Famine in the steppe (original) (raw)
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Journal of Central Asian History, 2022
The article focuses on why the famine, which began in some regions of Kazakhstan as early as 1930 due to grain and livestock requisitions carried out in the previous two years, in 1931 turned into the largest mass death event in the history of Central Asia, and a great famine comparable in the USSR only to the Ukrainian Holodomor. On the basis of archival documents from the funds of the state agency in charge of requisitioning and distributing meat and livestock, the study claims that the decisive factor in multiplying starvation deaths to such a level as to kill every third Qazaq was the Stalinist leadership's choice to make up for Soviet livestock losses caused by the chaos of collectivization by requisitioning, between the summer of 1930 and the summer of 1932, a unsustainable portion of the livestock of the Qazaqs, who at the time were by far the largest Soviet pastoral nomadic population. The article shows that the livestock taken from the Qazaqs was used primarily to feed the population of Moscow and Leningrad, thus linking the two areas and social groups of the USSR at opposite poles of the Stalinist "hierarchy of consumption". It follows that the specificity of the Qazaqs in the 1930s is not that they were just victims of the policies of communist "modernization" (collectivization and sedentarization of Soviet nomadic populations, none of which were devastated to a comparable degree), but that they were a group consciously sacrificed to the raison d'état of a new (in terms of political logic and degree of ruthlessness) imperial hierarchy.
Igor Cașu, The Benefits of Comparison: Famine in Kazakhstan in the Early 1930s in Soviet Context
Journal of Genocide Research, 2020
The hungry steppe: famine, mass violence and the making of soviet Kazakhstan, by Sarah Cameron, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2018, 294 pp., US$49.95 (hardcover), ISBN: 9781501730450 Copyright Line: © 2020 Igor Cașu Famines have multiple causes, among them being environment disasters. In the twentieth century, more than previously, the famines were rather man-made, i.e. connected to politics. Sometimes, the governments were not directly responsible for the food crises, but they tried to use them in order to promote their interests, which was reflected in the way the relief was distributed, when and to whom. In other instances, famines were due to ambitious modernization projects that did not pay too much attention to the life of large swaths of rural, but also urban population. These issues are valid for a wide range of regimes, including the Soviet one. As a matter of fact, the food crises in particular and the famines as a whole in the Soviet Union are one of the most controversial topics in the post-Soviet historiography. Out of the three famines during peacetime, the one of the early 1930s is the most researched, while the postwar famine of 1946-1947 received less attention. Among the books dealing with the early 1930s famine in the Soviet Union, the work written by Robert W. Davies and Stephen Wheatcroft stands out as the most important study on the subject, which is cited both by those who support the genocide approach and by those who reject it. Hungry Years mapped the main issues relating to the Soviet famines as a whole. The debates that followed Davies and Wheatcroft' s book raised, in my view, two main questions that historians should be focused on. First, assuming that Stalin did not intend to starve to death millions of peasants, the key issue is what he did when he acknowledged the human catastrophe he allegedly did not anticipate. Second, did Stalin view saving human life as a high priority or did he think there were higher priorities than that. Among the works dedicated to the Ukrainian Holodomor however there is no book yet to match the Years of Hunger. The recent book by Anne Applebaum is an important contribution to the Holodomor studies, but it failed to address specifically the above-mentioned issues. In addition, it neglected the fact the Ukrainian Holodomor was a part of a broader Soviet famine.
The Benefits of Comparison: Famine in Kazakhstan in the Early 1930s in Soviet Context
Journal of Genocide Research, 2020
Famines have multiple causes, among them being environment disasters. In the twentieth century, more than previously, the famines were rather man-made, i.e. connected to politics. Sometimes, the governments were not directly responsible for the food crises, but they tried to use them in order to promote their interests, which was reflected in the way the relief was distributed, when and to whom. In other instances, famines were due to ambitious modernization projects that did not pay too much attention to the life of large swaths of rural, but also urban population. These issues are valid for a wide range of regimes, including the Soviet one. As a matter of fact, the food crises in particular and the famines as a whole in the Soviet Union are one of the most controversial topics in the post-Soviet historiography. Out of the three famines during peacetime, the one of the early 1930s is the most researched, while the postwar famine of 1946-1947 received less attention. 1 Among the books dealing with the early 1930s famine in the Soviet Union, the work written by Robert W. Davies and Stephen Wheatcroft 2 stands out as the most important study on the subject, which is cited both by those who support the genocide approach and by those who reject it. 3 Hungry Years mapped the main issues relating to the Soviet famines as a whole. The debates that followed Davies and Wheatcroft's book raised, in my view, two main questions that historians should be focused on. First, assuming that Stalin did not intend to starve to death millions of peasants, the key issue is what he did when he acknowledged the human catastrophe he allegedly did not anticipate. Second, did Stalin view saving human life as a high priority or did he think there were higher priorities than that. 4 Among the works dedicated to the Ukrainian Holodomor however there is no book yet to match the Years of Hunger. The recent book by Anne Applebaum 5 is an important contribution to the Holodomor studies, but it failed to
2019
, Viktor Kondrashin, expert historian on the Soviet famine in the early 1930s, organized a workshop at the Institute for Russian History of the Academy of Sciences (IRI RAN). Contributions by Russian and Ukrainian as well as British, Irish and Swedish historians summed up their research projects concerning the famines in Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in 1929-1933. They highlighted the opposing interpretations of the causes of these famine-stricken regions. They also scrutinized the recent debates in the West of Anne Applebaum's book Red Famine. Motivated by this enlightening discussion, this brief offers a short overview of the history, and contemporary state, of the Soviet famine debate.
Discussion Article Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932 - 33 Revisited
2007
This article contributes to the debate about the role of Stalin in the Soviet famine of 1932-33. It provides data on Stalin's statements and actions in 1932-33, judicial and extrajudicial repression, and the process by which the 1933 deportation targets were drastically reduced. It is suggested that starvation was a cheap substitute for the cancelled deportations. It is argued that in 1932-33 Stalin pursued a multi-pronged policy of state terror against the population of the USSR. Some general issues of interpretation are also considered, such as Bolshevik perceptions, the characterisation of Soviet industrialisation, and approaches to Soviet history. Extensive attention is given to the classification of Stalin's actions according to national and international criminal law. In particular, the question of whether or not in 1932-33 the Ukrainian people were victims of genocide, is analysed. Attentively studying the author's text, not only do [specialists] not stint their compliments, but they also make some critical remarks. Because (is it necessary to prove the obvious?) any really good book invites discussion (Ivanov 2006, p. 120). The Stalinist leadership was only able to retain power then [in 1932] by using the most savage repression (Khlevnyuk 1992, p. 11).
Causes of the 1932 Famine in Soviet Ukraine: Debates at the Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference
Canadian Slavonic Papers, 2014
This article, based on documents from a Kyiv archive, explores the preconditions of famine in Ukraine through the 3rd All-Ukrainian Party Conference of July 1932, convened to discuss the grain crisis in the republic. It discusses recent historiography on the subject and the findings of Ukrainian historians. It argues that the causes of the famine may need to be broadened and that the argument that the famine should be regarded as genocide based on ethnic cleansing of Ukrainians is too narrow. Other factors that need to be considered are ignorance of local conditions, based in part on administrative restructuring during the time of the grain procurements campaign, lack of farming experience on the part of plenipotentiaries sent to the villages, overuse and misuse of land, a dramatic drop in livestock prior to 1932-1933 linked to collectivization, and above all the incompetence of Soviet party and government leaders at all levels. RESUME : Cet article, basé sur des documents provenant des archives de Kyiv, explore les conditions de la famine en Ukraine par un examen de la 3e Conférence du Parti communiste ukrainien de juillet 1932, convoquée pour discuter de la crise de grain dans la république. Il examine l'historiographie récente sur le sujet et les conclusions des historiens ukrainiens. Il fait valoir que les causes de la famine doivent être élargies et que l'argument selon lequel la famine devrait être considéré comme un génocide basé sur le nettoyage ethnique des Ukrainiens est trop étroite. D'autres facteurs qui doivent être pris en considération sont l'ignorance des conditions locales, fondées en partie sur la restructuration administrative pendant la période de la campagne des marchés de céréales, le manque d'expérience de l'agriculture de la part des plénipotentiaires envoyé au villages, la surexploitation et la mauvaise utilisation des terres, un dramatique tomber dans l'élevage avant 1932-1933 lié à la collectivisation, et surtout l'incompétence des dirigeants du parti et du gouvernement soviétique à tous les niveaux.
Natural Disaster and Human Actions in the Soviet Famine of 1931–1933
The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, 2001
Until recently both scholarly and popular discussions of the catastrophic famine in the Soviet Union in 1931-1933 invariably have described it as an artificial or ''manmade" famine. Certain well-known scholars have dominated this discussion, expressing two main interpretations of the famine. A Ukrainian nationalist interpretation holds that the Soviet regime, and specifically losif Stalin, intentionally imposed the famine to suppress the nationalist aspirations of Ukraine and Ukrainians; revisionists argue that the leadership imposed the famine to suppress more widespread peasant resistance to collectivization. According to these views, a natural disaster that could have caused a famine did not take place in those years.