU-Russia partnership has been placed in doubt. The aim of this article is to show that the " war of sanctions, " which has frozen official contacts and negotiations have not achieved anything. This crisis can only be overcome through dialogue. However, at the moment, the main critics of the EU sanctions amongst EU Member States are too weak to convince the other members to lift them. The article concerns the modern legal aspects and modern legal circumstances surrounding EU-Russia relations in the light of recent events and the deterioration of relations between Russia and the EU in general. In this framework, an account is given of the EU's reaction to the Ukrainian conflict in the context of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and of the EU restrictive measures as well as in the context of the Russian countersanctions. A special attention is paid to the EU Court of Justice case-law in the field of the restrictive measures.
The Minsk II Agreement: Implications of a Ceasefire
The Minsk II Agreement, reached on February 12, 2015 between Ukraine and the separatist provinces in the east of the country, did not lead to an immediate ceasefire. The Russian-backed separatists intensified the fighting and succeeded in encircling and defeating the Ukrainian forces in the Debaltseve bulge. Russia is thus working to establish the separatist provinces as a significant actor and position them as leverage against Ukraine’s tilt to the West. Overall, Russia is working to create a “frozen conflict” in Ukraine, which can be heated up if the need arises to protect Russian interests. However, it is still too early to assess the effectiveness of Russia’s tactic, particularly in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. The economic sanctions have not been lifted, and in the meantime, Russia has expanded its competition with the West to other arenas, first and foremost the Middle East. It is stepping up its efforts to rehabilitate its status in the region, eroded in recent years because of the political turmoil in the Arab world.
Were the Minsk Agreements doomed to failure? An alternative history
Puti k miru i bezopasnosti, 2022
History does not allow for subjunctive mood but politics do allow. As Russia"s special military operation is underway in Ukraine growing into a major, deadly conflict with unpredictable consequences, it is worthwhile to ask a question: could this conflict be prevented if the Minsk agreements were implemented? The 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements were aimed at securing a ceasefire between the Ukrainian government and pro-Russian separatists in southeastern Ukraine (Donbass). The rebels from Donetsk and Lugansk drew their courage from the "Crimea precedent"-Moscow"s incorporation of the Crimea "on the basis of voluntary self-determination and historical commonness". The Minsk agreements were a product of the Normandy format-a platform for senior diplomats from France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine, created in June 2014 with the aim of finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The agreements ended large-scale fighting, but not creeping violence that posed the main obstacle for the political settlement of the conflict. The article provides an analysis of the Minsk agreements, including their strengths and weaknesses. Special attention is paid to the EU"s political goals and instruments for the peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian conflict. The article also seeks to explain why the Europeans have not been able to take on a more visible and effective role in the implementation of their proclaimed goals.
Russia's War on Ukraine: Two Inconvenient Truths for the EU
Rome, IAI, November 2022, 5 p. (JOINT Briefs ; 24), 2022
While continuing to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty, EU leaders should actively discourage actions which bring an unnecessarily high risk of escalation, such as a direct Ukrainian attempt to retake Crimea by force. Over the months and years to come, efforts at deterrence must be paired with an understanding that a fully stable order cannot be constructed by forever excluding Russia.
ARE SANCTIONS NECESSARY? INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE FACE OF WAR IN UKRAINE
Crisis resulting from the refusal to sign association agreement between the European Union and Ukraine by Viktor Yanukovych's government was one of the most unpredictable events in the history of this country. The agreement was to be a symbolic confirmation of the development direction of Ukraine: economic modernisation and political democratisation. As a result of lengthy discussions over the content and validity of the understanding, a crisis arose that turned into an armed conflict. International community did not approve of this situation and imposed sanctions on the Russian Federation. A number of financial sanctions was imposed, assets were frozen, acquisition of financial funds was limited, embargo was imposed on a number of industrial and energy products and the Russian authorities were forbidden to cross the EU borders. The aim of this article is to present the outcomes of the sanctions and assessment of their effectiveness. For this purpose, the most adequate method was used namely institutional and legal analysis. Therefore, the subject of the research is a set of selected legal sources (notes, framework documents, research reports) concerning the regulation of sanctions towards Russia.
How to end Russia's war on Ukraine: Safeguarding Europe's future, and the dangers of a false peace
As Ukraine continues to fight to liberate its occupied territories and eject Russian invaders, its Western backers debate the likely endgame for the war and its aftermath. The international response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, while impressive in many ways, remains inadequate to the task and dangerously wobbly. Russia’s wider threat to the rules-based international order is also insufficiently acknowledged. Many proposals have been put forward for how the conflict could, or should, be brought to a close. Some, though well-intentioned, involve concessions that would effectively appease Russia, betray Ukraine and endanger Europe. Persistent calls for a ceasefire or ‘negotiated settlement’ to end the fighting without tackling its underlying cause – Russia’s ambition to eliminate Ukraine as we know it – will do no more than reward the aggressor while punishing the victim. This multi-author report takes nine commonly espoused ideas for quick fixes or objections to bolster...