H. D. P. Envall | The Australian National University (original) (raw)
Books by H. D. P. Envall
A political leader is most often a nation’s most high-profile foreign policy figure, its chief di... more A political leader is most often a nation’s most high-profile foreign policy figure, its chief diplomat. But how do individual leadership styles, personalities, perceptions, or beliefs shape diplomacy? In Japanese Diplomacy, the question of what role leadership plays in diplomacy is applied to Japan, a country where the individual is often viewed as being at the mercy of the group and where prime ministers have been largely thought of as reactive and weak. In challenging earlier, simplified ideas of Japanese political leadership, H. D. P. Envall argues that Japan’s leaders, from early Cold War figures such as Yoshida Shigeru to the charismatic and innovative Koizumi Jun’ichirō to the present leadership of Abe Shinzō, have pursued leadership strategies of varying coherence and rationality, often independent of their political environment. He also finds that different Japanese leaders have shaped Japanese diplomacy in some important and underappreciated ways. In certain environments, individual difference has played a significant role in determining Japan’s diplomacy, both in terms of the country’s strategic identity and summit diplomacy. What emerges from Japanese Diplomacy, therefore, is a more nuanced overall picture of Japanese leadership in foreign affairs.
Refereed Articles by H. D. P. Envall
Asian Journal of Political Science, 2011
On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzō was feted as the 'prince' of Japanese politics. A ... more On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzō was feted as the 'prince' of Japanese politics. A year later, Abe's Liberal Democratic Party had suffered a major electoral defeat and Abe's time as his country's leader was over. As a study of political leadership, this article seeks to explain the leadership outcomes of Abe's brief prime ministership, in particular the dramatic fall in public support Abe suffered during his tenure. It is argued that, despite the difficult circumstances Abe faced, the nature of his political demise cannot be fully accounted for by structural factors alone. It is also necessary to understand the role played by Abe himself and, in particular, his flawed leadership strategy. In the end, Abe's political demise followed a basic logic: high expectations followed by disillusionment characterised by sudden plunges in approval*a tragedy of hubris leading to nemesis.
Asian Security, 2015
Abstract Discontent over US military bases in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominen... more Abstract Discontent over US military bases in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent “thorn in the side” of US–Japan relations. But what exactly has been the effect of Okinawa’s base politics on the management of the alliance? We examine Okinawa’s significance on the US–Japan alliance—the “Okinawa effect”—in terms of the alliance’s strategic coherence. Through an examination of the post–Cold War history of the base issue, we argue that, while there little to suggest that the Okinawa issue has undermined the alliance’s strategic effectiveness, alliance efficiency in dealing with burden sharing problems has been diminished, at times substantially. While reduced efficiency may often be inevitable in alliances between democracies, this persistent inability to resolve burden sharing disputes in the Okinawan case means that there is still potential for deteriorating efficiency to eventually undermine the alliance’s solidarity and effectiveness.
Survival
Japan’s recent policy shifts suggest a national strategy designed to present a counterweight to C... more Japan’s recent policy shifts suggest a national strategy designed to present a counterweight to China without challenging it for regional primacy.
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Since 2012, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has sought to remake the country’s foreign and secu... more Since 2012, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has sought to remake the country’s foreign and security policy. Abe’s agenda, which is increasingly called an ‘Abe Doctrine’, has prompted considerable debate as to its true nature. Is the Abe Doctrine nationalist, revisionist, or realist? This article contributes to these debates by tracing the competing characterizations of an Abe Doctrine’s policy ideas and assessing these against the doctrine’s policy prescriptions. It argues that the Abe Doctrine–situated within the long-term evolution of Japanese policymaking – is chiefly realist rather than nationalist in its policy prescriptions. In fact, where the doctrine does constitute a major departure from past policy practice, largely unrecognized until now, is not so much in how it expands Japan’s international role but in how it narrows this role. The underlying logic of the Abe Doctrine may therefore be pushing Japan towards a new form of regional realism.
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2013
The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with p... more The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
Japanese Studies, 2008
The orthodox view or ‘rule’ of Japanese politics over past decades has been that Japanese leaders... more The orthodox view or ‘rule’ of Japanese politics over past decades has been that Japanese leadership is weak and reactive. As such, Koizumi Jun'ichirō, a recent Japanese prime minister, is seen as a great exception to this rule. This article seeks to re-evaluate this orthodoxy in light of wider leadership theory and recent studies on Japanese political leadership. Focusing especially on how assessments of Koizumi's leadership compare to those of previous leaders, it looks at how the literature on Japanese politics has viewed both Japan's political environment and its political leaders. It argues that Koizumi interacted with, not merely reacted to, his political environment. At the same time, he employed a leadership style which, although distinctive, shared important similarities with previous leaders. Accordingly, he was less an exception to this rule than a confirmation of the historical diversity of Japanese political leadership.
Japan has been a strong supporter of America’s ‘pivot’, or ‘rebalance’, to the Asia-Pacific. Why ... more Japan has been a strong supporter of America’s ‘pivot’, or ‘rebalance’, to the Asia-Pacific. Why has it responded in such a way? Japan’s established position in the region naturally makes it a keen supporter of the status quo and thus of the US-led order. Yet this does not fully explain Japan’s support. This article contends that to understand Japan’s position, it is necessary to more closely consider how Japan views the rebalance’s probable strategic benefits and costs. In fact, increasingly difficult Sino-Japanese relations have led Japan to reassess such costs and benefits, with Japan becoming more anxious to ensure that the United States continues to provide strategic reassurance to the region, even if this means that Japan is required to restructure its own security role in return. In turn, Japan’s security restructuring has important implications not only for its national security but also for wider regional stability.
This article examines the use of strategic partnerships by Asian states as a means of enhancing n... more This article examines the use of strategic partnerships by Asian states as a means of enhancing national and regional security, as well as advancing economic and other objectives. It argues that strategic partnerships are best conceived as a new practice that signals the emergence of new forms of “security governance” in the region. It observes, however, that whereas early strategic partnerships were based on substantive shared agreement on “system principles,” contemporary strategic partnerships take different forms, some grounding closer cooperation between like-minded partners and some intending to facilitate better management of partners with divergent values and interests. The contemporary behavior of the United States and its traditional and new security partners in the region conform to this general pattern. The article concludes that the proliferation of strategic partnerships and the emergence of regional security governance should prompt a reappraisal of traditional approaches to Asian security, which tend to concentrate on architecture and community at the expense of practices.
Discontent over US military bases in Japan's Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent " thorn... more Discontent over US military bases in Japan's Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent " thorn in the side " of US–Japan relations. But what exactly has been the effect of Okinawa's base politics on the management of the alliance? We examine Okinawa's significance on the US–Japan alliance—the " Okinawa effect " —in terms of the alliance's strategic coherence. Through an examination of the post–Cold War history of the base issue, we argue that, while there little to suggest that the Okinawa issue has undermined the alliance's strategic effectiveness , alliance efficiency in dealing with burden sharing problems has been diminished, at times substantially. While reduced efficiency may often be inevitable in alliances between democracies , this persistent inability to resolve burden sharing disputes in the Okinawan case means that there is still potential for deteriorating efficiency to eventually undermine the alliance's solidarity and effectiveness.
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2013
The US military bases in the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa have long been a source of domestic p... more The US military bases in the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa have long been a source of domestic political opposition to the US–Japan alliance. As an alliance management issue, the ongoing troubles surrounding the bases raise questions as to when and why states adopt particular bargaining strategies when dealing with allies. Why, for instance, has the Japanese government not made greater use of this ‘Okinawa card’ when negotiating alliance issues with the USA? Even though highlighting particular domestic problems as a part of a negotiating strategy (known as tying hands) should appeal to a weaker ally such as Japan, this article argues that in the Okinawan case the reverse has been true. Japan has generally, though not always, sought to minimise or downplay domestic opposition to its alliance agreements, essentially preferring a cutting-slack to a tying-hands approach. The Japanese experience suggests that when states which are directly dependent on an alliance for their security see their security environment as unstable, they view tying-hands strategies as too likely to undermine their bargaining credibility. Maintaining credibility is important in an alliance bargaining context because it is a way for such states to signal their commitment to an alliance and so guard against abandonment.
The Obama Administration has embraced multilateral security politics in the Asia-Pacific more vis... more The Obama Administration has embraced multilateral security politics in the Asia-Pacific more visibly and more extensively than its predecessors. It has done so, however, by applying several key preconditions for the U.S. involvement in this process: such involvement must be consistent with the purpose and maintenance of its bilateral alliances in the region, must reflect clear and shared interests and values which the U.S. could endorse and support, and must pursue clearly designated action plans to realize those interests and values. Subsequent to designating those criteria, U.S. policy planners have employed alternate strategies of multilateral retrenchment and counterpunching which, it is argued here, have muddled Washington's determination to achieve such conditions. Yet Washington has been reluctant to reconcile multilateral retrenchment and counterpunching by nominating a single unifying strategy to realize more concrete regional security and order-building. It is argued here that the convergent security approach provides an opportunity for the U.S. to become a more enduring and meaningful player in evolving multilateral regional security architectures. The risk incurred in adopting this strategy is that its success depends on the willingness of the U.S. traditional allies in the region to collaborate more effectively with each other. To date, Washington has adopted a combination of bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral security approaches to realize more effective institution-building as a way to underwrite regional stability. It has not nominated any one Asia-Pacific institution to achieve this policy objective. Instead, it has pursued what is at least a tacit convergent security posture by nominating different institutions and networks to achieve a diversity of policy interests and outcomes.
On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzō was feted as the ‘prince’ of Japanese politics. A ... more On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzō was feted as the ‘prince’ of Japanese politics. A year later, Abe's Liberal Democratic Party had suffered a major electoral defeat and Abe's time as his country's leader was over. As a study of political leadership, this article seeks to explain the leadership outcomes of Abe's brief prime ministership, in particular the dramatic fall in public support Abe suffered during his tenure. It is argued that, despite the difficult circumstances Abe faced, the nature of his political demise cannot be fully accounted for by structural factors alone. It is also necessary to understand the role played by Abe himself and, in particular, his flawed leadership strategy. In the end, Abe's political demise followed a basic logic: high expectations followed by disillusionment characterised by sudden plunges in approval—a tragedy of hubris leading to nemesis.
This article examines whether there is an identifiable Gaullist tradition in post-war Japanese se... more This article examines whether there is an identifiable Gaullist tradition in post-war Japanese security politics and how the security policies of Koizumi Jun'ichirō, a recent Japanese prime minister, compare to such a tradition. The article argues that Gaullism has been a minority tradition in domestic Japanese politics and so its practitioners have often compromised on their goals out of political necessity. Its most distinctive characteristic, therefore, has been its inward-looking agenda, the preoccupation with achieving a domestic political transformation in order to make Japan's domestic politics more conducive to its agenda. Although Koizumi did not pursue a strategy encompassing all of Gaullism's goals, he did make great efforts to pursue the Gaullist agenda. More importantly, he followed this established pattern of directing his efforts inward, toward a transformation of Japan's domestic politics of security.
Book Chapters by H. D. P. Envall
Defined as a "special strategic partnership," the Japan-Australia relationship is qualitatively d... more Defined as a "special strategic partnership," the Japan-Australia relationship is qualitatively distinct from many of Tokyo's other bilateral relationships. In particular, it exhibits features that mark it out as a security alignment and perhaps even a "quasi-alliance," in that it is sustained by the two countries' relationships with the United States. This chapter argues that the Japan-Australia partnership has developed as a multi-faceted alignment mechanism founded upon shared interests and values. It encompasses a full spectrum of functions and, moreover, represents an attempt by the two countries to promote an "Indo-Pacific" vision, which embodies their shared worldview and common agenda for action.
Reconsidering Postwar Japanese History: A Handbook, 2023
Japan's alliance with the United States remains the cornerstone of the country's security policy.... more Japan's alliance with the United States remains the cornerstone of the country's security policy. Indeed, the alliance has long delivered Japan considerable strategic advantages, such as greater deterrence of regional security threats. Yet the alliance has also come with costs. It has institutionalized Tokyo's dependence on Washington, thus limiting the country's strategic autonomy. This chapter examines how Japan has sought to manage the task of reconciling such tensionsbetween the often-conflicting goals of deterrence and autonomy. It argues that, while Japan has pursued autonomy where possible, it has repeatedly prioritized deterrence as the country's primary national security goal.
National perspectives on a multipolar order, 2021
Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century, Jun 28, 2017
A political leader is most often a nation’s most high-profile foreign policy figure, its chief di... more A political leader is most often a nation’s most high-profile foreign policy figure, its chief diplomat. But how do individual leadership styles, personalities, perceptions, or beliefs shape diplomacy? In Japanese Diplomacy, the question of what role leadership plays in diplomacy is applied to Japan, a country where the individual is often viewed as being at the mercy of the group and where prime ministers have been largely thought of as reactive and weak. In challenging earlier, simplified ideas of Japanese political leadership, H. D. P. Envall argues that Japan’s leaders, from early Cold War figures such as Yoshida Shigeru to the charismatic and innovative Koizumi Jun’ichirō to the present leadership of Abe Shinzō, have pursued leadership strategies of varying coherence and rationality, often independent of their political environment. He also finds that different Japanese leaders have shaped Japanese diplomacy in some important and underappreciated ways. In certain environments, individual difference has played a significant role in determining Japan’s diplomacy, both in terms of the country’s strategic identity and summit diplomacy. What emerges from Japanese Diplomacy, therefore, is a more nuanced overall picture of Japanese leadership in foreign affairs.
Asian Journal of Political Science, 2011
On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzō was feted as the 'prince' of Japanese politics. A ... more On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzō was feted as the 'prince' of Japanese politics. A year later, Abe's Liberal Democratic Party had suffered a major electoral defeat and Abe's time as his country's leader was over. As a study of political leadership, this article seeks to explain the leadership outcomes of Abe's brief prime ministership, in particular the dramatic fall in public support Abe suffered during his tenure. It is argued that, despite the difficult circumstances Abe faced, the nature of his political demise cannot be fully accounted for by structural factors alone. It is also necessary to understand the role played by Abe himself and, in particular, his flawed leadership strategy. In the end, Abe's political demise followed a basic logic: high expectations followed by disillusionment characterised by sudden plunges in approval*a tragedy of hubris leading to nemesis.
Asian Security, 2015
Abstract Discontent over US military bases in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominen... more Abstract Discontent over US military bases in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent “thorn in the side” of US–Japan relations. But what exactly has been the effect of Okinawa’s base politics on the management of the alliance? We examine Okinawa’s significance on the US–Japan alliance—the “Okinawa effect”—in terms of the alliance’s strategic coherence. Through an examination of the post–Cold War history of the base issue, we argue that, while there little to suggest that the Okinawa issue has undermined the alliance’s strategic effectiveness, alliance efficiency in dealing with burden sharing problems has been diminished, at times substantially. While reduced efficiency may often be inevitable in alliances between democracies, this persistent inability to resolve burden sharing disputes in the Okinawan case means that there is still potential for deteriorating efficiency to eventually undermine the alliance’s solidarity and effectiveness.
Survival
Japan’s recent policy shifts suggest a national strategy designed to present a counterweight to C... more Japan’s recent policy shifts suggest a national strategy designed to present a counterweight to China without challenging it for regional primacy.
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Since 2012, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has sought to remake the country’s foreign and secu... more Since 2012, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has sought to remake the country’s foreign and security policy. Abe’s agenda, which is increasingly called an ‘Abe Doctrine’, has prompted considerable debate as to its true nature. Is the Abe Doctrine nationalist, revisionist, or realist? This article contributes to these debates by tracing the competing characterizations of an Abe Doctrine’s policy ideas and assessing these against the doctrine’s policy prescriptions. It argues that the Abe Doctrine–situated within the long-term evolution of Japanese policymaking – is chiefly realist rather than nationalist in its policy prescriptions. In fact, where the doctrine does constitute a major departure from past policy practice, largely unrecognized until now, is not so much in how it expands Japan’s international role but in how it narrows this role. The underlying logic of the Abe Doctrine may therefore be pushing Japan towards a new form of regional realism.
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2013
The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with p... more The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
Japanese Studies, 2008
The orthodox view or ‘rule’ of Japanese politics over past decades has been that Japanese leaders... more The orthodox view or ‘rule’ of Japanese politics over past decades has been that Japanese leadership is weak and reactive. As such, Koizumi Jun'ichirō, a recent Japanese prime minister, is seen as a great exception to this rule. This article seeks to re-evaluate this orthodoxy in light of wider leadership theory and recent studies on Japanese political leadership. Focusing especially on how assessments of Koizumi's leadership compare to those of previous leaders, it looks at how the literature on Japanese politics has viewed both Japan's political environment and its political leaders. It argues that Koizumi interacted with, not merely reacted to, his political environment. At the same time, he employed a leadership style which, although distinctive, shared important similarities with previous leaders. Accordingly, he was less an exception to this rule than a confirmation of the historical diversity of Japanese political leadership.
Japan has been a strong supporter of America’s ‘pivot’, or ‘rebalance’, to the Asia-Pacific. Why ... more Japan has been a strong supporter of America’s ‘pivot’, or ‘rebalance’, to the Asia-Pacific. Why has it responded in such a way? Japan’s established position in the region naturally makes it a keen supporter of the status quo and thus of the US-led order. Yet this does not fully explain Japan’s support. This article contends that to understand Japan’s position, it is necessary to more closely consider how Japan views the rebalance’s probable strategic benefits and costs. In fact, increasingly difficult Sino-Japanese relations have led Japan to reassess such costs and benefits, with Japan becoming more anxious to ensure that the United States continues to provide strategic reassurance to the region, even if this means that Japan is required to restructure its own security role in return. In turn, Japan’s security restructuring has important implications not only for its national security but also for wider regional stability.
This article examines the use of strategic partnerships by Asian states as a means of enhancing n... more This article examines the use of strategic partnerships by Asian states as a means of enhancing national and regional security, as well as advancing economic and other objectives. It argues that strategic partnerships are best conceived as a new practice that signals the emergence of new forms of “security governance” in the region. It observes, however, that whereas early strategic partnerships were based on substantive shared agreement on “system principles,” contemporary strategic partnerships take different forms, some grounding closer cooperation between like-minded partners and some intending to facilitate better management of partners with divergent values and interests. The contemporary behavior of the United States and its traditional and new security partners in the region conform to this general pattern. The article concludes that the proliferation of strategic partnerships and the emergence of regional security governance should prompt a reappraisal of traditional approaches to Asian security, which tend to concentrate on architecture and community at the expense of practices.
Discontent over US military bases in Japan's Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent " thorn... more Discontent over US military bases in Japan's Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent " thorn in the side " of US–Japan relations. But what exactly has been the effect of Okinawa's base politics on the management of the alliance? We examine Okinawa's significance on the US–Japan alliance—the " Okinawa effect " —in terms of the alliance's strategic coherence. Through an examination of the post–Cold War history of the base issue, we argue that, while there little to suggest that the Okinawa issue has undermined the alliance's strategic effectiveness , alliance efficiency in dealing with burden sharing problems has been diminished, at times substantially. While reduced efficiency may often be inevitable in alliances between democracies , this persistent inability to resolve burden sharing disputes in the Okinawan case means that there is still potential for deteriorating efficiency to eventually undermine the alliance's solidarity and effectiveness.
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2013
The US military bases in the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa have long been a source of domestic p... more The US military bases in the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa have long been a source of domestic political opposition to the US–Japan alliance. As an alliance management issue, the ongoing troubles surrounding the bases raise questions as to when and why states adopt particular bargaining strategies when dealing with allies. Why, for instance, has the Japanese government not made greater use of this ‘Okinawa card’ when negotiating alliance issues with the USA? Even though highlighting particular domestic problems as a part of a negotiating strategy (known as tying hands) should appeal to a weaker ally such as Japan, this article argues that in the Okinawan case the reverse has been true. Japan has generally, though not always, sought to minimise or downplay domestic opposition to its alliance agreements, essentially preferring a cutting-slack to a tying-hands approach. The Japanese experience suggests that when states which are directly dependent on an alliance for their security see their security environment as unstable, they view tying-hands strategies as too likely to undermine their bargaining credibility. Maintaining credibility is important in an alliance bargaining context because it is a way for such states to signal their commitment to an alliance and so guard against abandonment.
The Obama Administration has embraced multilateral security politics in the Asia-Pacific more vis... more The Obama Administration has embraced multilateral security politics in the Asia-Pacific more visibly and more extensively than its predecessors. It has done so, however, by applying several key preconditions for the U.S. involvement in this process: such involvement must be consistent with the purpose and maintenance of its bilateral alliances in the region, must reflect clear and shared interests and values which the U.S. could endorse and support, and must pursue clearly designated action plans to realize those interests and values. Subsequent to designating those criteria, U.S. policy planners have employed alternate strategies of multilateral retrenchment and counterpunching which, it is argued here, have muddled Washington's determination to achieve such conditions. Yet Washington has been reluctant to reconcile multilateral retrenchment and counterpunching by nominating a single unifying strategy to realize more concrete regional security and order-building. It is argued here that the convergent security approach provides an opportunity for the U.S. to become a more enduring and meaningful player in evolving multilateral regional security architectures. The risk incurred in adopting this strategy is that its success depends on the willingness of the U.S. traditional allies in the region to collaborate more effectively with each other. To date, Washington has adopted a combination of bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral security approaches to realize more effective institution-building as a way to underwrite regional stability. It has not nominated any one Asia-Pacific institution to achieve this policy objective. Instead, it has pursued what is at least a tacit convergent security posture by nominating different institutions and networks to achieve a diversity of policy interests and outcomes.
On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzō was feted as the ‘prince’ of Japanese politics. A ... more On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzō was feted as the ‘prince’ of Japanese politics. A year later, Abe's Liberal Democratic Party had suffered a major electoral defeat and Abe's time as his country's leader was over. As a study of political leadership, this article seeks to explain the leadership outcomes of Abe's brief prime ministership, in particular the dramatic fall in public support Abe suffered during his tenure. It is argued that, despite the difficult circumstances Abe faced, the nature of his political demise cannot be fully accounted for by structural factors alone. It is also necessary to understand the role played by Abe himself and, in particular, his flawed leadership strategy. In the end, Abe's political demise followed a basic logic: high expectations followed by disillusionment characterised by sudden plunges in approval—a tragedy of hubris leading to nemesis.
This article examines whether there is an identifiable Gaullist tradition in post-war Japanese se... more This article examines whether there is an identifiable Gaullist tradition in post-war Japanese security politics and how the security policies of Koizumi Jun'ichirō, a recent Japanese prime minister, compare to such a tradition. The article argues that Gaullism has been a minority tradition in domestic Japanese politics and so its practitioners have often compromised on their goals out of political necessity. Its most distinctive characteristic, therefore, has been its inward-looking agenda, the preoccupation with achieving a domestic political transformation in order to make Japan's domestic politics more conducive to its agenda. Although Koizumi did not pursue a strategy encompassing all of Gaullism's goals, he did make great efforts to pursue the Gaullist agenda. More importantly, he followed this established pattern of directing his efforts inward, toward a transformation of Japan's domestic politics of security.
Defined as a "special strategic partnership," the Japan-Australia relationship is qualitatively d... more Defined as a "special strategic partnership," the Japan-Australia relationship is qualitatively distinct from many of Tokyo's other bilateral relationships. In particular, it exhibits features that mark it out as a security alignment and perhaps even a "quasi-alliance," in that it is sustained by the two countries' relationships with the United States. This chapter argues that the Japan-Australia partnership has developed as a multi-faceted alignment mechanism founded upon shared interests and values. It encompasses a full spectrum of functions and, moreover, represents an attempt by the two countries to promote an "Indo-Pacific" vision, which embodies their shared worldview and common agenda for action.
Reconsidering Postwar Japanese History: A Handbook, 2023
Japan's alliance with the United States remains the cornerstone of the country's security policy.... more Japan's alliance with the United States remains the cornerstone of the country's security policy. Indeed, the alliance has long delivered Japan considerable strategic advantages, such as greater deterrence of regional security threats. Yet the alliance has also come with costs. It has institutionalized Tokyo's dependence on Washington, thus limiting the country's strategic autonomy. This chapter examines how Japan has sought to manage the task of reconciling such tensionsbetween the often-conflicting goals of deterrence and autonomy. It argues that, while Japan has pursued autonomy where possible, it has repeatedly prioritized deterrence as the country's primary national security goal.
National perspectives on a multipolar order, 2021
Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century, Jun 28, 2017
Bilateral Perspectives on Regional Security, 2012
The hallmark of Australia's defense politics has been its dependence on great and powerful friend... more The hallmark of Australia's defense politics has been its dependence on great and powerful friends. Australia's reliance on the United Kingdom and British Empire until the Second World War was replaced by its strategic lifeline to the United States during that conflict and the subsequent Cold War. Described as a "half-turning point," this transformation did not mark the clear emergence of a more independent Australian foreign policy but instead signified the transfer of one dependency for another. 1 Indeed, despite regular debates about pursuing a more independent foreign and security policy, Australian strategy has historically been characterized by an expectation of protection along with a sense of trepidation that such protection may not be forthcoming. 2 Abandonment, rather than entrapment, has been the major obsession preoccupying Australia's foreign policy decision-makers. 3
IN SMALL STEPS AT FIRST, and notwithstanding some significant setbacks, Japan has sought to engag... more IN SMALL STEPS AT FIRST, and notwithstanding some significant setbacks, Japan has sought to engage more strongly with India since the end of the Cold War. Exemplified by the 2006 "strategic and global partnership," which encompassed both economic and security relations, Japan's new engagement with India raises some important questions. 1 What has Japan sought to achieve, and how has it sought to achieve it? And what factors have shaped Japan's approach? The demise of the Soviet Union, China's rise, Japan's economic decline, the globalization of the US-Japanese alliance, and India's own receptiveness to deeper engagement have all played a part in pushing Japan toward closer engagement with India. Trade and commercial opportunities have also become more obvious over the years, both as India itself has developed and opened up its economy and as opportunities for trade growth elsewhere have diminished. But the more significant part of this transformation is the strategic dimension, which has evolved rapidly since the mid-2000s. While it is possible to see this transformation as the result of]apan's belated recognition oflndia's growing strategic weight in the Asia-Pacific region, it is a mistake to see Japan's engagement oflndia as just a response to the latter's rising profile. Japan's engagement oflndia is in fact highly dependent on the important changes that have been taking place in Japan's own strategic environment. Two such changes have been especially important. The first was the strategic approach adopted by the United States toward the region over the past decade, including its relations with India. The second was the rapid rise of China's economic and military power in Asia, its troubled relationship with Japan over the past decade, and ongoing questions about its intentions regarding the
National perspectives on a multipolar order: Interrogating the global power transition (ed. Benjamin Zala), 2021
International Disaster Response: Rebuilding the Quad? (ed. Yuki Tatsumi & Jason Li), 2019
Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century, edited by Michael Wesley (Canberra: ANU Press), Jul 2017
United States Engagement in the Asia Pacific: Perspectives from Asia, edited by Yoichiro Sato and Tan See Seng (Amherst: Cambria Press), 2015
United States Engagement in the Asia Pacific: Perspectives from Asia, 2015
US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges, edited by Yuku Tatsumi (Washington, DC: Stimson Center), Apr 2015
The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses, edited by Ian Hall (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press), 2014
Bilateral Perspectives on Regional Security: Australia, Japan and the Asia Pacific Region, edtied by William T. Tow and Rikki Kersten (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan), 2012
electronic journal of contemporary …, 2008
... March 2005. It is edited by Linus Hagström and Marie Söderberg (also author of the introducto... more ... March 2005. It is edited by Linus Hagström and Marie Söderberg (also author of the introductory chapter) and includes contributions from a range of scholars, including Yoichiro Sato, Christopher Hughes and Quansheng Zhao. ...
Asian Studies Review, 2012
Another issue that deserves further analysis is Watt's suggestion that SCAP's decision to place r... more Another issue that deserves further analysis is Watt's suggestion that SCAP's decision to place repatriation under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health and Welfare resulted in the repatriates becoming ''quarantined'' from their role in Japan's colonial endeavours (p. 69). Anyone who has looked at the issue of the repatriation of the Japanese and the difficulties they experienced-particularly in the case of the repatriates from Manchukuo-is struck by the repatriates' obvious lack of awareness of, or responsibility for, their role in Japan's imperialist project. The degree to which this was the result of a SCAP decision is sure to be debated into the future. One very welcome aspect of Watt's book is the inclusion of kanji characters after the romanisation of some Japanese (and Chinese) people's names and place names. While not all names are listed in this way, those that are included make it easier for them to be traced. It would be wonderful if more publishers adopted this practice. While When Empire Comes Home would have benefited from tighter editing to remove some minor grammatical errors and to give some points greater clarity, the main problem with the book is the sheer number of issues that are addressed and, consequently, without the level of analysis they deserve. Yet, despite its problems, When Empire Comes Home is a useful reference for those who require a survey of the issues surrounding the repatriation of the overseas Japanese after August 1945, and the manner in which they are portrayed in literature and film.
Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies, 2018
358 an analysis (842-847), but not in the book. Condensing the book's section on prewar household... more 358 an analysis (842-847), but not in the book. Condensing the book's section on prewar household registries would have given the authors space to unpack the implications of adopting the kokumin/kukmin term for the evolving boundaries of each country's body politic and ongoing debates about, for example, multicultural families, foreigners' voting rights, and (in Japan) married women's surnames. Without such discussion, the authors risk leaving readers with the impression that each people's identity was constituted in stone with these founding constitutions.
In December 2012, Shinzō Abe achieved perhaps the most remarkable comeback of post-war Japanese p... more In December 2012, Shinzō Abe achieved perhaps the most remarkable comeback of post-war Japanese politics by becoming the Japanese prime minister for a second time. Not since Shigeru Yoshida in 1948 has a Japanese politician managed such a feat. In The Abe Restoration: Contemporary Japanese Politics and Reformation, Craig Mark offers an early analysis of the Abe prime ministership.
Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies, vol. 13, no. 4, Dec 15, 2013
Explaining post-war Japanese politics (and society) is a task that often lends itself to outdoors... more Explaining post-war Japanese politics (and society) is a task that often lends itself to outdoorsadventure metaphors. One has to sail through the maelstrom of the immediate post-war period, climb the mountain that was the 'bubble era' and, finally, descend into the abyss that has been Japan's post-bubble 'lost decade' and beyond.
Although not an introductory-style text, the book is nevertheless a textbook, especially in terms... more Although not an introductory-style text, the book is nevertheless a textbook, especially in terms of layout, with lots of diagrams, sub-headings and cartoons. While textbooks of this size are certainly not unheard of, as a text for Japanese foreign policy studies, this one stands out -all together, the book has 576 pages. In addition to the main text, it contains a number of tables and figures, as well as 129 pages of chronology, bibliography, appendices and index. It is detailed, well-referenced and well-researched. Yet, the book, despite it size, has a feel of only just having squeezed everything in. Even at 576 pages, space has been at a premium, and the result is a study notable for its breadth rather than its depth.
East-West Center Occasional Paper, 2024
This East-West Center Occasional Paper is the second of a set of two papers examining how Japan a... more This East-West Center Occasional Paper is the second of a set of two papers examining how Japan and Australia are seeking to employ minilateral institutions to enhance their cooperation and compete strategically in an increasingly contested region. The first paper demonstrated how Japan and Australia have adopted a minilateralist approach that chiefly prioritizes traditional security concerns, in contrast to China's emphasis on geoeconomics alongside its efforts to entrench its global/regional leadership and shape the international order. This second paper considers the strategic objectives underlying China's practice of minilateralism and reevaluates the order-building and geoeconomic dimensions within the Australian/Japanese practice of minilateralism. It concludes that for Australia and Japan minilateral cooperation in these areas continues to lag traditional security efforts, and thus points to the need for the partners, along with the United States, to invest greater attention and resources in these directions to give greater substance to their joint vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: This Occasional Paper was written with the generous support of the Australia-Japan Foundation. The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue. Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options. The East-West Center in Washington provides US and Indo-Pacific government stakeholders and program partners with innovative training, analytical, dialogue, exchange, and public diplomacy initiatives to meet policy priorities.
CITATION: Envall, HDP, Hatakeyama, Kyoko Wilkins, Thomas S., and Hirono, Miwa (2024) “Japan/Australia Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific (II): Advancing Cooperation in Order-Building and Geoeconomics,” East-West Center Occasional Paper 10, 10 June, Washington, DC: East-West Center.
East-West Center Occasional Paper , 2024
his East-West Center Occasional Paper is the first in a set of two papers examining the ways in w... more his East-West Center Occasional Paper is the first in a set of two papers examining the ways in which Australia and Japan have sought to leverage minilateral forms of cooperation as a means of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. The topic of minilateralism is usually treated as response to the rise of China on the part of “Western” countries, but this obscures the fact that Beijing is also a major practitioner of minilateral forms of cooperation. This paper concludes that Australia and Japan have taken a traditional “security-first” approach to minilateralism. This stands in contrast to the more expansive approach pursued by Beijing, which focuses primarily on geoeconomics along with China’s broader goal of becoming a global leader, which has potential implications for international order. This indicates a significant “mismatch” between the respective vectors along which Australia/Japan and China are pursuing competitive advantage, and underscores how Canberra and Tokyo will need to manage the “security/economic disconnect” in the region, questions to be examined further in the second Occasional Paper that follows.
This East-West Center Occasional Paper is part of an Australia-Japan Foundation funded project, entitled “Enhancing Australia-Japan Cooperation: New Approaches to Minilateralism,” undertaken by Thomas Wilkins, Miwa Hirono, Kyoko Hatakeyama, and H.D.P. Envall. It is the first in a series of two papers. The second is entitled “Japan/Australia Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific (II): Advancing Cooperation in Order-Building and Geoeconomics.”
CITATION: Wilkins, Thomas S., Hirono, Miwa, Hatakeyama, Kyoko and Envall, HDP (2024) “Indo-Pacific Minilateralism and Strategic Competition (I): Australia/Japan and Chinese Approaches Compared,” East-West Center Occasional Paper 9, 9 June, Washington, DC: East-West Center.
Griffith Asia Institute Research Paper, 2022
Australia has long viewed Japan as a key strategic partner in Asia. Since 2007, the two countries... more Australia has long viewed Japan as a key strategic partner in Asia. Since 2007, the two countries have been working to deepen their strategic partnership, which was formalized when they signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in March that year.
As a regional order-builder, Japan has come to play an key role in the Indo-Pacific. According to Saori Katada, it has become something of a “pivotal state” driving regionalism and shaping the norms and rules of the Indo-Pacific. Japan is also significant for Australia. First, as an entrepreneurial state engaged in order-building, Japan represents a useful model for Australia as it pursues its own order-building initiatives. Second, Japan’s preferred vision for regional order, FOIP, is well aligned to Australia’s own thinking.
So, what might Australia learn from Japan’s attempts at order-building in the Indo-Pacific? And how might the two countries cooperate more effectively as they pursue their visions for the region? The aims of this paper are to: (1) outline Japanese and Australian approaches to order-building in the Indo-Pacific; (2) compare the two approaches and ascertain their strengths, weaknesses, and differences; and (3) using Japan’s FOIP as a guide, consider options for Australia to enhance its role as an Indo-Pacific order builder and to further develop its partnership with Japan in regional order-building.
Policy Report, 2019
The quadrilateral security dialogue, or “Quad,” was reborn in 2017 to secure a “rules-based order... more The quadrilateral security dialogue, or “Quad,” was reborn in 2017 to secure a “rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.” Bringing together the US, Japan, India, and Australia, the Quad was initially intended as a mechanism for responding to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. However, it quickly became entangled in growing strategic competition across Asia and collapsed in 2008. Although the four countries still sometimes differ in their views of the region’s strategic trends, the Quad’s revival points to a greater alignment of interests this time around. Nonetheless, major challenges to the Quad’s viability remain. First, it is unclear whether the four powers will be able to maximise opportunities for cooperation while ensuring that wider geopolitical rivalries do not again overwhelm the grouping. Second, given that it has been revived to support this “Indo-Pacific” order, the Quad is constrained by the vagueness of the Indo-Pacific concept and the absence of Indonesia.
East Asia Forum, Mar 1, 2024
Australia and Japan's 'hard security' minilateralism focuses on countering China but lacks appeal... more Australia and Japan's 'hard security' minilateralism focuses on countering China but lacks appeal for developing nations. By contrast, China uses multi-layered minilateralism (security, networked, economic, informal) to advance geoeconomic and governance priorities, offering development assistance and building broader relationships. To compete, Australia and Japan should expand their minilateral agenda beyond security, focusing on economics and governance to offer developing nations a compelling alternative.
Japan and Australia have a common interest in cooperating to boost their resilience in the face o... more Japan and Australia have a common interest in cooperating to boost their resilience in the face of coercive economic practices by major powers in the Indo-Pacific. Increasingly, the two countries are pursuing minilateral arrangements to achieve this economic-security goal, with areas of emerging cooperation in energy transition, supply-chain security, as well as critical and emerging technologies. This paper will examine Australia-Japan minilateral cooperation in this nexus between economics and security. It will demonstrate that growing minilateral cooperation is due to its inherent agility and adaptability in the face of a rapidly changing region and also because such arrangements can be easily built on a base of established bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
East Asia Forum, Mar 2, 2024
Japan and Australia, as middle powers in the Indo-Pacific, have a shared interest in using minila... more Japan and Australia, as middle powers in the Indo-Pacific, have a shared interest in using minilateralism to boost regional cooperation, strengthen regional economic order and prevent coercive economic practices, particularly from major powers such as China. While these countries have traditionally relied on bilateral partnerships and multilateral institutions, minilateral approaches have a unique advantage due to their agility and adaptability and are being used increasingly to protect against geoeconomic coercion.
East Asia Forum, Feb 28, 2024
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad, an initiative including Japan, Australia, India ... more The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad, an initiative including Japan, Australia, India and the United States, faces challenges in harmonising its strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly due to India's reluctance to engage on security matters. Despite this, there is an increasing emphasis on maritime security and monitoring Chinese influence in the region. In the future, the Quad is expected to play a larger role by overcoming the different strategic positions among member states.
East Asia Forum, Apr 16, 2016
The ‘competitive evaluation process’ Australia is now applying to decide who manufactures the cou... more The ‘competitive evaluation process’ Australia is now applying to decide who manufactures the country’s future submarines looms as a potential tipping point for the Japan–Australia strategic partnership. If the two countries were to enter into a long term relationship to build these submarines, a closer strategic partnership across the board becomes more likely. But if Australia opts for a German or French partnership, the momentum in Australia–Japan security relations could be seriously eroded.
East Asia Forum, Feb 21, 2024
The Indo-Pacific region is experiencing a rise in minilateral cooperation, with Japan and Austral... more The Indo-Pacific region is experiencing a rise in minilateral cooperation, with Japan and Australia heavily involved in these endeavours to address joint economic or security issues, both independently and through bilateral partnerships. In particular, Australia has pushed for the creation of the AUKUS trilateral partnership for a nuclear-powered submarine program and defencetechnology collaboration, while Japan is part of a trilateral agreement with the United Kingdom and Italy for joint production of a stealth fighter under the Global Combat Air Programme. Minilaterals have the potential to provide a host of strategic benefits and mitigate the risks of strategic contestation in the Indo-Pacific.
East Asia Forum, Jun 15, 2016
Strategic partnerships are becoming central to the management of international security in the As... more Strategic partnerships are becoming central to the management of international security in the Asia-Pacific region. All the major powers and many of the minor ones have entered into multiple partnerships with both friends and potential strategic rivals. China, for instance, has cultivated close to 50 strategic partnerships across the region and beyond, with nations as diverse as Afghanistan, Australia and India. By contrast, India has about 20 or so partnerships and Japan around 10.
Asia Pacific Bulletin, Jun 7, 2016
For reasons largely of poor diplomatic management, however, the two parties [Australia and Japan]... more For reasons largely of poor diplomatic management, however, the two parties [Australia and Japan] allowed their more aspirational hopes for a major strategic relationship to get ahead of the complex realities of the biggest defense acquisition in Australian history
The Interpreter, Jan 22, 2018
Pity the news subeditor in summertime Australia. It’s January, the days are languid, and even the... more Pity the news subeditor in summertime Australia. It’s January, the days are languid, and even the Trump administration can’t fill the entire World News section. Unsurprisingly, then, some headlines published in the lead-up to last week’s meeting between Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and his Japanese counterpart, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, with its prospect of a new security deal, were overhyped.
Nuclear Asia, 2017
Speculation is rife that North Korea’s burgeoning nuclear and ballistic missile programs will spa... more Speculation is rife that North Korea’s burgeoning nuclear and ballistic missile programs will spark a dangerous new Northeast Asian arms race.
The Trump Administration's First 100 Days: What Should Asia Do?, 2017
When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited then US President-elect Donald Trump in November ... more When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited then US President-elect Donald Trump in November 2016, he presented Trump with a Honmas Beres S-05 golf driver embellished with gold and intended, apparently, ‘for players seeking a higher trajectory and slice correction.’ The clubs were well received (even if, as it turned out, they were made in China). So when the two leaders met again in February 2017, they played golf together and spent five hours discussing United States-Japan relations.
ANU-MASI Policy Background Paper, May 24, 2013
Inside Story, Nov 7, 2012
