Expressivism (original) (raw)
In meta-ethics, expressivism is a theory about the meaning of moral language. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms – for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being" – are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being m
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dbo:abstract | In meta-ethics, expressivism is a theory about the meaning of moral language. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms – for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being" – are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences. (en) L'expressivisme est une théorie méta-éthique relative à la signification du langage moral. Selon l'expressivisme, les phrases qui emploient des termes moraux comme « Il est mal de torturer un être humain innocent » ne sont pas des descriptions ou des affirmations de faits. Les termes moraux tels que « mal », « bon » ou « juste » ne se réfèrent pas non plus à des propriétés réelles et immanentes. La fonction principale des phrases morales, selon l'expressivisme, n'est pas d'énoncer quelque fait que ce soit mais plutôt d'exprimer une attitude évaluative vis-à-vis d'un objet d'évaluation. Parce que la fonction du langage moral est non descriptive, les phrases morales ne possèdent aucune condition de vérité et n'ont en elles-mêmes aucune valeur de vérité. (fr) |
dbo:wikiPageExternalLink | https://archive.org/details/spreadingwordgro0000blac http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/moral-anti-realism http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/moral-cognitivism http://www.ditext.com/hare/lm.html |
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rdfs:comment | In meta-ethics, expressivism is a theory about the meaning of moral language. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms – for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being" – are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being m (en) L'expressivisme est une théorie méta-éthique relative à la signification du langage moral. Selon l'expressivisme, les phrases qui emploient des termes moraux comme « Il est mal de torturer un être humain innocent » ne sont pas des descriptions ou des affirmations de faits. Les termes moraux tels que « mal », « bon » ou « juste » ne se réfèrent pas non plus à des propriétés réelles et immanentes. La fonction principale des phrases morales, selon l'expressivisme, n'est pas d'énoncer quelque fait que ce soit mais plutôt d'exprimer une attitude évaluative vis-à-vis d'un objet d'évaluation. (fr) |
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