"Different Humans and Different Rights?" - On Human Dignity from Western and Eastern Orthodox Perspectives (original) (raw)
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Human Dignity and the Foundations of Human Rights
The expression "human dignity" is nowadays commonly found in close proximity to that of "human rights", not only in official legal and political documents, but also in the discourse of political activists, lawyers, philosophers and ordinary citizens. We can distinguish at least three functions that invocations of human dignity perform in connection with human rights.
This Chapter explores four prominent objections to the overarching role that human dignity plays in constitutional and human rights law. In the eyes of its critics, human dignity is objectionable because it (1) is too variable to be captured by a coherent constitutional theory; (2) stands in opposition to a liberal vision of constitutional governance; (3) fails to offer guidance for resolving constitutional disputes; and (4) is incapable of justifying anything until it is itself justified. My aim is to unearth the presuppositions that generate these objections, explain why these presuppositions are controversial, and to formulate a set of plausible alternatives that do not give rise to these objections. Since the leading objections stem from presuppositions that need not be accepted, these objections do not preclude the formulation of a comparative constitutional theory of human dignity.
The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity
Cambridge University Press eBooks, 2014
Many venerable legal documents suggest that human dignity is the ground of human rights. The German Constitution (1945) opens in Article 1 with the captivating declaration: 'human dignity is inviolable' , and goes on in Article 2 to state: 'The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world' (emphasis added). 1 The Helsinki Accords (1975) even more explicitly claim that human rights 'derive from the inherent dignity of the human person'. On this view human beings have rights because they have dignity. On an even stronger view, which is also quite common in constitutional law, it is the very function of those rights to protect the dignity of human beings. In that case, all human rights are specifications of one fundamental right: the right to have one's dignity (or the dignity of the human species?) respected. At the other end of the spectrum of possible views we find the sceptical idea that all appeals to human dignity are entirely vacuous: they can be made for any specific claim about human rights whatsoever, they are routinely being made for opposing views, for example about euthanasia, and have no argumentative, butonlyrhetorical,force.'Dignityisauselessconcept...andcanbeeliminated without any loss of content' (Macklin 2003). 2 I shall argue that both views are mistaken. Appeals to human dignity have a proper role in human rights discourse, but it is not a foundational and also in some other respects a limited role.
Why Dignity is not the Foundation of Human Rights
This essay questions what is argued by many scholars today, namely that the moral concept of human dignity provides the basis for the establishment of human rights. More specifically, I critically discuss the two most prominent conceptions of human dignity, the 'status' and the 'value' (coming from the Catholic and the Kantian traditions) conceptions of dignity, which are suggested today as the foundations of human rights (sections I and II). Ultimately, I propose a different, 'duty-based' philosophical account for the justification of the latter (section III). Since 1948, human rights have been widely accepted and ratified by most countries. However, a great number of human rights violations and abuses still occur worldwide. Even if there is a broad human rights' framework, the latter is considered to be ineffective. One of the main reasons of its ineffectiveness is the fact that in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and in the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC), rights are described in abstract terms. But for human rights to be respected they have to be clear and concrete. I argue that the formulation of rights by the drafters of the major human rights documents should be supplemented by their philosophical establishment. It is argued by many scholars today that human dignity provides the basis for the establishment of human rights. In this essay, I question the claim that human dignity is the foundation of human rights. More specifically, I critically discuss the two most prominent conceptions of human dignity, namely the 'status' and the 'value' (coming from the Catholic and the Kantian traditions) conceptions of dignity, which are suggested today as the foundations of human rights (sections I and II). Ultimately, I propose a different, 'duty-based' philosophical account for the justification of the latter (section III).
Human Dignity and Human Rights
This chapter aims, first, to briefly present how the notion of human dignity has been conceptualized over centuries of philosophical thought; second, to stress the foundational role it currently plays in international human rights law; third, to emphasize its even more crucial role in the international policy documents relating to bioethics; fourth, to present the reasons for the recourse to human rights in the formulation of global bioethical standards; and finally to briefly address the challenge to the universality of human dignity and human rights posed by cultural diversity.
Dignity as a Traditional Value: International Legal Analysis
Background/Objectives: The term "dignity" is widely used in the texts of the international legal instruments, but international law has not developed its agreed definition. This concept of dignity is reflected in the first international human rights instruments. Methods/Statistical analysis: Analysis of international instruments on human rights shows that in the 20th century, the concept of dignity became the basis of human rights law. This is confirmed by the fact that, firstly, dignity is inherent to all members of the human family. Secondly, all human beings are free and equal in dignity and rights. And thirdly, these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. That is why the better understanding of human dignity as a traditional value can boost promotion and fulfillment of human rights. Findings: The article deals with the concept of dignity from the standpoint of philosophy, Western Christianity and Russian Orthodoxy that contributed to the formulation of the concept of dignity, its definition and elements, and international law. Applications/Improvements: The centrality of human dignity in universal human rights texts can be explained by its core nature. It is fundamental and at the same time it seems uncontroversial enough to attract the entirety of the world community notwithstanding the diversity of morals, cultures, ethnicities, and religions that exist within the broad range of nations.
The Legal Significance of Human Dignity
In this thesis, I traced the history of human dignity through the history of ideas from its inception in Stoic anthropology, religion and the Enlightenment, to dignity's legalization in Modernity. In discussing the history of dignity in the legal systems of Germany, South Africa and the US, I worked on the premise that dignity comprises of three universal elements, as identified by prominent academics. These elements are the equal inherent dignity paradigm, the claim that everybody's dignity must be protected and respected and the injunction that states must progressively realize dignity by way of socio-economic rights, within their respective means. These elements are part and parcel of the constitutional architecture of dignity, whether applied as a value or a right, or both, in constitutional systems that protect dignity. I theorized that there is a correlation between the three elements and the conceptualization of dignity by Kant, the renowned Enlightenment philosopher, who claimed that inherent dignity is priceless, a sort of an uber right that operates as a categorical imperative - in constitutional terms not subject to limitation. Consequently; everybody has a reciprocal duty to protect and respect each other's dignity. In applying Kant's claim of dignity as manifested in the three elements to the adjudication of constitutional dignity in the aforementioned legal systems, I based my interpretation on the distinction of constitutional norms as rules and principles as advocated by Dworkin and mainly Alexy. I came to the conclusion that the German application truly corresponds with Kant's categorical imperative as Alexy's distinction of rules and principles is correctly applied. South African adjudication of dignity is underdeveloped in the perspective of Alexy's distinction in instances where there is a conflict between adjudication of dignity as a value and dignity as a right, when the principle of proportionality is applied to competing rights. To correct this, I proposed a model of interpretation of the dignity-clause in the Constitution along the lines of Alexy's theory of constitutional rights, to ensure legal consistency and to determine the legal significance of human dignity. The US system differs from that of Germany and South Africa, as dignity is solely employed as a value to strengthen rights claims and the three elements of dignity are not applied as a first-order rule.
Oxímora. Revista Internacional de Ética y Política, 2016
This paper will evaluate the convenience of using the legal concept of human dignity in the human rights discourse and its effectiveness to address injustice in a twenty-first century democratic society. This article will argue that the difficulty of defining human dignity does not diminish its merits and allows it to be both solid and adaptable to new challenges. Then, this paper will argue that human dignity is a powerful concept due to its capacity to bring change and modernise society and will conclude that there is a strong relationship between time, human dignity, human rights and democracy.