Rapid Creation of a Temporary Isolation Ward for Patients With Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in Taiwan (original) (raw)
Related papers
SARS in Hospital Emergency Room
Thirty-one cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred after exposure in the emergency room at the National Taiwan University Hospital. The index patient was linked to an outbreak at a nearby municipal hospital. Three clusters were identified over a 3-week period. The first cluster (5 patients) and the second cluster (14 patients) occurred among patients, family members, and nursing aids. The third cluster (12 patients) occurred exclusively among healthcare workers. Six healthcare workers had close contact with SARS patients. Six others, with different working patterns, indicated that they did not have contact with a SARS patient. Environmental surveys found 9 of 119 samples of inanimate objects to be positive for SARS coronavirus RNA. These observations indicate that although transmission by direct contact with known SARS patients was responsible for most cases, environmental contamination with the SARS coronavirus may have lead to infection among healthcare workers without documented contact with known hospitalized SARS patients.
SARS in Healthcare Facilities, Toronto and Taiwan
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2004
The healthcare setting was important in the early spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in both Toronto and Taiwan. Healthcare workers, patients, and visitors were at increased risk for infection. Nonetheless, the ability of individual SARS patients to transmit disease was quite variable. Unrecognized SARS case-patients were a primary source of transmission, and early detection and intervention were important to limit spread. Strict adherence to infection control precautions was essential in containing outbreaks. In addition, grouping patients into cohorts and limiting access to SARS patients minimized exposure opportunities. Given the difficulty in implementing several of these measures, control measures were frequently adapted to the acuity of SARS care and level of transmission within facilities. Although these conclusions are based only on a retrospective analysis of events, applying the experiences of Toronto and Taiwan to SARS preparedness planning efforts will likely minimize future transmission within healthcare facilities.
Journal of the Medical Association of Thailand = Chotmaihet thangphaet, 2004
On March 11, 2003, a World Health Organization (WHO) physician was admitted to Bamrasnaradura Institute, after alerting the world to the dangers of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Vietnam and developing a fever himself. Specimens from the first day of his admission were among the first to demonstrate the novel coronavirus, by culture, reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), and rising of specific antibody, but proper protective measures remained unknown. The authors instituted airborne, droplet and contact precautions from the time of admission, and reviewed the efficacy of these measures. A specific unit was set up to care for the physician, beginning by roping off an isolated room and using a window fan to create negative pressure, and later by constructing a glass-walled antechamber, designated changing and decontamination areas, and adding high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. The use of personal protective equipment (PPE) was consistently...
Environmental and Occupational Health Response to SARS, Taiwan, 2003
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2004
Industrial hygiene specialists from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) visited hospitals and medical centers throughout Taiwan. They assisted with designing and evaluating ventilation modifications for infection control, developed guidelines for converting hospital rooms into SARS patient isolation rooms, prepared designs for the rapid conversion of a vacated military facility into a SARS screening and observation facility, assessed environmental aspects of dedicated SARS hospitals, and worked in concert with the Taiwanese to develop hospital ventilation guidelines. We describe the environmental findings and observations from this response, including the rapid reconfiguration of medical facilities during a national health emergency, and discuss environmental challenges should SARS or a SARS-like virus emerge again.
Management of inpatients exposed to an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
Journal of Hospital Infection, 2004
This is a prospective observational study of a cohort of inpatients exposed to a severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak. Strict infection control policies were instituted. The 70 patients exposed to the SARS outbreak were isolated from the rest of the hospital. They were triaged, quarantined and cohorted in three open plan wards. Selective isolation was carried out immediately when symptoms and signs suspicious of SARS manifested clinically. The patients' ages ranged from 21 to 90 years and 56% had surgery before the quarantine. Sixteen patients with unexplained fever during the period of quarantine were isolated, seven of whom were eventually diagnosed with probable SARS. The crude incidence of SARS in our cohort was 10%. The SARS case fatality was 14%. No secondary transmission of the SARS virus within the cohort was observed. Strict infection control, together with appropriate triaging, cohorting and selective isolation, is an effective and practical model of intervention in cohorts exposed to a SARS outbreak. Such a management strategy eases the logistic constraints imposed by demands for large numbers of isolation facilities in the face of a massive outbreak.
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2005
This document has been produced by the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Epidemiology Working Group and the participants at the Global Meeting on the Epidemiology of SARS, 16-17 May 2003.
Surveillance of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in the post-outbreak period
Singapore medical journal, 2005
This retrospective one-month survey evaluated the practicality of post-severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) surveillance recommendations in previously SARS-affected countries, namely Singapore. These included staff medical sick leave for febrile illness, inpatient fevers, inpatient pneumonia, atypical pneumonia, febrile illnesses with significant travel history and sudden unexplained deaths from pneumonia/ adult respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS). Surveillance data on medical sick leave of staff, all inpatient fevers, all febrile (temperature greater than or equal to 38 degrees Celsius) inpatient pneumonia, including atypical pneumonia, and deaths from pneumonia were collected from sick leave reports, ward reports, isolation room rounds and mortuary reports from 1 to 28 September 2003. Baseline results show 167 (1.4/1000 staff-days) observed in staff sick leave for febrile illnesses, and 1798 (71.3/1000 bed-days) observed for inpatient fever. There were 40, 31 and 12 instances...
Infection control for SARS in a tertiary paediatric centre in Hong Kong
Journal of Hospital Infection, 2004
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an emerging infectious disease. After the appearance of an index patient in Hong Kong in February 2003, SARS outbreaks occurred rapidly in hospitals and spread to the community. The aim of this retrospective study is to evaluate the effectiveness of a triage policy and risk-stratified infection control measures in preventing nosocomial SARS infection among paediatric healthcare workers (HCWs) at the Prince of Wales Hospital, a general hospital to which children with SARS are referred in Hong Kong. The acute paediatric wards were stratified into three areas: (1) ultra high-risk area, (2) high-risk area and (3) moderate-risk area according to different risk levels of nosocomial SARS transmission. The implementation of different levels of infection control precautions was guided by this risk stratification strategy. Between 13 March and 23 June, 38 patients with probable and suspected SARS, 90 patients with non-SARS pneumonia, and 510 patients without pneumonia were admitted into our unit. All probable SARS cases were isolated in negative-pressure rooms. Twenty-six HCWs worked in the ultra high-risk area caring for SARS patients and 88 HCWs managed non-SARS patients in other ward areas. None of the HCWs developed clinical features suggestive of SARS. In addition, there was no nosocomial spread of SARS-associated coronavirus to other patients or visitors during this period. In conclusion, stringent infection control precautions, appropriate triage and prompt isolation of potential SARS patients may have contributed to a lack of nosocomial spread and HCW acquisition of SARS in our unit.