S (original) (raw)

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Saari, Donald G.; "Methods of Apportionment and the House of Representatives"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 85, No. 10; December, 1978; 792-802; #2191.

[**Saari, Donald G.**]; Packel, Edward W.; "Strategic Equilibria and Decisive Set Structures for Social Choice Mechanisms"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 4; June, 1982; 373-378; #1520.

Saari, Donald G.; "Inconsistencies of Weighted Summation Voting Systems"; Mathematics of Operations Research; Vol. 7, No. 4; November, 1982; 479-490; #321.

Saari, Donald G.; "The Ultimate of Chaos Resulting From Weighted Voting Systems"; Advances in Applied Mathematics; Vol. 5, No. 3; September, 1984; 286-308; #1132.

Saari, Donald G.; "Price Dynamics, Social Choice, Voting Methods, Probability and Chaos"; Advances in Equilibrium Theory; edited by Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Owen Burkinshaw and Neal J. Rothman; Berlin; Springer Verlag; 1985; 1-24; #375.

Saari, Donald G.; "Random Behavior in Numerical Analysis, Decision Theory, and Macrosystems: Some Impossibility Theorems";Dynamics of Macrosystems; edited by Jean-Pierre Aubin, Donald G. Saari and Karl Sigmund; Berlin; Springer Verlag; 1986; 115-126; #1800.

Saari, Donald G.; "The Sources of Some Paradoxes from Social Choice and Probability"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 41, No. 1; February, 1987; 1-22; #1383.

Saari, Donald G.; "Chaos and the Theory of Elections"; Dynamical Systems; edited by A. B. Kurzhanski and Karl Sigmund; Berlin; Springer Verlag; 1987; 179-188; #1799.

Saari, Donald G.; "Symmetry, Voting and Social Choice"; Mathematical Intelligencer; Vol. 10, No. 3; Summer, 1988; 32-42; #2000.

Saari, Donald G.; van Newenhizen, Jill; "The Problem of Indeterminacy in Approval, Multiple and Truncated Voting Systems"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 2; November, 1988; 101-120; #2041. [See comment by Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill, response by Saari and Van Newenhizen, and rejoinder by Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill]

Saari, Donald G.; Van Newenhizen, Jill; "Is Approval Voting an 'Unmitigated Evil?' A Response to Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill"; Public Choice; Vol. 59, No. 2; 1988; 133-147; #2077. [Response to Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill comment on a paper by Saari and Van Newenhizen; see rejoinder by Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill]

Saari, Donald G.; "A Dictionary for Voting Paradoxes"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 48, No. 2; August, 1989; 443-475; #2180.

Saari, Donald G.; "Susceptibility to Manipulation";Public Choice; Vol. 64, No. 1; January, 1990; 21-41; #2224.

Saari, Donald G.; "Consistency of Decision Processes"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 23, No. 1-4; 1990; 103-137; #2192.

Saari, Donald G.; "The Borda Dictionary";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 4; November, 1990; 279-317; #2332.

Saari, Donald G.; "Relationship Admitting Families of Candidates"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 8, No. 1; February, 1991; 21-50; #2335.

Saari, Donald G.; "Erratic Behavior in Economic Models"; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Vol. 16, Nos. 1-2; July, 1991; 3-35; #3484.

Saari, Donald G.; "Calculus and Extensions of Arrow's Theorem"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 20, No. 3; 1991; 271-306; #2193.

Saari, Donald G.; "The Aggregate Excess Demand Function and Other Aggregation Procedures"; Economic Theory; Vol. 2, No. 3; July, 1992; 359-388; #3493.

Saari, Donald G.; "Millions of Election Rankings from a Single Profile"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 9, No. 4; October, 1992; 277-306; #2194.

Saari, Donald G.; "Symmetry Extensions of 'Neutrality' I. Advantage to the Condorcet Loser"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 9, No. 4; October, 1992; 307-336; #2195.

Saari, Donald G.; "Symmetry Extensions of 'Neutrality' II. Partial Ordering of Dictionaries"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 10, No. 4; October, 1993; 301-334; #2196.

Saari, Donald G.; Geometry of Voting; Berlin; Springer-Verlag; 1994; #2703. [See review by Merlin]

Saari, Donald G.; "A Chaotic Explanation of Aggregation Paradoxes"; SIAM Review; Vol. 37, No. 1; March, 1995; 37-52; #2198.

Saari, Donald G.; "Inner Consistency or Not Inner Consistency; A Reformulation is the Answer"; Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics; edited by William A. Barnett, Herve Moulin, Maurice Salles, and Norman Schofield; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1995; 187-212; #2197.

Saari, Donald G.; Basic Geometry of Voting; Berlin; Springer Verlag; 1995; #2190.

Saari, Donald G.; "The Mathematical Symmetry of Choosing"; Mathematica Japonica; Vol. 44, No. 1; 1996; 183-200; #3046.

Saari, Donald G.; Merlin, Vincent R.; "The Copeland Method. I. Relationships and the Dictionary";Economic Theory; Vol. 8, No. 1; June, 1996; 51-76; #3047. [see Part II]

Saari, Donald G.; "Election Results and a Partial Ordering for Positional Ordering"; Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy; edited by Norman J. Schofield; Boston/Dordrecht/London; Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1996; 93-110; #2457.

[**Saari, Donald G.**]; Merlin, Vincent R.; "Copeland Method. II. Manipulation, Monotonicity, and Paradoxes";Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 72, No. 1; January, 1997; 148-172; #3045. [see Part I]

Saari, Donald G.; "The Generic Existence of a Core for q-Rules"; Economic Theory; Vol. 9, No. 2; February, 1997; 219-260; #3119.

Saari, Donald G.; "Informational Geometry of Social Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 2; April, 1997; 211-232; #2521.

Saari, Donald G.; "Are Individual Rights Possible?";Mathematics Magazine; Vol. 70, No. 2; April, 1997; 83-92; #3044.

Saari, Donald G.; "Connecting and Resolving Sen's and Arrow's Theorems"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 2; February, 1998; 239-261; #3206.

Saari, Donald G.; Valognes, Fabrice; "Geometry, Voting, and Paradoxes"; Mathematics Magazine; Vol. 71, No. 4; October, 1998; 243-259; #3303.

Saari, Donald G.; Tataru, Maria M.; "The Likelihood of Dubious Election Outcomes";Economic Theory; Vol. 13, No. 2; March, 1999; 345-363; #3480. [Corrigendum: Economic Theory, Vol.14, No. 3, (November, 1999), 750]

Saari, Donald G.; "Explaining All Three-Alternative Voting Outcomes"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 87, No. 2; August, 1999; 313-355; #3652.

Saari, Donald G.; "Chaos, But in Voting and Apportionments?";Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences; Vol. 96, No. 19; September, 1999; 10568-10571; #3641.

Saari, Donald G.; Valognes, Fabrice; "The Geometry of Black's Single-Peakedness and Related Conditions"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 32, No. 4; December, 1999; 429-456; #3642.

Saari, Donald G.; "Review of Principles of Electoral Reform and The Politics of Consensus"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 1; January, 2000; 179-188; #3594. [Review of book by Dummett and book by Emerson]

Saari, Donald G.; "Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes. I. Pairwise Votes";Economic Theory; Vol. 15, No. 1; 2000; 1-53; #3702.

Saari, Donald G.; "Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes. II. Positional Voting"; Economic Theory; Vol. 15, No. 1; 2000; 55-102; #3703.

[**Saari, Donald G.**]; Merlin, Vincent R.; "A Geometric Examination of Kemeny's Rule";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 3; May, 2000; 403-438; #3623.

Saari, Donald G.; Merlin, Vincent R.; "Changes That Cause Changes"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 4; August, 2000; 691-705; #3674.

Saari, Donald G.; "Suppose You Want to Vote Strategically"; Math Horizons; November, 2000; 5-10; #3741.

Saari, Donald G.; "Analyzing a Nail-biting Election"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 3; July, 2001; 415-430; #3764.

Saari, Donald G.; Chaotic Elections! A Mathematician Looks at Voting; American Mathematical Society; Providence, RI; 2001; #3659.

Saari, Donald G.; Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected; Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 2001; #3842. [See review by Weymark.]

Saari, Donald G.; "Adopting a Plurality Vote Perspective"; Mathematics of Operations Research; Vol. 27, No. 1; February, 2002; 45-64; #3951.

Saari, Donald G.; "Unsettling Aspects of Voting Theory"; Economic Theory; Vol. 22, No. 3; October, 2003; 529-555; #4110.

Saari, Donald G.; “Geometry of Chaotic and Stable Discussions”; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 111, No. 5; 2004; 377-393; #4364.

Saari, Donald G.; Barney, Steven; “Consequences of Reversing Preferences”;Mathematical Intelligencer; Vol. 25, No. 4; 2003; 17-31; #4363.

Saari, Donald G.; “The Profile Structure for Luce's Choice Axiom”; Journal of Mathematical Psychology; Vol. 49, No. 3; 2005; 226-253; #4362.

Saari, Donald G.; “Which is Better: The Condorcet or Borda Winner?”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 1; January, 2006; 107-129; #4497.

Saari, Donald G.; Petron-Brunel, Anne; “Negative Externalities and Sen's Liberalism Theorem”; Economic Theory; Vol. 28, No. 2; 2006; 265-281; #4868.

Saari, Donald G.; “Mathematics and Voting”; Notices of the American Mathematical Society; Vol. 55, No. 4; April, 2008; 448-455; #4904.

[**Saari, Donald G.**]; Li, Lingfang (Ivy); "Sen's Theorem: Geometric Proof, New Interpretations"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 3; October, 2008; 393-413; #4951.

Saari, Donald G.; "Complexity and the Geometry of Voting"; Mathematical and Computer Modelling; Vol. 48, No. 9-10; 2008; 1335-1356; #5120.

[**Saari, Donald G.**]; Kronewetter, Jason; "From Decision Problems to Dethroned Dictators"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 44, No. 7-8; 2008; 745-761; #5093.

Saari, Donald G.; "Condorcet Domains: A Geometric Perspective"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 161-182; #5014.

Saari, Donald G.; Asay, Garrett R.; "Finessing a Point: Augmenting the Core"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 1; January, 2010; 121-143; #5103.

Saari, Donald G.; "Systematic Analysis of Multiple Voting Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 2; February, 2010; 217-147; #5111.

Saari, Donald G.; "Review of Peter Emerson (ed): Designing an All-inclusive Democracy"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 2; July, 2010; 331-335; #5235.

Saari, Donald G.; "Source of Complexity in the Social and Managerial Sciences: An Extended Sen's Theorem"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 609-620; #5516.

Saaty, Thomas L.; Vargas, Luis G.; "The Possibility of Group Choice: Pairwise Comparisons and Merging Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 3; March, 2012; 481-496; #5553.

[Sabourian, Hamid]; Lee, Jihong; "Efficient Repeated Implementation"; Econometrica; Vol. 79, No. 6; 2011; 1967-1994; #5719.

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; van Winden, Frans; "Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Volo. 60, No. 3; 2010; 210-216; #5445.

[**Sadovskii, A. L.**]; Sadovskii, Leonid Efimovich; Mathematics and Sports; Translated by S. Makar-Limanov; American Mathematical Society; Providence, R.I.; 1993; #3545. [Chapter 4, "Those Judges!", pp. 35-52, discusses aggregating rankings]

Sadovskii, Leonid Efimovich; Sadovskii, A. L.; Mathematics and Sports; Translated by S. Makar-Limanov; American Mathematical Society; Providence, R.I.; 1993; #3545. [Chapter 4, "Those Judges!", pp. 35-52, discusses aggregating rankings]

[Safra, Zvi]; Karni, Edi; "Individual Sense of Justice: a Utility Representation";Econometrica Vol. 70, No. 1; January, 2002; 263-284; #4042.

Safra, Zvi; Weissengrin, Einat; "Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem with a Restricted Domain"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 2; April, 2003; 177-187; #3999.

[Safra, Zvi]; Karni, Edi; “Moral Sentiments and Social Choice”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 3; April, 2008; 427-446; #4911.

[**Sager, Lawrence G.**];Kornhauser, Lewis A.; "Unpacking the Court"; Yale Law Review; Vol. 96, No. 1; November, 1986; 82-117; #3270. [Follows Easterbrook on Arrow and the Supreme Court]

[**Sager, Lawrence G.**]; Kornhauser, Lewis A.; "The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts";California Law Review; Vol. 81, No. 1; January, 1993; 1-59; #3275. [advocating issue voting]

Saglam, Ismail; "A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation";Economics Bulletin; Vol. 3, No. 55; 2008; 1-8; #5038.

[Saglam, Ismail]; Mumcu, Aye; "Games of Capacity Allocation in Many-to-one Matching with an Aftermarket"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 3; September, 2009; 383-403; #5157.

Sah, Raaj Kumar;Stiglitz, Joseph E.; "Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies"; Economic Journal; Vol. 98, No. 391; June, 1988; 451-470; #2119.

Sahi, Siddhartha; "Correlation Inequalities for Partially Ordered Algebras"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 361-369; #5027.

[**Sahlquist, H.**];Hansson, Bengt; "A Proof Technique for Social Choice with Variable Electorate";Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 13, No. 2; October, 1976; 193-200; #20.

Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; "On Constant Maskin Monotonic Social Choice Functions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 42, No. 2; August, 1987; 382-386; #1626.

Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation"; Econometrica; Vol. 56, No. 3; May, 1988; 693-700; #2112.

Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu; Yamato, Takehiko; "Characterizing Natural Implementability: The Fair and Walrasian Correspondences"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 28, No. 2; August, 1999; 271-293; #3906.

[Saijo, Tatsuyoshi]; Cason, Timothy N.; Sjöström, Tomas; Yamato, Takehiko; “Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work?”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 57, No. 2; 2006; 206-235; #4848.

Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Yamato, Takehiko; "Fundamental Impossibility Theorems on Voluntary Participation in the Provision of Non-excludable Public Goods"; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 14, No. 1-2; March, 2010; 51-73; #5370.

Sainte-Laguë, A.; "Calcul des Probabilités. La Représentation Proportionnelle et la Méthodes Moindres Carrés"; Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires des Séances de l'Académie des Sciences; Vol. 151; 1 Août 1910; 377-378; #1805.

[**Saipe, A. L.**];Cook, Wade D.; "Committee Approach to Priority Planning: the Median Ranking Method"; Cahiers du Centre d'Études de Recherche Opérationnelle; Vol. 18, No. 3; 1976; 337-351; #2486.

[Saitoh, Hiroki]; Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; "Domain Expansion of the Pivotal Mechanism"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 3; March, 2010; 455-470; #5185.

[Saitoh, Hiroki]; Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; "Strategy-proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: a Relationship Between Equity and Efficiency"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 3; March, 2012; 473-480; #5552.

Sakaguchi, Minoru; "Some Entropy Results in Voting Behavior"; Mathematica Japonica; Vol. 31, No. 6; November, 1986; 939-956; #2479.

Sakai, Toyotaka; "An Axiomatic Approach to Intergenerational Equity"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 1; February, 2003; 167-176; #3998.

Sakai, Toyotaka; Shimoji, Masaki; “Dichotomous Preferences and the Possibility of Arrovian Social Choice”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 3; June, 2006; 435-445; #4500.

Sakai, Toyotaka; “Equitable Intergenerational Preferences on Restricted Domains”;Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 1; August, 2006; 41-54; #4516.

[Sakai, Toyotaka]; Bochet, Olivier; “Strategic Manipulations of Multi-valued Solutions in Economies with Indivisibilities”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 53, No. 1; 2007; 53-68; #4830.

Sakai, Toyotaka; "Intergenerational Equity and an Explicit Construction of Welfare Criteria"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 3; September, 2010; 393-414; #5240.

Sakai, Toyotaka; "A Characterization and an Impossibility of Finite Length Anonymity for Infinite Generations"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 46, No. 5; 2010; 877-883; #5430.

Sakai, Toyotaka; Wakayama, Takuma; "Strategy-proofness, Tops-only, and the Uniform Rule"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 72, No. 3; 2012; 287-301; #5706.

[Sakakibara, Kenichi]; Okada, Akira; Suga, Koichi; "The Dynamic Transformation of Political Systems Through Social Contract: A Game Theoretic Approach"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 1; January, 1997; 1-21; #2423.

[Sako, Kazue]; Hirt, Martin; "Efficient Receiptfree Voting Based on Homomorphic Encryption"; Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT 2000; Edited by Bart Preneel; Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1807; Springer; Berlin; 2000; 539-556; #3935.

Salant, David; "Existence of Vote Maximizing Equilibrium in One Dimension"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 5, No. 1; August, 1983; 73-88; #211.

Salant, Steven;Goodstein, Eban; "Predicting Committee Behavior in Majority Rule Voting Experiments";Rand Journal of Economics; Vol. 21, No. 2; Summer, 1990; 293-313; #2287.

Salant, Yuval; “On the Learnability of Majority Rule”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 135, No. 1; July, 2007; 196-213; #4888.

Salas, Rafael; "Multilevel Interterritorial Convergence and Additive Multidimensional Inequality Decomposition"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 1; January, 2002; 207-218; #3884.

Salles, Maurice; "A Note on Ken-Ichi Inada's 'Majority Rule and Rationality' "; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 8, No. 4; August, 1974; 539-540; #646.

Salles, Maurice; "A General Possibility Theorem for Group Decision Rules with Pareto-Transitivity"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 11, No. 1; August, 1975; 110-118; #645.

Salles, Maurice; "Characterization of Transitive Individual Preferences for Quasi-transitive Collective Preference Under Simple Games"; International Economic Review; Vol. 17, No. 2; June, 1976; 308-318; #1146.

Salles, Maurice; Wendell, Richard E.; "A Further Result on the Core of Voting Games";International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 6, Issue 1; 1978; 35-40; #1200.

[Salles, Maurice]; Bordes, Georges A.; "Sur l'impossibilité des Fonctions de Décision Collective: Un Commentaire et un Résultat"; Revue d'Économie Politique; Vol. 88, No. 3; May-June, 1978; 442-448; #1641.

[Salles, Maurice]; Gaertner, Wulf; "Procédures d'agrégation avec domaines restreints et théorèmes d'existence"; Analyse et agrégation des préférences; edited by Pierre Batteau, Eric Jacquet-Lagrèze and Bernard Monjardet; Paris; Economica; 1981; 75-122; #1360.

Salles, Maurice; "Jeux Simples d'Agrégation";Économie Appliquée; Vol. 36, No. 4; 1983; 697-710; #271.

[Salles, Maurice]; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; editors; Social Choice and Welfare; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1983; #409.

[Salles, Maurice]; Barrett, C. Richard; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "On the Structure of Fuzzy Social Welfare Functions";Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 19, No. 1; May, 1986; 1-10; #879.

[Salles, Maurice]; Le Breton, Michel; "On the Generic Emptiness of the Local Core of Voting Games"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 4, No. 4; December, 1987; 287-294; #854.

Salles, Maurice; "Remarques sur la théorème d'Arrow tel qu'il est énoncé par Jean-Paul Penot"; Gazette des Mathématiciens; No. 36; April, 1988; 45; #2064. [Comment on Appendix of paper by Penot.]

Salles, Maurice; "The Best Voting Method: A Review of Voting Procedures by Michael Dummett"; Social Choice and Welfare; October, 1989; Vol. 6, No. 4; 337-346; #2147.

[Salles, Maurice]; Le Breton, Michel; "The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 19, No. 2; 1990; 111-127; #2280.

[Salles, Maurice]; Barrett, C. Richard; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Rationality and Aggregation of Preferences in an Ordinally Fuzzy Framework"; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 49, No. 1; July 10, 1992; 9-13; #3025.

[Salles, Maurice]; Bordes, Georges A.; Le Breton, Michel; "Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results; and Applications to Voting Games"; Mathematics of Operations Research; Vol. 17, No. 3; 1992; 509-518; #2990.

[Salles, Maurice];Barnett, William A.; Schofield, Norman; Social Choice, Welfare and Ethics; Cambridge University Press; 1995; #2420.

Salles, Maurice; "On Modelling Individual Rights: Some Conceptual Issues: Discussion"; Social Choice Re-examined,Vol. 2; Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 129-133; #2785. [discussion of paper by Pattanaik]

[Salles, Maurice]; Brunel, Anne; "Interpretative, Semantic and Formal Difficulties of the Social Choice Rule Approach to Rights"; Freedom in Economics, New Perspectives in Normative Analysis; Edited by Jean-François Laslier, Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Laslier, and Alain Trannoy; Routledge; 1998; 101-111; #3512. [See comment by Hammond.]

Salles, Maurice; "Review of The Measurement of Voting Power (Felsenthal and Machover)"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 3; May, 2000; 567-569; #3631.

[Salles, Maurice]; Geslin, Stéphanie; Ziad, Abderrahmane; “Fuzzy Aggregation in Economic Environments: I. Quantitative Fuzziness, Public Goods and Monotonicity Assumptions”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 45, No. 2; April, 2003; 155-166; #4408.

[Salles, Maurice]; C. Barrett, Richard; Petron-Brunel, Anne; "A New Approach to Rights in Social Choice Theory Which Incorporates Utilitarianism"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 1; February, 2004; 17-28; #4198.

Salles, Maurice; “Forward”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 229-230; #4457.

[Salles, Maurice]; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; “An Interview with I. M.D. Little”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 357-368; #4464.

Salles, Maurice; “The Launching of ‘Social Choice and Welfare’ and the Creation of the ‘Society for Social Choice and Welfare’”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 557-564; #4474.

[Salles, Maurice]; Fara, Rudolf; “An Interview with Michael Dummett: From Analytical Philosophy to Voting Analysis and Beyond”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 2; October, 2006; 347-364; #4529.

Salles, Maurice; “Foreword”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 4; December, 2007; 557; #4681.

Salles, Maurice; "Prasanta K. Pattanaik: President-elect of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare 2004-2005, President 2006-2007"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 543; #5510.

[Salles, Maurice]; Fono, Louis Aimé; "Continuity of Utility Functions Representing Fuzzy Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 669-682; #5521.

[Salomaa, Arto];Nurmi, Hannu; "A Cryptographic Approach to the Secret Ballot"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 36, No. 1; January, 1991; 34-40; #2958.

[Salomaa, Arto]; Nurmi, Hannu; "Cancellation and Reassignment of Votes in Secret Ballot Elections";European Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 9, No. 3; August, 1993; 427-435; #2953.

[Salomaa, Arto]; Nurmi, Hannu; "A Comparative Overview of Cryptographic Voting Protocols"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 84; 1998; 29-43; #3687.

Salonen, Hannu; Saukkonen, Kari; “On Continuity of Arrovian Social Welfare Functions”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, No. 1; October, 2005; 85-93; #4446.

[Salonen, Hannu]; Nurmi, Hannu; "More Borda Count Variations for Project Assessment"; AUCO Czech Economic Review; Vol. 2, No. 2; September, 2008; 109-122; #5053.

Salonen, Hannu; Vartiainen, Hannu; "On the Existence of Undominated Elements of Acyclic Relations"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 60, No. 3; 2010; 217-221; #5425.

[**Salop, Steven C.**];Post, David; "Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels"; Georgetown Law Journal; Vol. 80, No. 3; February, 1992; 743-774; #3274.

[**Salop, Steven C.**]; Post, David; "Issues, Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others"; Vanderbilt Law Review; Vol. 49, No. 4; May, 1996; 1069-1085; #3299.

Samejima, Yusuke; “Strategic Candidacy, Monotonicity, and Strategy-proofness”;Economics Letters; Vol. 88, No. 2; 2005; 190-195; #4651.

Samejima, Yusuke; “Strategic Candidacy and Single-peakedness”; Japnese Economic Review; Vol. 58, No. 4; 2007; 423-442; #4708.

[Samet, Dov];Kalai, Ehud; "On Weighted Shapley Values"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 16, Issue 3; 1987; 205-222; #1954.

Samet, Dov; Schmeidler, David; "Between Liberalism and Democracy"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 110, No. 2; June, 2003; 213-412; #4125.

Samuelson, Larry; "On the Independence From Irrelevant Alternatives in Probabilistic Choice Models"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 35, No. 2; April, 1985; 376-389; #379.

Samuelson, Larry; "On the Restrictiveness of Monotonic Scalable Choice in Probabilistic Choice Models"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 14, No. 1; August, 1987; 18-38; #1660.

[Samuelson, Larry]; Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; "Weakly Implementable Social Choice Rules"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 33, No. 2; September, 1992; 135-151; #3064.

Samuelson, Paul A.; "Comment on Welfare Economics"; A Survey of Contemporary Economics, Vol. II; edited by B. F. Haley; Homewood, Illinois; Irwin; 1952; 36-38; #647.

Samuelson, Paul A.; "Arrow's Mathematical Politics";Human Values and Economic Policy; edited by Sidney Hook; New York; New York University Press; 1967; 41-51; #648.

Samuelson, Paul A.; "Maximum Principles in Analytical Economics"; American Economic Review; Vol. 62, No. 3; June, 1972; 249-262; #649.

Samuelson, Paul A.; "The 1972 Nobel Prize for Economic Science"; Science; Vol. 178, No. 4060; 3 November 1972; 487-489; #1808.

Samuelson, Paul A.; "Reaffirming the Existence of `Reasonable' Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions"; Economica; Vol. 44, No. 173; February, 1977; 81-88; #25.

Samuelson, Paul A.; "Bergsonian Welfare Economics";Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Bergson; edited by Steven Rosenfielde; Cambridge University Press; 1981; 223-266; #307.

Samuelson, Paul A.; "Sparks from Arrow's Anvil";Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy; edited by George R. Feiwel; Basingstoke; Macmillan; 1987; 154-178; #1877.

[**Sanathanan, L.**];Wolsky, A. M.; "The Inferred Referendum - A Rule for Committee Decisions";Theory and Decision; Vol. 14, No. 1; March, 1982; 75-88; #1317.

[Sanchez, A. Jesus]; Martinez, Diego; "A Note on the Optimal Level of Public Inputs";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 3; March, 2010; 363-369; #5178.

[Sánchez, M. Carmen]; Peris, Josep E.; Subiza, Begoña; "Numerical Representation of Choice Functions"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 80; 1998; 1-10; #4233.

Sánchez, M. Carmen; Peris, Josep E.; "Veto in Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 1; January, 1999; 81-97; #3316.

[Sánchez, M. Carmen]; Peris, Josep E.; "An Oligarchy Theorem in Fixed Agenda without Pareto Conditions"; Economics Letters; Vol. 62, No. 2; February, 1999; 201-206; #3527.

[Sánchez, M. Carmen]; Peris, Josep E.; "Characterization of Social Choice Sets in Terms of Individuals' Maximal Sets: the Fixed Agenda Framework"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 1; January, 2001; 113-127; #3732.

Sánchez, M. Carmen; Llinares, Juan-Vicente; Subiza, Begoña; "A KKM-result and an Application for Binary and Non-binary Choice Functions"; Economic Theory Vol. 21, No. 1; May, 2003; 185-193; #4035.

Sánchez, M. Carmen; Peris, Josep E.; “Hierarchies of Power in Non-binary Social Choice”; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 42, No. 7-8; 2006; 843-853; #4846.

Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín; Fragnelli, Vito; "Two-sided Market Situations with Existing Contracts"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 34, No. 2; February, 2010; 295-313; #5175.

Sandbu, Martin Eiliv; "Axiomatic Foundations for Fairness-motivated Preferences";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 4; December, 2008; 589-619; #4960.

[**Sander, Leonard M.**]; Page, Scott E.; Schneider-Mizell, Casey M.; “Conformity and Dissonance in Generalized Voter Models”; Journal of Statistical Physics; Vol. 128, No. 6; September, 2007; 1279-1287; #4709.

[**Sanders, M. E.**];Bensel, R. F.; "Electoral Rules and Rational Voting: The Effects of Candidate Viability Perceptions on Voting Decisions"; Power, Voting and Voting Power; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Würzburg-Vienna; Physica Verlag; 1982; 188-200; #1415.

[Sandholm, Tuomas]; Conitzer, Vincent; Lang, Jérôme; “When Are Elections with Few Candidates Hard to Manipulate?”; Journal of the ACM; Vol. 54, No. 3; 2007; Article 14; 33 pp. (electronic); #4716.

[Sandroni, Alvaro]; Feddersen, Timothy; “The Calculus of Ethical Voting”;International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 35, No. 1; 2006; 1-25; #4739.

[Sand-Zantman, Wilfried]; Casamatta, Georges; “Citizen Candidacy with Asymmetric Information”; Topics in Theoretical Economics (electronic); Vol. 5, Art. 3; 2005; 41 pp.; #4635.

Sanver, M. Remzi; "Scoring Rules Cannot Respect Majority in Choice and Elimination Simultaneously"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 43, No. 2; March, 2002; 151-155; #3953.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Aşan, Göksel; "Another Characterization of the Majority Rule";Economics Letters; Vol. 75, No. 3; May, 2002; 409-413; #3969.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Kaymak, Baris; "Sets of Alternatives as Condorcet Winners"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 3; June, 2003; 477-494; #4087.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Sertel, Murat R.; "Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games Are the Generalized Condorcet Winners"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 2; April, 2004; 331-347; #4215.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Koray, Semih; “Murat R. Sertel et l'Economie Publique”; (French); Economie Publique; Vol. 15, No. 2; 2004; 207-211; #4777.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Özkal-Sanver, Ipek; “Efficiency in the Degree of Compromise: A New Axiom for Social Choice”Group Decision and Negotiation; Vol. 13, No. 4; July, 2004; 375-380; #4775.

Sanver, M. Remzi; “Equilibrium Outcomes of Taxation Endowment Games”Review of Economic Design; Vol. 9, No. 4; 2005; 307-316; #4774.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Erdem, Orhan; “Minimal Monotonic Extensions of Scoring Rules”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, No. 1; October, 2005; 31-42; #4443.

Sanver, M. Remzi; “Nash Implementing Non-Monotonic Social Choice Rules by Awards”; Economic Theory; Vol. 28, No. 2; 2006; 453-460; #4773.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Aşan, Göksel; “Maskin Monotonic Aggregation Rules”;Economics Letters; Vol. 91, No. 2; May, 2006; 179-183; #4772.

Sanver, M. Remzi; “Nash Implementation of the Majority Rule”; Economics Letters; Vol. 91, No. 3; June, 2006; 369-372; #4771.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Brams, Steven J.; “Critical Strategies Under Approval Voting: Who Gets Ruled In and Who Gets Ruled Out”; Electoral Studies; Vol. 25, No. 2; June, 2006; 287-305; #4770.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Özkal-Sanver, Ipek; “Nash Implementation via Hyperfunctions”;Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 3; June, 2006; 607-623; #4503.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Aşan, Göksel; “Maskin Monotonic Aggregation Rules”;Economic Letters; Vol. 91, No. 2; 2006; 179-183; #4860.

Sanver, M. Remzi; “Nash Implementing Non-monotonic Social Choice Rules by Awards”; Economic Theory; Vol. 28, No. 2; 2006; 453-460; #4867.

Sanver, M. Remzi; “Nash Implementation of the Majority Rule”; Economic Letters; Vol. 91, No. 3; 2006; 369-372; #4856.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Özkal-Sanver, Ipek; “Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 1; August, 2006; 211-219; #4515.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Ozdemir, Ugur; “Dictatorial Domains in Preference Aggregation”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 1; January, 2007; 61-76; #4556.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Çengelci, Murat Ali; “Is Abstention an Escape from Arrow's Theorem?”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 3; April, 2007; 439-442; #4576.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Doğan, Emre; “On the Alternating Use of ‘Unanimity’ and ‘Surjectivity’ in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem”; Economics Letters; Vol. 96; July, 2007; 140-143; #4762.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Beno�t, Jean-Pierre; Ok, Efe A.; “On Combining Implementable Social Choice Rules”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 60, No. 1; 2007; 20-30; #4768.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc; “A Minimax Procedure for Electing Committees”; Public Choice; Vol. 132, Nos. 3-4; 2007; 401-420; #4767.

Sanver, M. Remzi; “A Characterization of Superdictatorial Domains for Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 54, No. 3; 2007; 257-260; #4766.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Özyurt, Selçuk; “Strategy-proof Resolute Social Choice Correspondences”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 1; January, 2008; 89-101; #4694.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Doğan, Emre; “Arrovian Impossibilities in Aggregating Preferences over Non-resolute Outcomes”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 3; April, 2008; 495-506; #4915.

Sanver, M. Remzi; "Strategy-Proofness of the Plurality Rule over Restricted Domains"; Economic Theory; Vol. 39, No. 3; June, 2009; 461-471; #5039.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Brams, Steven J.; "Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 215-237; #5017.

Sanver, M. Remzi; Selçuk, Özer; "Sophisticated Preference Aggregation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 1; June, 2009; 73-86; #5140.

Sanver, M. Remzi; "Characterizations of Majoritarianism: A Unified Approach";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 1; June, 2009; 159-171; #5145.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Özyurt, Selçuk; "A General Impossibility Result on Strategy-proof Social Choice Hyperfunctions"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 66, No. 2; 2009; 880-892; #5313.

Sanver, M. Remzi; Zwicker, William S.; "One-way Monotonicity as a Form of Strategy-proofness"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 38, No. 4; 2009; 553-574; #5297.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Can, Burak; Erdamar, Bora; "Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 67, No. 2; August, 2009; 123-144; #5387.

Sanver, M. Remzi; Selçuk, Özer; "A Characterization of the Copeland Solution";Economics Letters; Vol. 107, No. 3; 2010; 354-355; #5277.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Çengelci, Murat Ali; "Simple Collective Identity Functions";Theory and Decision; Vol. 68, No. 4; 2010; 417-443; #5284.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Özkal-Sanver, pek; "A New Monotonicity Condition for Tournament Solutions"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 69, No. 3; 2010; 439-452; #5466.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Laslier, Jean-Françoise; Handbook on Approval Voting; In_Studies in Choice and Welfare_; New York and Heidelberg: Springer; 2010; #5434.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Aleskerov, Fuad; Karabekyan, Daniel; Yakuba, Vyacheslav; "An Individual Manipulability of Positional Voting Rules"; SERIEs; Vol. 2, No. 4; December, 2011; 431-446; #5637.

[Sanver, M. Remzi]; Aleskerov, Fuad; Karabekyan, Daniel; Yakuba, Vyacheslav I.; "On the Manipulability of Voting Rules: The Case of 4 and 5 Alternatives"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 64, No. 1; July, 2012; 67-73; #5592.

Sapir, Luba; "The Optimality of the Expert and Majority Rules under Exponentially Distributed Competence"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 45, No. 1; August, 1998; 19-35; #3408.

[Sapir, Luba]; Berend, Daniel; “Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 1; February, 2005; 83-92; #4270.

Sapir, Luba; “Generalized Means of Jurors' Competencies and Marginal Changes of Jury's Size”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 50, No. 1; 2005; 83-101; #4365.

[Sapir, Luba]; Berend, Daniel; “Monotonicity in Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Dependent Voters”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 3; April, 2007; 507-528; #4578.

[Sapir, Luba]; Berend, Daniel; Chernyavsky, Yuri; "Ranking of Weighted Majority Rules"; Journal of Applied Probability; Vol. 45, No. 4; 2008; 994-1006; #5273.

Sapir, Norman; “Political Equilibria with Electoral Uncertainty”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 3; April, 2007; 461-490; #4579.

Saporiti, Alejandro; Tohmé, Fernando; “Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 2; April, 2006; 363-383; #4482.

Saposnik, Rubin; "Power, The Economic Environment and Social Choice"; Econometrica; Vol. 42, No. 3; May, 1974; 461-470; #650.

Saposnik, Rubin; "On the Transitivity of the Social Preference Relation Under Simple Majority Rule"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 10, No. 1; February, 1975; 1-7; #651.

Saposnik, Rubin; "Social Choice with Continuous Expression of Individual Preferences"; Econometrica; Vol. 43, No. 4; July, 1975; 683-690; #652.

Saposnik, Rubin; "A Power Rule for Social Choice";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 2; August, 1984; 97-103; #817.

Saposnik, Rubin; "Collective Choice on a Set of Games"; Public and International Economics: Essays in Honour of Professor Hirofumi Shibata; El-Agraa, Ali M., editor; New York; St. Martin's Press; 1993; 92-99; #2946.

[**Sargent, Thomas J.**];Williamson, Oliver E.; "Social Choice: A Probabilistic Approach"; Economic Journal; Vol. 77, No. 308; December, 1967; 797-813; #695.

[**Sarin, Rakesh K.**];Dyer, James S.; "Group Preference Aggregation Rules Based on Strength of Preference"; Management Science; Vol. 25, No. 9; September, 1979; 822-832; #1643.

Sarin, Rakesh K.; "Two Criticisms of Bayesian Group Decision Theory"; Information Pooling and Group Decision Making; Edited by Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen; Greenwich, CT; JAI Press; 1986; 69-72; #2088.

[Sarkar, Palash]; Barua, Rana; Chakravarty, Satya R.; "Minimal-Axiom Characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf Indices of Voting Power"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 58, No. 3; November, 2009; 367-375; #5381.

[**Särlvik, B.**];Upton, G. J. G.; "A Loyalty-distance Model of Voting Change"; Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: A; Vol. 144, Part 2; 1981; 247-259; #1396.

Sartori, Giovanni; "The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Method?"; Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences; edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart; New York; Agathon Press; 1986; 43-68; #2202.

Sato, Shin; "Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Classes";Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 57, No. 1; January, 2009; 48-57; #5044.

Sato, Shin; "On Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 2; August, 2008; 331-343; [Erratum: Vol. 32, No. 2; February, 2009; 335-336]; #4946.

Sato, Shin; "Informational Requirements of Social Choice Rules"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 57, No. 2; March, 2009; 188-198; #5035.

Sato, Shin; "Circular Domains"; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 14, No. 3-4; September, 2010; 331-342; #5351.

Sato, Shin; "Informational Requirements of Social Choice Rules: Corrigendum";Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 62, No. 1; July, 2011; 77; #5678.

Sato, Shin; "On Strategy-proof Social Choice under Categorization"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 3; March, 2012; 455-471; #5551.

[Satoh, Yuuji]; Nishino, Hisakazu; Cui, Wentian; Mizutani, Masayoshi; "The Hypercore on Social Choice Problem"; Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan; Vol. 42, No. 2; 1999; 141-148; #3692.

Satterthwaite, Mark A.; "Strategyproofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 10, No. 2; April, 1975; 187-217; #654.

[**Satterthwaite, Mark A.**]; Blin, Jean-Marie; "Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness"; Public Choice; Vol. 26; Summer, 1976; 51-58; #963.

[**Satterthwaite, Mark A.**]; Muller, Eitan; "The Equivalence of Strong Positive Association and Strategy-proofness";Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 14, No. 2; April, 1977; 412-418; #598.

[**Satterthwaite, Mark A.**]; Blin, Jean-Marie; "On Preferences, Beliefs, and Manipulation within Voting Situations"; Econometrica; Vol. 45, No. 4; May, 1977; 881-888; #459

[**Satterthwaite, Mark A.**]; Blin, Jean-Marie; "Individual Decisions and Group Decisions: The Fundamental Differences"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 10, No. 2; October, 1978; 247-267; #964.

[**Satterthwaite, Mark A.**]; Kalai, Ehud; Muller, Eitan; "Social Welfare Functions when Preferences are Convex, Strictly Monotonic and Continuous"; Public Choice; Vol. 34, No. 1; 1979; 87-97; #155.

Satterthwaite, Mark A.; Sonnenschein, Hugo F.; "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points";Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 48, No. 4; October, 1981; 587-597; #3123.

[**Satterthwaite, Mark A.**]; Muller, Eitan; "Strategy-proofness: The Existence of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms";Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner; edited by Leonid Hurwicz, David Schmeidler and Hugo Sonnenschein; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1985; 131-172; #1078.

Satterthwaite, Mark A.; "Strategy Proof Allocation Mechanisms"; The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 4; Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman; London; Macmillan; 1987; 518-520; #1927.

Satterthwaite, Mark A.; "Strategy-proofness and Markets"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 1; January, 2001; 37-58; #3726.

Satz, Debra;Ferejohn, John A.; "Rational Choice and Social Theory"; The Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 91, No. 2; February, 1994; 71-87; #3113.

[Sauger, Nicolas]; Van der Straeten, Karine; Laslier, Jean-François; Blais, André; "Strategic, Sincere, and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: an Experimental Study";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 3; September, 2010; 435-472; #5242.

[Saukkonen, Kari]; Salonen, Hannu; “On Continuity of Arrovian Social Welfare Functions”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, No. 1; October, 2005; 85-93; #4446.

Saukkonen, Kari; “Continuity of Social Choice Functions with Restricted Coalition Algebras”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 4; June, 2007; 637-647; #4584.

Saukkonen, Kari; "Continuity, Manifolds, and Arrow's Social Choice Problem";Statistical Science and Interdisciplinary Research; Vol. 1, Mathematical Programming and Game Theory for Decision Making; World Science Publishers; Hackensack, NJ; 2008; 415-450; #5083.

[Saumell, Laia]; Camps, Rosa; Mora, Xavier; "A Continuous Rating Method for Preferential Voting: The Complete Case"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 39, Number 1; June, 2012; 141-170; #5572.

Savaglio, Ernesto; Vannucci, Stefano; "On the Volume-ranking of Opportunity Sets in Economic Environments"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 1; June, 2009; 1-24; #5137.

[**Sawyer, J.**];Cartwright, B.; Littlechild, S.; "Individual Preferences, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare";Social Choice; edited by Bernhardt Lieberman; New York; Gordon and Breach; 1971; 301-317; #1187.

Sbicca, Fabrizio; "Formulazioni alternative dei diritti libertari nella teoria della scelta sociale"; Rivista di Politica Economica; Vol. 91, No. 10; October, 2001; 61-92; [With English summary]; #4051.

Scarrow, Howard A.; "Ballot Format in Plurality Partisan Elections"; Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences; edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart; New York; Agathon Press; 1986; 242-246; #2215.

Scarrow, Howard A.; "Cross-Endorsement and Cross-Filing in Plurality Partisan Elections"; Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences; edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart; New York; Agathon Press; 1986; 248-254; #2216.

[**Scarrow, Howard A.**]; Grofman, Bernard; "Iannucci and Its Aftermath: The Application of the Banzhaf Index to Weighted Voting in New York State"; Applied Game Theory; Steven J. Brams; Andrew Schotter; and Gerhard Schwödiauer, eds.; Vienna; Physica Verlag; 1979; 168-183; #3266.

Scarsini, Marco; A Strong Paradox of Multiple Elections"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 2; February, 1998; 237-238; #3205.

[Schaps, Mary]; Karotkin, Drora; “The Network of Weighted Majority Rules and its Geometric Realizations”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 42, No. 1; 2003; 75-90; #4332.

[**Schauenberg, B.**];Kliemt, Hartmut; "Coalitions and Hierarchies: Some Observations on the Fundamentals of Human Cooperation"; Coalitions and Collective Action; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Vienna; Physica-Verlag; 1984; 9-32; #1453.

Schick, Frederick; "Arrow's Proof and the Logic of Preference"; Philosophy of Science; Vol. 36, No. 2; June, 1969; 127-144; #655.

Schick, Frederick; "Democracy and Interdependent Preferences"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 3, No. 1; October, 1972; 55-75; #1105.

Schick, Frederick; "Towards a Logic of Liberalism";Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 77, No. 2; February, 1980; 80-98; #1081.

[Schickler, Eric];Rae, Douglas W.; "Majority Rule"; Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook; Dennis Mueller, editor; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1997; 163-180; #3197.

Schiller, Marvin; "On the Logic of Being a Democrat"; Philosophy; Vol. 44, No. 167; January, 1969; 46-56; #2001.

Schleicher, Heinz; "Théorie des jeux et interactions entre groupes"; Jeux, information et groupes; edited by Heinz, Schleicher; Éditions Économica; Paris; 1979; 129-196; #3225.

Schleicher, Heinz; Jeux, information et groupes; With a preface by Martin Shubik; Éditions Économica; Paris; 1979; #3216.

[Schlötterer, Christian]; Eckert, Daniel; Klamler, Christian; Mitlöhner, Johann; “A Distance-based Comparison of Basic Voting Rules”; Central European Journal of Operations Research; Vol. 14, No. 4; 2006; 377-386; #4746.

Schmeidler, David; "A Condition for the Completeness of Partial Preference Relations"; Econometrica; Vol. 39, No. 2; March, 1971; 403-404; #657.

Schmeidler, David; Vind, Karl; "Fair Net Trades"; Econometrica; Vol. 40, No. 4; July, 1972; 637-642; #3793.

[Schmeidler, David]; Pazner, Elisha A.; "A Difficulty in the Concept of Fairness"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 41(3), No. 127; July, 1974; 441-443; #3791.

[Schmeidler, David]; Kalai, Ehud; Pazner, Elisha A.; "Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes"; Econometrica; Vol. 44, No. 2; March, 1976; 233-240; #560.

[Schmeidler, David]; Karni, Edi; "Independence of Non-Feasible Alternatives and Independence of Non-Optimal Alternatives"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 12, No. 3; June, 1976; 488-493; #562.

[Schmeidler, David]; Kalai, Ehud; "An Admissible Set Occurring in Various Bargaining Situations";Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 14, No. 2; April, 1977; 402-411; #738.

[Schmeidler, David]; Kalai, Ehud; "Aggregation Procedures for Cardinal Preferences: A Formulation and Proof of Samuelson's Impossibility Conjecture"; Econometrica; Vol. 45, No. 6; September, 1977; 1431-1438; #561.

[Schmeidler, David]; Pazner, Elisha A.; "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity"; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 92, No. 1; November, 1978; 671-687; #3792.

Schmeidler, David; Sonnenschein, Hugo F.; "Two Proofs of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the Possibility of a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Function"; Decision Theory and Social Ethics, Issues in Social Choice; edited by Hans W. Gottinger and Werner Leinfeller; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1978; 227-234; #656.

[Schmeidler, David]; Hurwicz, Leonid; Sonnenschein, Hugo, editors, Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1985; #1074.

[Schmeidler, David]; Postlewaite, Andrew; "Strategic Behavior and a Notion of ex ante Efficiency in a Voting Model"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 3, No. 1; June, 1986; 37-49; #872.

[Schmeidler, David]; Gilboa, Itzhak; "A Cognitive Model of Individual Well-being"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 2; April, 2001; 269-288; #3757.

[Schmeidler, David]; Samet, Dov; "Between Liberalism and Democracy"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 110, No. 2; June, 2003; 213-412; #4125.

Schmid, A. Allen; "Problem in the Theory of Public Choice: Discussion"; American Economic Review; Vol. 59, No. 2; May, 1969; 212-213; #1247.

[Schmidt, Ulrich]; Traub, Stefan; Seidl, Christian; Levati, Maria Vittoria; “Friedman, Harsanyi, Rawls, Boulding – or Somebody Else? An Experimental Investigation of Distributive Justice”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 2; April, 2005; 283-309; #4280.

Schmitz, Norbert; "A Further Note on Arrow's Impossibility Theorem"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 4, No. 2; August, 1977; 189-196; #30.

Schmitz, Patrick W.; Troeger, Thomas; "The (Sub-)optimality of the Majority Rule";Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 74, No. 2; March, 2012; 651-665; #5614.

[Schneider, Friedrich]; Pommerehne, Werner W.; Hart, Albert; "Tragic Choices and Collective Decision-Making: AnEmpirical Study of Voter Preferences for Alternative Collective Decision-Making Mechanisms"; Economic Journal; Vol. 107, No. 442; May, 1997; 618-635; #3376.

[**Schneider-Mizell, Casey M.**]; Page, Scott E.; Sander, Leonard M.; “Conformity and Dissonance in Generalized Voter Models”; Journal of Statistical Physics; Vol. 128, No. 6; September, 2007; 1279-1287; #4709.

Schoenmakers, Berry; "A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and its Application to Electronic Voting"; Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO '99; Edited by Michael Wiener; Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1666; Springer; Berlin; 1999; 148-164; #3937.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Is Majority Rule Special?"; Probability Models of Collective Decision Making; edited by Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg; Columbus; Merrill; 1972; 60-82; #1260.

Schofield, Norman J.; "A Game Theoretic Analysis of Olson's Game of Collective Action"; Journal of Conflict Resolution; Vol. 19, No. 3; September, 1975; 441-461; #1435.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Transitivity of Preferences on a Smooth Manifold of Alternatives"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 14, No. 1; February, 1977; 149-171; #3059.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Dynamic Games of Collective Action"; Public Choice; Vol. 30; Summer, 1977; 77-106; #1052.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 45(3), No. 141; October, 1978; 575-594; #11.

Schofield, Norman J.; "The Theory of Dynamic Games"; Game Theory and Political Science; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook; New York; New York University Press; 1978; 113-164; #1746.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Formal Political Theory";Quality and Quantity; Vol. 14, No. 1; January, 1980; 249-275; #1342.

Schofield, Norman J.; "The Bargaining Set in Voting Games"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 25, No. 2; March, 1980; 120-129; #3049.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Generic Properties of Simple Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 7, No. 2; July, 1980; 175-192; #19.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Individual and Collective Rationality"; Politics as Rational Action: Essays in Public Choice and Policy Analysis; edited by Leif Lewin and Evert Vedung; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1980; 99-120; #2189.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Bargaining Set Theory and Stability in Coalition Governments"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 3, No. 1; July, 1982; 9-32; #1525.

Schofield, Norman J.; "The Relationship Between Voting and Party Strength in an Electoral System"; Power, Voting and Voting Power; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Würzburg-Vienna; Physica Verlag; 1982; 121-134; #1411.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Generic Instability of Majority Rule"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 50(4), No. 163; October, 1983; 695-705; #48.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Equilibria in Simple Dynamic Games"; Social Choice and Welfare; edited by Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Maurice Salles; North-Holland; Amsterdam; 1983; 269-284; #27.

Schofield, Norman J.; "The General Relevance of the Impossibility Theorem in Smooth Social Choice"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 16, No. 1; January, 1984; 21-44; #283.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Social Equilibrium and Cycles on Compact Sets"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 33, No. 1; June, 1984; 59-71; #279.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Classification Theorem for Smooth Social Choice on a Manifold"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 3; October, 1984; 187-201; #818.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Bargaining Over Public Goods"; Coalitions and Collective Action; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Vienna; Physica-Verlag; 1984; 33-50; #1454.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Political Fragmentation and the Stability of Coalition Governments in Western Europe"; Coalitions and Collective Action; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Vienna; Physica-Verlag; 1984; 297-319; #1470.

Schofield, Norman J.; Laver, Michael; "Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments"; British Journal of Political Science; Vol. 15, No. 2; April, 1985; 143-164; #1101.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Anarchy, Altruism and Cooperation: A Review"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 2, No. 4; December, 1985; 207-219; #828.

Schofield, Norman J.; Social Choice and Democracy; Berlin; Springer Verlag; 1985; #408. [see review by Aizerman and review by Kelly]

Schofield, Norman J.; "Permutation Cycles and Manipulation of Choice Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 3, No. 2; July, 1986; 107-118; #1069.

[**Schofield, Norman J.**]; McKelvey, Richard D.; "Structural Instability of the Core"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 15, No. 3; 1986; 179-198; #1697.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Existence of a 'Structurally Stable' Equilibrium for a Non-Collegial Voting Rule"; Public Choice; Vol. 51, No. 3; 1986; 267-284; #3120.

[**Schofield, Norman J.**]; McKelvey, Richard D.; "Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point"; Econometrica; Vol. 55, No. 4; July, 1987; 423-433; #1990.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Bargaining in Weighted Majority Voting Games, With an Application to Portfolio Distributions";The Logic of Multiparty Systems; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Dordrecht; Kluwer; 1987; 51-65; #2097.

Schofield, Norman J.; Laver, Michael; "Bargaining Theory and Cabinet Stability in European Coalition Governments: 1945-1983"; The Logic of Multiparty Systems; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Dordrecht; Kluwer; 1987; 137-152; #2103.

Schofield, Norman J.; Grofman, Bernard; Feld, Scott L.; "The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 82, No. 1; March, 1988; 195-211; #2014.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Smooth Social Choice";Mathematical and Computer Modelling; Vol. 12, No. 4-5; 1989; 417-435; #3048.

Schofield, Norman J.; Tovey, Craig A.; "Probability and Convergence for Supra-Majority Rule with Euclidean Preferences"; Mathematical and Computer Modelling; Vol. 16, No. 8-9; August-September, 1992; 41-58; #2199.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Political Economy: A Personal Interpretation and an Overview"; Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation; Barnett, William A.; Hinich, Melvin J.; Schofield, Norman J., editors; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1993; 1-22; #3235.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Party Competition in a Spatial Model of Coalition Formation"; Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation; Barnett, William A.; Hinich, Melvin J.; Schofield, Norman J., editors; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1993; 135-174; #3236.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Rational Choice and Political Economy"; Critical Review; Vol. 9, No. 1-2; Winter-Spring, 1995; 189-211; #3056.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Existence of a Smooth Social Choice Functor"; Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics; edited by Barnett, William A.; Hervé Moulin; Maurice Salles; Norman Schofield; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1995; 213-246; #2555.

[**Schofield, Norman J.**]; Barnett, William A.; Salles, Maurice; Social Choice, Welfare and Ethics; Cambridge University Press; 1995; #2420.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Introduction: Research Programs in Preference and Belief Aggregation"; Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy; edited by Norman J. Schofield; Boston/Dordrecht/London; Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1996; 1-22; #2453.

Schofield, Norman J.; Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy; Boston/Dordrecht/London; Kluwer Academic Publishers; 1996; #2452.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Voting Models in the Arrovian Framework: Discussion"; Social Choice Re-Examined, Vol. 1; edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 68-71; #3134. [discussion of a paper by Aleskerov]

Schofield, Norman J.; "Multiparty Electoral Politics"; Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook; Dennis Mueller, editor; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1997; 271-295; #3246.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Aggregation of Smooth Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 2; February, 1998; 161-185; #3201.

Schofield, Norman J.; Sened, Itai; Nixon, David; "Nash Equilibrium in Multiparty Competition with 'Stochastic' Voters"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 84; 1998; 3-27; #3686.

Schofield, Norman J.; "The C1 Topology on the Space of Smooth Preference Profiles"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 3; May, 1999; 445-470; #3444.

Schofield, Norman J.; "The Heart and the Uncovered Set"; Mathematical Utility Theory; edited by Gerhard Herden, Norbert Knoche, Christian Seidl, and Walter Trockel; Springer Verlag; Vienna; 1999; 79-113; #3697.

Schofield, Norman J.; "A Smooth Social Choice Method of Preference Aggregation";Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory; Edited by Myrna H. Wooders; Fields Institute Communication, Vol. 23; American Mathematical Society; Providence, RI; 1999; 213-232; #3821.

Schofield, Norman J.; Parks, Robert P.; "Nash Equilibrium in a Spatial Model of Coalition Bargaining"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 39, No. 2; March, 2000; 133-174; #3963.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Institutional Innovation, Contingency and War: a Review"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 3; May, 2000; 463-479; #3625.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Constitutions, Voting and Democracy: a Review"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 3; July, 2001; 571-600; #3773.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Generic Existence of Local Political Equilibrium";Approximation, Optimization and Mathematical Economics; Edited by Marc Lassonde; Physica; Heidelberg; 2001; 297-308; #3940.

Schofield, Norman J.; Sened, Itai; "Local Nash Equilibrium in Multiparty Politics"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 109, No. 1-4; January, 2002; 193-211; #4020.

Schofield, Norman J.; “Representative Democracy and Social Choice Theory”; In Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1; Edited by K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura; North-Holland; 2002; 425-455; #4399.

Schofield, Norman J.; "Power, Prosperity and Social Choice: A Review"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 1; February, 2003; 85-118; #3994.

Schofield, Norman J.; “The Intellectual Contribution of Condorcet to the Founding of the US Republic 1785–1800”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 303-318; #4461.

Schofield, Norman J.; “Local Political Equilibria”; Social Choice and Strategic Decisions; edited by David Austen-Smith and John Duggan; Springer; Berlin; 2005; 57-91; #4652.

Schofield, Norman J.; “Equilibria in the Spatial Stochastic Model of Voting with Party Activists”; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 10, No. 3; 2006; 183-203; #4744.

Schofield, Norman J.; “The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium”; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 74, No. 3; 2007; 965-980; #4714.

Schofield, Norman J.; Claassen, Christopher; Ozdemir, Ugur; Zakharov, Alexei; "Application of a Theorem in Stochastic Models of Elections"; International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences; 2010; Art. ID 562813, 30 pp.; #5257.

[Schofield, Norman]; Gallego, Maria E.; Kilgour, D. Marc; "Guest Editors' Introduction to the Special Issue on the Political Economy of Elections and Bargaining"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 3; April, 2011; 355-364; #5404.

Schofield, Norman; Gallego, Maria E.; Ozdemir, Ugur; Zakharov, Alexei; "Competition for Popular Support: A Valence Model of Elections in Turkey"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 3; April, 2011; 451-482; #5408.

Schofield, Norman; Claassen, Christopher; Ozdemir, Ugur; Zakharov, Alexei; "Estimating the Effects of Activists in Two-party and Multi-party Systems: Comparing the United States and Israel"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 3; April, 2011; 483-518; #5409.

Schokkaert, Erik; Devooght, Kurt; "The Empirical Acceptance of Compensation Axioms";Freedom in Economics, New Perspectives in Normative Analysis; Edited by Jean-Fran�ois Laslier, Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Laslier, and Alain Trannoy; Routledge; 1998; 257-281; #3525. [See comment by Bossert.]

Schokkaert, Erik; Devooght, Kurt; "Responsibility-Sensitive Fair Compensation in Different Cultures"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 2; October, 2003; 207-242; #4182.

[Schokkaert, Erik]; Ooghe, Erwin; Van de Gaer, Dirk; “Equality of Opportunity versus Equality of Opportunity Sets”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 2; February, 2007; 209-230; #4566.

[Schokkaert, Erik]; Bosmans, Kristof; "Equality Preference in the Claims Problem: a Questionnaire Study of Cuts in Earnings and Pensions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 4; November, 2009; 533-557; #5166.

[Schotter, Andrew];Fischer, Dietrich; "The Inevitability of the `Paradox of Redistribution' in the Allocation of Voting Weights"; Public Choice; Vol. 33, No. 2; 1978; 49-67; #83. [see comment by Holler]

Schotter, Andrew; "Voting Weights as Power Proxies: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results"; Applied Game Theory; Steven J. Brams; Andrew Schotter; and Gerhard Schwödiauer, eds.; Vienna; Physica Verlag; 1979; 58-73; #3265.

Schotter, Andrew; "The Paradox of Redistribution: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results"; in Power, Voting, and Voting Power; Edited by Manfred J. Holler; Physica Verlag; Wurzburg; 1982; #3928.

Schram, Arthur; "Do People Care about Democracy? Comment"; Public Choice; Vol. 91, No. 1; April, 1997; 49-51; #3380. [Comment on paper by Weck-Hannemann and Güth]

[Schulte, Elisabeth]; Grüner, Hans Peter; "Speed and Quality of Collective Decision Making: Incentives for Information Provision"; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Vol. 76, No. 3; 2010; 734-747; #5419.

Schulte, Elisabeth; "Information Aggregation and Preference Heterogeneity in Committees"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 69, No. 1; 2010; 97-118; #5459.

[Schulteis, Tim]; Peters, Hans; Vermeulen, Dries; "Generalized Stochastic Dominance and Bad Outcome Aversion"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 2; July, 2010; 285-290; #5232.

[Schulz, Christof]; Sieg, Gernot; "Evolutionary Dynamics in the Voting Game"; Public Choice; Vol. 85, No. 1-2; October, 1995; 157-172; #3371.

Schulze, Markus; "A New Monotonic, Clone-independent, Reversal Symmetric, and Condorcet-consistent Single-winner Election Method"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 2; February, 2011; 267-303; 15400.

[**Schulze, William D.**]; Messer, Kent D.; Poe, Gregory L.; Rondeau, Daniel; Vossler, Christian A.; "Social Preferences and Voting: An Exploration Using a Novel Preference Revealing Mechanism"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 94, No. 3-4; April, 2010; 308-317; #5340.

Schumaker, Paul; "Review of Equity in Theory and Practice [H. P. Young]"; The Journal of Politics; Volume 57, No. 3; August, 1995; 867-871; #2831. [review of book by Young]

Schummer, James; "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency on Restricted Domains of Exchange Economies"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 1; January, 1997; 47-56; #2425.

[Schummer, James]; Chun, Youngsub; Thomson, William; "Constrained Egalitarianism: A New Solution for Claims Problems"; Seoul Journal of Economics; Fall, 2001; Vol. 14, No. 3; 269-297; #4053.

Schuyler, G. L.; "The Ordering of n Items Assigned to k Rank Categories by Votes of m Individuals";Journal of the American Statistical Association; Vol. 43; December, 1948; 559-563; #3164.

[Schwallier, Peter]; Hodge, Jonathan K.; “How Does Separability Affect the Desirability of Referendum Election Outcomes?”; Theory and Decision; Vol. 61, No. 3; 2006; 251-276; #4747.

Schwartz, Edward P.;Schwartz, Warren F.; "Decisionmaking by Juries Under Uncertainty and Supermajority Voting Rules"; Georgetown Law Journal; Vol. 80, No. 3; February, 1992; 775-807; #3277.

Schwartz, Thomas; "On the Possibility of Rational Policy Evaluation"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 1, No. 1; October, 1970; 89-106; #658.

Schwartz, Thomas; "Rationality and the Myth of the Maximum"; Noûs; Vol. 6, No. 2; May, 1972; 97-117; #659.

Schwartz, Thomas; "On the Utility of MacKay's Comparisons"; Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 72, No. 17; 2 October 1975; 549-551; #1388. [Comment on paper by MacKay]

Schwartz, Thomas; "Vote Trading and Pareto Efficiency"; Public Choice; Vol. 24; Winter, 1975; 101-109; #1286.

Schwartz, Thomas; "Choice Functions, 'Rationality' Conditions and Variations on the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 13, No. 3; December, 1976; 414-427; #22.

Schwartz, Thomas; "Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 71, No. 3; September, 1977; 999-1010; #1171.

Schwartz, Thomas; "The Universal-Instability Theorem"; Public Choice; Vol. 37, No. 3; 1981; 487-501; #23.

Schwartz, Thomas; "No Minimally Reasonable Collective Choice Process Can Be Strategy-Proof"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 3, No. 1; July, 1982; 57-72; #960.

Schwartz, Thomas; "A Really General Impossibility Theorem"; Quality and Quantity; Vol. 16, No. 6; December, 1982; 493-505; #961.

[Schwartz, Thomas]; McCubbins, Mathew D.; "The Politics of Flatland"; Public Choice; Vol. 46, No. 1; 1985; 45-60; #821.

Schwartz, Thomas; The Logic of Collective Choice; New York; Columbia University Press; 1986; #410. [See review by Shepsle]

[Schwartz, Thomas]; Ordeshook, Peter C.; "Agendas and Control of Political Outcomes"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 81, No. 1; March, 1987; 179-199; #1630.

Schwartz, Thomas; "Your Vote Counts on Account of the Way It Is Counted: An Institutional Solution to the Paradox of Not Voting"; Public Choice; Vol. 54, No. 2; 1987; 101-121; #3121.

Schwartz, Thomas; "Votes, Strategies and Institution: An Introduction to the Theory of Collective Choice"; Congress: Structure and Policy; McCubbins and Sullivan, eds.; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1987; 318-345; #2242.

Schwartz, Thomas; "Cyclic Tournaments and Cooperative Majority Voting: A Solution"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 1; January, 1990; 19-29; #2149.

Schwartz, Thomas; "The Paradox of Representation";Journal of Politics; Vol. 57, No. 2; May, 1995; 309-323; #2856.

[Schwartz, Thomas]; Duggan, John; "Strategic Manipulability Without Resoluteness or Shared Beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite Generalized"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 1; January, 2000; 85-93; #3588.

Schwartz, Thomas; "From Arrow to Cycles, Instability, and Chaos by Untying Alternatives"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 1; January, 2001; 1-22; #3724.

Schwartz, Thomas; “A Procedural Condition Necessary and Sufficient for Cyclic Social Preference”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 137, No. 1; November, 2007; 688-695; #4880.

Schwartz, Thomas; "Social Choice and Individual Values in the Electronic Republic";Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 621-632; #5517.

[**Schwartz, Warren F.**];Schwartz, Edward P.; "Decisionmaking by Juries Under Uncertainty and Supermajority Voting Rules"; Georgetown Law Journal; Vol. 80, No. 3; February, 1992; 775-807; #3277.

Schweizer, Urs; "Calculus of Consent: A Game-Theoretic Perspective"; Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; Vol. 146, No. 1; March, 1990; 28-54; #2176. [See comment by Pethig]

Schwettmann, Lars; "Review: Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare (Marc Fleurbaey)"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 1; January, 2012; 181-185; #5538.

Schwingenschlögl, Udo; Pukelsheim, Friedrich; “Seat Biases in Proportional Representation Systems with Thresholds”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 1; August, 2006; 189-193; #4523.

Schwingenschlögl, Udo; "Probabilities of Majority and Minority Violation in Proportional Representation"; Statistics and Probability Letters; Vol. 77, No. 17; 2007; 1690-1695; #5130.

[Scitovski, Rudolf]; Maroševi, Tomislav; "An Application of a Few Inequalities among Sequences in Electoral Systems"; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 194, No. 2; 2007; 480-485; #5131.

Scitovsky, Tibor; "John Hicks 1904-1989"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 2; April, 1990; 97-98; #2157.

[Scoones, David]; Gallego, Maria E.; "Intergovernmental Negotiation, Willingness to Compromise, and Voter Preference Reversals"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 3; April, 2011; 591-610; #5413.

Scott, Alex; Fey, Mark; "The Minimal Covering Set in Large Tournaments"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 1; January, 2012; 1-9; #5527.

Scriven, Tal; "Preference, Rational Choice and Arrow's Theorem"; Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 78, No. 12; December, 1981; 778-785; #1491.

Scriven, Tal; "Plato's 'Democratic Man' and the Implausibility of Preference Utilitarianism"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 24, No. 1; January, 1988; 43-55; #1915.

Seabright, Paul; "Social Choice and Social Theories"; Philosophy and Public Affairs; Vol. 18, No. 4; Fall, 1989; 365-387; #3297.

[Sefton, Martin]; Montero, Maria; Zhang, Ping; “Enlargement and the Balance of Power: An Experimental Study”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 1; January, 2008; 69-87; #4690.

[Sefton, Martin]; Drouvelis, Michalis; Montero, Maria; "Gaining Power Through Enlargement: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 69, No. 2; 2010; 274-292; #5458.

Segal, Ilya R.; “The Communication Requirements of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 136, No. 1; September, 2007; 341-378; #4892.

Segal, Ilya R.; "Nash Implementation with Little Communication"; Theoretical Economics; Vol. 5, No. 1; January, 2010; 51-71; #5372.

Segal, Uzi; Sobel, Joel; “Min, Max, and Sum”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 106, No. 1; September, 2002; 126-150; [“With applications to social choice theory”]; #4239.

[Segal, Uzi]; Heyd, David; “Democratically Elected Aristocracies”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 1; August, 2006; 103-127; #4513.

Segerstrom, Paul S.; "Moral Efficiency. A New Criterion for Social Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 2; April, 1990; 109-129; #2159.

Seidl, Christian; "On Liberal Values"; Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 35, No. 3-4; 1975; 257-292; #1109.

Seidl, Christian; "Asymmetric Information and the Dynamics of Coalition Formation: Observations on Some Unsolved Problems"; Coalitions and Collective Action; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Vienna; Physica-Verlag; 1984; 216-227; #1465.

Seidl, Christian; "Beyond Pareto Optimality? A Comment to Yew-Kwang Ng"; Zeitscrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 46, No. 3; 1986; 305-310; #1653. [Comment on paper by Ng; see: response by Ng, note by Seidl; rejoinder by Ng]

Seidl, Christian; "A Final Note to Ng"; Zeitscrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 46, No. 3; 1986; 317; #1655. [Note on Ng response to Seidl comment on paper by Ng; See rejoinder by Ng]

Seidl, Christian; "The Impossibility of Nondictatorial Tolerance"; Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 46, Supplementum 5; December, 1986; 211-225; #2002.

Seidl, Christian; "On the Impossibility of a Generalization of the Libertarian Resolution of the Liberal Paradox";Journal of Economics [Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie]; Vol. 51, No. 1; 1990; 71-88; #2178.

Seidl, Christian; "Foundations and Implications of Rights"; Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2; Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 53-77; #2780. [see discussion by Orosel]

[Seidl, Christian]; Traub, Stefan; Schmidt, Ulrich; Levati, Maria Vittoria; “Friedman, Harsanyi, Rawls, Boulding – or Somebody Else? An Experimental Investigation of Distributive Justice”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 2; April, 2005; 283-309; #4280.

Seidmann, Daniel J.; "A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 1; January, 2011; 49-74; #5391.

[**Seiford, Lawrence M.**];Cook, Wade D.; "Priority Ranking and Consensus Information"; Management Science; Vol. 24, No. 6; December, 1978; 1721-1732; #1701.

[**Seiford, Lawrence M.**]; Cook, Wade D.; "On the Borda-Kendall Consensus Method for Priority Ranking Problems"; Management Science; Vol. 28, No. 6; June, 1982; 621-637; #1705.

[**Seiford, Lawrence M.**]; Armstrong, Ronald D.; Cook, Wade D.; "Priority Ranking and Consensus Formation: The Case of Ties";Management Science; Vol. 28, No. 6; June, 1982; 638-645; #1707.

[**Seiford, Lawrence M.**]; Cook, Wade D.; Warner, Stanley L.; "Preference Ranking Models: Conditions for Equivalence";Journal of Mathematical Sociology; Vol. 9, No. 2; 1983; 125-138; #1706.

[**Seiford, Lawrence M.**]; Cook, Wade D.; Kress, Moshe; "An Axiomatic Approach to Distance on Partial Orderings"; R.A.I.R.O. Recherche Opérationnelle; Vol. 20, No. 2; 1986; 115-122; #1441.

[Sekiguchi, Yohei]; Kitahara, Minoru; "Condorcet Jury Theorem or Rational Ignorance"; Journal of Public Economic Theory; Vol. 10, No. 2; April, 2008; 281-300; #5064.

[Sekiguchi, Yohei]; Cato, Susumu; "A Generalization of Campbell and Kelly's Trade-off Theorem"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 2; February, 2012; 237-246; #5541.

[Selçuk, Özer]; Sanver, M. Remzi; "Sophisticated Preference Aggregation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 1; June, 2009; 73-86; #5140.

[Selçuk, Özer]; Sanver, M. Remzi; "A Characterization of the Copeland Solution";Economics Letters; Vol. 107, No. 3; 2010; 354-355; #5277.

Selinger, Stephen; "Harsanyi's Aggregation Theorem Without Selfish Preferences"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 20, No. 1; January, 1986; 53-62; #837.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Preferences, Votes and the Transitivity of Majority Decisions"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 31, No. 2(86); April, 1964; 163-165; #1359.

[**Sen, Amartya K.**]; Runciman, Walter G.; "Games, Justice and the General Will"; Mind; Vol. 74, No. 296; October, 1965; 554-562; #644.

Sen, Amartya K.; "A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions"; Econometrica; Vol. 34, No. 2; April, 1966; 491-499; #1202.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Quasi-transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 36 (3), No. 107; July, 1969; 381-393; #660.

Sen, Amartya K.; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Rational Choice under Majority Decision"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 1, No. 2; August, 1969; 178-202; #661.

Sen, Amartya K.; Collective Choice and Social Welfare; San Francisco; Holden-Day; 1970; #662. [See review by Fitzroy and review by Kim]

Sen, Amartya K.; "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal"; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 78, No. 1; January/February, 1970; 152-157; #663.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Interpersonal Comparison and Partial Comparability"; Econometrica; Vol. 38, No. 3; May, 1970; 393-409; #664. {See correction: Econometrica; Vol. 40, No. 5; September, 1972; 959]

Sen, Amartya K.; "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 38 (3), No. 115; July, 1971; 307-317; #665.

Sen, Amartya K.; "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal: reply"; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 79, No. 6; November/December, 1971; 1406-1407; #2368. [Reply to Hillinger and Lapham]

Sen, Amartya K.; "Choice, Orderings and Morality";Practical Reason; edited by Stephen Körner; Oxford; Blackwell; 1972; 54-67; #668. [see comment by Watkins and reply by Sen]

Sen, Amartya K.; "Reply to Comments"; Practical Reason; edited by Stephen Körner; Oxford; Blackwell; 1972; 78-82; #1734. [reply to comments by Watkins on paper by Sen]

Sen, Amartya K.; "Behavior and the Concept of Preference"; Economica; Vol. 40, No. 159; August, 1973; 241-259; #667.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Is a Paretian Liberal Really Impossible: A Reply"; Public Choice; Vol. 21; Spring, 1975; 111-113; #669. [Reply to paper by Bernholz, see rejoinder by Bernholz]

Sen, Amartya K.; "Liberty, Unanimity and Rights";Economica; Vol. 43, No. 171; August, 1976; 217-245; #670.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination";Econometrica; Vol. 45, No. 1; January, 1977; 53-89; #671. [See comment by Farkas and Nitzan]

Sen, Amartya K.; "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory"; Philosophy and Public Affairs; Vol. 6, No. 4; Summer, 1977; 317-344; #725.

Sen, Amartya K.; "On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis"; Econometrica; Vol. 45, No. 7; October, 1977; 1539-1572; #726.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Welfare Inequalities and Rawlsian Axiomatics"; Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences; edited by Robert E. Butts and Jaakko Hintikka; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1977; 271-292; #1204. [See comment by Harsanyi and reply by Sen]

Sen, Amartya K.; "Non-Linear Social Welfare Functions: A Reply to Professor Harsanyi"; Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences; edited by Robert E. Butts and Jaakko Hintikka; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1977; 297-302; #1205. [reply to comment by Harsanyi on paper by Sen]

Sen, Amartya K.; "Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong With Welfare Economics"; Economic Journal; Vol. 89, No. 355; September, 1979; 537-558; #729. [See comment by Ng and reply by Sen]

Sen, Amartya K.; "Strategies and Revelation: Informational Constraints in Public Decisions"; Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences; edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1979; 13-28; #727.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare"; Economics and Human Welfare; edited by Michael J. Boskin; New York; Academic Press; 1979; 183-201; #728.

Sen, Amartya K.; "A Reply to 'Welfarism: A Defence against Sen's Attack' "; Economic Journal; Vol. 91, No. 362; June, 1981; 531-535; #2241. [Reply to Ngcomment on paper by Sen]

Sen, Amartya K.; "Rights and Agency"; Philosophy and Public Affairs; Vol. 11, No. 1; Winter, 1982; 3-39; #372. [Seecomment by Regan]

Sen, Amartya K.; Williams, Bernard; editors; Utilitarianism and Beyond; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1982; #2042.

Sen, Amartya K.; Choice, Welfare and Measurement; Oxford; Blackwell; 1982; #730. [See review by Wagenhals and review by Taylor]

Sen, Amartya K.; "Liberty and Social Choice";Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 80, No. 1; January, 1983; 5-28; #245.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation"; Philosophy and Public Affairs; Vol. 12, No. 2; Spring, 1983; 113-132; #263.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Rights and Capabilities";Resources, Values and Development; Sen, Amartya, editor; Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press; 1984; 307-324; #2350.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Well Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures, 1984"; Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 82, No. 4; April, 1985; 169-221; #1380.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Social Choice and Justice: A Review Article"; Journal of Economic Literature; Vol. 23, No. 4; December, 1985; 1764-1776; #819.

Sen, Amartya K.; Commodities and Capabilities; Elsevier Science Ltd.; 1985; #2701. [See review by Basu]

Sen, Amartya K.; "Social Choice Theory"; Handbook of Mathematical Economics, Vol. III; edited by Kenneth J. Arrow and Michael D. Intriligator; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1986; 1073-1181; #731.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Foundations of Social Choice Theory: An Epilogue"; Foundations of Social Choice Theory; edited by Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1986; 213-248; #905.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Information and Invariance in Normative Choice"; Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Vol. 1 Social Choice and Public Decision-Making; edited by Walter P. Heller, Ross M. Starr and David A. Starrett; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1986; 29-55; #1399.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Social Choice"; The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 4; Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman; London; Macmillan; 1987; 382-393; #1925.

Sen, Amartya K.; The Standard of Living; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1987; #4238. [See review by Weymark.]

Sen, Amartya K.; "Freedom of Choice: Concept and Content"; European Economic Review; Vol. 32, No. 2-3; March, 1988; 269-294; #2351.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Socialism, Markets and Democracy";Indian Economic Journal; Vol. 37, No. 4; April-June, 1990; 1-6; #2474.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Welfare, Freedom and Social Choice: A Reply"; Recherches Economiques de Louvain; Vol. 56, No. 3-4; 1990; 451-485; #2270.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Utility: Ideas and Terminology";Economics and Philosophy; Vol. 7, No. 2; October, 1991; 277-283; #2473.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Welfare, Preference and Freedom"; Journal of Econometrics; Vol. 50, No. 1-2; October-November, 1991; 15-29; #2475.

Sen, Amartya K.; Inequality Reexamined; Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press; 1992; #3135.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Internal Consistency of Choice"; Econometrica; Vol. 61, No. 3; May, 1993; 495-521; #2492.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms";Oxford Economic Papers; Vol. 45, No. 4; October, 1993; 519-541; #2433.

Sen, Amartya K.; "The Formulation of Rational Choice"; American Economic Review; Vol. 84, No. 2; May, 1994; 385-390; #2449.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Well-Being, Capability and Public Policy"; Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia; Vol. 53, No. 7-9; July-September, 1994; 333-347; #1780.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Rationality and Social Choice";American Economic Review; Vol. 85, No. 1; March, 1995; 1-24; #2419.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Environmental Evaluation and Social Choice: Contingent Valuation and the Market Analogy"; Japanese Economic Review; Vol. 46, No.1; March, 1995; 23-36; #3260.

Sen, Amartya K.; "How to Judge Voting Schemes";The Journal of Economic Perspectives; Vol. 9, No. 1; Winter, 1995; 91-98; #2545.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Maximization and the Act of Choice"; Econometrica; Vol. 65, No. 4; July, 1997; 745-779; #2506.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Individual Preference as the Basis of Social Choice"; Social Choice Re-Examined, Vol. 1; edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 15-37; #3150. [see discussion by Gevers]

[**Sen, Amartya K.**]; Arrow, Kenneth J.; Suzumura, Kotaro; editors; Social Choice Re-examined, 2 Vols.; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; #2775.

Sen, Amartya K.; "Policy Making and Social Choice Pessimism"; inIssues in economic theory and public policy: Essays in honour of Professor Tapas Majumdar; edited by Bose, Amitava; Rakshit, Mihir; Sinha, Anup; Oxford University Press; Delhi; Oxford and New York; 1997; 3-22; #3649.

Sen, Amartya K.; "The Possibility of Social Choice"; American Economic Review; Vol. 89, No. 3; June, 1999; 349-378; #3528.

[**Sen, Amartya K.**]; Arrow, Kenneth J.; Suzumura, Kotaro; Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1; North-Holland; 2002; #4403.

Sen, Amartya K.; "The Fog of Identity"; Politics, Philosophy and Economics; Vol. 8, No. 3; August, 2009; 285-288; #5385.

Sen, Amartya; "Foreword (Special issue in honor of Prasanta K. Pattanaik)"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 545-547; #5511.

[Sen, Arunava];Abreu, Dilip; "Subgame Perfect Implementation: A Necessary and Almost Sufficient Condition"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 50, No. 2; April, 1990; 285-299; #2165.

[Sen, Arunava]; Dutta, Bhaskar; "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 58, No. 1; January, 1991; 121-128; #2293.

[Sen, Arunava]; Abreu, Dilip; "Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium"; Econometrica; Vol. 59, No. 4; July, 1991; 997-1021; #2305.

[Sen, Arunava];Dutta, Bhaskar; "Implementing Generalized Condorcet Social Choice Functions via Backward Induction"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 10, No. 2; April, 1993; 149-160; #2364.

Sen, Arunava; "Review of Moulin, Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 11, No. 3; July, 1994; 287; #2404.

[Sen, Arunava]; Dutta, Bhaskar; "Bayesian Implementation: The, Necessity of Infinite Mechanisms";Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 64, No. 1; October, 1994; 130-141; #2696.

[Sen, Arunava]; Dutta, Bhaskar; Vohra, Rajiv; "Nash Implementation through Elementary Mechanisms in Economic Environments"; Economic Design; Vol. 1, No. 2; April, 1995; 173-203; #3122.

Sen, Arunava; "The Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Social Choice Correspondences: A General Formulation and a Limit Result"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 3; June, 1995; 277-292; #2392.

[Sen, Arunava]; Bergin, James; "Implementation in Generic Environments"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 4; September, 1996; 467-478; #3184.

[Sen, Arunava]; Dutta, Bhaskar; "Ranking Opportunity Sets and Arrow Impossibility Theorems: Correspondence Results"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 71, No. 1; October, 1996; 90-101; #2695.

[Sen, Arunava]; Le Breton, Michel; "Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability"; Econometrica ; Vol. 67, No. 3; May, 1999; 605-628; #3663.

Sen, Arunava; "Another Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem";Economics Letters; Vol. 70, No. 3; March, 2001; 381-385; #5438.

[Sen, Arunava]; Barberà, Salvador; Dutta, Bhaskar; “Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 101, No. 2; 2001; 374-394; [Corrigendum: Vol. 120, No. 2 (2005), p. 275]; #4295.

[Sen, Arunava]; Dutta, Bhaskar; Peters, Hans; "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 106, No. 2; October, 2002; 392-416; #4144.

[Sen, Arunava]; Chatterji, Shurojit; Aswal, Navin; "Dictatorial Domains"; Economic Theory; Vol. 22, No. 1; August, 2003; 45-62; #4129.

[Sen, Arunava]; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; “Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules”; Econometrica; Vol. 72, No. 2; 2004; 523-540; #4338.

[Sen, Arunava]; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; “Top-Pair and Top-Triple Monotonicity”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 1; August, 2006; 175-187; #4526.

[Sen, Arunava]; Bikhchandani, Sushil; Chatterji, Shurojit; Lavi, Ron; Mu'alem, Ahuva;Nisan, Noam; “Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-strategy Implementation”; Econometrica; Vol. 74, No. 4; 2006; 1109-1132; #4858.

[Sen, Arunava]; Dutta, Bhaskar; Peters, Hans; “Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 1; January, 2007; 163-179; #4563.

[Sen, Arunava]; Dutta, Bhaskar; Peters, Hans; “Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 4; May, 2008; 701-702; #4926.

[Sen, Arunava]; Mitra, Manipushpak; "Efficient Allocation of Heterogenous Commodities with Balanced Transfers"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 1; June, 2010; 29-48; #5220.

[Sen, Arunava]; Chatterji, Shurojit; "Tops-only Domains"; Economic Theory; Vol. 46, No. 2; 2011; 255-282; #5415.

[Sen, Arunava]; Picot, Jérémy; "An Extreme Point Characterization of Random Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions: The Two Alternative Case"; Economics Letters; Vol. 115, No. 1; April, 2012; 49-52; #5630.

Sen, Arunava; "The Gibbard Random Dictatorship Theorem: A Generalization and a New Proof"; SERIEs; Vol. 2, No. 4; December, 2011; 515-527; #5641.

[Sen, Arunava]; Mishra, Debasis; "Roberts' Theorem with Neutrality: A Social Welfare Ordering Approach"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 75, No. 1; May, 2012; 283-298; #5629.

[Sen, Arunava]; Dutta, Bhaskar; "Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 74, No. 1; 2012; 154-169; #5707.

[Sened, Itai]; Schofield, Norman J.; Nixon, David; "Nash Equilibrium in Multiparty Competition with 'Stochastic' Voters"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 84; 1998; 3-27; #3686.

[Sened, Itai]; Schofield, Norman J.; "Local Nash Equilibrium in Multiparty Politics"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 109, No. 1-4; January, 2002; 193-211; #4020.

Sengupta, Abhijit; Sengupta, Kunal; "A Hotelling-Downs Model of Electoral Competition with the Option to Quit"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 62, No. 2; 2008; 661-674; #5128.

Sengupta, Kunal; "Choice Rules with Fuzzy Preferences: Some Characterizations"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 2; February, 1999; 259-272; #3415.

[Sengupta, Kunal]; Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; “Rational Choice and von Neumann-Morgenstern's Stable Set: The Case of Path-dependent Procedures”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 3; December, 2006; 611-619; #4551.

[Sengupta, Kunal]; Pattanaik Prasanta K.; "On the Structure of Simple Preference-based Choice Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 1; January, 2000; 33-43; #3584.

[Sengupta, Kunal]; Bandyopadhyay, Taradas; “Intransitive Indifference and Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 46, No. 3; 2004; 311-326; #4294.

[Sengupta, Kunal]; Sengupta, Abhijit; "A Hotelling-Downs Model of Electoral Competition with the Option to Quit"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 62, No. 2; 2008; 661-674; #5128.

Sengupta, Manimay; "On a Concept of Representative Democracy"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 3, No. 3; October, 1974; 249-262; #1218.

[Sengupta, Manimay]; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Conditions for Transitive and Quasi-Transitive Majority Decisions"; Economica; Vol. 41, No. 164; November, 1974; 414-423; #616.

Sengupta, Manimay; "On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting"; Econometrica; Vol. 46, No. 2; March, 1978; 331-344; #73.

Sengupta, Manimay; Dutta, Bhaskar; "A Condition for Nash-Stability under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Functions"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 10, Nos. 1,2,3,4; January, 1979; 293-309; #1298.

Sengupta, Manimay; "Monotonicity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Strategy-proofness of Social Decision Functions";Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 47(2), No. 147; January, 1980; 393-407; #75.

Sengupta, Manimay; "The Knowledge Assumption in the Theory of Strategic Voting"; Econometrica; Vol. 48, No. 5; July, 1980; 1301-1304; #74.

[Sengupta, Manimay]; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Restricted Preferences and Strategyproofness of a Class of Social Decision Functions"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 47(5), No. 150; October, 1980; 965-973; #44.

[Sengupta, Manimay]; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Outcomes of Admissible Nash Equilibria and Sophisticated Voting When Decisions are Based on Pairwise Comparisons"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 1; January, 1981; 39-54; #1305.

Sen(gupta), Manimay; "Implementable Social Choice Rules: Characterizations and Correspondence Theorems Under Strong Nash Equilibrium"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 11, No. 1; January, 1983; 1-24; #188.

Sen(gupta), Manimay; "Strategy-Proofness of a Class of Borda Rules"; Public Choice; Vol. 43, No. 3; 1984; 251-285; #762.

Sengupta, S. Sankar; "Lattices, Bargaining and Group Decisions"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 16, No. 2; March, 1984; 111-134; #286.

[Senné, Thomas]; Courtin, Sébastien; Mbih, Boniface; Moyouwou, Issofa; "The Reinforcement Axiom under Sequential Positional Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 3; September, 2010; 473-500; #5243.

Seo, Fumiko; "On Construction of the Fuzzy Multiattribute Risk Function for Group Decision Making"; Multiperson Decision Making Models Using Fuzzy Sets and Probability Theory; Kacprzyk, Janusz and Fedrizzi, Mario, editors; Kluwer Academic Publishers; Dordrecht; 1990; 198-218; #3171.

[Seo, Tae Kun]; Deb, Rajat; Ghosh, Indranil K.; "Welfare Asymptotics of the Pivotal Mechanism for Excludable Public Goods"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 43, No. 2; March, 2002; 209-224; #4039.

[Seo, Tae Kun]; Deb, Rajat; "Rothschild and Stiglitz's Mean Preserving: Revisited";Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 659-668; #5520.

Serafini, Paolo; Simeone, Bruno; "Certificates of Optimality: the Third Way to Biproportional Apportionment"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 2; February, 2012; 247-268; #5542.

Serizawa, Shigehiro; "Power of Voters and Domain of Preferences Where Voting by Committees Is Strategy-Proof"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 67, No. 2; December, 1995; 599-608; #2659.

Serizawa, Shigehiro; "An Impossibility Theorem in Pure Public Goods Economies with Feasibility Constraints: Voting by Committees in Non-rectangular Feasible Sets"; Japanese Economic Review; Vol. 47, No. 4; December, 1996; 368-383; #2656.

Serizawa, Shigehiro; "Strategy-Proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies"; Economic Theory; Vol. 7, No. 3; April, 1996; 501-512; #2658. [See corrigendum:Economic Theory; Vol. 9, No. 2; February, 1997; 379-380]

[Serizawa, Shigehiro]; Ching, Stephen; "A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 78, No. 1 January, 1998; 157-166; #3335.

[Serizawa, Shigehiro]; Barberà, Salvador; Massò, Jorgi; "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 25, No. 2; November, 1998; 272-291; #3479.

Serizawa, Shigehiro; "Inefficiency of Strategy-proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies";Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 106, No. 2; October, 2002; 219-241; #4037.

Serizawa, Shigehiro; Weymark, John A.; “Efficient Strategy-Proof Exchange and Minimum Consumption Guarantees”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 109, No. 2; April, 2003; 246-263; #4413.

Serizawa, Shigehiro; “Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation”;Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 2; April, 2006; 305-331; #4480.

[Serizawa, Shigehiro]; Mizobuchi, Hideyuki; “Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 1; August, 2006; 195-210; #4518.

[Serizawa, Shigehiro]; Hatsumi, Kentaro; "Coalitionally Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies with Homogeneous Indivisible Goods"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 3; September, 2009; 423-447; #5160.

[Serizawa, Shigehiro]; Takagi, Shohei; "An Impossibility Theorem for Matching Problems"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 2; July, 2010; 245-266; #5230.

[Serizawa, Shigehiro]; Ashlagi, Itai; "Characterizing Vickrey Allocation Rule by Anonymity"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 3; March, 2012; 531-542; #5556.

Serrano, Roberto;Vohra, Rajiv; "Non-cooperative Implementation of the Core"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 4; October, 1997; 513-525; #2772.

Serrano, Roberto; “The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules”; SIAM Review; Vol. 46, No. 3; 2004; 377-414; [electronic]; #4366.

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv; “A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 50, No. 2; 2005; 312-331; #4673.

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Raji; “Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 134, No. 1; 2007; 117-137; #4717.

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv; "Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: a Unified Approach to Exact and Approximate Implementation"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 46, No. 5; 2010; 775-785; #5448.

[Serrano, Roberto]; Kunimoto, Takashi; "A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 146, No. 6; 2011; 2583-2595; #5714.

Sertel, Murat R.;Van der Bellen, Alexander; "Synopses in the Theory of Choice"; Econometrica; Vol. 47, No. 6; November, 1979; 1367-1390; #1352.

Sertel, Murat R.; Van der Bellen, Alexander; "Routes and Paths of Comparison and Choice";Public Choice; Vol. 35, Issue 2; 1980; 205-218; #1353.

Sertel, Murat R.; Van der Bellen, Alexander; "On the Routewise Application of Choice"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 22, No. 3; June, 1980; 423-438; #2843.

Sertel, Murat R.; "Explorations in Aggregating Choices"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 14, No. 3; December, 1987; 251-262; #1886.

Sertel, Murat R.; "Characterizing Fidelity for Reflexive Choices"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 15, No. 1; February, 1988; 93-95; #3218.

Sertel, Murat R.; "A Non-Dictatorial Compromise";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5, No. 1; March, 1988; 19-29; #1940.

Sertel, Murat R.; "Characterizing Approval Voting"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 45, No. 1; June, 1988; 207-211; #2047.

Sertel, Murat R.; "Choice, Hull, Continuity and Fidelity"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 16, No. 2; October, 1988; 203-206; #2072.

Sertel, Murat R.; Yilmaz, Bilge; "The Majoritarian Compromise Is Majoritarian-optimal and Subgame-perfect Implementable"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 4; August, 1999; 615-627; #3577.

Sertel, Murat R.; Sanver, M. Remzi; "Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games Are the Generalized Condorcet Winners"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 2; April, 2004; 331-347; #4215.

[**Sertel, Murat R.**]; Kara, Ayça E. Giritligil; “Does Majoritarian Approval Matter in Selecting a Social Choice Rule? An Exploratory Panel Study”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, No. 1; October, 2005; 43-73; #4444.

[**Sertel, Murat R.**]; Kibris, Özgür; “Bargaining over a Finite Set of Alternatives”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 3; April, 2007; 421-437; #4573.

Sertel, Murat; Slinko, Arkadii; “Ranking Committees, Income Streams or Multisets”;Economic Theory; Vol. 30, No. 2; 2007; 265-287; #4839. [Erratum, p. 289]

Seth, Arvind; "Voting Power and Component Importance"; Game Theory and Economic Applications; Edited by B. Dutta, D. Mookherjee, T. Parthasarathy, T. E. S. Raghavan, D. Ray and S. Tijs; Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems; Springer; Berlin; 1992; 189-204; #3553.

[Sethi, Rajiv]; Koçkesen, Levent; Ok, Efe A.; "Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 31, No. 2; May, 2000; 303-310; #3711.

[Sethi, Rajiv]; Koçkesen, Levent; Ok, Efe A.; "The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 92, No. 2; June, 2000; 274-299; #3712.

Sethuraman, Jay; Teo, Chung-Piaw; Vohra, Rakesh V.; “Integer Programming and Arrovian Social Welfare Functions”; Mathematics of Operations Research; Vol. 28, No. 2; 2003; 309-326; #4367.

Sethuraman, Jay; Teo, Chung-Piaw; Vohra, Rakesh V.; “Anonymous Monotonic Social Welfare Functions”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 128, No. 1; 2006; 232-254; #4861.

[Settepanella, Simona]; Amendola, Gennaro; "Optimality in Social Choice"; Journal of Mathematical Sociology; Vol. 36, No. 1; 2012; 44-77; #5708.

Seurot, François; "La théories de la négociation"; Jeux, information et groupes; edited by Heinz, Schleicher; Éditions Économica; Paris; 1979; 218-247; #3227.

Shachar, Ron; "Party Loyalty as Habit Formation"; Journal of Applied Econometrics; Vol. 18, Issue 3; May/June, 2003; 251-269; #4093.

Shapiro, Ian; "Review of: The Idea of Justice [Sen]"; Journal of Economic Literature; Vol. 49, No. 4; December, 2011; 1251-1263; #5635.

Shelah, Saharon; “On the Arrow Property”; Advances in Applied Mathematics; Vol. 34, No. 2; 2005; 217-251; #4368.

[Shalev, Jonathan]; Granot, Daniel; Maschler, Michael; "Unanimity in Voting for Voters"; International Game Theory Review; Vol. 2, No. 23; 2000; 117-127; #3919.

[Shalev, Jonathan]; Barberà, Salvador; Maschler, Michael; "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 37, No. 1; October, 2001; 40-78; #3960.

[Shalev, Jonathan]; Granot, Daniel; Maschler, Michael; "Voting for Voters: The Unanimity Case"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 31, No. 2; January, 2003; 155-202; #4115.

[Shamis, Elena];Chebotarev, Pavel Yu.; "Constructing an Objective Function for Aggregating Incomplete Preferences"; Constructing Scalar-valued Objective Functions; Springer; Berlin; 1997; 100-124; #3219.

[Shamis, Elena]; Chebotarev, Pavel Yu.; "Characterizations of Scoring Methods for Preference Aggregation"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 80; 1998; 299-332; #3685.

Shapiro, Perry; "Aggregation and the Existence of a Social Utility Function"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 16, No. 2; December, 1977; 475-480; #92.

Shapley, Lloyd S.;Shubik, Martin; "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 48, No. 3; September, 1954; 787-792; #1181.

[**Shapley, Lloyd S.**];Riker, William H.; "Weighted Voting: A Mathematical Analysis for Instrumental Judgement"; Representation: Nomos X; edited by James Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman; New York; Atherton Press; 1968; 199-216; #1182.

[**Shapley, Lloyd S.**]; Dubey, Pradeep; "Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index"; Mathematics of Operations Research; Vol. 4, No. 2; May, 1979; 99-131; #1330.

[Sharrard, George];DeMaio, Gerald; Muzzio, Douglas; "Approval Voting: The Empirical Evidence"; American Politics Quarterly; Vol. 11, No. 3; July, 1983; 365-374; #1678.

Shasha, Dennis; "Minority Rules"; The Puzzling Adventures of Dr. Ecco; New York; W. H. Freeman; 1988; 13-18; #2135.

[Shavell, Steven]; Kaplow, Louis; "Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle"; Journal of Political Economy ; Vol. 109, No. 2; April, 2001; 281-286; #3805. [See comment by Fleurbaey, Tungodden, and Changand reply by Kaplow and Shavell]

[Shavell, Steven]; Kaplow, Louis; Fairness vs. Welfare; Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press; 2002; #4237.

[Shavell, Steven]; Kaplow, Louis; “Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice” Journal of Legal Studies; Vol. 32, No. 1; January, 2003; 331-362; #4420.

[Shavell, Steven]; Kaplow, Louis; "Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: Reply"; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 112, No. 1; February, 2004; 249-251; [Reply to comment by Fleurbaey, Tungodden, and Chang on paper by Kaplow and Shavell]; #4155.

Shayo, Moses; Harel, Alon; "Non-consequentialist Voting"; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Vol. 81, No. 1; January, 2012; 299-313; #5623.

Shekhar, Shashi; Wu, Weili; "Optimal Placement of Data Replicas in Distributed Database with Majority Voting Protocol"; Theoretical Computer Science; Vol. 258, Nos. 1-2; May, 2001; 555-571; #3901.

Shelah, Saharon; “On the Arrow Property”; Advances in Applied Mathematics; Vol. 34, No. 2; 2005; 217-251; #4674.

Shelah, Saharon; "What Majority Decisions Are Possible"; Discrete Mathematics; Vol. 309, No. 8; 2009; 2349-2364; #5319.

Shelley, Fred M.; "Notes on Ostrogorski's Paradox"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 17, No. 3; November, 1984; 267-273; #404.

Shelley, Fred M.; "Voting Power in a System of Compound Majority Rule"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 9, No. 3; June, 1985; 287-291; #787.

[Shen, Qi]; Bordurtha, James N. (Jr); "Normally Distributed Admissible Choices are Optimal"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 73-83; #5010.

Shenoy, Prakash P.; "The Banzhaf Power Index for Political Games"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 2, No. 3; April, 1982; 299-315; #1517.

Shepardson, Dylan; Tovey, Craig A.; "Smallest Tournaments Not Realizable by 2/3-majority Voting"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 3; September, 2009; 495-503; #5163.

Shepp, Larry; "Updating Hardy, Littlewood and Pólya with Linear Programming"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 403-420; #5030.

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "A Note on Zeckhauser's 'Majority Rule With Lotteries on Alternatives': The Case of the Paradox of Voting";Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 84, No. 4; November, 1970; 705-709; #1191.

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 66, No. 2; June, 1972; 555-568; #1053.

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "The Paradox of Voting and Uncertainty"; Probability Models of Collective Decision Making; edited by Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg; Columbus, Ohio; Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company; 1972; 252-272; #1370.

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "Parties, Voters and the Risk Environment: A Mathematical Treatment of Electoral Competition Under Uncertainty"; Probability Models of Collective Decision Making; edited by Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg; Columbus, Ohio; Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company; 1972; 273-297; #1371.

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models"; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 23, No. 1; February, 1979; 27-59; #1042.

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "The Role of Institutional Structure in the Creation of Policy Equilibrium"; Public Policy and Public Choice; edited by Douglas W. Rae and Thomas J. Eismeier; Beverly Hills; Sage; 1979; 249-281; #76.

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; Weingast, Barry R.; "Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice"; Public Choice; Vol. 37, No. 3; 1981; 221-237; #89.

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; Weingast, Barry R.; "Institutionalized Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory With Policy Implications"; American Economic Review; Vol. 72, No. 2; May, 1982; 367-371; #297.

[**Shepsle, Kenneth A.**];Fiorina, Morris P.; "Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics"; Political Equilibrium; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle; Boston; Kluwer-Nijhoff; 1982; 49-64; #1355.

[**Shepsle, Kenneth A.**]; Ordeshook, Peter C.; editors, Political Equilibrium; Boston; Kluwer-Nijhoff; 1982; #411.

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; Weingast, Barry R.; "Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes With Implications for Agenda Institutions"; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 28, No. 1; February, 1984; 49-74; #328.

[**Shepsle, Kenneth A.**]; Denzau, Arthur T.; Riker, William H.; "Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style";American Political Science Review; Vol. 79, No. 4; December, 1985; 1117-1134; #795.

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "The Positive Theory of Legislative Institutions: An Enrichment of Social Choice and Spatial Models"; Public Choice; Vol. 50, Nos. 1-3; 1986; 135-178; #1408.

[**Shepsle, Kenneth A.**]; Greenberg, Joseph; "The Effect of Electoral Rewards in Multiparty Competition with Entry"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 81, No. 2; June, 1987; 525-537; #1629.

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "Review of Thomas Schwartz'sThe Logic of Collective Choice"; Economics and Philosophy; Vol. 4, No. 1; April, 1988; 183-188; #2016.

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; Cohen, Ronald N.; "Multiparty Competition, Entry, and Entry Deterrence in Spatial Models of Elections"; Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting; edited by James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1990; 12-45; #2803.

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; "Losers in Politics (and How They Sometimes Become Winners): William Riker's Heresthetic"; Perspectives in Politics; Vol. 1, No. 2; June, 2003; 307-315; #4136.

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; Weingast, Barry R.; "Why So Much Stability? Majority Voting, Legislative Institutions, and Gordon Tullock"; Public Choice; Vol. 152, No. 1-2; July, 2012; 83-95; #5581.

Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing; "Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-bidding in Contests?"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 2; July, 2010; 175-197; #5227.

Sheridan, T. B.;Sicherman, A.; "Estimation of a Group's Multiattribute Utility Function in Real Time by Anonymous Voting"; IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics; Vol. 7, No. 5; May, 1977; 392-394; #1809.

[Sherstyuk, Katerina]; Dellis, Arnaud; D'Evelyn, Sean; "Multiple Votes, Ballot Truncation and the Two-party System: an Experiment"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 2; July, 2011; 171-200; #5495.

Sheshinski, Eytan; "Relation Between a Social Welfare Function and the Gini Index of Income Inequality"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 4, No. 1; February, 1972; 98-100; #1248.

[**Shields, Deborah J.**]; Martin, Wade E.; Tolwinski, Boleslaw; Kent, Brian; "An Application of Social Choice Theory to U.S.D.A. Forest Service Decision Making"; Journal of Policy Modeling; Vol. 18, No. 6; December, 1996; 603-621; #3386.

Shikano, Susumu; Mack, Verena; "When Does the Second-Digit Benford's Law-Test Signal an Election Fraud? Facts or Misleading Test Results"; Jahrbucher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik; Vol. 231, No. 5-6; November, 2011; 719-732; #5644.

[Shimoji, Masaki]; Sakai, Toyotaka; “Dichotomous Preferences and the Possibility of Arrovian Social Choice”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 3; June, 2006; 435-445; #4500.

Shimomura, Ken-Ichi; "Partially Efficient Voting by Committees"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 3; June, 1996; 327-342; #2756.

[Shin, Sungwhee]; Suh, Sang-Chul; "Strategy-proofness and Efficiency in a Simple Production Economy"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 3; May, 2000; 523-532; #3628.

Shinohara, Ryusuke; "The Possibility of Efficient Provision of a Public Good in Voluntary Participation Games"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 32, No. 3; March, 2009; 367-387; #4987.

Shinotsuka, Tomoichi; "Equity, Continuity, and Myopia: A Generalization of Diamond's Impossibility Theorem"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 1; January, 1998; 21-30; #3187.

Shinotsuka, Tomoichi; Takamiya, Koji; “The Weak Core of Simple Games with Ordinal Preferences: Implementation in Nash Equilibrium”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 44, No. 2; August, 2003; 379-389; #4429.

[Shinotsuka, Tomoichi]; Hara, Chiaki; Suzumura, Kotaro; Xu, Yongsheng; "Continuity and Egalitarianism in the Evaluation of Infinite Utility Streams"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 2; August, 2008; 179-191; #4938.

Shishido, Harunor; Zeng, Dao-Zhi; "Mark-Choose-Cut Algorithms For Fair And Strongly Fair Division"; Group Decision and Negotiation; Vol. 8, Issue 2; March, 1999; 125-137; #3458.

[Shitovitz, Benjamin];Greenberg, Joseph; "Consistent Voting Rules for Competitive Local Public Goods Economies"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 46, No. 2; December, 1988; 223-236; #2081.

Shogren, J. F.; "On Increased Risk and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 3; July, 1990; 221-229; #2328.

Sholomov, Lev A.; "Estimation of the Complexity Characteristics of a Mechanism for Choice With Participation of Several Persons"; Soviet Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences; Vol. 23, No. 3; May-June, 1985; 68-78; #846.

Sholomov, Lev A.; "Explicit Form of Neutral Social Decision Rules for Basic Rationality Conditions"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 39, No. 1; January, 2000; 81-107; #3823.

[**Shorrocks, Anthony F.**];Foster, James E.; "Poverty Orderings"; Econometrica; Vol. 56, No. 1; January, 1988; 173-177; #3110.

[**Shorrocks, Anthony F.**]; Foster, James E.; "Inequality and Poverty Orderings"; European Economic Review; Vol. 32, Nos. 2-3; March, 1988; 654-661; #3111.

[**Shorrocks, Anthony F.**]; Foster, James E.; "Poverty Orderings and Welfare Dominance"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5, Nos. 2/3; August, 1988; 179-198; #2005.

[**Shotts, Kenneth W.**]; Meirowitz, Adam; "Pivots versus Signals in Elections"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 144, No. 2; March, 2009; 744-771; #5081.

[Shubik, Martin];Shapley, Lloyd S.; "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 48, No. 3; September, 1954; 787-792; #1181x.

Shubik, Martin; "A Two Party System, General Equilibrium and the Voter's Paradox"; Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie; Vol. 28; December, 1968; 341-354; #1249.

Shubik, Martin; "Voting, or a Price System in a Competitive Market Structure"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 64, No. 1; March, 1970; 179-181; #1250.

Shubik, Martin; "Comment on Ordeshook"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 65, No. 4; December, 1971; 1146; #1231. [Comment on paper by Ordeshook; see rejoinder by Ordeshook]

Shubik, Martin; Young, Hobart Peyton; Game Theory and Political Science; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook; New York; New York University Press; 1978; 511-527; #1757.

Shuchat, Alan; Shull, Randy; Trenk, Ann N.; "Fractional Weak Discrepancy of Posets and Certain Forbidden Configurations"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 291-301; #5021.

[Shugart, Matthew Soberg];Taagepera, Rein; "Predicting the Number of Parties: A Quantitative Model of Duverger's Mechanical Effect"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 87, No. 2; June, 1993; 455-464; #2895.

Shugart, Matthew Soberg; Taagepera, Rein; "Plurality Versus Majority Election of Presidents: A Proposal for a 'Double Complement Rule' "; Comparative Political Studies; Vol. 27, No. 3; October, 1994; 323-348; #2915.

[Shugart, Matthew Soberg]; Cox, Gary W.; "Strategic Voting Under Proportional Representation"; Journal of Law, Economics & Organization; Vol. 12, No. 2; October, 1996; 299-324; #3095.

[**Shughart, William F., II.**]; Reksulak, Michael; "What Should Government Do? Problems of Social Cost, Externalities and All That"; Public Choice; Vol. 152, No. 1-2; July, 2012; 103-114; #5583.

[Shull, Randy]; Shuchat, Alan; Trenk, Ann N.; "Fractional Weak Discrepancy of Posets and Certain Forbidden Configurations"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 291-301; #5021.

Sichelstiel, Gerhard;Söllner, Fritz; "Finite Sensibility and Utility Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 1; January, 1996; 25-41; #2762.

[**Sicherman, A.**];Sheridan, T. B.; "Estimation of a Group's Multiattribute Utility Function in Real Time by Anonymous Voting"; IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics; Vol. 7, No. 5; May, 1977; 392-394; #1809.

Sieg, Gernot; Schulz, Christof; "Evolutionary Dynamics in the Voting Game"; Public Choice; Vol. 85, No. 1-2; October, 1995; 157-172; #3371.

[Sieg, Holger]; Epple, Dennis; Romer, Thomas; "Interjurisdictional Sorting and Majority Rule: An Empirical Analysis"; Econometrica; Vol. 69, No. 6; November, 2001; 1437-1465; #3957.

[**Silva, José A.**]; Alcalde, José; Marco, María del Carmen; "The Minimal Overlap Rule Revisited"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 1; June, 2008; 109-128; #4933.

[Silver, Nate]; Gelman, Andrew; Edlin, Aaron; "What Is the Probability Your Vote Will Make a Difference?"; Economic Inquiry; Vol. 50, No. 2; April, 2012; 321-326; #5605.

Silverstein, Helena; "Review of The Proliferation of Rights: Moral Progress or Empty Rhetoric?"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 93, No. 4; December, 1999; 965-966; #3597. [Review of book by Wellman]

Silvestre, Joaquim "Progress and Conservation under Rawls's Maximin Principle"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 1; January, 2002; 1-27; #3890.

[Silvestre, Joaquim]; Llavador, Humberto; Roemer, John E.; "Intergenerational Justice When Future Worlds Are Uncertain"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 46, No. 5; 2010; 728-761; #5429.

[Simeone, Bruno]; Grilli di Cortona, Pietro; Manzi, Cecilia; Pennisi, Aline; Ricca, Federica; Evaluation and Optimization of Electoral Systems; SIAM; Philadelphia, PA; 1999; #3695.

[Simeone, Bruno]; Apollonio, N.; Becker, R. I.; Lari, I.; Ricca, Federica; "Bicolored Graph Partitioning Or: Gerrymandering at its Worst"; Discrete Applied Mathematics; Vol. 157, No. 17; 2009; 3601-3614; #5271.

[Simeone, Bruno]; Serafini, Paolo; "Certificates of Optimality: the Third Way to Biproportional Apportionment"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 2; February, 2012; 247-268; #5542.

[**Simmons, Forest W.**]; Heitzig, Jobst; "Some Chance for Consensus: Voting Methods for Which Consensus Is an Equilibrium"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 1; January, 2012; 43-57; #5530.

Simmons, Peter J.; "Where Did Prescriptive Welfare Economics Go Wrong? Discussion"; Contemporary Economic Analysis, Vol. 2; edited by David A. Currie and Will Peters; Croom Helm; London; 1980; 217-220; #3222. [discussion of paper by Mayston]

Simpson, Paul B.; "On Defining Areas of Voter Choice: Professor Tullock on Stable Voting";Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 83, No. 3; August, 1969; 478-490; #672. [Comment on paper by Tullock]

Simula, Laurent; "Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax and Nonlinear Pricing: Optimality Conditions and Comparative Static Properties"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 2; July, 2010; 199-220; #5228.

Singer, Eugene; "Extensions of the Classical Rule 'Divide and Choose' "; Southern Economic Journal; Vol. 28, No. 4; April, 1962; 391-394; #3409.

Sitarz, Sebastia; "Mean Value and Volume-based Sensitivity Analysis for Olympic Rankings"; European Journal of Operations Research; Vol. 216, No. 1; 232-238; #5712.

Sjöström, Tomas; "On the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 8, No. 4; October, 1991; 333-340; #2320.

Sjöström, Tomas; "Implementation in Perfect Equilibria"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 10, No. 1; January, 1993; 97-106; #2734.

Sjöström, Tomas; "Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Renegotiation"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 26, No. 2; February, 1999; 337-352; #3665.

[Sj�str�m, Tomas]; Maskin, Eric; “Implementation Theory”; In Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1; Edited by K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura; North-Holland; 2002; 237-288; #4396.

[Sjöström, Tomas]; Cason, Timothy N.; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Yamato, Takehiko; “Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work?”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 57, No. 2; 2006; 206-235; #4848.

Skala, Heinz J.; "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Some New Aspects"; Decision Theory and Social Ethics; edited by Hans W. Gottinger and Werner Leinfellner; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1978; 215-226; #1121.

[**Skarbek, David B.**]; Smith, Adam C.; Wilson, Bart J.; "Anarchy, Groups, and Conflict: an Experiment on the Emergence of Protective Associations"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 2; February, 2012; 325-353; #5545.

[Slavkovik, Marija]; Pigozzi, Gabriella; van der Torre, Leendert; "A Complete Conclusion-based Procedure for Judgment Aggregation"; Algorithmic decision theory; Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 5783; Springer, Berlin; 2009; 1-13; #5486.

[**Slavov, S. N.**]; Bernheim, B. Douglas; "A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 76, No. 1; January, 2009; 33-62; #5047.

[Slikker, Marco]; Borm, Peter; van den Brink, René; Levínsky, René; “On Two New Social Choice Correspondences”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 47, No. 1; 2004; 51-68; #4299.

Slikker, Marco; Borm, Peter; van den Brink, René; "Internal Slackening Scoring Methods"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 72, No. 4; April, 2012; 445-462; #5631.

Slinko, Arkadii "On Asymptotic Strategy-proofness of the Plurality and the Run-off Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 2; April, 2002; 313-324; #3871.

Slinko, Arkadii; "On Asymptotic Strategy-Proofness of Classical Social Choice Rules";Theory and Decision; Vol. 52, No. 4; June, 2002; 389-398; #4012.

Slinko, Arkadii; “How Large Should a Coalition Be to Manipulate an Election?”;Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 47, No. 3; 2004; 289-293; #4369.

Slinko, Arkadii; “How the Size of a Coalition Affects its Chances to Influence an Election”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 1; January, 2006; 143-153; #4487.

[Slinko, Arkadii]; Pritchard, Geoffrey; “On the Average Minimum Size of a Manipulating Coalition”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 2; October, 2006; 263-277; #4533.

[Slinko, Arkadii]; Sertel, Murat; “Ranking Committees, Income Streams or Multisets”;Economic Theory; Vol. 30, No. 2; 2007; 265-287; #4839. [Erratum, p. 289]

[Slinko, Arkadii]; Koray, Semih; "Self-selective Social Choice Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 1; June, 2008; 129-149; #4934.

[Slinko, Arkadii]; McCabe-Dansted, John C.; Pritchard, Geoffrey; "Approximability of Dodgson's Rule"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 2; August, 2008; 311-330; #4945.

Slinko, Arkadii; "Additive Representability of Finite Measurement Structures"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 113-133; #5012.

[Slinko, Arkadii]; Elkind, Edith; Faliszewski, Piotr; "Cloning in Elections: Finding the Possible Winners"; Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research; Vol. 42; 2011; 529-573; #5717.

Slivinski, A.; "Bergson Social Welfare Functions in Applied Welfare Analysis"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 4, No. 4; December, 1987; 241-251; #855.

[**Sloane, N. J. A.**]; Applegate, David; LeBrun, Marc; "Descending Dungeons and Iterated Base-Changing"; The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn; Edited by Steven Brams, William V. Gehrlein, and Fred S. Roberts; Springer; Berlin; 2009; 393-402; #5029.

Sloof, Randolph; "Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator's Vote: A Comment"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 3; July, 1997; 449-464; #2538.

Sloss, Judith; "Stable Outcomes in Majority Rule Voting Games"; Public Choice; Vol. 15; Summer, 1973; 19-48; #1222.

[Slotznick, Benjamin];Laing, James D.; Nakabayashi, Sampei; "Winners, Blockers and the Status Quo: Simple Collective Decision Games and the Core"; Public Choice; Vol. 40, No. 3; 1983; 263-279; #250.

[Slotznik, Benjamin]; Laing, James D.; "When Anyone Can Veto: a Laboratory Study of Committees Governed by Unanimous Rule"; Behavioral Science; Vol. 36, No. 3; July, 1991; 179-195; #2996.

Slutzki, Giora; Volij, Oscar; “Scoring of Web Pages and Tournaments -- Axiomatizations”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 1; January, 2006; 75-92; #4491.

Slutsky, Steven M.; "Abstentions and Majority Equilibrium"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 11, No. 2; October, 1975; 292-304; #1354.

Slutsky, Steven M.; "A Voting Model for the Allocation of Public Goods: Existence of an Equilibrium"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 14, No. 2; April, 1977; 299-325; #2348.

Slutsky, Steven M.; "A Characterisation of Societies with Consistent Majority Decision"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 44(2), No. 137; June, 1977; 211-225; #914.

Slutsky, Steven M.; "Equilibrium Under α-Majority Voting"; Econometrica; Vol. 47, No. 5; September, 1979; 1113-1125; #1028.

Slutsky, Steven M.; "Elections with Incomplete Information: A Comment on the Papers of Coughlin and Ferejohn"; Public Choice; Vol. 50, Nos. 1-3; 1986; 105-129; #2894. [comment on paper by Coughlin and paper by Ferejohn; see response by Coughlin]

[Smaoui, Hatem]; Lepelley, Dominique; Louichi, Ahmed; “On Ehrhart Polynomials and Probability Calculations in Voting Theory”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 3; April, 2008; 363-383; #4907.

[Smaoui, Hatem]; Diss, Mostapha; Louichi, Ahmed; Merlin, Vincent; "An Example of Probability Computations under the IAC Assumption: The Stability of Scoring Rules";Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 64, No. 1; July, 2012; 57-66; #5591.

[Smart, Michael]; Gans, Joshua S.; "Majority Voting with Single-Crossing Preferences";Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 59, No. 2; February, 1996; 219-237; #4068.

Smith, Adam C.; Skarbek, David B.; Wilson, Bart J.; "Anarchy, Groups, and Conflict: an Experiment on the Emergence of Protective Associations"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 2; February, 2012; 325-353; #5545.

Smith, David A.; "Manipulability Measures of Common Social Choice Functions";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 4; August, 1999; 639-661; #3579.

Smith, John H.; "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate"; Econometrica; Vol. 41, No. 6; November, 1973; 1027-1041; #673.

Smith, Joseph Wayne; "Tal Scriven on Preference, Rational Choice and Arrow's Theorem"; International Logic Review; No. 27; June, 1983; 51-55; #189.

[Smith, Stefani Cheri]; Conley, John P.; "Finite Decentralization in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 1; February, 2003; 49-75; #3992.

Smith, Tony; "On the Existence of Most-Preferred Alternatives"; International Economic Review; Vol. 15, No. 1; February, 1974; 184-194; #674.

Smith, Trenton G.; “The McDonald’s Equilibrium: Advertising, Empty Calories, and the Endogenous Determination of Dietary Preferences”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 23, No. 3; December, 2004; 383-413; #4263.

Smith, Vernon L.; "The Possibility of Unanimity and Voluntary Consent in Social Choice";Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 85, No. 6; December, 1977; 1125-1139; #51.

Smith, Vernon L.; "Experimental Mechanisms for Public Choice"; Game Theory and Political Science; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook; New York; New York University Press; 1978; 323-355; #1751.

[Smith, W. James]; Beckman, Steven R.; Formby, John P.; Zheng, Buhong; "Envy, Malice and Pareto Efficiency: An Experimental Examination"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 2; April, 2002; 349-367; #3873.

Snarr, Hal W.; Edwards, Jeffrey A.; "Does Income Support Increase Abortions?";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 4; November, 2009; 575-599#5174.

[Snell, J. Laurie];Kemeny, John G.; Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences; Cambridge; MIT Press; 1962; [Chapter II: "Preference Rankings: An Axiomatic Approach"]; #1662.

Snider, G. A.; "Assessing the Candidate Preference Function"; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 23, No. 4; November, 1979; 732-754; #2049.

[**Snyder, James M., Jr.**]; Dougan, William R.; "Interest-Group Politics under Majority Rule"; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 61, No. 1 July, 1996; 49-71; #3339.

[Snyder, Josh]; Cariani, Fabrizio; Pauly, Marc; "Decision Framing in Judgement Aggregation"; Synthese; Vol. 163, No. 1; 2008; 1-24; #5091.

[Sobel, Joel]; Segal, Uzi; “Min, Max, and Sum”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 106, No. 1; September, 2002; 126-150; [“With applications to social choice theory”]; #4239.

Sobel, Jordan Howard;Taking Chances. Essays on Rational Choice; Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 1994; #2462.

[Söllner, Fritz];Sichelstiel, Gerhard; "Finite Sensibility and Utility Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 1; January, 1996; 25-41; #2762.

Sollogoub, Michel; "La théorie de la prise de décision collective en situation d'incertitude"; Jeux, information et groupes; edited by Heinz, Schleicher; Éditions Économica; Paris; 1979; 19-43; #3223.

[Sondermann, Dieter];Kirman, Alan P.; "Arrow's Theorem, Many Agents and Invisible Dictators"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 5, No. 2; October, 1972; 267-277; #575.

[Sone, Yasunori];Lijphart, Arend; Pintor, Rafael Lopez; "The Limited Vote and the Single Nontransferable Vote: Lessons from the Japanese and Spanish Examples"; Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences; edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart; New York; Agathon Press; 1986; 154-169; #2209.

[Sönmez, Tayfun]; Banerjee, Suryapratim; Konishi, Hideo; "Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 18, No. 1; January, 2001; 135-153; #3734.

[Sönmez, Tayfun]; Abdulkadiroǧlu, Atila; Ünver, M. Utku; "Room Assignment-rent Division: a Market Approach"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 3; June, 2004; 515-538; #4227.

Sönmez, Tayfun; Utku Ünver, M.; “House Allocation with Existing Tenants: An Equivalence”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 52, No. 1; 2005; 153-185; #4370.

Sonnenschein, Hugo F.; "Relationship Between Transitive Preferences and the Structure of the Choice Space"; Econometrica; Vol. 33, No. 3; July, 1965; 624-634; #675. [See comment by Lorimer and reply by Sonnenschein]

Sonnenschein, Hugo F.; "Reply to 'A Note on Orderings'"; Econometrica; Vol. 35, Nos. 3-4; July-October, 1967; 540-541; #676. [Reply to Lorimer comment on paper by Sonnenschein]

[**Sonnenschein, Hugo F.**];Mas-Colell, Andreu; "General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions";Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 39(2), No. 118; April, 1972; 185-192; #586.

[**Sonnenschein, Hugo F.**]; Barberà, Salvador; "Preference Aggregation with Randomized Social Orderings";Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 18, No. 2; August, 1978; 244-254; #8.

[**Sonnenschein, Hugo F.**]; Schmeidler, David; "Two Proofs of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the Possibility of a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Function"; Decision Theory and Social Ethics, Issues in Social Choice; edited by Hans W. Gottinger and Werner Leinfeller; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1978; 227-234; #656.

[**Sonnenschein, Hugo F.**]; Satterthwaite, Mark A.; "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points";Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 48, No. 4; October, 1981; 587-597; #3123.

[**Sonnenschein, Hugo F.**];Hurwicz, Leonid; Schmeidler, David; editors, Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1985; #1074.

[**Sonnenschein, Hugo F.**]; Barberà, Salvador; Zhou, Lin; "Voting by Committees"; Econometrica; Vol. 59, No. 3; May, 1991; 595-609; #2258.

[**Sonnenschein, Hugo F.**]; Jackson, Matthew O.; “Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions”; Econometrica; Vol. 75, No. 1; 2007; 241-257; #4838.

Sonstegaard, Miles H.; "A Shortcut Method of Calculating the Distribution of Election Outcome Types under Approval Voting"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 44, No. 3; June, 1998; 211-220; #3407.

[**Sonstelie, Jon C.**];Camacho, Antonio; "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utilities: A Note"; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 82, No. 3; May/June, 1974; 60-61; #469.

[**Sordo, Miguel A.**]; Ramos, Hector M.; Ollero, Jorge; "A Sufficient Condition for Generalized Lorenz Order"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 90, No. 2; February, 2000; 286-292; #3700.

[**S�rensen, Erik �.**]; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Hole, Astri Drange; Tungodden, Bertil; "The Importance of Moral Reflection and Self-reported Data in a Dictator Game with Production"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 36, No. 1; January, 2011; 105-120; #5394.

Sosnowska, H.; "A Note on Mezetti's 'Paretian Efficiency, Rawlsian Justice and the Nozick Theory of Rights' "; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 7, No. 3; July, 1990; 261-264; #2331. [Comment on paper by Mezzetti]

[**Sotskov, Alexander I.**];Danilov, Vladimir I.; "Stable Blocking in Mechanisms of Social Choice";Ekonomika i Matematicheski Metody; Vol. 23, No. 5; 1987; 888-898; #2058.

[**Sotskov, Alexander I.**]; Danilov, Vladimir I.; "Coalition-Stable Mechanisms of Group Choice"; Ekonomika i Matematicheski Metody; Vol. 24, No. 1; 1988; 113-124; #1969.

[**Sotskov, Alexander I.**]; Danilov, Vladimir I.; "Stable Blocking in Social Choice Mechanisms"; Matekon; Vol. 25, No. 1; Fall, 1988; 38-53; #2259.

[**Sotskov, Alexander I.**]; Danilov, Vladimir I.; "Coalition-Stable Social Choice Mechanisms"; Matekon; Vol. 25, No. 2; Winter, 1988-1989; 45-61; #2229.

[**Sotskov, Alexander I.**]; Danilov, Vladimir I.; "Implementation of Group Choice Correspondences by Coalitional Equilibria"; Matekon; Vol. 29, No. 1; Fall, 1992; 5-26; #2641.

[**Sotskov, Alexander I.**]; Danilov, Vladimir I.; "On Strongly Consistent Social Choice Functions"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 22, No. 4; 1993; 327-346; #2640.

Sotskov, Alexander I.; "Vetoing in Social Choice with Blockings"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 27, No. 2; April, 1994; 203-216; #2693.

[**Sotskov, Alexander I.**]; Danilov, Vladimir I.; Social Choice Mechanisms; Springer; Berlin; 2002; #4073. [See review by Campbell]

Soubeyran, Raphaël; "Contest with Attack and Defense: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voter Turnout?"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 32, No. 3; March, 2009; 337-353; #4985.

[**Sousa, A. O.**]; Lima, F. W. S.; Sumuor, M. A.; "Majority-vote on Directed Erdös-Rényi Random Graphs"; Physica A. Statistical Mechanics and its Applications; Vol. 387, No. 14; 2008; 3503-3510; #5272.

[**Spanier, E. H.**]; Dubins, Lester E.; "How to Cut a Cake Fairly"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 68, No. 1; January, 1961; 1-17; #3466.

Spiegler, Ran; “Argumentation in Multi-issue Debates”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 2; April, 2006; 385-402; #4483.

[Spillman, Bonnie];Bezdek, James C.; Spillman, Richard; "A Fuzzy Relation Space for Group Decision Theory"; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 1; 1978; 255-268; #1423.

Spillman, Bonnie; Spillman, Richard; Bezdek, James C.; "Development of an Instrument for the Dynamic Measurement of Consensus"; Communication Monographs; Vol. 46, No. 1; March, 1979; 1-12; #1816.

[Spillman, Bonnie];Bezdek, James C.; Spillman, Richard; "Fuzzy Relation Spaces for Group Decision Theory"; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 2; 1979; 5-14; #1424.

Spillman, Bonnie; Spillman, Richard; Bezdek, James C.; "A Study of Coalition Formation in Decision Making Groups: An Application of Fuzzy Mathematics"; Kybernetes; Vol. 8, No. 3; 1979; 203-211; #1815.

Spillman, Bonnie; Spillman, Richard;Bezdek, James C.; "Fuzzy Analysis of Consensus in Small Groups"; Fuzzy Sets; edited by Paul P. Wang and S. K. Chang; New York; Plenum; 1980; 291-308; #299.

[Spillman, Richard];Bezdek, James C.; Spillman, Bonnie; "A Fuzzy Relation Space for Group Decision Theory"; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 1; 1978; 255-268; #1423.

[Spillman, Richard];Spillman, Bonnie;Bezdek, James C.; "Development of an Instrument for the Dynamic Measurement of Consensus"; Communication Monographs; Vol. 46, No. 1; March, 1979; 1-12; #1816.

[Spillman, Richard]; Bezdek, James C.; Spillman, Bonnie; "Fuzzy Relation Spaces for Group Decision Theory"; Fuzzy Sets and Systems; Vol. 2; 1979; 5-14; #1424.

[Spillman, Richard];Spillman, Bonnie; Bezdek, James C.; "A Study of Coalition Formation in Decision Making Groups: An Application of Fuzzy Mathematics"; Kybernetes; Vol. 8, No. 3; 1979; 203-211; #1815.

[Spillman, Richard]; Spillman, Bonnie; Bezdek, James C.; "Fuzzy Analysis of Consensus in Small Groups"; Fuzzy Sets; edited by Paul P. Wang and S. K. Chang; New York; Plenum; 1980; 291-308; #299.

Spitz, Elaine;Majority Rule; Chatham House; Chatham, N.J.; 1983; #339.

[**Spoerhase, J.**]; Noltemeier, H.; Wirth, H.-C.; “Multiple Voting Location and Single Voting Location on Trees”; European Journal of Operations Research; Vol. 181, No. 2; 2007; 654-667; #4725.

[Sprenger, Jan]; Hartmann, Stephan; Pigozzi, Gabriella; "Reliable Methods of Judgement Aggregation"; Journal of Logic and Computation; Vol. 20, No. 2; 2010; 603-617; #5283.

Sprumont, Yves; "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule"; Econometrica; Vol. 59, No. 2; March, 1991; 509-519; #2590.

Sprumont, Yves; "Intermediate Preferences and Rawlsian Arbitration Rules"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 10, No. 1; January, 1993; 1-15; #2589.

Sprumont, Yves; "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments"; Canadian Journal of Economics; Vol. 28, No. 1; February, 1995; 68-107; #2588.

Sprumont, Yves; "A Note on Strategyproofness in Edgeworth-Box Economies"; Economics Letters; Vol. 49, No. 1; July 1995; 45-50; #2587.

Sprumont, Yves; "Axiomatizing Ordinal Welfare Egalitarianism When Preferences May Vary"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 68, No. 1; January, 1996; 77-110; #2586.

Sprumont, Yves; "Equal Factor Equivalence in Economies with Multiple Public Goods"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 4; August, 1998; 543-558; #3291.

Sprumont, Yves; Zhou, Lin; "Pazner-Schmeidler Rules in Large Societies"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 31, No. 3; April, 1999; 321-339; #3827.

Sprumont, Yves; "On the Testable Implications of Collective Choice Theories";Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 93, No. 2; August, 2000; 205-232; #3970.

[Sprumont, Yves]; Bossert, Walter; “Efficient and Non-deteriorating Choice”;Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 45, No. 2; 2003; 131-142; #4300.

[Sprumont, Yves]; Maniquet, François; “Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-rival Environments”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 120, No. 2; 2005; 155-174; #4339.

[Sprumont, Yves]; Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro; “Maximal-element Rationalizability”; Theory and Decision; Vol. 58, No. 4; 2005; 325-350; #4655.

[Sprumont, Yves]; Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro; “Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains Without Full Transitivity”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 3; December, 2006; 435-458; #4552.

[Sprumont, Yves]; Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro; “Ordering Infinite Utility Streams”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 135, No. 1; July, 2007; 579-589; #4886.

[Sprumont, Yves]; Maniquet, François; "Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: An Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 68, No. 1; January, 2010; 275-302; #5377.

[Squintani, Francesco]; Doraszelski, Ulrich; Gerardi, Dino; “Communication and Voting with Double-sided Information”; Contributions to Theoretical Economics; Vol. 3, Art. 6; 2003; 41 pp.; [electronic]; #4314.

[Squintani, Francesco]; Bernhardt, Dan; Duggan, John; “Electoral Competition with Privately-informed Candidates”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 58, No. 1; 2007; 1-29; #4730.

[Squintani, Francesco]; Bernhardt, Dan; Campuzano, Larissa; Câmara, Odilon; "On the Benefits of Party Competition"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 66, No. 2; 2009; 685-707; #5198.

[Srivastava, Sanjay];Palfrey, Thomas R.; "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies"; Econometrica; Vol. 59, No. 2; March, 1991; 479-501; #2501.

[Srivastava, Sanjay]; Herrero, Maria Jose; "Implementation via Backward Induction"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 56, No. 1; February, 1992; 70-88; #2643.

[Srivastava, Sanjay]; Jackson, Matthew O.; "On Two-Person Nash Implementable Choice Functions"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 9, No. 3; July, 1992; 263-264; #2748.

[Srivastava, Sanjay]; Jackson, Matthew O.; "A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions Which Lead to Impossibility Theorems"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 63, No. 1; January, 1996; 23-38; #2687.

Srivastava, Sanjay; Trick, Michael A.; "Sophisticated Voting Rules: The Case of Two Tournaments";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 3; June, 1996; 275-289; #2752.

[Stacchetti, Ennio];Barberà, Salvador; Gul, Faruk; "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 61, No. 2; December, 1993; 262-289; #2678.

Stadelmann, David; Portmann, Marco; Eichenberger, Reiner; "Evaluating the Median Voter Model's Explanatory Power"; Economics Letters; Vol. 114, No. 3; March, 2012; 312-314;#5612.

Stadler, Bärbel M. R.; "Abstention in Dynamical Models of Spatial Voting"; Physica A. Statistical and Theoretical Physics; Vol. 287, No. 3/4; December, 2000; 660-668; #3929.

Stadler, Bärbel M. R.; "Abstention Causes Bifurcations in Two-Party Voting Dynamics"; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Vol. 114, No. 2/3; September, 2000; 215-232; #3933. [Extends results in paper by Miller and Stadler]

[**Stadler, P. F.**]; Miller, J. H.; "The dynamics of Locally Adaptive Parties under Spatial Voting; Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; Vol. 23, No. 2; 1998; 171-189; #3934. [Results here are extended in paper by Stadler]

[Stafford, Elizabeth Ann];Downing, Paul B.; "Citations as an Indicator of Classic Works and Major Contributors in Social Choice"; Public Choice; Vol. 37, No. 2; 1981; 219-230; #161.

[Stanca, Luca]; Basu, Kaushik; Becchetti, Leonardo; "Experiments with the Traveler's Dilemma: Welfare, Strategic Choice and Implicit Collusion"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 575-595; #5514.

Starmer, Chris; "Explaining Risky Choices Without Assuming Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 2; April, 1996; 201-213; #3178.

[**Starr, Ross M.**];Goldman, Steven; "Pairwise, t-wise and Pareto Optimalities"; Econometrica; Vol. 50, No. 3; May, 1982; 593-606; #150.

[**Starr, Ross M.**]; Heller, Walter P.; Starrett, David A., editors, Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Vol. 1 Social Choice and Public Decision-Making; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1986; #1026.

[**Starrett, David A.**];Heller, Walter P.; Starr, Ross M.; editors, Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Vol. 1 Social Choice and Public Decision-Making; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1986; #1026.

Stearns, Maxwell L.; "The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice"; Yale Law Journal; Vol. 103, No. 5; March, 1994; 1219-1293; #2622.

Stearns, Maxwell L.; "Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence"; University of Pennsylvania Law Review;Vol. 144, No. 2; December, 1995; 309-463; #3126.

Stearns, Maxwell L.; "Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice"; California Law Review; Vol. 83, No. 6; December, 1995; 1309-1413; #3127.

Stearns, Maxwell L.; "How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue Identification: a Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others";Vanderbilt Law Review; Vol. 49, No. 4; May, 1996; 1045-1067; #3125.

Stearns, Richard; "The Voting Problem"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 66, No. 9; November, 1959; 761-763; #677.

Stecher, Jack Douglas; “Existence of Approximate Social Welfare”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 1; January, 2008; 43-56; #4691.

Steedman, Ian;Krause, Ulrich; "Goethe's Faust, Arrow's Possibility Theorem and the Individual Decision Maker"; The Multiple Self; edited by Jon Elster; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1986; 197-231; #899.

Stefanescu, Anton; "Impossibility Results for Choice Correspondences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 33, No. 2; April, 1997; 129-148; #3348.

Stefanescu, Anton; “Double Implementation of Voting Operators”; Roumanian Review of Pure and Applied Mathematics; Vol. 49, No. 1; 2004; 79-87; #4371.

Stefanescu, Anton; Ferrara, Massimiliano; “Implementation of Voting Operators”;Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 42, No. 3; 2006; 315-324; #4863.

[Steffen, Frank]; Holler, Manfred J.; Ono, Rie; "Constrained Monotonicity and the Measurement of Power"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 50, No. 4; May, 2001; 385-397; #3903.

[Steffen, Frank]; Braham, Matthew; “The Chairman's Paradox Revisited”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 28, No. 2; February, 2007; 231-253; #4570.

Stehling, Frank; "Indices of Preference Inequality and the Construction of Social Preference Relations"; in Theory and Applications of Economic Indices; (Proc. Internat. Sympos., Univ. Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe, 1976); Physica-Verlag; Würzburg; 1978; 535-561; #2485.

[Steinel, Wolfgang]; De Dreu, Carsten K. W.; “Social Decision Making in Fuzzy Situations: Motivated Information Processing and Strategic Choice”; In Social Psychology and Economics, edited by De Cremer, David; Zeelenberg, Marcel; Murnighan, J. Keith; Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; Mahwah, N.J.; 2006; 55-77; #4890.

Steiner, Hans-Georg; "Nonmeasurable Voting Bodies: A Characterization of Measurability"; International Journal of Mathematical Education in Science and Technology; Vol. 17, No. 3; May-June, 1986; 367-376; #880.

Steiner, Hans-Georg; "Mathematics of Electoral Systems: Some Classroom Experiments"; Archimede; Vol. 38, Nos. 2-3; 1986; 95-111; #1693.

Steiner, Hillel; "Putting Rights in Their Place"; Recherches Économiques de Louvain; Vol. 54, No. 3-4; 1990; 391-408; #2271.

Steiner, Hillel; An Essay on Rights; Oxford; Blackwell; 1994; #2992. [see review by Gaertner and review by Hamlin]

Steinhaus, Hugo; "The Problem of Fair Division"; Econometrica; Vol. 16, No. 1; January, 1948; 101-104; #2858.

Steinhaus, Hugo; "Sur la division pragmatique";Econometrica; Vol. 17, Supplement; July, 1949; 315-319; #2859.

[Stengle, Gilbert]; Baryshnikov, Yuliy M.; Eisenberg, Bennett; "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for the Existence of the Limiting Probability of a Tie for First Place"; Statistics & Probability Letters; Vol. 23, No. 3; 15 May 1995; 203-209; #3550.

Stensholt, Eivind; "Circle Pictograms for Vote Vectors"; SIAM Review; Vol. 38, No. 1; March, 1996; 96-119; #2458.

Stensholt, Eivind; "Beta Distributions in a Simplex and Impartial Anonymous Cultures"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 37, No. 1; January, 1999; 45-57; #3655.

Stensholt, Eivind; “Single Transferable Votes with Tax Cuts”; SIAM Review; Vol. 46, No. 3; 2004; 417-442; [electronic]; #4372.

Stensholt, Eivind; "Voces Populi and the Art of Listening"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 35, No. 2; July, 2010; 291-317; #5233.

Sterba, James P.; "In Defense of Rawls Against Arrow and Nozick"; Philosophia; Vol. 7, No. 2; June, 1978; 293-303; #1338. [Comment on paper by Arrow and book by Nozick]

Stevens, Dana N.; "A Very Unsubtle Version of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: A Subtle Comment";Economic Inquiry; Vol. 14, No. 2; June, 1976; 297-299; #678. [Comment on paper by Feldman]

Stevens, Dana N.; Foster, James E.; "The Possibility of Democratic Pluralism"; Economica; Vol. 45, No. 180; November, 1978; 401-406; #369.

[**Stevens, Dana N.**]; Phillips, John; "A Just, Non-Binary Choice Rule"; American Economist; Vol. 25, No. 2; Fall, 1981; 44-48; #158.

Stewart, Ian; "Fair Shares for All"; New Scientist; Vol. 146, No. 1982; 17 June 1995; 42-46; #3478.

[**Stiglitz, Joseph E.**];Sah, Raaj Kumar; "Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies"; Economic Journal; Vol. 98, No. 391; June, 1988; 451-470; #2119.

Still, Jonathan W.; "A Class of New Methods for Congressional Apportionment"; SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics; Vol. 37, No. 2; October, 1979; 401-418; #2481.

[**Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.**]; Fang, Fang; Whinston, Andrew B.; "Proper Scoring Rules with Arbitrary Value Functions"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 46, No. 6; 2010; 1200-1210; #5447.

Stob, Michael; "A Supplement to: 'A Mathematician's Guide to Popular Sports' "; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 91, No. 5; May, 1984; 277-282; #2849. [Comment on paper by Jech]

Stob, Michael; "Rankings From Round-Robin Tournaments"; Management Science; Vol. 31, No. 9; September, 1985; 1191-1195; #2853. [Comment on paper by Goddard; see reply by Goddard]

[Stob, Michael]; Osherson, D. N.; Weinstein, Scott; "Social Learning and Collective Choice"; Synthese; Vol. 70, No. 3; March, 1987; 319-347; #1698.

Stoetzel, A.; "Un modèle de correspondance entre préférences individuelles et choix collectif"; Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines; No. 55; Autumn, 1976; 5-23; #1507.

Stone, Daniel F.; "A Signal-jamming Model of Persuasion: Interest Group Funded Policy Research"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 3; September, 2011; 397-424; #5503.

[**Stone, Michael G.**]; Pouzet, Maurice; Rosenberg, Ivo G.; "A Projection Property"; Algebra Universalis; Vol. 36, No. 2; 1996; 159-184; #3829.

Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem on Restricted Domains"; Methods of Operations Research; Vol. 50; Verlag Anton Hain; 1985; 83-98; #847.

Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Societies with a priori Information and Anonymous Social Welfare Functions"; Methods of Operations Research; Vol. 54; Verlag Anton Hain; 1986; 279-291; #1443.

Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Continuity and Social Choice Functions"; Methods of Operations Research; Vol. 57; 1987; 297-308; #1908.

Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Some Social Choice Problems"; Surveys in Game Theory and Related Topics; edited by H. J. M. Peters and O. J. Vrieze; Amsterdam; Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica Amsterdam; 1987; 307-330; #1907.

Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Choice Correspondences Based on Individual Choices"; XII Symposium on Operations Research; Königstein; Athenäum/Hain/Hanstein; 1989; 99-110; #3058.

Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "A Possibility in Aggregating Social Welfare"; XIII Symposium on Operations Research; Königstein; Athenäum/Hain/Hanstein,; 1990; 517-524; #3057.

Storcken, Antonius J. A.; "Intensities and Social Choice"; XIV Symposium on Operations Research; Königstein; Athenäum/Hain/Hanstein; 1990; #3056.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Peters, Hans; van der Stel, Hans; "Pareto Optimality, Anonymity, and Strategy-proofness in Location Problems"; International Journal of Game Theory; Vo. 21, No. 3; 1992; 221-235; #3054.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Bossert, Walter; "Strategy-proofness of Social Welfare Functions: The Use of the Kemeny Distance Between Preference Orderings"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 9, No. 4; October, 1992; 345-360; #3055.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Peters, Hans; van der Stel, Hans; "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Strategy-proofness on Economic Domains"; Game Theory and Economic Applications; edited by B. Dutta, D. Mookherjee, T. Parthasarathy; Berlin; Springer; 1992; #3052.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Peters, Hans; van der Stel, Hans; "Generalized Median Solutions, Strategy-proofness and Strictly Convex Norms"; Zeitschrift für Operations Research; Vol. 38, No. 1; 1993; 19-53; #3053.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Peters, Hans; van der Stel, Hans; "Range Convexity, Continuity, and Strategy-proofness of Voting Schemes"; Zeitschrift für Operations Research; Vol. 38, No. 2; 1993; 213-229; #3051.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Monsuur, Herman; "Measuring Intransitivity"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 34, No. 2; October, 1997; 125-152; #3050.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Otten, Gert-Jan; Borm, Peter; Tijs, Stef; "Decomposable Effectivity Functions"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 33, No. 3; June, 1997; 277-289; #3375.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Peremans, W.; Peters, Hans; van der Stel, Hans; "Strategy-Proofness on Euclidean Spaces"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 3; July, 1997; 379-401; #2534.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Klaus, Bettina; Peters, Hans; "Strategy-proof Division with Single-Peaked Preferences and Initial Endowments"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 2; February, 1998; 297-311; #3209.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Klaus, Bettina; "Choice Correspondences for Public Goods";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 1; January, 2002; 127-154; #3896.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Peleg, Bezalel; Peters, Hans; "Nash Consistent Representation of Constitutions: A Reaction to the Gibbard Paradox"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 43, No. 2; March, 2002 267-287; #4048.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Ehlers, Lars; Peters, Hans; "Strategy-Proof Probablistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 10, No. 2; August, 2002; 408-434; #4064.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Ehlers, Lars; Peters, Hans; “Threshold Strategy-proofness: On Manipulability in Large Voting Problems”; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 49, No. 1; 2004; 103-116; #4319.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Peleg, Bezalel; Peters, Hans; “Constitutional Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences”; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 33, No. 3; 2005; 381-396; #4671.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Maus, Stefan; Peters, Hans; “Minimally Manipulable Anonymous Social Choice Functions”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 53, No. 3; 2007; 239-254; #4816.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Maus, Stefan; Peters, Hans; “Minimal Manipulability: Anonymity and Unanimity”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 2; September, 2007; 247-269; #4606.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Maus, Stefan; Peters, Hans; “Minimal Manipulability: Unanimity and Nondictatorship”; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 43, No. 6; 2007; 675-691; #4810.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Ehlers, Lars; "Arrow's Possibility Theorem for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 64, No. 2; November, 2008; 533-547; #5074.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Ehlers, Lars; "Oligarchies in Spatial Environments";Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 45, No. 3-4; 2009; 250-256; #5324.

[**Storcken, Antonius J. A.**]; Peters, Hans; Roy, Souvik; "Strategy-Proof Voting Rules on a Multidimensional Policy Space for a Continuum of Voters with Elliptic Preferences"; SERIEs; Vol. 2, No. 4; December, 2011; 485-496; #5639.

Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.); "The Power of Voting Blocks: An Example"; Mathematics Magazine; Vol. 50, No. 1; January, 1977; 22-24; #1179.

Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.); "Homogeneity, Independence, and Power Indices"; Public Choice; Vol. 30; Summer, 1977; 107-118; #1172.

Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.); "Majority Rule and General Decision Rules"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 8, No. 4; October, 1977; 351-360; #934.

Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.); "Probability Models For Power Indices"; Game Theory and Political Science; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook; New York; New York University Press; 1978; 477-510; #1756.

Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.); "Using Integrals to Evaluate Voting Power"; Two-Year College Mathematics Journal; Vol. 10, No. 3; June, 1979; 179-181; #1180.

Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.); Topics in the Theory of Voting; Boston; Birkhäuser; 1980; #1178. [See review by Kim]

Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.); Davis, Morton D.; Brams, Steven J.; "Power and Satisfaction in an Ideologically Divided Voting Body"; Power, Voting and Voting Power; edited by Manfred J. Holler; Würzburg-Vienna; Physica Verlag; 1982; 239-255; #1420.

[**Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.)**]; Brams, Steven J.; "The Entry Problem in a Political Race"; Political Equilibrium; edited by Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle; Boston; Kluwer-Nijhoff; 1982; 181-195; #1779.

Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.); "Power Indices in Politics"; Modules in Applied Mathematics: Vol. 2, Political and Related Models; edited by Steven J. Brams, William F. Lucas and Philip D. Straffin, Jr.; New York; Springer Verlag; 1983; 256-321; #157.

[**Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.)**]; Brams, Steven J.; Lucas, William F.; Modules in Applied Mathematics: Vol. 2, Political and Related Models; Springer Verlag; 1983; #306.

Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.); "Spatial Models of Power and Voting Outcomes"; Applications of Combinatorics and Graph Theory to the Biological and Social Sciences; edited by Fred S. Roberts; New York-Berlin; Springer; 1989; 315-335; #2935.

Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.); "Power and Stability in Politics"; Handbook of Game Theory with Economic ApplicationsVol. 2; Aumann, Robert J.; Hart, Sergiu, editors; Amsterdam; Elsevier, North-Holland; 1994; 1127-1151; #3124.

Straffin, Philip D. (Jr.); "The Instability of Democratic Decisions"; Math Horizons; Vol. 9, No. 4; April, 2002; 12-14; #4118. [An introduction toMcKelvey's Theorem.]

Strasnick, Steven; "Social Choice and the Derivation of Rawls' Difference Principle"; The Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 73, No. 4; February 26, 1976; 85-99; #679.

Strasnick, Steven; "The Problem of Social Choice: Arrow to Rawls"; Philosophy and Public Affairs; Vol. 5, No. 3; Spring, 1976; 241-273; #21.

Strasnick, Steven; "Ordinality and the Spirit of the Justified Dictator"; Social Research; Vol. 44, Winter, 1977; 668-690; #49.

Strasnick, Steven; "Extended Sympathy Comparisons and the Basis of Social Choice"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 10, Nos. 1,2,3,4; January, 1979; 311-328; #489.

Strasnick, Steven; "Moral Structures and Axiomatic Theory"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 11, No. 2; June, 1979; 195-206; #1308.

Strasnick, Steven; "Neo-Utilitarian Ethics and the Ordinal Representation Assumption"; Philosophy in Economics; edited by J. C. Pitt; Dordrecht; D. Reidel; 1981; 63-92; #721.

Stratmann, Thomas; "Instability of Collective Decisions? Testing for Cyclical Majorities";Public Choice; Vol. 88, Nos. 1-2 July, 1996; 15-28; #3333.

Stratman, Thomas; "Logrolling"; Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook; Dennis Mueller, editor; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1997; 322-341; #3248.

[Stretton, Hugh]; Orchard, Lionel; "Public Choice"; Cambridge Journal of Economics; Vol. 21, No. 3; May, 1997; 409-430; #3375.

Strnad, Jeff; "The Structure of Continuous-Valued Neutral Monotonic Social Functions";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 2, No. 3; December, 1985; 181-195; #829.

Strnad, Jeff; "Full Nash Implementation of Neutral Social Functions"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 16, No. 1; 1987; 17-37; #1689.

Stromquist, Walter; "How to Cut a Cake Fairly"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 87, No. 8; October, 1980; 640-644; #3261.

[Stromquist, Walter]; Austin, A. Keith; "Commentary"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 90, No. 7; August-September, 1983; 474; #3401.

Strulovici, Bruno; "Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation"; Econometrica; Vol. 78, No. 3; 2010; 933-971; #5276.

[Stuart, Charles];Hansson, Ingemar; "Voting Competitions with Interested Politicians: Platforms do not Converge to the Preferences of the Median Voter"; Public Choice; Vol. 44, No. 3; 1984; 431-441; #1578.

Stuart, Jeffrey L.; Weaver, James R.; "Voting Matrices and Tie-breaking";International Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics; Vol. 54, No. 3; 2009; 437-450; #5308.

[Stutzer, Alois]; Frey, Bruno S.; "The Use of Happiness Research for Public Policy";Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 4; April, 2012; 659-674; #5565.

Su, Francis Edward; "Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 106, No. 10; December, 1999; 930-942; #3598.

Su, Francis Edward; "Review of Cake Cutting Algorithms: Be Fair if you Can";American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 107, No. 2; February, 2000; 185-188; #3604. [Review of book by Robertson and Webb]

[Su, Francis Edward]; Peterson, Elisha; "Four-Person Envy-Free Chore Division";Mathematics Magazine; Vol. 75, No. 2; April, 2002; 117-122; #5210.

[Su, Francis Edward]; Haake, Claus-Jochen; Raith, Matthias G.; "Bidding for Envy-freeness: a Procedural Approach to N-player Fair-division Problems"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 4; October, 2002; 723-749; #3975.

[Su, Francis Edward]; Berg, Deborah E.; Norine, Serguei; Thomas, Robin; Wollan, Paul; "Voting in Agreeable Societies"; American Mathematical Monthly; Vol. 117, No. 1; 2010; 27-39; #5289.

Subiza, Begoña; Peris, Josep E.; "Numerical Representation for Lower Quasi-Continuous Preferences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 33; 1997; 149-156; #4120.

[Subiza, Begoña]; Peris, Josep E.; Sánchez, M. Carmen; "Numerical Representation of Choice Functions"; Annals of Operations Research; Vol. 80; 1998; 1-10; #4233.

[Subiza, Begoña]; Peris, Josep E.; "Condorcet Choice Correspondences for Weak Tournaments";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 2; February, 1999; 217-231; #3413.

[Subiza, Begoña]; Sánchez, M. Carmen; Llinares, Juan-Vicente; "A KKM-result and an Application for Binary and Non-binary Choice Functions"; Economic Theory Vol. 21, No. 1; May, 2003; 185-193; #4035.

Subiza, Begoña; Peris, Josep E.; “Condorcet Choice Functions and Maximal Elements”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 3; June, 2005; 497-508; #4436.

[**Subochev, A. N.**]; Aleskerov, Fuad T.; "On the Stability of Solutions in the Ordinal Social Choice Problem"; Doklady Akademii Nauk; Vol. 426, No. 3; 2009; 318-320; [Russian]; #5314.

Subochev, A. N.; "Dominating, Weakly Stable, and Uncovered Sets: Properties and Generalizations"; Avtomatika i Telemekhanika; 2010, No. 1; 130-143; [Russian; Translation in:Automation and Remote Control 71 (2010), no. 1, 116-127]; #5473.

Subramanian, S.; "The Impossibility of a Nondiscriminating Liberal. A Liberty Paradox Without the Pareto Principle"; Economics Letters; Vol. 16, Nos. 3/4; 1984; 243-247; #391.

Subramanian, S.; "Rights, Consensus and the Optimum Savings Problem"; Journal of Quantitative Economics; Vol. 3, No. 1; January, 1987; 1-11; #2593.

Subramanian, S.; "The Liberal Paradox with Fuzzy Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol 4, No. 3; September, 1987; 213-218; #1718.

Subramanian, S.; "Basic Needs, Positive Freedom, and the Possibility of Rights-Respecting Social Choice"; Themes in Development economics: Essays in Honour of Malcolm Adiseshiah; Subramanian, S., ed.; Oxford; Oxford University Press; 1992; 78-97; #2591.

Subramanian, S.; "Preference Motivations and Libertarian Dilemmas"; Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies; Vol. 63, No. 2; June, 1995; 167-174; #2592.

Subramanian, S.; Majumdar, Manabi; "On Measuring Deprivation Adjusted for Group Disparities"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 2; April, 2002; 265-280; #3888.

Subramanian, S.; "The Arrow Paradox with Fuzzy Preferences"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 58, No. 2; 2009; 265-271; #5309.

[**Subramanian, S.**]; Jayaraj, D.; "The Wellbeing Implications of a Change in the Sex-ratio of a Population"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 1; June, 2009; 129-150; #5143.

Subramanian, S.; "Liberty, Equality, and Impossibility: Some General Results in the Space of 'Soft' Preferences"; Journal of Economic Policy Reform; Vol. 13, No. 4; 2010; 325-341; #5420.

Sudhölter, Peter;Peleg, Bezalel; "Nucleoli as Maximizers of Collective Satisfaction Functions";Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 15, No. 3; May, 1998; 383-411; #3254. [See erratum, Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 2; February, 2000; 379-380.]

[Sudhölter, Peter]; Peleg, Bezalel; "Single-peakedness and Coalition-proofness";Review of Economic Design; Vol. 4; 1999; 381-387; #4386.

[Sudhölter, Peter]; Peleg, Bezalel; Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games;Kluwer; 2003; #4389.

[**Suen, Ching Y.**]; Lam, Louisa; "Majority Vote of Even and Odd Experts in a Polychotomous Choice Situation"; Theory and Decision; Vol. 41, No. 1 July, 1996; 13-36; #3337.

[Suen, Wing]; Li, Hao; "Viewpoint: Decision-Making in Committees"; Canadian Journal of Economics; Vol. 42, No. 2; May, 2009; 359-392; #5040.

[Suga, Koichi];Suzumura, Kotaro; "Gibbardian Libertarian Claims Revisited"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 3, No. 1; June, 1986; 61-74; #873.

[Suga, Koichi]; Suzumura, Kotaro; "Arrow and the Problem of Social Choice"; Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy; edited by George R. Feiwel; Basingstoke; Macmillan; 1987; 255-271; #1881.

[Suga, Koichi]; Okada, Akira; Sakakibara, Kenichi; "The Dynamic Transformation of Political Systems Through Social Contract: A Game Theoretic Approach"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 1; January, 1997; 1-21; #2423.

[Suga, Koichi]; Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi; "Impossibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare Levels: The 'Extended Sympathy Approach' Reconsidered"; Japanese Economic Review; Vol. 49, No. 2; June, 1998; 171-190; #3395.

Sugden, Robert; "Social Choice and Individual Liberty"; Contemporary Economic Analysis; edited by Michael J. Artis and Avelino Romeo Nobay; London; Croom Helm; 1978; 243-271; #370.

Sugden, Robert; The Political Economy of Public Choice; New York; Wiley, 1981; #163.

Sugden, Robert; "Review of A. Camacho's Societies and Social Decision Functions"; Economic Journal; Vol. 93, No. 371; September, 1983; 673-675; #217.

Sugden, Robert; "Free Association and the Theory of Proportional Representation"; American Political Science Review; Vol. 78, No. 1; March, 1984; 31-43; #1473.

Sugden, Robert; "Why be Consistent? A Critical Analysis of Consistency Requirements in Choice Theory"; Economica; Vol. 52, No. 206; May, 1985; 167-183; #1631.

Sugden, Robert; "Liberty, Preference, and Choice"; Economics and Philosophy; Vol. 1, No. 2; October, 1985; 213-229; #1126.

Sugden, Robert; Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare; Oxford; Basil Blackwell; 1986; #2342.

Sugden, Robert; "Social Justice"; The Theory of Choice: A Critical Guide; Hargreaves Heap, Shaun; Hollis, Martin; Lyons, Bruce; Sugden, Robert; Weale, Albert; editors; Oxford; Blackwell; 1992; 259-285; #2905.

Sugden, Robert; "Rights: Why Do They Matter, and to Whom?"; Constitutional Political Economy; Vol. 4, No. 1; Winter, 1993; 127-152; #3007.

Sugden, Robert; "The Theory of Rights"; The Ethical Foundations of the Market Economy; Siebert, Horst, editor; Tubingen; Mohr (Siebeck); 1994; 31-53; #3069.

Sugden, Robert; " Review of On Voting"; Journal of Economic Literature; Vol. 37, No. 4; December, 1999; 1715-1716; #3845. [Review of book by Tullock]

Sugden, Robert; "Living with Unfairness: the Limits of Equal Opportunity in a Market Economy"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 1; February, 2004; 211-236; #4207.

Sugden, Robert; “The Value of Opportunities over Time When Preferences Are Unstable”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 29, No. 4; December, 2007; 665-682; #4685.

[Sugden, Robert]; McQuillin, Ben; "The Representation of Alienable and Inalienable Rights: Games in Transition Function Form"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 683-706; #5522.

[Sugden, Robert]; McQuillin, Ben; "Reconciling Normative and Behavioural Economics: the Problems to Be Solved"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 4; April, 2012; 553-567; #5558.

[Sugden, Robert]; McQuillin, Ben; "How the Market Responds to Dynamically Inconsistent Preferences"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 38, Number 4; April, 2012; 617-634; #5562.

[Sugiyama, Kozo];Toda, Mitsuhiko; Tagawa, Shojiro; "A Method for Aggregating Ordinal Assessments by a Majority Decision Rule"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 3, No. 3; October, 1982; 227-242; #1001.

[Suh, Sang-Chul];Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi; "A Characterization of the Walras Rule"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 11, No. 3; July, 1994; 335-352; #2407.

Suh, Sang-Chul; "Double Implementation in Nash and Strong Nash Equilibria"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 14, No. 3; July, 1997; 439-447; #2537.

Suh, Sang-Chul; Shin, Sungwhee; "Strategy-proofness and Efficiency in a Simple Production Economy"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 3; May, 2000; 523-532; #3628.

Suh, Sang-Chul; "Non-manipulable Solutions in a Permit Sharing Problem: Equivalence between Non-manipulability and Monotonicity"; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 6, Nos. 3-4; April, 2001; 447-460; #4052.

Suh, Sang-Chul; "Games Implementing the Stable Rule of Marriage Problems in Strong Nash Equilibria"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 1; February, 2003; 33-39; #3990.

Suh, Sang-Chul; Wen, Quan; "Subgame Perfect Implementation of Stable Matchings in Marriage Problems"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 1; June, 2008; 163-174; #4936.

Suits, Daniel B.; "A Note on the Theory of Social Choice"; Kyklos; Vol. 5, No. 3; 1951-1952; 213-218; #2186.

[**Sullivan, T.**];Cox, Gary W.; McCubbins, Mathew D., "Policy Choice as an Electoral Investment"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1, No. 3; October, 1984; 231-242; #794.

[**Sumuor, M. A.**]; Lima, F. W. S.; Sousa, A. O.; "Majority-vote on Directed Erdös-Rényi Random Graphs"; Physica A. Statistical Mechanics and its Applications; Vol. 387, No. 14; 2008; 3503-3510; #5272.

[Sun, Ching-jen]; Anbarci, Nejat; "Weakest Collective Rationality and the Nash Bargaining Solution"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 3; September, 2011; 425-429; #5504.

[Sun, Ching-jen]; Anbarci, Nejat; "Distributive Justice and the Nash Bargaining Solution"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 3; September, 2011; 453-470; #5506.

[Sun, Guang-Zhen]; Ng, Yew-Kwang; "Exclusion of Self Evaluations in Peer Ratings: An Impossibility and Some Proposals"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 20, No. 3; June, 2003; 443-456; #4084.

[**Sundaram, Rangarajan K.**];Banks, Jeffrey S.; "Repeated Games, Finite Automata, and Complexity"; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 2, No. 2; June, 1990; 97-117; #2569.

[**Sundaram, Rangarajan K.**]; Banks, Jeffrey S.; "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Repeated Elections Model"; Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation: Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics.; Barnett, William A.; Hinich, Melvin J.; Schofield, Norman J., eds.; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1993; 295-311; #2565.

Sunding, David; "Social Choice by Majority Rule With Rational Participation"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 1; February, 1995; 3-12; #2377.

Sunding, David; "Strategic Participation and the Median Voter Result"; Economic Design; Vol.1, No. 4; April, 1996; 355-363; #3300.

Sung, Shao Chin; Vlach, Milan; “Competitive Envy-free Division”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 23, No. 1; August, 2004; 103-111; #4245.

Sung, Shao Chin; Dimitrov, Dinko; “On the Axiomatic Characterization of ‘Who Is a J?’ ”; Logique et Analyse (N.S.); Vol. 48, No. 189-192; 2005; 101-112; #4675.

[Sung, Shao Chin]; Dimitrov, Dinko; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud; “Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 2; April, 2006; 421-433; #4485.

Dimitrov, Dinko; Xu, Yongsheng; “Procedural Group Identification”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 54, No. 2; September, 2007; 137-146; #4894.

Suppes, Patrick; "Some Formal Models of Grading Principles"; Synthese; Vol. 16, Nos. 3/4; December, 1966; 284-306; #680.

Suppes, Patrick; "Maximizing Freedom of Decision: An Axiomatic Analysis"; Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy; edited by George R. Feiwel; Basingstoke; Macmillan; 1987; 243-254; #1880.

Suppes, Patrick; "The Nature and Measurement of Freedom"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 13, No. 2; April, 1996; 183-200; #3177.

Suppes, Patrick; “The Pre-history of Kenneth Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 319-326; #4462.

Surekha, K.; Bhaskara Rao, K. P. S.; "May's Theorem in an Infinite Setting"; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 46, No. 1; 2010; 50-55; #5265.

Suzuki, Takeshi; "Natural Implementation in Public Goods Economies"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 33, No. 4; November, 2009; 647-664; #5171.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Remarks on the Theory of Collective Choice"; Economica; Vol. 43, No. 172; November, 1976; 381-390; #1102.

Suzumura, Kotaro; Blair, Douglas H.; Bordes, Georges A.; Kelly, Jerry S.; "Impossibility Theorems Without Collective Rationality";Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 13, No. 3; December, 1976; 361-379; #450.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "On the Consistency of Libertarian Claims"; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 45(2), No. 140; June, 1978; 329-342; #681. [See correction: Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 46(4), No. 145; October, 1979; 743]

Suzumura, Kotaro; "On Distributional Value Judgements and Piecemeal Welfare Criteria"; Economica; Vol. 47, No. 186; May, 1980; 125-139; #722.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Liberal Paradox and the Voluntary Exchange of Rights Exercising"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 22, No. 2; June, 1980; 407-422; #18.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "On the Possibility of 'Fair' Collective Choice Rules" International Economic Review; Vol. 22, No. 2; June, 1981; 351-364; #16.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "On Pareto Efficiency and the No-envy Concept of Equity"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 25, No. 3; December, 1981; 367-379; #17.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Fountain, John; "Collective Choice Rules Without the Pareto Principle"; International Economic Review; Vol. 23, No. 2; June, 1982; 299-308; #364.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Equity, Efficiency and Rights in Social Choice"; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 3, No. 2; September, 1982; 131-155; #723.

Suzumura, Kotaro; Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press; 1983; #215.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Resolving Conflicting Views of Justice in Social Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; edited by Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Maurice Salles; Amsterdam; North-Holland; 1983; 125-149; #724.

Suzumura, Kotaro; Suga, Koichi; "Gibbardian Libertarian Claims Revisited"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 3, No. 1; June, 1986; 61-74; #873.

Suzumura, Kotaro; Suga, Koichi; "Arrow and the Problem of Social Choice"; Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy; edited by George R. Feiwel; Basingstoke; Macmillan; 1987; 255-271; #1881.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Social Welfare Function";The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 4; Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman; London; Macmillan; 1987; 418-420; #1926.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Reduction of Social Choice Problems: A Simple Proof of Arrow's General Possibility Theorem"; Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics; Vol. 29, No. 2; December, 1988; 219-221; #2233.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Voluntary Exchange of Rights and the Liberal Paradox" (Japanese); Economic Review (Keizai Kenkyu); Vol. 41, No. 2; April, 1990; 129-136; #2929.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Dictator Lemma: Detailed Proof"; Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics; Vol. 31, No. 1; June, 1990; 35-36; #2288.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "On the Voluntary Exchange of Libertarian Rights"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 8, No. 3; July, 1991; 199-206; #2313.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Alternative Approaches to Libertarian Rights in the Theory of Social Choice"; Issues in Contemporary Economics. Volume 1: Markets and Welfare; Arrow, Kenneth J., editor; London; Macmillan; 1991; 215-242; #2944.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Gaertner, Wulf; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Individual Rights Revisited"; Economica; Vol. 59, No. 234; May, 1992; 161-177; #1981.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Rights, Welfarism, and Social Choice"; American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings; Vol. 84, No. 2; May, 1994; 435-439; #2357.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Basu, Kaushik; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; Choice, Welfare, and Development: A Festschrift in Honour of Amartya K. Sen; Oxford; Oxford University Press; 1995; #2571.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Welfare, Rights, and Social Choice" (Japanese); Economic Review (Keizai Kenkyu); Vol. 47, No. 1; January, 1996; 64-79; #2922.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Pattanaik, Prasanta K.; "Individual Rights and Social Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework"; Oxford Economic Papers; Vol. 48, No. 2; April, 1996; 194-212; #2557.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "The "New" Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory" (Japanese); Economic Review (Keizai Kenkyu); Vol. 48, No. 1; January, 1997; 15-24; #2921.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Interpersonal Comparisons of the Extended Sympathy Type and the Possibility of Social Choice"; Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2; Edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; 202-229; #2790. [see discussion by Roberts]

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Arrow, Kenneth J.; Sen, Amartya K.; editors; Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. 2; New York; St Martin's Press; 1997; #2775.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Consequences, Opportunities, and Procedures"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 1; January, 1999; 17-40; #3313.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Welfare Economics beyond Welfarist-Consequentialism"; Japanese Economic Review; Vol. 51, No. 1; March, 2000; 1-32; #3639.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Pareto Principles from Inch to Ell"; Economics Letters; Vol. 70; January, 2001; 95-98; #4232.

Suzumura, Kotaro; "Obituary: Ken-Ichi Inada; 1925-2002"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 19, No. 4; October, 2002; 707-707; #3973.

Suzumura, Kotaro; “Introduction”; In Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1; Edited by K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura; North-Holland; 2002; 1-32; #4391.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Arrow, Kenneth J.; Sen, Amartya K.; Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1; North-Holland; 2002; #4403.

Suzumura, Kotaro; Xu, Yongsheng; “On Constrained Dual Recoverability Theorems”;Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 45, No. 2; April, 2003; 143-154; #4404.

Suzumura, Kotaro; Xu, Yongsheng; “Consequences, Opportunities, and Generalized Consequentialism and Non-consequentialism” Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 11, No. 2; August, 2003; 293-304; #4418.

Suzumura, Kotaro; Xu, Yongsheng; "Recoverability of Choice Functions and Binary Relations: Some Duality Results"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 21, No. 1; August, 2003; 21-37; #4171.

Suzumura, Kotaro; Xu, Yongsheng; "Welfarist-consequentialism, Similarity of Attitudes, and Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 22, No. 1; February, 2004; 237-251; #4208.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Fleurbaey, Marc; Tadenuma, Koichi; “Arrovian Aggregation in Economic Environments: How Much Should We Know about Indifference Surfaces?”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 124, No. 1; 2005; 22-44; #4660.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Fleurbaey, Marc;Tadenuma, Koichi; “The Informational Basis of the Theory of Fair Allocation”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 24, No. 2; April, 2005; 311-341; #4281.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves; “Maximal-element Rationalizability”; Theory and Decision; Vol. 58, No. 4; 2005; 325-350; #4655.

Suzumura, Kotaro; “An Interview with Paul Samuelson: Welfare Economics, “Old” and “New”, and Social Choice Theory”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3; December, 2005; 327-356; #4463.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves; “Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains Without Full Transitivity”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 27, No. 3; December, 2006; 435-458; #4552.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves; “Ordering Infinite Utility Streams”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 135, No. 1; July, 2007; 579-589; #4886.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Bossert, Walter; “A Characterization of Consistent Collective Choice Rules”; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 138, No. 1; January, 2008; 311-320; #4878.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Hara, Chiaki; Shinotsuka, Tomoichi; Xu, Yongsheng; "Continuity and Egalitarianism in the Evaluation of Infinite Utility Streams"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 31, No. 2; August, 2008; 179-191; #4938.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Bossert, Walter; "Multi-profile Intergenerational Social Choice";Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 3; September, 2011; 493-509; #5508.

[Suzumura, Kotaro]; Bossert, Walter; "Rationality, External Norms, and the Epistemic Value of Menus"; Social Choice and Welfare; Volume 37, Number 4; October, 2011; 729-741; #5525.

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; "On the Existence of Fair Allocations"; Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie; Vol. 43, No. 3; 1983; 301-308; #2917.

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; "The Utilitarian Criterion, Finite Sensibility and the Weak Majority Preference Principle: A Further Analysis"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 2, No. 1; May, 1985; 23-35; #1043.

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; "Fairness, the Veil of Ignorance and Social Choice"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 6, No. 1; January, 1989; 1-17; #2025.

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; "Sigma-Optimality and Fairness"; International Economic Review; Vol. 35, No. 2; May, 1994; 527-531; #2961.

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; "Queue Allocation of Indivisible Goods"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 11, No. 4; October, 1994; 323-330; #2373.

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; "Strategy-proof Allocation of Indivisible Goods"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16, No. 4; August, 1999; 557-567; #3573.

[Svensson, Lars-Gunnar]; Larsson, Bo; “Strategy-proof Voting on the Full Preference Domain”; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 52, No. 3; 2006; 272-287; #4844.

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Torstensson, Pär; “Strategy-proof Allocation of Multiple Public Goods”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 30, No. 2; February, 2008; 181-196; #4703.

Swank, Otto H.; "Rational Voters in a Partisanship Model"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12, No. 1; February, 1995; 13-27; #2378.

[**Swank, Otto H.**]; Letterie, Wilko; van Dalen, Hendrik P.; "When Policy Advisors Cannot Reach a Consensus"; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 17, No. 3; May, 2000; 439-461; #3624.

[**Swank, Otto H.**]; Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; “Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control”; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26, No. 3; June, 2006; 527-545; #4505.

[Syau, Yu-Ru]; Jiao, Yue; Lee, E. Stanley; “Fuzzy Adaptive Network in Presidential Elections”; Mathematical and Computer Modelling; Vol. 43, Nos. 3-4; 2006; 244-253; #4782.

Syed, Sabbir Ahmed; "The Apportionment of Representation and the Voting Power";Journal of Information & Optimization Sciences; Vol. 10, No. 3; 1989; 459-470; #3554.

[Szalas, Andrzej]; Gabbay, Dov M.; "Voting by Eliminating Quantifiers"; Studia Logica; Vol. 92, No. 3; 2009; 365-379; #5299.

[Szenberg, Michael]; Ramrattan, Lall; "Abram Bergson (1914-2003): In Memoriam";American Economist; Vol. 47, No. 2; Fall, 2003; 3-5; #4153.

[Szentes, Balázs]; Gershkov, Alex; "Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition"; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 144, No. 1; 2009; 36-68; #5269.

Szpiro, George G.; Numbers Rule: The Vexing Mathematics of Democracy, from Plato to the Present; Princeton University Press; Princeton, NJ; 2010; #5288.

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z