NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES POLITICAL DYNASTIES (original) (raw)

Political Dynasties

2007

We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent of dynastic bias in legislative politics versus other occupations, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We also study the self-perpetuation of political elites. We find that legislators who enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. In politics, power begets power.

Political Dynasties in a Democracy: Why Political Families Exist and Persist in the United States of America

International Political Science Association - 24th World Congress of Political Science (Poznan, Poland)

In its pursuit of liberty and determination to prevent the rise of a political monarchy, the United States’ developed a highly democratic system of government that may have inadvertently fostered pseudo-aristocratic tendencies in enabling an oligarchy. The political dynamics and lived experiences of its ostensibly democratic development appear at odds with the nation’s founding principles. In America’s úber-democracy, voters elect almost every conceivable public office; yet the democratic process often contradicts its egalitarian foundations. One such contradiction is the prevalence of political elites within the public sphere, and the hegemonic role of America’s political dynasties. The existence and prevalence of political families speaks to the enduring power of pedigree in a society that supposedly apportions democratic authority based on merit. The persistence of political families in a democratic country raises concerns about imperfections in popular representation. My research focuses on twelve US case study families with at least four successive generations in the direct line elected to state or federal office. I will outline what I have found thus far that accounts for the perpetuation of these families throughout the decades; why political dynasties so entrenched in American politics; and what causes one dynasty to ultimately decline, only to have their place taken by another. This examination aims to understand why certain families are able to succeed in public office, generation after generation, and what this ultimately tells us about the value of class merit in American democracy.

Term Limits and Political Dynasties: Unpacking the Links

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019

This paper reviews the empirical evidence linking political dynasties to the imposition of term limits under the 1987 Constitution. It finds evidence that political clans have found a way around this Constitutional constraint, by fielding more family members in powergiving rise to more fat political dynasties. Hence, we carefully argue that the introduction of term limits-combined with the failure to introduce other ancillary reforms (notably an anti-dynasty law)-may have brought about instead some unintended consequences. So it is not term limits per se that created fat political dynasties. We further argue that it is a non sequitur to argue that dynasties will be curbed by removing term limits. This is particularly true given fat political clans are already prevalent. Simply removing term limits at this point will secure the political foothold of many already fat political dynasties. Real reforms should be focused not on removing term limits, but on further strengthening those reforms that should have accompanied itincluding enhancing competition in the political sphere, such as by supplying alternative leaders, strengthening political parties and regulating political dynasties.

Democratic Dynasties: Explaining Their Prevalence in Modern Democracies

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015

Though no systematic cross-national data exist political dynasties seem common in some countries yet almost completely absent in others. Dynasties might be important because if dynastic politics is common it may prevent meritocratic access to position of political power, thus denying the political system talent. But what explains the existence and variation in the extent of political dynasties? The popular literature seems to point to culture, but we develop a theory based on the electoral system and party organisation. In short we expect dynasties to be more common where the electoral system is candidate based and where party organisations are personalised rather than institutionalised. Using a number of cases, Argentina, the US, the UK, Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands and Israel we find support for our hypothesis.