How do the Variations in Military Organization Influence the Implementation of Economic Coup Proofing Mechanisms in the MENA Region? The Cases of Jordan, Syria and Egypt (original) (raw)
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International Studies Quarterly, 2018
What are the most efficient strategies to prevent military coups d'état? The answer depends on coup agency, that is, who attempts to overthrow the regime: elite officers or lower-ranking combat officers. Elite officers and lower-ranking combat officers have different incentives, opportunities, and capacities when it comes to perpetrating coups. Using original data on coup agency, public spending, and officer salaries in the Middle East and North Africa, we find that counterbalancing—a strategy designed to increase barriers for coup plotters' coordination efforts—and higher shares of defense spending prove more effective at preventing coups by elite officers. However, higher social spending reduces the risk of coups by combat officers. Political liberalization has mixed effects on military agents. It decreases the risk of coups by combat officers, but makes elite officers more likely to mount coups. Our findings suggest that the study of coups needs to better incorporate variation and that we need to rethink the image of coups as purely elite-led power grabs.
Armed Forces & Society, 2015
This article argues that coup-proofing does not necessarily reduce the general propensity among military officers to stage coups d'e ´tat against authoritarian incumbents. Sophisticated coup-proofing terminates coup cascades and buys incumbent rulers time in office, but general coup risk remains high even if they maintain power for long periods of time. The article uses a new data set on coups in the Middle East and North Africa covering the period 1950–2013. The data reveal that the number of coup instances has decreased over time, but the risk for incumbents of falling to a coup during their extended time in office remains constant, even in coup-proofed autocracies. When autocrats apply coup-proofing measures, timing and agency become increasingly important. Plotters attempt coups either immediately after power turnovers or when incumbents turn into lame ducks after excessively long periods of rule. Success rates increase when coup plotters are supported by central military leaderships.
Mediterranean Politics, 2015
The popular mass uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) call into question the assumption, widespread prior to the "Arab Spring", that militaries in these countries were subservient to civilianized and consolidated authoritarian regime incumbents. In most countries militaries have stepped in to suppress uprisings, replace incumbents, or cause civil wars. The analysis of political-military relations explains the immediate outcome of popular mass mobilization in the MENA region and helps re-conceptualize coup-proofing as an important authoritarian survival strategy. Accounting for variation in the degree of officers' loyalty toward incumbents provides an opportunity to test the efficacy of coupproofing. The article accounts for questions largely ignored in the theoretical literature: which coup-proofing mechanisms work best, and under which circumstances? In a qualitative comparison of Egypt and Syria, the article illustrates that authoritarian regimes have applied fundamentally different coup-proofing strategies. The Syrian regime has engineered integrative strategies to tie officers closer to the incumbent, provoking a greater degree of loyalty during regime crisis than in Egypt where officers were excluded from politics.
Coup-proofing strategies in counter-revolutionary regimes: Egypt since 2013
2023
Most of the existing literature on coup-proofing in Arab countries focused on the measures implemented during periods of stability, overlooking external issues like foreign aid and militaryto-military relationships. This paper examines the strategies used by the Egyptian counterrevolutionary regime to maintain control over the armed forces and analyzes their impact on power dynamics and decision-making. The president employs a three-track strategy, with the military playing a pivotal role. He aims to retain power and establish absolute personalist rule by preventing military coups, avoiding popular uprisings, and obstructing external support for regime change. Three major conclusions: (1) While coup-proofing measures offer benefits in terms of ensuring the military's allegiance, the concessions granted to the military in return reinforced its autonomy. This autonomy may lead to military defection if circumstances change, such as if the privileges granted to the army are reduced or if public outrage against the regime's economic policies escalates and the regime fails to respond. In addition, the regime has no alternative but to continue to rely on the military and retired officers because it lacks a robust and cohesive party organization. (2) The regime believes effective opposition mobilization will lead to street protests, causing the military to become the primary threat as it will not defend the regime against the people. Thus, the regime's iron fist remains strong and will endure as long as the opposition remains divided. (3) Egypt's foreign policy aims to align its survival with regional and global powers' interests, with the military playing a crucial role. Tactics include compromising on economic reforms, offering lucrative military contracts to foreign corporations, and connecting the debt to other foreign and regional policies that affect Egypt.
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Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness, 2019
This paper examines the relationship between coup-proofing and military effectiveness, with a focus on force employment as the key determinant of military effectiveness. Coup-proofing practices, such as exploitation of ethnic and familial loyalties, fragmentation of the military organization, and establishment of multiple intelligence agencies, are employed by political leaders to prevent potential coups and maintain power. However, these practices have detrimental effects on a military's ability to perform effectively in conventional interstate warfare. The case of Iraq under Saddam Hussein's rule is used to illustrate the impact of coup-proofing on military performance, highlighting the importance of force employment in determining the outcome of several battles. The study emphasizes the need to consider underlying practices influenced by regime type when assessing military effectiveness and determining priorities for internal and external threats.
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Public Choice, 2014
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A Military Coup is a Military Coup … or is it?
Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1978
The prominent role of the military in the politics of the so-called "developing world" in particular has generated an entire subdiscipline with its associated trappings: "experts," university courses, research committees of various academic associations, specialized literature and even journals. The three volumes* under consideration are among the many recent contributions to the burgeoning body of work on the topic. The volume edited by Harries-Jenkins and van Doom includes ten papers first presented at the sixth meeting of the International Sociological Association's Research Committee on Armed Forces and Society. The "central issue" of these papers, which draw almost exclusively on European historical experience, is how armed forces legitimate their role in or out of the political arena. In contrast to the other two volumes, much of the analysis focusses on "post-industrialized societies." Welch provides a lengthy introduction and a brief conclusion to nine case studies focussing on successful implementation of civilian control of the military in what he still calls "developing countries." The cases analyzed range from China and Mexico to Lebanon and Finland, with only the African continent excluded. Nordlinger's book attempts to cover an even larger area of the globe. The author sets out to provide general explanations for the impressive role of the military in the politics of the "non-Western countries" of "Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East" (2). The amount of territory covered is not the only reason for considering Nordlinger's work the most ambitious of the three. The book is published in a moderately priced and prestigious series whose "final and overriding goal... is to show what the comparative political scientist does and why this is an activity * The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy
Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'etat
Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(6):1017-1040, 2012
Previous studies have attested to leaders ''coup-proofing'' their regimes by reducing the ability or disposition of their armies to seek their removal. The following article tests the utility of these efforts. ''Structural'' coup-proofing such as counterbalancing is expected to reduce the ability to organize a coup plot by creating substantial coordination obstacles to soldiers. Coup-proofing by spoiling militaries with organizational resources is expected to reduce the willingness to intervene. However, increased organizational resources are expected to increase the army's capabilities, thereby increasing the likelihood of a coup's success. The theory is empirically tested using a selection model with a global sample from 1961 to 2000. Findings suggest that both coup-proofing strategies are effective deterrents of coup activity and, more generally, that characteristics of the military appear to be far more important than economic influences on coups.