When Civil Wars Recur: Conditions for Durable Peace after Civil Wars (original) (raw)
Related papers
Sustaining the Peace after Ethnic Civil Wars
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2013
We explore factors that influence the duration of peace after an ethnic civil war. Results from a series of survival models indicate that political and economic discrimination against the ethnic group that was involved in the war on the opposition side diminishes chances for peace. This finding is robust across different model specifications. Group size, group concentration, war duration and war outcome also influence the risk of war recurrence, although these results are not as robust as those for ethnic discrimination. The intensity of the war and its humanitarian consequences— deaths, displacement, and genocide—do not seem significantly to influence the duration of post-war peace. Taken together, our findings show that the way ethnic groups interact with each other after a war is a more important factor than the level of violence during the war. Peace and ethnic co-existence are possible in the aftermath of ethnic conflicts.
Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence
Int Interact, 2007
Over half of all civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997 were followed by at least one if not more episodes of civil war. We present a model to explain which characteristics of a civil war and the postwar environment make civil war more or less likely to recur. We test this model with data on civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997. Findings suggest that civil wars are less likely to recur following rebel victories and peace agreements supported by peacekeeping forces. Postwar economic development also reduces the probability of civil war recurrence, and the longer the peace can be sustained, the less likely civil war is to recur. These effects hold regardless of whether the previous war was ethnically based or not, and whether it was secessionist or revolutionary.
Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006
What causes peaceful resolution of civil wars to endure rather than to collapse into renewed fighting? Existing studies predict that third-party peace enforcement by the United Nations (UN) or domestic institutions such as democracy, parliamentary, and presidential institutions and the proportional representation (PR) electoral system promotes enduring peace in societies that have emerged from a civil war. However, extant empirical works test the effect of third-party enforcement but not the impact of domestic institutions on peace after civil wars. Hence, I test the impact of democracy, presidential, and parliamentary institutions, electoral systemsFPR and majoritarianFand third-party enforcement by the UN on the durability of peace after termination of civil wars. Results from a bootstrapped Weibull duration model show that democracy and the PR electoral system significantly reduces the likelihood that civil war may recur, but that third-party enforcement by the UN does not have a significant effect on the hazard rate of peace spells. A brief case study analysis of recent attempts to build democratic institutions in Cambodia and Kosovo by the international community also supports the claims posited in this article. The peace agreement signed by Mozambique's FRELMO party and the RENAMO rebel group in 1992 ended years of brutal fighting between these two parties and has helped to sustain peace over the last decade. In contrast, the 1993 Arusha peace accords signed by the Hutu-dominated government and the minority Tutsi group collapsed rapidly and was followed by a 100-day genocide that left 800,000 people dead (Sisk 2001). Although Mozambique and Rwanda share similar features, enduring peace in Mozambique has helped to promote economic growth in that country, while Rwanda remains impoverished. 1 What causes peace settlements or ''peace spells''Fthat is, the duration of peace after civil wars endFto endure in some cases (e.g., Mozambique), rather than to collapse into renewed fighting (e.g., Rwanda)? Analysts of civil war settlements have devoted significant attention to answering the above question. Identifying the appropriate policies and institutions that can enhance the security of minority groups in countries ravaged by civil war is of paramount importance given the current situation in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, a closer look at recent cases of 1 The annual growth rate from 1990 to 2001 has been 4.
The dynamics of civil war duration and outcome
Journal of Peace Research, 2004
high stakes generally make compromise difficult (Licklider, 1995). Given these challenges, what goes into the calculations rebels and governments use when deciding to end or continue a civil war? Recent scholarship has focused intensively on the 'greed vs. creed' question (see Collier & Hoeffler, 1999; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002a; de Soysa, 2002). These studies attempt to explain the outbreak and duration of civil wars based on political, ethnic, and economic grievances, and typically theorize from the perspective of the non-state combatants. In the past few years, attention has turned back to the role of the state in civil wars. One such line of inquiry probes the effect of
Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars
Since the early 1950s, civil wars have been longer lasting and more frequent than international wars, producing high levels of death and disability. 1 Ethnic wars have been especially common, comprising 55 percent (70) to 72 percent (91) of all civil wars between 1945 and 1999. 2 Moreover, cross-national evidence suggests that ethnic wars last longer than nonethnic wars. 3 These numbers are even more troubling given that, during the 1990s, more than 200 ethnic minorities and subordinate majorities throughout the world were contesting their political status. 4 In addition to the challenge of ending civil wars, one of the most vex-Partitioning to Peace
An analysis of post-conflict stabilization
Department for International Development of the United Kingdom , 2015
This project is concerned with explaining why peace endures in countries that have experienced a civil war. A statistical analysis (Cox Proportional Hazard models) was employed to identify factors that contribute significantly to the duration of peace. Six qualitative case studies of post-conflict peace stabilization were also produced and examined alongside the regression results. The main findings are: • The duration of peace is difficult to explain. Many variables are insignificant in the regressions. • The outcome of the conflict is significant: military victories, especially by Governments, last longer than other outcomes. • Settlements are more likely to break down than military victories. • UN peacekeeping operation (UNPKO) variables (dummy, treatment, total number of uniformed personnel, troops, type of mission) are not significant. • Settlements that are buttressed by UNPKOs are less likely to break down. • The case studies provide important additional insights and identify a number of factors that were important for the consolidation of peace. Many of these variables are difficult if not impossible to measure using statistical methods either because the data are not available/reliable or because the variables elude measurement. This is a report for the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom. (co-authors Richard Caplan, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, and Anke Hoeffler, Department of Economics, University of Oxford). (https://www.gov.uk/dfid-research-outputs/an-analysis-of-post-conflict-stabilization).
2009
Partition has been proposed as a way to (i) end ethnic civil wars and to (ii) build a lasting peace after ethnic civil wars end. This dissertation builds on partition theory and the ethnic security dilemma in three ways, demonstrating empirical support for a novel theory of why violence recurs following the end of ethnic civil wars and how partition can be used to prevent such violence. The dissertation begins by introducing the puzzle of ethnic group concentration: the social sciences have demonstrated that concentrated ethnic groups produce both peace and violence. The first case study discredits the notion that ethnic group concentration produced during ethnic civil wars will produce an end to ethnic civil wars. I conducted detailed field research, producing a longitudinal study of ethnic migration and violence in the Georgia-Abkhaz civil war (1992-1993), which acts as a crucial case. I conclude that partitioning groups does not end ethnic war. This is the first accurate empirical test of the ethnic security dilemma. Next, the dissertation looks at partition's ability to build peace by concentrating ethnic groups in new homeland states, and I argue that postpartition violence is caused by weak states and the triadic political space endogenously created by partitions that do not separate ethnic groups completely. I call this the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma, building on previous ethnic security dilemma research. I test this empirically by introducing an index measuring the degree to which partitions separate ethnic groups, and I compare all ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004, demonstrating that partitions which completely separate ethnic groups provide a better chance for peace. Third, I selected two cases (Moldova and Georgia) to examine the causal processes of postwar recurring violence. Georgia, which experienced post-partition violence, and Moldova, which did not, act as a structured case comparison. I conclude that mixed ethnic demography interacts with state-building to cause or avert renewed violence.
Dismantling the Conflict Trap : Essays on Civil War Resolution and Relapse
2012
Countries that have experienced civil war suffer a greater risk for new conflict than countries with no prior history of civil war. This empirical finding has been called a conflict trap where the legacy of previous war -unsolved issues, indecisive outcomes, and destruction -leads to renewed fighting. Yet, countries like Cambodia, El Salvador, Indonesia, and Mozambique have managed to overcome decade-long conflicts without relapse. This dissertation addresses this empirical puzzle by seeking to dismantle the conflict trap and look at microlevel explanations for civil war resolution and relapse. It adds to existing scholarship in three ways: first, by using disaggregated empirics on war termination and how fighting resumes; second, by exploring government agency in conflict processes; and third, by disaggregating rebel organizations. Essay I present original data on the start and end dates and means of termination for all armed conflicts, 1946-2005. Contrary to previous work, this data reveal that wars does not always end through victory or peace agreement, but commonly end under unclear circumstances. Essay II addresses how developments exogenous to the conflict influence governments' decision to engage in a peace process. The results show that after natural disasters when state resources need to be allocated towards disaster relief, governments are more willing to negotiate and conclude ceasefires with insurgents. Essay III focuses on the post-conflict society, and posits that security concerns among former war participants will push them towards remobilizing into rebellion. The findings indicate that if ex-belligerent elite's security is compromised, the parties of the previous war will resume fighting, while insecurity among former rank-and-file leads to the formation of violent splinter rebel groups. Finally, Essay IV seeks to explain why governments sometimes launch offensives on former rebels in post-conflict countries. The results show that internal power struggles provide leaders with incentives to use force against domestic third parties to strengthen their position against intra-government rivals. Taken together, this dissertation demonstrates that there is analytical leverage to be had by disaggregating the processes of violence in civil war and post-conflict societies, as well as the actors involved -both the government and rebel sides.