Discussion with Arguments about the Concept of Memory as a Criterion of Self- Identity (original) (raw)
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On Memory and Personal Identity
Journal of Buddhist Studies 6 (2008): 219-234
In recent years, there are growing interests among scholars in the constructive engagement between cognitive science and phenomenology. Among them, the late Francisco Varela not only coded the term "neurophenomenology," but also initiated a series of dialogue that engage Western scientists and philosophers with Buddhist scholars. Various publications of this ongoing forum bring together the most upto-date research in many fi elds of scientifi c research, especially cognitive science, and the philosophical refl ections from the Buddhist perspective. It was primarily their discussions that inspired me to examine the puzzling issue with regard to memory and personal identity; in particular, whether memory determines one's personality or self or the other way around: does one's self make memory possible? In this paper, I attempt to explore the relationship between memory and personal identity by drawing sources mainly from the fi fth century Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu. After discussing the ambiguous meaning of the Sanskrit term smti, I will introduce Vasubandhu's views on the conditions of memory and the store-consciousness as the basis for memory, followed by a Mādhyamika criticism of his position. Through this study, I hope to contribute to the new fi eld of neurophenomenology with insights from the ancient wisdom of Buddhism, and to continue the ongoing constructive dialogue between the two disciplines.
Memory, Personal Identity, and Memory Modification
Memory, Personal Identity, and Memory Modification: Memory certainly is one of the most significant characteristics of human beings. It is connected with anthropologically essential capabilities like strategic planning, self-reflection, and the development of a unique life story. Although the importance of memory seems to be evident, there is a strong negligence of the role of memory and remembering in theories on personal identity. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that this is mainly due to three factors: 1.) the missing differentiation between various kinds of memory; 2.) the one-sided focus on diachronic identity in the philosophical debate on personal identity; and 3.) the lack of integration of psychological research on memory into philosophical theory. I will discuss how each of these problems should be approached, and outline possible implications for the debate on memory modification and enhancement.
Lockean Memory Theory of Personal Identity: A Critique
FALSAFA: Journal of Philosophy, ABU Zaria, 2018
The problem of memory is an epistemological one and has remained a perennial problem from time immemorial. Consequently, philosophers have struggled for centuries to make conceptual clarification between memory and personal identity without success. However, according to John Locke, one’s personal identity extends only so far as their own consciousness, so long as one is the same self, the same rational being. Hence, he maintains that one has the same personal identity. Thus, given this assertion, it implies that any change in one’s personal identity, automatically implies that the self has changed. As a result, the bond between consciousness and memory in Lockean’s memory theory of personal identity has awakened us from our dogmatic slumber. Therefore, it is in this light that this paper intends to make detailed analysis with a view to pointing out the pitfalls of the Lockean memory theory of personal identity and thereby proffering solution to the problem. Also, this paper depicts that owing to the issue of forgetfulness, Locke’s memory theory cannot be accepted as basis for personal identity. Furthermore, in achieving the above, an analytic method was adopted in order to critically analyze the Lockean memory theory, as a basis for personal identity.
The purpose of this paper is to work about the relationship between memory and identity in two different cases: first, when we try to reconstruct the live of a disappeared person during the war, and, second, when we ask about the life of a leader who has died but who remains significant for a group or a community. We approach this topic with other researchers in two projects in which mimetic theory was used as a framework.
Essay - On Personal Identity, Memory and Responsibility
Asking about personal identity and its implications are of central questions in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and undoubtedly theology and eschatology. The essential components of this enquiry can be articulated by these questions: Who am I? What am I constituted of? What does differentiate me from others? How do I persist through time? Based on the responses to these enquiries various philosophical accounts of personal identity have been shaped: Substance Dualism, Property Dualism, Predicate Dualism, Continuity of Consciousness, Psychological Continuity, Bundle Theory, and No-Self Theory, to name a few. One of the essential problems in personal identity is identity persistence through time. This problem, which can be articulated as identicalness of an individual at time T1 to an individual at time T2, has significant implications for subsequent questions in the fields of ethics and philosophy of law. The proposed resolution for this problem brings out its practical consequences in ethics, agency, and responsibility.
Personal Identity, Memory and Circularity: an Alternative for Q-memory
I shall argue that a psychological criterion of personal identity can be rescued from the circularity objection only by accepting what has not even seemed to be an option to philosophers so far: that memory is only indicative rather than constitutive of psychological continuity and hence, by a psychological criterion, of personal identity. In order to do this, I shall claim that the traditional solution to the objection, Sydney Shoemaker's Q-memory (section I), is seriously incomplete (section II). Next, I shall show that there is a kind of psychological continuity that is not (co-)constituted by memory and does not presuppose personal identity (section III). Memory, I shall argue, presupposes-and is hence indicative of-this kind of conti- nuity (section iv). By analyzing personal identity in terms of this alternative kind of psychological continuity, the circularity objection can be avoided (section v). The new solution to the circularity objection I shall propose accepts and explains the intuition that memory presupposes personal identity-memory presupposes the alternative kind of psychological continuity, which, in turn, analyzes personal identity-without letting this stand in the way of a psycho- logical criterion of personal identity.
2004
A fundamental issue in the behavioral, educational, and social sciences concerns the intrapersonal and interpersonal struggle with the question "who am I?" This issue is reflected in such research themes as self definition, identity seeking, selfknowledge, search for identity, self seeking, identity quest, symbolic self-completion, and self-interpretation. For the purposes of this chapter, we will adopt the term self-definition, given that this term has enjoyed widespread use in social and personality psychology as of late. What do people want to know about themselves? What information are they likely to endorse or reject? For exactly what sort of self-definition do people strive and what land of self-knowledge will they store in their memory? Epistemic and pragmatic reasons suggest that people strive, or at least should strive, for a selfdefinition that is accurate, balanced, and truthful. Epistemic reasons date back to ancient Greek philosophers. Socrates, for example, advocated the pursuit of accurate self-knowledge (gnothi seauton) as the highest human virtue and value. Socrates prescribed selfscrutiny as the method to achieve truthful knowledge about the self, and he also guarded against the uncritical endorsement of desirable information. Importantly, the search for an accurate self-definition has pragmatic benefits. Such a definition informs and guides the individual in selecting environments that match her or his abilities, including appropriate positions in professional and social hierarchies. Hence, in the long run, an accurate self-definition
Paper published on the 112th American Sociological Association Annual Meeting Proceedings, 2017
Our aim is to theoretically explore the relation between "memory" and "identity", approaching the intersection between two theories that have collectivist orientations: Maurice Halbwachs´ theory of memory and the George H Mead´s reflection about identity. At the beginning, we show how memory and identity are codependent phenomena. We then show a) how Halbwachs explains the formation of individual memory based on the collectivity and b) how Mead explains the formation of identity also based on collectivity. In the end, we show how both explanations could benefit from each other based on their convergent collectivist approach.
Memory and Identity: Some Remarks from Neuroscience
Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii, 2019
Memory has always been understood as the basis of human identity. However, current neuroscientific data about how our brain creates memories makes it problematic to maintain certain identity theories, particularly the psychological view on identity. In this paper we will expose this neuroscientific data regarding memory, how it should affect the debate around identity, and the consequences of this discussion for ethics as a whole.