Chapter 5. Nuclear Deterrence as a Complex System (original) (raw)
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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM National Security Report
2019
The body of unclassified and declassified documents and eyewitness testimony from participants on both sides of the Cuban missile crisis has revealed numerous instances of potential escalation to nuclear war. Some of the potential escalations resulted from incomplete information, others from inappropriate subordinate action, and still others from actual missteps. It can be argued that these represent "close calls" that provide an evidentiary basis for inferring the risk of failure of nuclear deterrence. On the other hand, according to the declassified Defense Department assessment of military operations during the crisis, "The military establishment responded to a threat to our national security promptly, with imagination, vigor, and an exemplary degree of professional competence and skill. " This statement is consistent with the optimistic view that the US deterrence system in place during the crisis had such a degree of reliability that close calls were either manageable or of such low risk that they did not jeopardize the system's overall performance.
Nuclear Deterrence as a Complex System
2019
The body of unclassified and declassified documents and eyewitness testimony from participants on both sides of the Cuban missile crisis has revealed numerous instances of potential escalation to nuclear war. Some of the potential escalations resulted from incomplete information, others from inappropriate subordinate action, and still others from actual missteps. It can be argued that these represent "close calls" that provide an evidentiary basis for inferring the risk of failure of nuclear deterrence. On the other hand, according to the declassified Defense Department assessment of military operations during the crisis, "The military establishment responded to a threat to our national security promptly, with imagination, vigor, and an exemplary degree of professional competence and skill. " This statement is consistent with the optimistic view that the US deterrence system in place during the crisis had such a degree of reliability that close calls were either manageable or of such low risk that they did not jeopardize the system's overall performance.
Critically analyse the nuclear deterrence theory.
Given their overwhelming destructive power, why are nuclear weapons sometimes argued to be a stabilizing force? This has been justified by the theory of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence hypothesizes that if a nation armed with nuclear weapons threatens nuclear retaliation, other countries will refrain from initiating a military attack against it. 1 The dawn of the nuclear age began at Hiroshima, as nuclear weapons threatened to destroy cities. 2 During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence preserved the peace between the two superpowers by making the prospect of total war irrational. There were economic warfare and proxy battles, for example in Afghanistan 3 , but no direct war was recorded. However, during the 1962 Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union came close to nuclear war over the Soviet Union's placement of nuclear weapons in Cuba, and a potential nuclear conflict was therefore narrowly avoided 4 . Since 1945, however, there has never been a nuclear war; not even a single use of a weapon in anger. 5 But will nuclear deterrence ever come close to failing? Diverging views have emerged concerning the theory -some scholars welcome the proliferation of nuclear weapons while others see it as a threat and try to prevent it. This essay will look at the realist perspective, followed by the bureaucratic politics (organizational) theory's point of view, and both will be backed by the stances of political scientists and game theorists such as Iklé, Schelling, Mearsheimer, Bull, Lavoy, Ward. Ultimately however, proliferation of nuclear weapons will only exacerbate the relations between states. Renewed tensions between Russia and the West (with proxies in Syria
2020
Effectiveness of nuclear weapons substantially attached to their effectiveness in terms of deterrence. What we mean by deterrence is usually attributed to their political power, as political deterrence, rather than practical or militaristic one. Despite that, in this article, we will approach nuclear deterrence is terms of practical lenses which will be based on military doctrines and strategic stability. In the first part, we will assess doctrinal problems that nuclear weapons could face in the 21 st Century battlefields. In the following part, we will discuss the new technologies like cyber capabilities, hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence/automation, and their possible effects over the strategic stability that we already have in terms of nuclear deterrence. Such kind of doctrinal and practical analysis of nuclear weapons will help us to understand, rather than the political side of deterrence, whether nuclear weapons could have a place in actual battlefield planning and deterrence in the 21 st Century wars.
Uncertainty and complexity in nuclear decision-making
2022
Complex systems modelling is already implemented in critical policy areas such as climate change and health. It could also play an important role in the nuclear weapons sphere – by opening alternative pathways that may help mitigate risks of confrontation and escalation – but such modelling has yet to be fully embraced by policymakers in this community. By applying a complexity lens, policy- and decision-makers at all stages along the nuclear chain of command might better understand how their actions could have significant consequences for international security and peace. Nuclear decision-making is shaped by, and interacts with, the ever-changing international security environment and nuclear weapons policy. Tackling problems in the nuclear weapons policy field requires the implementation of ‘system of systems’ design principles, mathematical modelling approaches and multidisciplinary analysis. This research paper presents nuclear weapons decision-making as a complex endeavour, wit...
A World of Risk: The Current Environment for US Nuclear Weapons Policy
US Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today's …
The United States currently has some 10,000 nuclear weapons in its stockpile. 1 They are there because of a long chain of technical and political decisions made in the past. Although current U.S. nuclear weapons policy may be understood in light of this history, it should be assessed in the context of present international security risks. These risks include dangers left over from the cold war era, challenges posed by states that are newly growing in power, and the dramatic new presence of nonstate actors. The salient features of this new environment, the context of technology and international politics in which nuclear weapons decisions must now be made, are the subject of this chapter.
2006
Nuclear proliferation is not what it used to be. In the 1960s proliferation issues were integrally related to alliance management, causing divisions in NATO that were perhaps most obvious when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in a famous speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan characterized independent nuclear deterrent forces as “dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility.” Directed primarily at France but also at Britain, this speech—and the sentiment it embodied—created tensions in Atlantic relations that were not fully resolved until the end of the Cold War.
Nuclear Security in 21st Century: Testing Theory of Deterrence
We are in the arena of most complexity than the world ever experienced. The strategic setting of the 21st century is very unusual from the threats faced during the Cold War. The risk of a nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia has significantly diminished; other risks -terrorism, cyber war, climate change -have grown. But those risks may have also nuclear dimension. Again there are several state to state tensions across the world like South Korea-North Korea, Iran-Israel, Iran-US. These tensions may escalate to nuclear height. So it is pretty sure that nuclear threats did not end with the Cold War.