combinatorial auctions without money (original) (raw)

An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents

Eva Tardos

Internet Mathematics, 2004

View PDFchevron_right

On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions

Allan Borodin

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2010

View PDFchevron_right

Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions

Michael Schapira

Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 2012

View PDFchevron_right

Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions

ita _it

1999

View PDFchevron_right

Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions

Ahuva Mu'alem

Foundations of Computer …, 2003

View PDFchevron_right

Hard-to-Manipulate Combinatorial Auctions

Saurabh Sanghvi

2010

View PDFchevron_right

Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation

Robert Kleinberg

Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '10, 2010

View PDFchevron_right

Near Optimal Non-truthful Auctions

Thanh Nguyên Nguyen

2011

View PDFchevron_right

Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy

Robert Kleinberg

Proceedings of the 43rd annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '11, 2011

View PDFchevron_right

Combinatorial auctions: Vc v. vcg

Michael Schapira

View PDFchevron_right

Combinatorial auctions with budgets

Amos Fiat

2010

View PDFchevron_right

Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design

Konstantinos Daskalakis

2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2013

View PDFchevron_right

Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies

Ron Lavi

Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm - SODA '06, 2006

View PDFchevron_right

Inapproximability for VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions

Robert Kleinberg, Michael Schapira

Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2010

View PDFchevron_right

Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction

Mark Isaac

Experimental Economics, 2000

View PDFchevron_right

Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions

Kaustubh Deshmukh

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2002

View PDFchevron_right

VC v. VCG: Inapproximability of combinatorial auctions via generalizations of the VC dimension

Michael Schapira

2009

View PDFchevron_right

On complexity of single-minded auction

Xiaotie Deng

Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 2004

View PDFchevron_right

Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions

Yair Bartal

Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge - TARK '03, 2003

View PDFchevron_right

Instantiating the Contingent Bids Model of Truthful Interdependent Value Auctions

Takayuki Ito

View PDFchevron_right

Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games

Weizhao Wang

Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2005

View PDFchevron_right

Truthfulness via proxies

Robert Kleinberg

2010

View PDFchevron_right

Decomposing Truthful and Competitive Online Double Auctions

Laurent Perrussel

View PDFchevron_right

Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions

Michael Schapira

Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '08, 2008

View PDFchevron_right

Equilibria of Greedy Combinatorial Auctions

Allan Borodin

SIAM Journal on Computing, 2017

View PDFchevron_right

Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions

Michael Schapira

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2008

View PDFchevron_right

The Primal Auction: a new design for multi-commodity double auctions

Michiel Keyzer

View PDFchevron_right

Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders

Michael Schapira

Mathematics of Operations Research, 2010

View PDFchevron_right