Deception Undermines the Stability of Cooperation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity (original) (raw)
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Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2007
Communication about social topics is abundant in human societies, and many functions have been attributed to such gossiping. One of these proposed functions is the management of reputations. Reputation by itself has been shown to have a strong influence on cooperation dynamics in games of indirect reciprocity, and this notion helps to explain the observed high level of cooperation in humans. Here we designed a game to test a widespread assumption that gossip functions as a vector for the transmission of social information. This empirical study (with 14 groups of nine students each) focuses on the composition of gossip, information transfer by gossip, and the behavior based on gossip information. We show that gossip has a strong influence on the resulting behavior even when participants have access to the original information (i.e., direct observation) as well as gossip about the same information. Thus, it is evident that gossip has a strong manipulative potential. Furthermore, gossip about cooperative individuals is more positive than gossip about uncooperative individuals, gossip comments transmit social information successfully, and cooperation levels are higher when people encounter positive compared with negative gossip.
Evolution of gossip-based indirect reciprocity on a bipartite network
Cooperation can be supported by indirect reciprocity via reputation. Thanks to gossip, reputations are built and circulated and humans can identify defectors and ostracise them. However, the evolutionary stability of gossip is allegedly undermined by the fact that it is more error-prone that direct observation, whereas ostracism could be ineffective if the partner selection mechanism is not robust. The aim of this work is to investigate the conditions under which the combination of gossip and ostracism might support cooperation in groups of different sizes. We are also interested in exploring the extent to which errors in transmission might undermine the reliability of gossip as a mechanism for identifying defectors. Our results show that a large quantity of gossip is necessary to support cooperation, and that group structure can mitigate the effects of errors in transmission. Cooperation among individuals is essential for their survival, in human and animal societies. Human beings are an intrinsically social species and most of our evolutionary success can be attributed to our highly developed ability to cooperate with each other. This ability is especially important in groups, where individuals need to coordinate their actions in order to achieve personal benefits that cannot be obtained without cooperation. However, those who do not contribute but reap the collective benefits are better off than cooperators 1. In models of indirect reciprocity 2–4 , cooperation can thrive when information about others is acquired either via direct observation, or via " image score " , a reliable and publicly visible indication of one's past cooperative behaviour 5. When modelled as simple scores, pro-social reputations are evolutionary stable only if they track behaviour with the same accuracy as direct experience 6. Cooperation becomes fragile when errors are possible , that is, when there is an even small probability for an individual to record a good partner as a bad one or vice-versa 7. Image score is effective in supporting group cooperation, but only when group size of individuals playing a Public Goods Game (PGG) does not exceed four 8. When group size increases, there is a concomitant decrease in the frequency of cooperation, showing that indirect reciprocity, even when supported by an image score mechanism , is not effective in large groups. The authors explain this decline in cooperation as due to the difficulty of observing reputations of many individuals in large communities. However, when agents are placed on a bipartite graph and they can actively select their group members, image score becomes effective in sustaining cooperation, even for groups of 20 individuals 9. Notwithstanding its effectiveness in supporting cooperation in models of indirect reciprocity, image score is limited by its reliance on direct observation. Thanks to language, humans are able to overcome this limitation and can exchange information about each other, thus isolating defectors and selecting cooperative partners 10,11. Thanks to gossip, we can map our social group 12 , learn about its rules 13 , and enforce social norms 14 , among other things. Gossip is crucial to make information about known cheaters travel within the network, thus allowing for identification of defectors, and it has a strong influence on the behaviour of participants in an economic experiment, even when they can rely on direct observation of others' actions 15. Gossip is also relatively more effective than punishment in promoting cooperation across a four-round PGG, it increases participants' gains and also efficiency, whereas punishment significantly decreases participants' earnings 16. In a computational study, gossipers who could actively select their group members and avoid ill-reputed agents are able to outperform free-riders and punishers in groups of 25 agents, whereas in smaller groups the combination of gossiping and material punishment is more successful in increasing cooperation levels 9. However, the evolutionary stability of gossip in supporting cooperation has been questioned. According to Nowak and Sigmund 17 , one of the main limitations of gossip consists in its being unreliable, while Ohtsuki, Iwasa
Empathy, conformism and consensus in reputation-based cooperation with private information
2019
Explaining the emergence of cooperation remains an open challenge in theoretical ecology and human evolution. Indirect Reciprocity (IR) constitutes one of the most elaborate mechanisms that provide a way out of what is known as the cooperation dilemma, relying on concepts such as social norms and reputations. In the last decades, several social norms have been identified as active promoters of cooperation in reputation-based settings. However, such norms often rely on the assumption that every action is observed by every member of a population, an assumption that cannot always be translated into real scenarios. A consequence of lifting this assumption is that reputations cease to be absolute and objective, i.e., independent opinions on agents’ reputations will tend to diverge throughout a population, defeating the advantages offered by IR. Here we propose an Evolutionary Game Theory computational model with a ternary reputation system, configurable observability of interactions and ...
Experimental Economics, 2018
We experimentally investigate the relationship between (un)kind actions and subsequent deception in a two-player, two-stage game. The first stage involves a dictator game. In the second-stage, the recipient in the dictator game has the opportunity to lie to her counterpart. We study how the fairness of dictator-game outcomes affects subsequent lying decisions where lying hurts one's counterpart. In doing so, we examine whether the moral cost of lying varies when retaliating against unkind actions is financially beneficial for the self (selfish lies), as opposed to being costly (spiteful lies). We find evidence that individuals engage in deception to reciprocate unkind behavior: The smaller the payoff received in the first stage, the higher the lying rate. Intention-based reciprocity largely drives behavior, as individuals use deception to punish unkind behavior and truth-telling to reward kind behavior. For selfish lies, individuals have a moral cost of lying. However, for spiteful lies, we find no evidence for such costs. Taken together, our data show a moral cost of lying that is not fixed but instead context-dependent.
The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2021
Large-scale non-kin cooperation is a unique ingredient of human success. This type of cooperation is challenging to explain in a world of self-interested individuals. There is overwhelming empirical evidence from different disciplines that reputation and gossip promote cooperation in humans in different contexts. Despite decades of research, important details of reputation systems are still unclear. Our goal with this theme issue is to promote an interdisciplinary approach that allows us to explore and understand the evolution and maintenance of reputation systems with a special emphasis on gossip and honest signalling. The theme issue is organized around four main questions: What are the necessary conditions for reputation-based systems? What is the content and context of reputation systems? How can reputations promote cooperation? And, what is the role of gossip in maintaining reputation systems and thus cooperation? This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of coopera...
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2021
Gossip is believed to be an informal device that alleviates the problem of cooperation in humans. Communication about previous acts and passing on reputational information could be valuable for conditional action in cooperation problems and pose a punishment threat to defectors. It is an open question, however, what kind of mechanisms can make gossip honest and credible and reputational information reliable, especially if intense competition for reputations does not exclusively dictate passing on honest information. We propose two mechanisms that could support the honesty and credibility of gossip under such a conflict of interest. One is the possibility of voluntary checks of received evaluative information from different sources and the other is social bonding between the sender and the receiver. We tested the efficiency of cross-checking and social bonding in a laboratory experiment where subjects played the Prisoner's Dilemma with gossip interactions. Although individuals ha...
Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
2009
We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that while pure indirect reciprocity appears to be important, the helping choice seems to be influenced at least as much by strategic considerations. Strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.
Four Puzzles of Reputation-Based Cooperation
Human Nature
Research in various disciplines has highlighted that humans are uniquely able to solve the problem of cooperation through the informal mechanisms of reputation and gossip. Reputation coordinates the evaluative judgments of individuals about one another. Direct observation of actions and communication are the essential routes that are used to establish and update reputations. In large groups, where opportunities for direct observation are limited, gossip becomes an important channel to share individual perceptions and evaluations of others that can be used to condition cooperative action. Although reputation and gossip might consequently support large-scale human cooperation, four puzzles need to be resolved to understand the operation of reputation-based mechanisms. First, we need empirical evidence of the processes and content that form reputations and how this may vary cross-culturally. Second, we lack an understanding of how reputation is determined from the muddle of imperfect, ...
Gossip Versus Punishment: The Efficiency of Reputation to Promote and Maintain Cooperation OPEN
Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups, but no behavioral research has yet examined their relative effectiveness and efficiency in promoting and maintaining cooperation. To examine these issues, we observed participants interacting in a four-round public goods game (PGG) with or without gossip and punishment options, and a subsequent two-round trust game (TG). We manipulated gossip as the option to send notes about other group members to these members' future partners, and punishment as the option to assign deduction points to reduce other group members' outcomes with a fee-to-fine ratio of 1:3. Findings revealed that in the four-round PGG, the option to gossip increased both cooperation and individual earnings, whereas the option to punish had no overall effect on cooperation (but a positive effect on cooperation in the last two rounds of the PGG) and significantly decreased individual earnings. Importantly, the initial option to gossip made people more trusting and trustworthy in the subsequent TG when gossip was no longer possible, compared to the no-gossip condition. Thus, we provide some initial evidence that gossip may be more effective and efficient than punishment to promote and maintain cooperation. Cooperation is essential for groups, organizations, and societies to achieve and maintain public goods that benefit all group members. However, cooperation to provide public goods usually requires people to overcome the temptation to free ride and take advantage of others' cooperation. Why do people cooperate despite this temptation to prioritize their own interests? Previous theory suggests that reputation (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups 1–3. Yet, little is known about the relative difference between gossip and punishment to promote cooperation and what happens to cooperation rates after these mechanisms are removed in future interactions 4. We extend previous research by directly comparing gossip and punishment in their relative ability to (1) promote cooperation, (2) enhance individual welfare, and (3) maintain cooperation in future interactions with no such mechanisms. One of the most widely studied solutions to cooperation problems involves opportunities to punish others' (selfish) behavior 1,2. Punishment decreases the incentive to free ride and makes cooperation relatively more beneficial for individuals. Indeed, punishment reduces the conflict between personal and collective interests in providing the public good, and thus increases cooperation 1,2. Yet, punishment is costly for individuals and groups, and is not always a feasible solution to promote cooperation 5. Moreover, although people do punish free riders during controlled experiments when given the chance 2,6 , peer punishment can be uncommon in real-life situations in both small-scale and large-scale societies 7,8. Thus, there is a need to generate other effective solutions to promote cooperation in groups. Importantly, people are prone to gossip about norm violators and free riders, and this gossip facilitates reputation spreading in large groups and social networks 9,10. Gossip is the exchange of positive or negative social information about absent others 10–13. Thus, gossip can influence others' reputation and enable people to select trustworthy partners and avoid cheaters, especially in large groups where directly observing all social interactions is not possible. Both simulation models and empirical studies suggest that reputation monitoring and exchange via gossip serves as a low-cost and efficient mechanism to promote cooperation 11–14. Reputation facilitates cooperation through a system of indirect reciprocity, where people with a cooperative reputation have greater chance to receive future indirect benefits from third parties 3. Indeed, reputation and indirect reciprocity can promote
Reputation, Gossip, and Human Cooperation
Why do people cooperate? We address this classic question by analyzing and discussing the role of reputation: people cooperate to maintain a positive reputation in their social environment. Reputation is a key element fueling a system of indirect reciprocity, where cooperators establish a good reputation and are thus more likely to receive future benefits from third parties. The tendencies to monitor, spread, and manage each other's reputation help explain the abundance of human cooperation with unrelated strangers. We review research on the phenomenon of reputation-based cooperation in the domains of how people manage their reputation in response to varying cues of reputation, when reputation can promote cooperation, and individual differences in reputation management. We also propose three directions for future research: group stability and reputation-based cooperation, solutions to cope with noise and biased reputation, and the relative efficiency of positive versus negative reputation systems.