Rik Peels | Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (original) (raw)

Books in English by Rik Peels

Cambridge University Press, 2023

In this book, Rik Peels explores atheism from a new perspective that aims to go beyond the highly... more In this book, Rik Peels explores atheism from a new perspective that aims to go beyond the highly polarized debate about arguments for and against God's existence. Since our beliefs about the most important things in life are not usually based on arguments, we should look beyond atheistic arguments and explore what truly motivates the atheist. Are there certain ideals or experiences that explain the turn to atheism? Could atheism be the default position for us, not requiring any arguments whatsoever? And what about the often-discussed arguments against belief in God—is there something that religious and nonreligious people alike can learn from them? This book explores how a novel understanding of atheism is possible – and how it effectively moves the God debate further. Believers and non-believers can learn much from Peels' assessment of arguments for and against atheism.

Cambridge University Press, 2020

Common-sense philosophy is important. It is important because it maintains that we know many thin... more Common-sense philosophy is important. It is important because it maintains that we know many things about the world, about ourselves, about morality, and even many things of a metaphysical nature. These important things are at the same time often in some specific sense unexciting or unsurprising as they are truisms, platitudes, things that almost no one in their right mind would deny. However, denying these truisms and platitudes, common-sense philosophers hold wreaks havoc in both our intellectual and our practical lives. At the same time, common-sense philosophy is highly exciting, as these truisms and platitudes give rise to many philosophical challenges. This book traces the history of the concept of common-sense and the roles it was assigned to play in the history of philosophy. These newly commissioned chapters are all written by specialists in the history of philosophy. This book also contains chapters in which contemporary epistemologists, moral philosophers, and metaphysicians in the common-sense tradition explain what they think is the value and power of common-sense philosophy.

Routledge, 2020

Common sense philosophy holds that widely and deeply held beliefs are justified in the absence of... more Common sense philosophy holds that widely and deeply held beliefs are justified in the absence of defeaters. While this tradition has always had its philosophical detractors who have defended various forms of skepticism or have sought to develop rival epistemological views, recent advances in several scientific disciplines claim to have debunked the reliability of the faculties that produce our common sense beliefs. At the same time, however, it seems reasonable that we cannot do without common sense beliefs entirely. Arguably, science and the scientific method are built on, and continue to depend on, common sense.

This collection of essays debates the tenability of common sense in the face of recent challenges from the empirical sciences. It explores to what extent scientific considerations—rather than philosophical considerations—put pressure on common sense philosophy. The book is structured in a way that promotes dialogue between philosophers and scientists. Noah Lemos, one of the most influential contemporary advocates of the common sense tradition, begins with an overview of the nature and scope of common sense beliefs, and examines philosophical objections to common sense and its relationship to scientific beliefs. Then, the volume features essays by scientists and philosophers of science who discuss various proposed conflicts between commonsensical and scientific beliefs: the reality of space and time, about the nature of human beings, about free will and identity, about rationality, about morality, and about religious belief. Notable philosophers who embrace the common sense tradition respond to these essays to explore the connection between common sense philosophy and contemporary debates in evolutionary biology, neuroscience, physics, and psychology.

Springer, 2018

It is widely thought that the cognitive science of religion (CSR) may have a bearing on the epist... more It is widely thought that the cognitive science of religion (CSR) may have a bearing on
the epistemic status of religious beliefs and on other topics in philosophy of religion.
Epistemologists have used theories from CSR to argue both for and against the
rationality of religious beliefs, or they have claimed that CSR is neutral vis-à-vis the
epistemic status of religious belief. However, since CSR is a rapidly evolving discipline,
a great deal of earlier research on the topic has become dated. Furthermore, most of
the debate on the epistemic consequences of CSR has not taken into account insights
from the philosophy of science, such as explanatory pluralism and explanatory levels.
This volume overcomes these deficiencies.

This volume brings together new philosophical reflection on cognitive science of
religion (CSR). It examines the influence of cognitive science of religion (CSR) theories
on the epistemic status of religious beliefs; it discusses its impact on philosophy of
religion; and it offers new insights for CSR. The book addresses the question of whether or not the plurality of theories in CSR makes epistemic conclusions about religious belief unwarranted. It also explores the impact of CSR on other topics in philosophy of religion like the cognitive consequences of sin and naturalism. Finally, the book investigates what the main theories in CSR aim to explain, and addresses the strengths and weaknesses of CSR.

Oxford University Press, 2017

In this book, I develop a theory of responsible belief. First, I tighten our grip on the core not... more In this book, I develop a theory of responsible belief. First, I tighten our grip on the core notions of ‘responsibility’ and ‘belief’ by giving an analysis of these two concepts that will play a crucial role in any account of responsible belief. Second, I present the problem of doxastic involuntarism: it seems that we cannot choose our beliefs, not even in an indirect way, and, therefore, we do not have obligations to hold or not to hold specific beliefs. I also defend the view that the main accounts that aim to meet this problem by arguing that we do have some kind of (compatibilist) control, fail. Third, I provide a solution to the problem by arguing that we do have control over all sorts of factors that make a difference to what we believe and argue that we, therefore, have certain intellectual obligations. Fourth, I defend the thesis that, sometimes, we can still believe responsibly, even though we have violated our intellectual obligations in coming to hold a belief, namely because we are excused for doing so. I argue that there are three types of excuses and discuss them and their implications in detail: force, ignorance, and luck. In an Appendix, I argue that any attempt to identify responsible belief with epistemically justified belief is doomed to fail. The book will appear early 2016 with Oxford University Press.

Oxford University Press, 2018

This volume provides a critical analysis and evaluation of scientism. It gives a detailed account... more This volume provides a critical analysis and evaluation of scientism. It gives a detailed account of scientism and its varieties, a defense and critique of scientism, and an assessment of the role scientism plays in particular realms of life, such as religion, ethics, and metaphysical thinking. In order to reach this aim, the following questions are formulated and answered: (i) How is scientism best defined? (ii) What varieties of scientism are there? (iii) How does scientism relate to philosophical naturalism, physicalism, reductionism, and other positions in its neighborhood? (iv) What arguments can be given for scientism? (v) What is to be said against scientism? (vi) What role does scientism play in various subfields of philosophy: metaphysics, ethics, and the philosophy of religion? (vi) Are there serious alternatives to scientism, and if so: what do they look like?

Edited by Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels, and René van Woudenberg

Cambridge University Press, 2016

Ignorance is a neglected issue in philosophy. For at least two reasons, this is surprising. First... more Ignorance is a neglected issue in philosophy. For at least two reasons, this is surprising. First, contrary to what one might expect, it is not clear what ignorance is. Some philosophers say or assume that it is lack of knowledge, whereas others claim or presuppose that it is absence of true belief. What is one ignorant of when one is ignorant? And how does ignorance of a specific fact relate to ignorance on some topic or to being an ignorant person (an ignoramus)?

Second, ignorance is of crucial importance in several domains of life, but the roles it plays in those domains have mostly received little attention. In the epistemic realm, ignorance might unexpectedly have some epistemic value, focusing on ignorance sheds new light on knowledge and epistemic justification, and the concept of culpable ignorance returns time and again in religious epistemology. In the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse, some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral character, and ignorance is closely related to moral risk. Finally, ignorance has certain social dimensions: it has been claimed to be the engine of science, it seems to be entailed by privacy and secrecy, and it is widely thought to constitute a legal excuse in certain circumstances. But if the nature of ignorance is more elusive than one would initially think and if ignorance plays a pivotal role in such important realms of life as the epistemic, the moral, and the social domains, then one could hardly wish for a better object of philosophical analysis and discussion.

The focus of this edited collection is on the epistemic dimension of ignorance. This volume addresses such issues as the nature of ignorance, the contextual dimension of ignorance, the epistemic value of ignorance, and social epistemological issues pertaining to ignorance. Together, these topics will add depth and insight into the question of how ignorance should be understood epistemologically. It will be the first in its kind in having as its focus exactly those problems associated with this dimension. It will draw together twelve commissioned chapters that are written by leading philosophers in the field and that represent diverse reflections on a rich topic.

Editors: Martijn Blaauw, Rik Peels

Routledge, 2017

This edited collection explores the moral and social dimensions of ignorance. The volume addresse... more This edited collection explores the moral and social dimensions of ignorance. The volume addresses such issues as the relation between ignorance and deception, ignorance as a moral excuse, ignorance as a legal excuse, and the relation between ignorance and moral character. Together, these topics will add depth and insight into the question of what are the moral and social relevance, value, and role of ignorance. It will be the first in its kind in having as its focus exactly those problems associated with this dimension. It will draw together twelve commissioned chapters written by leading philosophers in the field.

Published with Routledge

List of Contributors: Larry Alexander; Marcia Baron; Julia Driver; Don Fallis; Alex Guerrero; Sven Ove Hansson; Elinor Mason; Seumas Miller; Martin Peterson; Carolina Sartorio; Holly Smith; Michael Zimmermann

Papers in English by Rik Peels

Both scientists and society at large have rightfully become increasingly concerned about research... more Both scientists and society at large have rightfully become increasingly concerned about research integrity in recent decades. In response, codes of conduct for research have been developed and elaborated. We show that these codes contain substantial pluralism. First, there is metaphysical pluralism in that codes include values, norms, and virtues. Second, there is axiological pluralism, because there are different categories of values, norms, and virtues: epistemic, moral, professional, social, and legal. Within and between these different categories, norms can be incommensurable or incompatible. Codes of conduct typically do not specify how to handle situations where different norms pull in different directions. We review some attempts to develop an ordering of different sorts of norm violations based on a common measure for their seriousness. We argue that they all fail to give adequate guidance for resolving cases of incommensurable and conflicting norms. We conclude that value pluralism is inherent to codes of conduct in research integrity. The application of codes needs careful reasoning and judgment together with an intellectually humble attitude that acknowledges the inevitability of value pluralism.

Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology , 2021

What is it for a group to be ignorant? This is the question we answer in this chapter. After a fe... more What is it for a group to be ignorant? This is the question we answer in this chapter. After a few important distinctions regarding ignorance, we provide two case studies of group ignorance: fundamentalist ignorance and white ignorance. We formulate six desiderata that an account of group ignorance should meet. Subsequently, we argue that existing accounts of group belief, group justification, and group knowledge cannot easily be transposed to group ignorance. We then lay out our own Dynamic Account of group ignorance and reply to several objections that might be leveled against it.

This paper explores various relations that exist between replication and trustworthiness. After d... more This paper explores various relations that exist between replication and trustworthiness. After defining “trust”, “trustworthiness”, “replicability”, “replication study”, and “successful replication”, we consider, respectively, how trustworthiness relates to each of the three main kinds of replication: reproductions, direct replications, and conceptual replications. Subsequently, we explore how trustworthiness relates to the intentionality of a replication. After that, we discuss whether the trustworthiness of research findings depends merely on evidential considerations or also on what is at stake. We conclude by adding replication to the other issues that should be considered in assessing the trustworthiness of research findings: (1) the likelihood of the findings before the primary study was done (that is, the prior probability of the findings), (2) the study size and the methodological quality of the primary study, (3) the number of replications that were performed and the quality and consistency of their aggregated findings, and (4) what is at stake.

Julia Hermann, Jeroen Hopster, Wouter Kalf, Michael Klenk (eds.), Philosophy in the Age of Science? Inquiries into Philosophical Progress, Method, and Societal Relevance (London: Rowman & Littlefield), 2020

Contribution to a Festschrift for Herman Philipse. I explore whether there can be progress in phi... more Contribution to a Festschrift for Herman Philipse. I explore whether there can be progress in philosophy and theology. I respond to various objections against the idea of progress in philosophy and theology, by laying out a multitude of ways in which progress is possible and by giving various examples of each way, and by arguing for a structural
similarity between philosophy and theology: If there is progress in philosophy, then there is in theology.

It is widely thought that education should aim at positive epistemic standings, like knowledge, i... more It is widely thought that education should aim at positive epistemic standings, like knowledge, insight, and understanding. In this paper, we argue that, surprisingly, in pursuit of this aim, it is sometimes necessary to also cultivate ignorance. We exam- ine several types of case. First, in various circumstances educators should present students with defeaters for their knowledge, so that they come to lack knowledge, at least temporarily. Second, there is the phenomenon of ‘sca olding’ in education, which we note might sometimes involve the educator quite properly ensuring that the student is ignorant of certain kinds of information. Third, if ignorance is lack of true belief, as a number of commentators have claimed, then in those cases in which students believe something truly without knowing it and teachers show that they lack knowledge, students may abandon that belief and thus become ignorant. In examin- ing the role of ignorance in education, we explore exactly which kinds of ignorance are valuable in teaching situations and draw attention to important epistemic di er- ences between ignorance on di erent levels.

British Journal for Aesthetics (forthcoming), 2020

Some philosophers, such as Alex Rosenberg, claim that the natural sciences deliver epistemic valu... more Some philosophers, such as Alex Rosenberg, claim that the natural sciences deliver epistemic values such as knowledge and understanding, whereas, say, literature and literary studies, merely have aesthetic value. Many of those working in the field of literary studies oppose this idea. But it is not clear exactly how works of literary art embody knowledge and understanding and how literary studies can bring these to the light. After all, literary works of art are pieces of fiction, which suggests that they are not meant to represent the actual world. How then can they deliver knowledge and understanding? I argue that literature and literary studies confer knowledge and understanding in a variety of ways: they give us insight into the work and the world of the work of art in question, they shape our intellectual virtues, they invite us to apply various moral, epistemic, and prudential hypotheses, they deliver moral propositional knowledge, and they increase our understanding or bring about full understanding with respect to meaning, virtue, and significance. In the course of my argument, I refer at several junctures to Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles and Edith Wharton’s Summer, in order to illustrate each of these claims.

I reply to Stephen White’s criticisms of my Influence View. First, I reply to his worry that my A... more I reply to Stephen White’s criticisms of my Influence View. First, I
reply to his worry that my Appraisal Account of responsibility cannot make sense of doxastic responsibility. Then, I discuss in detail his stolen painting case and argue that the Influence View can make sense of it. Next, I discuss various other cases that are meant to show that acting in accordance with one’s beliefs does not render one blameless. I argue that in these cases, even though the subjects act in accordance with their own beliefs, there is plenty of reason to think that at some previous point in time they violated certain intellectual obligations that led to them to hold those beliefs. Even on a radically subjective account of responsibility, then,
we can perfectly well hold these people responsible for their beliefs. I go on to defend the idea that reasons-responsiveness will not do for doxastic responsibility: we need influence on our beliefs as well. Thus, doxastic compatibilism or rationalism is untenable. Subsequently, I defend my earlier claim that there is a crucial difference between beliefs and actions in that actions are often subject to the will, whereas beliefs are not. Finally, I respond to White’s worry that if one has a subjective epistemic obligation just because one believes that certain actions are epistemically bad, some people will have a wide range of absurd epistemic obligations, such as the obligation to listen to Infowars.

Goldberg has argued in several writings of his that our social context is crucial in determining ... more Goldberg has argued in several writings of his that our social context is crucial in determining whether we believe responsibly or not. In this reply to his criticisms, I explore whether my Influence Account of responsible belief can do justice to this social dimension of responsible belief. I discuss the case of Nancy the scientist, that of Fernando the doctor, and that of Janice who promises Ismelda to shovel her lane. I argue that the core solution to the challenges these cases provide is to distinguish between different kinds of intellectual obligations, such as epistemic, moral, and professional obligations. My Influence Account leaves plenty of room to make these distinctions. Even though my account is not primarily meant as an account of epistemically justified belief but rather as an account of responsible belief, I also argue that it can accommodate our intuitions about various important cases of epistemically (un)justified belief.

Introduction for 'New Developments in Cognitive Science of Religion - The Rationality of Religiou... more Introduction for 'New Developments in Cognitive Science of Religion - The Rationality of Religious Belief' forthcoming with Springer.

We discuss the philosophical debate over Cognitive Science of Religion and give an outline of the book.

Research Integrity and Peer Review, 2019

An influential idea in science, philosophy, and popular science writing is that science and the n... more An influential idea in science, philosophy, and popular science writing is that science and the natural sciences in particular reliably lead to rational belief and knowledge, whereas non-scientific sources of belief do not. This view is often referred to as ‘scientism’ and is defended, among others, by Alex Rosenberg, James Ladyman, Don Ross, and David Spurrett. In this paper, I present what I call the ‘argument from self-referential incoherence’ against scientism. The point of the argument is that scientism itself is not sufficiently supported by natural science and, therefore, on scientism itself scientism cannot be rationally believed. I discuss four possible responses. First, scientism itself is sufficiently supported by scientific evidence. Second, we should embrace scientism and make an exception for scientism itself. Third, scientism is a thesis that is pragmatically rather than epistemically justified. Fourth, scientism should not be interpreted as a thesis, belief, or assertion, but as something else, such as a stance. I argue that each of these responses fails. I conclude that scientism is hoist by its own petard.

Cambridge University Press, 2023

Cambridge University Press, 2020

Routledge, 2020

Springer, 2018

Oxford University Press, 2017

Oxford University Press, 2018

Edited by Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels, and René van Woudenberg

Cambridge University Press, 2016

Editors: Martijn Blaauw, Rik Peels

Routledge, 2017

Published with Routledge

Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology , 2021

British Journal for Aesthetics (forthcoming), 2020

We discuss the philosophical debate over Cognitive Science of Religion and give an outline of the book.

Research Integrity and Peer Review, 2019

This is a draft paper for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook on Assertion, edited by Sanford Goldber... more This is a draft paper for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook on Assertion, edited by Sanford Goldberg. In this paper, I explore to what extent ignorance is assertable. Any comments are welcome!

The cognitive science of religion is an academic field that provides a wide variety of natural ex... more The cognitive science of religion is an academic field that provides a wide variety of natural explanations of religious belief, including various evolutionary explanations. We shall discuss a few of those evolutionary explanations in more detail below. This paper explores the relation between those explanations and a core idea in classical Christian theology as well as (among other philosophical streams of thought) in Reformed Epistemology. This idea is the notion that sin has certain cognitive consequences, in addition to affective and existential consequences, even though these are all interwoven. In particular, sin is believed to have diminished and distorted human knowledge of God.

First, we offer some terminological clarifications and define the main concepts and phrases that figure in this debate, such as ‘sin’, ‘cognitive consequences of sin’, the ‘Fall’, and ‘evolutionary explanations of religious belief’ (§2). After that, we spell out the argument developed by De Smedt and De Cruz against a historic Fall (§3). Next, we pause a moment in order to ponder exactly what is at stake here (§4). In the ensuing sections, we discuss three possible solutions how evolutionary explanations of religious belief can be wedded to a historic account of the Fall (§§5-7) before we draw our conclusion (§8).

In this paper, I defend the Mixed Account of luck, as Neil Levy, E.J. Coffman, Wayne Riggs, and I... more In this paper, I defend the Mixed Account of luck, as Neil Levy, E.J. Coffman, Wayne Riggs, and I have presented it on several earlier occasions. On this account of luck, the actualization of some state of affairs Σ is lucky for some person S if and only if (i) whether or not Σ obtains is significant for S, (ii) S fails to exercise control over whether or not Σ obtains, (iii) Σ could easily have failed to obtain. I argue that states of affairs rather than persons, propositions, events, or strokes of luck should be the primary object of conceptual analysis when it comes to luck. I contrast the Mixed Account with rival accounts of luck, such as Duncan Pritchard's modal account, on which the obtaining of the modal condition is sufficient for an event's being lucky. I spell out each of the three conditions of the Mixed Account in detail: (i) the significance condition, (ii) the control condition, and (iii) the modal condition. Finally, I defend it against objections and conclude that it stands undefeated.

This paper proposes a normative taxonomy by which universities can express the extent to which th... more This paper proposes a normative taxonomy by which universities can express the extent to which they meet five core epistemic responsibilities. Epistemic responsibilities are responsibilities that have to do with the attainment of knowledge and understanding. The core epistemic responsibilities, which we call the Big Five, are to (1) foster research integrity, (2) teach for intellectual virtue, (3) address the big questions of life, (4) give humanistic inquiry and education a proper place, and (5) serve society. The paper characterizes the Big Five in some detail and explains why they are core epistemic responsibilities of universities. The paper concludes by describing the steps that should be taken in order to test, amend, and implement the taxonomy.

It has been a true pleasure to read the four preceding rigorous, kind, and thought-provoking resp... more It has been a true pleasure to read the four preceding rigorous, kind, and
thought-provoking responses to my book. I thank each of the authors for
taking so much time to exchange thoughts on what we all consider an
important issue; I am deeply honored! Now, there is much that we agree
on. For instance, each of us thinks that we are indeed responsible for our
beliefs and Booth, Zimmerman, and I agree that doxastic responsibility
should be understood in terms of influence. In what follows, I focus on what we disagree on. I realize that I cannot do full justice to the complexity of the challenges they have laid before me, but partial justice is better than no justice – so here we go.

It will not come as a surprise to the reader that in my book Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethi... more It will not come as a surprise to the reader that in my book Responsible
Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology (Peels 2017), I defend an
account of responsible belief. That the International Journal of
Philosophical Studies would devote a symposium to the book, though, surely
was a surprise for me. I am thrilled and honored by it. I have done my best
to reply to each of the challenging ensuing essays. I will first sketch, though,
what the discussion is all about, what distinguishes my approach to the
topic from others in the field, and how it is relevant to other societal and
philosophical issues.

A large number of scientists and several news platforms have, over the last few years, been speak... more A large number of scientists and several news platforms have, over the last few years, been speaking of a replication crisis in various academic disciplines, especially the biomedical and social sciences. This paper answers the novel question of whether we should also pursue replication in the humanities. First, I create more conceptual clarity by defining, in addition to the term “humanities,” various key terms in the debate on replication, such as “reproduction” and “replicability.” In doing so, I pay attention to what is supposed to be the object of replication:
certain studies, particular inferences, of specific results. After that, I spell out three reasons for thinking that replication in the humanities - objections that have been levelled in response to this idea of mine and Lex Bouter - is not possible and argue that they are unconvincing. Subsequently, I give a more detailed case for thinking that replication in the humanities. Finally, I explain why such replication in the humanities is not only possible, but also desirable.

I argue that ignorance should be understood as the absence of propositional knowledge or the abse... more I argue that ignorance should be understood as the absence of propositional knowledge or the absence of true belief, the absence of objectual knowledge, or the absence of procedural knowledge. I also argue that epistemic vices, hermeneutical frameworks, intentional avoidance of evidence, and other important phenomena that the agential and structural conceptions of ignorance draw our attention to, are best understood as important accidental features of ignorance, not as properties that are essential to ignorance.

Some scholars have claimed that replication – the independent repetition of an earlier study, ans... more Some scholars have claimed that replication – the independent repetition of
an earlier study, answering the same study question, using the same or
similar methods under the same or similar circumstances – is not possible
in the humanities. The reasoning is that the humanities search for cultural
meaning can yield multiple valid answers, and that research objects are
people and thus interactive entities. This may be true, suggest Rik Peels and
Lex M. Bouter, but it does not automatically follow that replication is not
possible. It is a desirable feature for empirical studies in the humanities to
be replicable, and it is equally desirable that the project of carrying out
replication studies in the humanities gets off the ground.

This paper provides an analysis of the propositional attitude of doubt. In order to illustrate th... more This paper provides an analysis of the propositional attitude of doubt. In order to illustrate that a rigorous analysis is needed, I first argue that four analyses of doubt that we find in the literature are unsatisfying: those of Bertrand Russell, Charles Peirce, Nathan Salmon, and Paul Thagard. Next, I show that ‘doubt’ is used in four different ways: as a verb with an accusative noun, as a verb with a subordinate clause, as a mass noun in the expression ‘in doubt’, and as an accusative count noun. Subsequently, I provide and defend an account of doubt that p and doubt whether p, being in doubt, and having doubts. I argue that there is no single phenomenon involved when it comes to doubt: these varieties of doubt are all conceptually distinct, even though doubt that p and doubt whether p are conceptually very close. Finally, I show one way in which my analysis of doubt is relevant by applying it to the relation between religious faith and doubt.

This short entry provides an overview of the life and philosophical work of William Kingdon Cliff... more This short entry provides an overview of the life and philosophical work of William Kingdon Clifford.

Christian liturgical commemoration has received little attention from philosophers of religion. T... more Christian liturgical commemoration has received little attention from philosophers of religion. This article provides an exploration of this topic. I argue that Christian liturgical commemoration is a response in a dialectical relationship with God that has three stereotypical properties: to think about and let one's life be influenced by the relevant persons and events, honoring the relevant persons, and preserving the memory of the persons and events in question. This practice has its roots in the Old and New Testament concepts of commemoration and remembrance, referred by such verbs as zachar and mimnēskomai. On these concepts, commemoration is a response to divine action. Partly on the basis of this dialectical relationship account of commemoration and partly on the basis of general considerations, I also argue that Christian liturgical commemoration has both events and persons as its objects, that something is a commemorative vehicle if it was designed or instituted as such and a commemorative vehicle for someone if that person takes it to be a commemorative means, and that one participates in Christian liturgical commemoration if one successfully thinks about the object in question and lets one's life be influenced by that.

In this paper I explore whether epistemically rational trust can be voluntary. And argue that it ... more In this paper I explore whether epistemically rational trust can be voluntary. And argue that it can!

Ongeredigeerde draft-versie van enkele pagina's uit 'God bewijzen' (2013), van Rik Peels en mij. ... more Ongeredigeerde draft-versie van enkele pagina's uit 'God bewijzen' (2013), van Rik Peels en mij. Iets uitgebreider dan het origineel. Onderstaande pagina's veronderstellen dat men weet wat 'basisovertuigingen' (basic beliefs) zijn. Dat wordt uitgelegd in hoofdstuk 2 van ons boek.

Ik zie in de filosofie een renaissance van argumenten voor Gods bestaan. Ik ben zelf geleidelijk ... more Ik zie in de filosofie een renaissance van argumenten voor Gods bestaan. Ik ben zelf geleidelijk in de waarde van dit soort argumenten gaan geloven, maar kom heel wat aarzelingen tegen bij theologen en filosofen. Ik heb geprobeerd die eens goed op een rijtje te zetten. Ik heb getracht de zorgen van deze mensen – jouw zorgen? – te formuleren en erop te reageren. Het resultaat vind je in dit paper. Commentaar en feedback zijn van harte welkom: Wordt jouw zorg geformuleerd of is die afwezig? Is jouw bezwaar accuraat weergegeven? Vind je de reactie overtuigend?

Considerations of scale appear high on the list of intuitive evidence against theism. The sheer s... more Considerations of scale appear high on the list of intuitive evidence against theism. The sheer spatial and temporal vastness of the universe and the seemingly insignificant place that human beings occupy in space and time strikes many people as telling evidence for atheism. Surely, the universe would have looked very different if God wanted there to be intelligent life. These considerations, however, have received scant attention in the philosophical literature. In this paper, we explore the prospects of developing them into an argument against theism. We attempt various possible reconstructions of the argument, but argue that ultimately none succeed. The intuitive appeal of considerations from scale does not survive critical scrutiny.

In Leven zonder God onderzoekt Rik Peels het atheïsme vanuit een nieuw perspectief, dat verder ga... more In Leven zonder God onderzoekt Rik Peels het atheïsme vanuit een nieuw perspectief, dat verder gaat dan het sterk gepolariseerde debat over argumenten voor en tegen het bestaan van God.

In debatten over godsgeloof hebben atheïsten, agnosten en gelovigen iets over het hoofd gezien. De aandacht is voornamelijk uitgegaan naar argumenten voor en tegen het bestaan van God, maar atheïsme zelf is niet voldoende onderzocht. Terecht hebben atheïsten ieder aspect van een godsdienstige levensbeschouwing aan de orde gesteld. Maar het wordt nu tijd om atheïsme zelf op die manier kritisch te onderzoeken.

In dit boek probeert Rik Peels niet alleen atheïsme beter te begrijpen, maar ook eerlijker te evalueren. Wat is er zo aantrekkelijk aan atheïsme? Zijn er specifieke denkwijzen die mensen richting atheïsme leiden? En los van de vraag of de atheïstische argumenten het bestaan van God weerleggen, valt er misschien iets te leren van atheïsme voor ons allemaal? Met deze rijke verkenning van doelbewust leven zonder God transformeert Rik Peels het debat tussen atheïsten en gelovigen tot een streven naar een dieper begrip van elkaar.

Het icoon van gewelddadig extremisme is nog altijd de aanslag op de Twin Towers van 11 september ... more Het icoon van gewelddadig extremisme is nog altijd de aanslag op de Twin Towers van 11 september 2001. Maar er is de afgelopen jaren veel veranderd. Extremisme komt vandaag de dag van verschillende kanten.

Niet alleen is extreemrechts flink gegroeid, er is ook steeds meer anti-institutioneel radicalisme, dat zich richt tegen overheid, wetenschap, media en rechtspraak. Ook zijn extremisme en radicaal complotdenken sterker verweven geraakt, onder meer door de coronacrisis. Daar komt nog bij dat er allerlei nieuwe bewegingen zijn ontstaan, zoals die van de Incels (involuntary celibates), die menen dat hun eenzaamheid te wijten is aan het feminisme, en van ‘soevereinen’ die de overheid niet erkennen en geen belasting willen betalen.

In dit boek onderzoekt Rik Peels verschillende manieren om hedendaagse radicalisering beter te begrijpen. Zijn extremisten gek of zijn ze in feite gezonde, rationele mensen? Moeten wetenschap en overheid luisteren naar extremisten, en hoe dan? Kunnen de oudste wetenschappen, de filosofie en de theologie, ons iets leren over extremisme dat we tot nu toe gemist hebben?

Christelijk geloof en evolutie: hoe verhouden die twee zich tot elkaar? Wat kan er van de evoluti... more Christelijk geloof en evolutie: hoe verhouden die twee zich tot elkaar? Wat kan er van de evolutietheorie aanvaard worden als de Bijbel Gods openbaring is? En wat zijn de consequenties voor het christelijk geloof als de evolutietheorie waar is?

Een breed palet aan auteurs behandelt een scala aan vragen op wetenschapsfilosofisch (is de evolutietheorie een wereldbeeld?), exegetisch-hermeneutisch (was Adam een historisch persoon?) en systematisch-theologisch terrein (heeft de evolutietheorie gevolgen voor onze visie op verlossing?). Elke auteur trekt op zijn of haar deelgebied een eigen conclusie.

En God zag dat het goed was brengt de nodige bezinning op christelijk geloof en evolutietheorie verder. De redactie wordt gevormd door theoloog William den Boer, filosoof Rik Peels en bioloog / wetenschapsjournalist René Fransen.

Verder werken mee (alf.):
* Henk Bakker
* Henk van den Belt
* Koert van Berkum
* Gijsbert van den Brink
* Hans Burger
* Ab Flipse
* Arnold Huijgen
* Everard de Jong
* Marjo Korpel
* Gert Kwakkel
* Almatine Leene
* Ronald Meester
* Michael Mulder
* Stefan Paas
* Mart-Jan Paul
* Eric Peels
* Jeroen de Ridder
* Marcel Sarot
* Benno van den Toren
* Dolf te Velde
* Bert van Veluw
* Wim van Vlastuin
* René van Woudenberg

Dit pamflet wil richting wijzen in het verwarde en verwarrende debat over de Nederlandse dodenher... more Dit pamflet wil richting wijzen in het verwarde en verwarrende debat over de Nederlandse dodenherdenking. Vertrekpunt is de vraag die de laatste twee à drie jaar centraal staat in het debat over de Nederlandse dodenherdenking: moeten we ook gesneuvelde Duitse soldaten herdenken? Dit is de meest actuele kwestie, getuige het protest van verschillende organisaties, honderden opiniestukken in kranten en op internet, en zelfs de betrokkenheid van de rechter toen op 4 mei 2012 in Vorden mensen langs een graf voor Duitse soldaten liepen. Ik laat zien dat we deze vraag alleen kunnen beantwoorden door te kijken naar wat herdenken eigenlijk is. Verder toon ik aan dat een goede analyse van herdenken ook een antwoord op allerlei andere vragen geeft, zoals de vraag of we een aparte krans voor de joodse slachtoffers moeten leggen, of er een officiële Duitse vertegenwoordiging moet worden uitgenodigd op 4 mei en of we niet een keer moeten ophouden met het herdenken van de
Tweede Wereldoorlog.

Moet je gek zijn om in God te geloven? Of op z’n minst naïef, onkritisch en zweverig? Moderne men... more Moet je gek zijn om in God te geloven? Of op z’n minst naïef, onkritisch en zweverig? Moderne mensen hebben afgerekend met de illusie dat er een God bestaat. Toch wil God maar niet dood. Nog altijd zijn er weinig on derwerpen die meer stof doen opwaaien dan juist religie. Buiten Europa groeit religieus geloof. En zelfs in het seculiere Nederland zijn er mensen die zich tot het geloof in God bekeren. Natuurlijk kunnen we dat zien als een nieuw bewijs voor de onuitroeibare irrationa-liteit van mensen. Maar misschien is er meer aan de hand. Misschien is geloven in God niet zo dom als het lijkt.

Dat laatste is precies wat in dit boek wordt beweerd. Twee wetenschappers zetten hier de argumenten voor en tegen Godsgeloof op een rij. Ze doen dat op een milde manier, zonder polemiek of bekeringsijver, al zijn ze zelf wel gelovig. Het boek is geschreven met vaart en humor en het bevat de laatste wetenschappelijke en filosofische inzichten over religie en Godsgeloof. Het is tot stand gekomen met medewerking van gelovige en niet-gelovige wetenschappers uit verschillende vakgebieden en bedoeld voor mensen die openstaan voor argumenten.

Theologia Reformata, 2020

If God, as the Biblical narratives suggest, cares in a special way for the marginal (a cha racter... more If God, as the Biblical narratives suggest, cares in a special way for the marginal (a cha racter trait we dubbed 'adunamophilia'), this appears to be at odds with God's perfect goodness, in the sense of treating all people fairly and with equal care. After a brief overview of God's adunamophilia as witnessed to by various Bible passages and the Christian tradition more broadly, we argue that the tension can be reduced but not resolved by considering God's adunamophilia in relation to God's righteousness. Going beyond this, we propose to consider God's adunamophilia as a manifestation of God's personal preference, which is not necessarily morally blameworthy. As creatures, humans are challenged to accept this scandalous preference, ultimately expressed in Christ's life among the marginal in his humiliation and death on the cross.

Radicaal-rechts gedachtegoed is geen nieuw fenomeen in Nederland. Al in 1997 startte de Anne Fran... more Radicaal-rechts gedachtegoed is geen nieuw fenomeen in Nederland.
Al in 1997 startte de Anne Frank Stichting met een monitor naar racisme en rechts-extremisme.
Een groot verschil met toen is dat de toegenomen dreiging van radicaal-rechts nu als blinde vlek wordt
bestempeld. Heeft alle media-aandacht voor jihadistisch geweld onze blik op rechts vertroebeld?

Renée van Riessen besprak in haar afscheidslezing vier vensters op nabijheid en dat levert talloz... more Renée van Riessen besprak in haar afscheidslezing vier vensters op nabijheid en dat levert talloze waardevolle inzichten op. In zijn reactie op deze lezing doet Rik Peels een poging tot een christelijke inbedding van nabijheid. Hij stelt daarbij vragen als: wie dien ik nabij te zijn? Zijn er grenzen aan nabijheid? Is er hoop als je geen nabijheid vindt in deze wereld?

Theologia Reformata (forthcoming), 2020

Dit artikel verkent een specifiek soort moeiten met geloof in wonderen: argumenten en aarzelingen... more Dit artikel verkent een specifiek soort moeiten met geloof in wonderen: argumenten en aarzelingen die te maken hebben met wetenschap en met een wetenschappelijk wereldbeeld. Daarmee bedoel ik een wereldbeeld dat geïnformeerd is door de natuurwetenschappen, in het bijzonder de fysica en de biologie, maar ook moderne ontwikkelingen in de geesteswetenschappen, zoals het ontstaan van de historisch-kritische methode in de exegese. Sinds de Verlichting heeft de ontmythologisering van de wereld langzaamaan gestalte gekregen in het dagelijks leven van veel mensen, in het Westen althans. Tegelijkertijd moeten we dit niet overdrijven: paradoxaal genoeg heeft de secularisatie juist ook allerhande wondergeloof, niet gedisciplineerd door enige traditie of liturgie, weelderig laten tieren. In het publieke discours echter, zeker onder hoogopgeleiden, wordt met verwijzing naar wetenschap, geloof in wonderen vaak als problematisch ervaren. Wonderen zijn toch in strijd met de wetenschap? Waarom zou je in iets geloven dat we vroeg of laat helemaal wetenschappelijk kunnen verklaren? Opmerkelijk genoeg zijn dergelijke bezwaren in de literatuur veel minder goed uitgewerkt dan de meer filosofische bezwaren die we bij Hume en Spinoza aantreffen. In dit artikel wordt een poging gedaan deze bezwaren toch serieus te nemen en te bezien wat ze betekenen voor geloof in wonderen.

Theologia Reformata (forthcoming), 2020

In dit stuk verkennen wij hoe Gods volkomen goedheid zich verhoudt tot zijn bijzondere zorg/voork... more In dit stuk verkennen wij hoe Gods volkomen goedheid zich verhoudt tot zijn bijzondere zorg/voorkeur voor het zwakke, twee belangrijke eigenschappen van God in de christelijke traditie. Dit is relevant omdat deze twee eigenschappen op gespannen voet met elkaar lijken te staan: zou een volkomen goede God niet iedereen gelijk behandelen?

Commentaar op en suggesties bij dit paper zijn van harte welkom!

En God zag dat het goed was. Christelijk geloof en evolutie in 25 cruciale vragen, 2019

In 2017 riep het boek En de aarde bracht voort van Gijsbert van den Brink hierover veel verschillende reacties op. Over zijn antwoorden liepen de meningen uiteen, maar over het belang van zijn onderzoeksvraag was iedereen het wel eens. Zijn boek was het startschot van een verdere noodzakelijke bezinning. Die bezinning wordt geboden in het boek En God zag dat het goed was. Dit boek verschijnt 4 oktober 2019.

In En God zag dat het goed was nemen 26 deskundigen de handschoen op en onderzoeken zij op deelgebieden verder hoe een bepaald element uit het christelijk geloof zich nu precies verhoudt tot de evolutietheorie. Een breed palet aan auteurs behandelt een scala aan vragen op wetenschapsfilosofisch (is de evolutietheorie een wereldbeeld?), exegetisch-hermeneutisch (was Adam een historisch persoon?) en systematisch-theologisch terrein (heeft de evolutietheorie gevolgen voor onze visie op verlossing?). Elke auteur trekt op zijn of haar deelgebied een eigen conclusie. En God zag dat het goed was brengt de nodige bezinning op christelijk geloof en evolutietheorie verder.

De redactie wordt gevormd door theoloog William den Boer, filosoof Rik Peels en bioloog/wetenschapsjournalist René Fransen.

In deze pdf de inleiding van de redactie op het boek, vergezeld van de inhoudsopgave.

Wetenschappers zijn minder vaak gelovig dan andere mensen. En Nobelprijswinnaars zijn bijna nooit... more Wetenschappers zijn minder vaak gelovig dan andere mensen. En Nobelprijswinnaars zijn bijna nooit gelovig. In de Verenigde Staten noemt 64% van de wetenschappers zichzelf ‘atheïst’ of ‘agnost’, tegenover slechts 6% van de Amerikaanse bevolking. Een onderzoek in Nederland onder hoogleraren liet zien dat 44% zichzelf als atheïst beschouwt, terwijl dat geldt voor 14% van de hele bevolking. Dus ook al is religie wijd en zijd verbreid in de wereld,, onder wetenschappers komt godsgeloof veel minder voor.

In discussies over het bestaan van God en de waarde van religie wordt dit soms als argument aangevoerd. Op de een of andere manier zou het feit dat de wetenschappelijke elite in hoge mate ongelovig is, iets zeggen over de redelijkheid van godsgeloof. In ons boek God bewijzen gaan we in op die stelling. In dit artikel willen we de vraag beantwoorden waarom wetenschappers zo ongelovig zijn.

In dit artikel verkennen we de ideeën van kardinaal John Henry Newman (1801–1890) en Martha Nussb... more In dit artikel verkennen we de ideeën van kardinaal John Henry Newman (1801–1890) en Martha Nussbaum (1947 – heden) over het doel en de waarde van universitair onderwijs in het algemeen en de geesteswetenschappen in het bijzonder. Newman ziet onderwijs als het exclusieve doel van de universiteit. Universiteiten moeten gericht zijn op het overdragen van wat hij noemt ‘universele kennis’ en op de intellectuele vorming van studenten (§1). Voor Nussbaum is het doel van universitair onderwijs nadrukkelijk ook morele vorming, gericht op burgerschap. De geesteswetenschappen spelen hierin een cruciale rol (§2). Na hun opvattingen geschetst te hebben, beschrijven we enkele overeenkomsten en verschillen (§3) en sluiten we af met een conclusie (§4).

Dit hoofdstuk geeft een overzicht van de belangrijkste vraagstukken in de huidige analytische god... more Dit hoofdstuk geeft een overzicht van de belangrijkste vraagstukken
in de huidige analytische godsdienstfilosofie. Ik bespreek achtereenvolgens
de kritiek op het verificatiecriterium van het logisch positivisme, dat
de mogelijkheid van godsdienstfilosofie in de weg stond, het debat over
de rationaliteit van religieus geloof, de argumenten tegen het bestaan van
God en de argumenten voor het bestaan van God. Ten slotte benoem ik
kort twee belangrijke ontwikkelingen van de laatste jaren: de bijdrage van
analytische filosofen aan de discussie over de verhouding tussen wetenschap en religie en de filosofische theologie, een nieuw veld waarin met behulp van de analytisch-filosofische methode klassieke thema’s uit vooral de christelijke geloofsleer geanalyseerd worden, zoals de Drie-eenheid, de twee naturen van Christus en de eucharistie. Ik zal me in dit hoofdstuk richten op de weergave van de discussie, met een overzicht van de belangrijkste argumenten voor en tegen diverse posities. Ik zal ze niet kritisch evalueren; dat heb ik elders gedaan.

Ik ga op zeven belangrijke kwesties in. De eerste en tweede betreffen de apologetische kritiek op... more Ik ga op zeven belangrijke kwesties in. De eerste en tweede betreffen de apologetische kritiek op denkkaders die men geërfd had en die geloof in God in de weg stonden: het logisch-positivisme uit het begin van de twintigste eeuw en het klassieke funderingsdenken uit de tijd van de Verlichting (met name de 17e eeuw). De derde en vierde betreffen het apologetische antwoord op twee belangrijke argumenten tegen geloof in God. Ten eerste het probleem van het kwaad, dat al eeuwen speelde, maar door bijvoorbeeld de Holocaust nog meer urgentie had gekregen. En ten tweede het probleem van religieuze diversiteit dat na de oorlog pregnanter werd naarmate men meer ontdekte over de variëteit aan religieuze tradities in de wereld. De vijfde en zesde betreffen argumenten vóór het bestaan van God: het kosmologische argument en het argument van afstemming. Nieuwe ontdekkingen in de natuurkunde in de loop van de twintigste eeuw speelden hierbij een cruciale rol. Ten slotte bespreek ik Alvin Plantinga’s argument tegen atheïsme: als God niet bestaat, dan hebben we geen enkele reden om te denken dat we ware overtuigingen hebben en dus ook geen enkele reden om te denken dat atheïsme waar is. Hierin klinkt de kritiek door op een wereldbeeld waarin neo-Darwinisme de alles verklarende theorie wordt, een ontwikkeling die na de oorlog duidelijk waar te nemen valt.

Opiniestuk in het Nederlands Dagblad (2011)

In dit artikel bespreek ik een dilemma van Herman Philipse voor de gelovige die meent dat ratione... more In dit artikel bespreek ik een dilemma van Herman Philipse voor de gelovige die meent dat rationeel religieus geloof geen argumenten vereist.

In dit artikel schets ik twee nieuwe visies op het probleem van het kwaad. De eerste visie, die v... more In dit artikel schets ik twee nieuwe visies op het probleem van het kwaad. De eerste visie, die van Alvin Plantinga, veronderstelt een expliciet christelijk standpunt en kan daarom alleen door christenen gebruikt worden. Hoewel deze benadering in een oude traditie staat, is zij vernieuwend door de plaatsing binnen de huidige metafysica en de onderbouwing door specifieke passages uit de Bijbel. De tweede visie, die van Peter van Inwagen, veronderstelt geen christelijk standpunt, maar wel een (filosofisch) standpunt over de vraag in hoeverre bepaalde goede en slechte standen van zaken ieder kwantificeerbaar en/of commensurabel zijn. Echter, ook hier blijken theologische standpunten van invloed te kunnen zijn...

In dit hoofdstuk betoog ik dat de theologie in ieder geval deels te taak heeft om verantwoord ove... more In dit hoofdstuk betoog ik dat de theologie in ieder geval deels te taak heeft om verantwoord over God te spreken. Eerst introduceer ik deze these en zet de belangrijkste
begrippen die daarin gebruikt worden uiteen. Vervolgens geef ik twee argumenten vóór deze these: degene die ontkent dat de theologie verantwoord over God kan spreken, raakt verstrikt in allerlei inconsistenties, en als de theologie niet verantwoord over God kan of mag spreken, dan verliest zij een groot deel
van haar relevantie. Daarna bespreek ik vier argumenten die tegen de onderhavige these zouden kunnen worden ingebracht: dat uitspraken over God niet waar of onwaar zijn, dat kennis over God niet mogelijk is, dat theologie als verantwoord
spreken over God niet strookt met de empirisch-wetenschappelijke methode en dat spreken over God op gespannen voet staat met wetenschappelijke objectiviteit. Ik betoog dat geen van deze vier argumenten overtuigend is.

Dit artikel biedt een kritische evaluatie van de Christelijke Dogmatiek van Gijsbert van den Brin... more Dit artikel biedt een kritische evaluatie van de Christelijke Dogmatiek van Gijsbert van den Brink en Kees van der Kooi. Eerst wordt de aard van het boek weergegeven door achtereenvolgens vier algemene en vervolgens vier theologische kenmerken te noemen. Hieruit blijkt het belang en het vernieuwende karakter van deze dogmatiek. De kritische noten die in dit artikel geplaatst worden betreffen dan ook specifieke onderdelen en doen weinig af aan de waarde en theologische reikwijdte van de Christelijke Dogmatiek. Allereerst wordt betoogd dat sprake is van een discrepantie tussen de wijze waarop de auteurs de systematische theologie duiden en de manier waarop zij die zelf beoefenen. De auteurs laten te weinig ruimte voor Gods openbaring buiten de Bijbel om. Belangrijke systematisch-theologische problemen die de positie van de auteurs oproepen worden niet opgelost en soms zelfs niet benoemd. De manier waarop de schrijvers spreken over de relatie tussen lichaam en ziel is onvoldoende Bijbels onderbouwd en vanuit systematisch oogpunt argumentatief niet overtuigend. Ten slotte worden op een aantal plaatsen in de Christelijke Dogmatiek belangrijke vragen gesteld, maar worden vervolgens antwoorden gegeven die eigenlijk antwoorden op andere vragen zijn.

This provides an overview of our 1,2M project on epistemic progress in the university, led by Ren... more This provides an overview of our 1,2M project on epistemic progress in the university, led by René van Woudenberg, Jeroen de Ridder, and me. September 2020 - Augustus 2023.

This provides an overview of the 1.5M ERC Starting Grant on the Epistemology and Ethics of fundam... more This provides an overview of the 1.5M ERC Starting Grant on the Epistemology and Ethics of fundamentalism that was recently awarded to me. I aim to carry out the research from 2020 to 2025 in the Philosophy Department (Faculty of Humanities) and the Faculty of Religion & Theology at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.

1.75 Million Research project funded by the Templeton World Charity Foundation, September 2016 - ... more 1.75 Million Research project funded by the Templeton World Charity Foundation, September 2016 - August 2019

Interview on my ERC Starting Grant on fundamentalism, in Filosofie Magazine.

Great news! In September 2018, we’ll start a new Master track at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam... more Great news! In September 2018, we’ll start a new Master track at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam within the 1-year master Exploring a Discipline, namely: PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION, for anyone interested in all sorts of theological and philosophical issues regarding religion & faith in God. Classes will be taught by professors from both theology and philosophy.

The main purpose of this Master is to equip student with sufficient knowledge and tools to explore important academic and societally relevant issues at the intersection of philosophy and religion, such as various challenges in contemporary hermeneutics, philosophy of religion, apologetics, and analytic theology. By the end of this year, the student will have an MA in theology and has the opportunity to continue his or her studies in the second year of a Research Master in Theology or a Research Master in Philosophy.

You’ll find more information in the attached Curriculum Overview. If you’d like to know more, please send an email to dr. Rik Peels, h.d.peels@vu.nl.

Several influential philosophers and scientists, such as Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins, clai... more Several influential philosophers and scientists, such as Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins, claim that only natural science can deliver reliable knowledge about the world. This claim is, of course, fiercely debated. This map provides you with an experience of what the world looks like if science is the measure of all things. We recommend starting your travel experience on the Path of Evolution in the South-West corner of the map. There you will encounter the idea that there is objective good and evil, as well as names of people advocating this idea. If you follow the path, you will encounter all sorts of theories, concepts, and people along your way. Travel to the city of God, then to the Metropolis of the Natural Sciences, and head for the mountains of research with peak Nobel at the horizon. We wish you a pleasant journey!

This interview focuses especially on the question of whether the scale (the age and seize) of the... more This interview focuses especially on the question of whether the scale (the age and seize) of the universe counts against the existence of God, as human beings seem to occupy a negligible place in it.

Some adherents of scientism, such as Alex Rosenberg, claim that the natural sciences deliver epis... more Some adherents of scientism, such as Alex Rosenberg, claim that the natural sciences deliver epistemic values such as knowledge and understanding, whereas, say, literature and literary studies, merely have aesthetic value. Many of those working in the field of literary studies oppose this idea. But it isn’t clear at all exactly how works of literary art embody knowledge and understanding and how literary studies can bring these out. After all, they are pieces of fiction, which suggests that they are not meant to represent the actual world. I argue that literature and literary studies nonetheless contain, confer, and bring about non-trivial knowledge and understanding in a variety of ways: they confer moral propositional knowledge, they question certain misguided concepts and hermeneutical frameworks, and they deliver non-propositional insight and understanding with respect to meaning, virtue, and significance. In the course of the argument, I refer at several junctures to Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles and Edith Wharton’s Summer, two novels that criticize dominant moral and social norms and paradigms, and in which the main character herself goes through of phase of (often harsh) knowledge acquisition.

Recensie van Renée van Riessen, Van zichzelf bevrijd. Levinas over transcendentie en nabijheid. U... more Recensie van Renée van Riessen, Van zichzelf bevrijd. Levinas over transcendentie en nabijheid. Uitg. Sjibbolet 2019.

Review in Journal of Analytic Theology of: Kevin Diller. Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma: How... more Review in Journal of Analytic Theology of:

Kevin Diller. Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma: How Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga Provide a Unified Response. Strategic Initiatives in Evangelical Theology. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2014. 326 pp. $27.20 (paper).

Review of Powell, "The Impassioned Life: Reason and Emotion in the Christian Tradition" , in: Phi... more Review of Powell, "The Impassioned Life: Reason and Emotion in the Christian Tradition" , in: Philosophy, Theology, and the Sciences