Lucie Boël | Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3 (original) (raw)
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Talks by Lucie Boël
29th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2024
Recent work in ignorance studies teaches us that ignorance is not always negative but is also a n... more Recent work in ignorance studies teaches us that ignorance is not always negative but is also a necessary starting point for knowledge: it lies at the core of scientific research. If the idea that science rises from ignorance seems obvious, there is however little study on how ignorance drives science and on the forms it can take. Recognizing and analyzing its driving force can deepen both our understanding of the dynamics of scientific research and of the concept of ignorance. I show that scientific research follows a cycle of ignorance, and I offer an interpretative framework for the analysis of cases of scientific ignorance.
has published on paradoxes, negation, vagueness, analytic truth, Frege's philosophy of mathematic... more has published on paradoxes, negation, vagueness, analytic truth, Frege's philosophy of mathematics and logic, and mathematical explanation. His current LICPOS 2023 research principally addresses two areas: nineteenth century German philosophy, particularly the mathematician/philosopher/logician Gottlob Frege, and historically informed philosophy of mathematics, with special attention to shared themes in Bernhard Riemann's complex analysis/algebraic geometry and the mathematical foundations developed by Frege and Richard Dedekind. The historical research supports an investigation into the metaphysics and epistemology of mathematical concepts, with special emphasis on the concept of "fruitfulness". Papers that are representative of the current research include: "The Riemannian Background to Frege's Philosophy" in The
Two approaches of ignorance shape our understanding of the concept. The heuristics explores its r... more Two approaches of ignorance shape our understanding of the concept. The heuristics explores its role in the dynamics of scientific discovery but lacks conceptual depth. In contrast, analytic epistemology delves into its nature but overlooks its scientific specificities. As a result, we have a partial comprehension of ignorance: either a superficial grasp of scientific ignorance, or a deep understanding of ignorance overlooking its scientific nuances. I explore how these approaches are complementary to enhance our understanding of scientific and common ignorance, asserting that their conceptual construction is a dialectical process integrating philosophy of science and epistemology. I show the respective limitations of the two characterizations of ignorance before illustrating how the heuristic approach adds flexibility to the conceptual framework, and how the latter structures the former. I propose a comprehensive conception of ignorance as the outcome of this dialectical process.
incertain, l'émergence d'un nouveau paradigme épistémologique ? (XVIIe-XXe) The Uncertainty of Kn... more incertain, l'émergence d'un nouveau paradigme épistémologique ? (XVIIe-XXe) The Uncertainty of Knowledge. From the Certainty of Knowledge to the Knowledge of the Uncertain: the Emergence of a New Epistemological Paradigm? (17th-20th c.)
(en anglais) (3) Le genre en préhistoire Claudine Cohen, philosophe, historienne des sciences, di... more (en anglais) (3) Le genre en préhistoire Claudine Cohen, philosophe, historienne des sciences, directrice d'études à l'EHESS et membre du Centre de recherches sur les arts et
29th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2024
Recent work in ignorance studies teaches us that ignorance is not always negative but is also a n... more Recent work in ignorance studies teaches us that ignorance is not always negative but is also a necessary starting point for knowledge: it lies at the core of scientific research. If the idea that science rises from ignorance seems obvious, there is however little study on how ignorance drives science and on the forms it can take. Recognizing and analyzing its driving force can deepen both our understanding of the dynamics of scientific research and of the concept of ignorance. I show that scientific research follows a cycle of ignorance, and I offer an interpretative framework for the analysis of cases of scientific ignorance.
has published on paradoxes, negation, vagueness, analytic truth, Frege's philosophy of mathematic... more has published on paradoxes, negation, vagueness, analytic truth, Frege's philosophy of mathematics and logic, and mathematical explanation. His current LICPOS 2023 research principally addresses two areas: nineteenth century German philosophy, particularly the mathematician/philosopher/logician Gottlob Frege, and historically informed philosophy of mathematics, with special attention to shared themes in Bernhard Riemann's complex analysis/algebraic geometry and the mathematical foundations developed by Frege and Richard Dedekind. The historical research supports an investigation into the metaphysics and epistemology of mathematical concepts, with special emphasis on the concept of "fruitfulness". Papers that are representative of the current research include: "The Riemannian Background to Frege's Philosophy" in The
Two approaches of ignorance shape our understanding of the concept. The heuristics explores its r... more Two approaches of ignorance shape our understanding of the concept. The heuristics explores its role in the dynamics of scientific discovery but lacks conceptual depth. In contrast, analytic epistemology delves into its nature but overlooks its scientific specificities. As a result, we have a partial comprehension of ignorance: either a superficial grasp of scientific ignorance, or a deep understanding of ignorance overlooking its scientific nuances. I explore how these approaches are complementary to enhance our understanding of scientific and common ignorance, asserting that their conceptual construction is a dialectical process integrating philosophy of science and epistemology. I show the respective limitations of the two characterizations of ignorance before illustrating how the heuristic approach adds flexibility to the conceptual framework, and how the latter structures the former. I propose a comprehensive conception of ignorance as the outcome of this dialectical process.
incertain, l'émergence d'un nouveau paradigme épistémologique ? (XVIIe-XXe) The Uncertainty of Kn... more incertain, l'émergence d'un nouveau paradigme épistémologique ? (XVIIe-XXe) The Uncertainty of Knowledge. From the Certainty of Knowledge to the Knowledge of the Uncertain: the Emergence of a New Epistemological Paradigm? (17th-20th c.)
(en anglais) (3) Le genre en préhistoire Claudine Cohen, philosophe, historienne des sciences, di... more (en anglais) (3) Le genre en préhistoire Claudine Cohen, philosophe, historienne des sciences, directrice d'études à l'EHESS et membre du Centre de recherches sur les arts et