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Papers by Kristof Gosztonyi

The public and the academic debates about the pros and cons of militias are beset with controvers... more The public and the academic debates about the pros and cons of militias are beset with controversy and tend to ask in general terms whether militias do more good than harm or vice versa. The academic research on militias made significant progress in recent years. However, the conditions under which militias perform better or worse from the perspective of the civilian population are still not well understood. Our paper sets out to explore the factors that contribute to a better or worse performance of militias with regard to civilian wellbeing. We use three waves of quantitative and qualitative survey data from NorthEast Afghanistan to test four hypotheses derived from our qualitative research. The four hypotheses relate to mechanisms which are expected to influence militia behaviour in the sense of making militias less threatening to the civilian population. Using our survey data, we found that the integration of informal local militias into the Afghan Local Police (ALP) was associated with a less threatening behaviour of the militias and a more positive contribution by them to (local) security – as perceived by respondents. We also found that the inclusion of local elders into the vetting procedure of militias (be they informal or formal) has a positive effect on militia performance. Community cohesion and the quality of communal leadership also showed strong correlations with militia behaviour, but their effect was mostly limited to restraining local armed groups (including the Taliban) and making them less threatening. They had only very limited influence on their perceived security contribution. We used extensive qualitative material to explain and contextualise these findings. The report concludes on a set of practical implications for states and international organisations interested in protecting the civilian population from abuses by militias.

During the course of 2015, the number of migrants arriving in Europe more than doubled in compari... more During the course of 2015, the number of migrants arriving in Europe more than doubled in comparison to the previous year. Of those making the journey, Afghans represent the third largest migrant group (14% of registered asylum seekers in the EU), with many choosing Germany as their final destination. This report discusses the causes of this large-scale migration, dividing its drivers into ‘push and pull factors’, and also outlining inhibiting factors. The report is based on field research carried out in four Northern and North-Eastern Afghan cities (Sheberghan, Mazar-e Sharif, Pul-i Khumri and Taloqan). The core of the study comprises 195 guideline interviews with households that have migrant members (61%) as well as with households that do not have migrant members (39%).

The drivers of migration (the push, pull and inhibiting factors) as extracted from 195 guideline interviews conducted in early 2016, explain the growing readiness to leave Afghanistan and to choose Europe (and Germany in particular) as the preferred destination. However, the study found that worsening security and economic prospects, on the one hand, and the stability and welcoming attitude towards migrants in Europe on the other, could not fully explain the dramatic increase in migration beginning in early 2015, and dropping sharply in spring 2016 after the EU-Turkey migrant deal came into effect.

Therefore, the study strongly points to one specific and overlooked driver explaining the significant change in migration dynamics between late 2014 and early 2016, namely a dramatic drop in the financial cost of migration starting in late 2014, and prevailing until early 2016. The cost of migration during this period decreased by approximately 85%, compared to average costs in previous years (from approximately $ 14-17,000 until late 2014 to $ 2,500-3,000 in 2015 and early 2016). The study noted a shift from “smuggler-facilitated” to mostly “self-organised” illegal migration. This shift coincided with a more permissive attitude by authorities in key transit states - most importantly Turkey – in terms of formal and informal administrative and law-enforcement harassment of migrants. The EU-Turkey migrant deal in force since 20 March 2016 seems to have re-established the status quo ante. Since then the costs of illegal migration have significantly risen again (prices are back to approximately 75% of their 2014 levels) and professional smugglers are back in business facilitating illegal migration from Afghanistan to the EU.

This issues paper on subnational governance is developed as part of the Governance Forum Afghanis... more This issues paper on subnational governance is developed as part of the Governance Forum Afghanistan (“Govern4Afg”) programme, an intervention in the Afghan governance sector that aims to promote and facilitate mutual learning and reflection by making and sharing diagnostic observations. The focus of this paper is on the aspects of subnational governance that are part of the state or significantly regulated by state.

This paper has two interconnected, but distinct parts. Part One takes stock of the structural, policy, and legal state of affairs in Afghan subnational governance, underlines the opportunities for improving public service delivery through subnational governance reform, and highlights the challenges, gaps, and areas in need of national deliberation and decision-making. Part Two is dedicated to filling the gap on village and district representation by offering evidence-based conclusions on a potential way forward on the issue. It focuses on the three-tiered structure of development shuras (councils) established under the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, consisting of Community Development Councils, Cluster-Level Development Councils, and District Development Assemblies.

Abstract: Though states frequently attempt to formalise and regulate militias, there has been ver... more Abstract: Though states frequently attempt to formalise and regulate militias, there has been very little research whether such a formalisation can, indeed, improve the performance of militias in terms of greater security provision and reduction of abuses against the population. Using original quantitative and qualitative data from North-East Afghanistan, we show that the integration of unregulated anti-Taliban militias into the Afghan Local Police (ALP) in late 2011 and early 2012 has, indeed, led to an improved performance of these militias in the eyes of the population: fear of militias dropped, while their perceived positive security impact increased when compared to their assessment prior to the establishment of ALP.

Am 22. Juni 2015 griffen Taliban das afghanische Parlament in Kabul an und attackierten damit ern... more Am 22. Juni 2015 griffen Taliban das afghanische Parlament in Kabul an und attackierten damit erneut eine staatliche Einrichtung im Zentrum der politischen Macht. Sechs Monate nach dem Ende des 13-jährigen NATO-Kampfeinsatzes nehmen im Westen Befürchtungen vor einer weiteren Eskalation der Gewalt und einer Machtzunahme der Taliban zu.

Analyse
Seit dem Ende des ISAF-Truppenabzugs kommt es vermehrt zu direkten Kämpfen zwischen afghanischen nationalen Sicherheitskräften und den Taliban. Die objektive Sicherheitssituation für die Bevölkerung hat sich verschlechtert. Dennoch bewerten viele Menschen im Norden des Landes die Folgen des Truppenabzugs Ende 2014/Anfang 2015 optimistischer als noch im Jahr 2012.

Die Anzahl der Gewaltopfer ist seit dem Jahr 2012 landesweit deutlich angestiegen und hat mit 3.699 zivilen Toten und 6.849 Verletzten im Jahr 2014 einen neuen Höchststand erreicht.

Die Zunahme direkter gewaltsamer Auseinandersetzungen zwischen staatlichen Sicherheitskräften, lokalen Milizen und den Taliban erhöhen die Gefahr eines neuen Bürgerkriegs in Afghanistan.

Ungeachtet dieser Entwicklung zeigen Meinungsumfragen aus dem Norden des Landes aus dem Jahr 2012 und von Ende 2014 bzw. Anfang 2015, dass die Befragten mögliche Sicherheitsrisiken des ISAF-Truppenabzugs inzwischen deutlich geringer einschätzen als noch im Jahr 2012.

Die Wahlen und die Regierungsbildung im Jahr 2014, die stärkere Präsenz der afghanischen Sicherheitskräfte und die anhaltende internationale Unterstützung des Landes könnten für die positiveren Einschätzungen der Jahre 2014/2015 verantwortlich sein.

Die jüngste Taliban-Offensive seit April 2015 verdeutlicht aber auch die Volatilität der Sicherheitslage. Es besteht das Risiko, dass diese Entwicklungen die vorsichtig optimistische Stimmung in der Bevölkerung wieder zunichte machen.

Nigeria is one of the most vibrant markets in Africa, with an entrepreneurial business culture an... more Nigeria is one of the most vibrant markets in Africa, with an entrepreneurial business culture and recent reforms in the banking sector that have won international plaudits. Foreign investment historically has been dominated by oil and gas, but has broadened substantially in recent years into finance, private equity, power, telecoms, consumer products and mining.

However, despite Nigeria’s size, and the energy and talents of its people, it has failed to achieve its full potential. The reasons include poor leadership, poor infrastructure and a history of high levels of corruption. The Nigerian market has long been notorious for graft, partly as a result of the country’s reputation as the world leader in financial crime, but also because of the systematic abuse of its oil wealth over several decades by the political class. As a result, many leading investors that might otherwise have flocked to the country have stayed away.

Against this background, this report seeks to answer one simple question: is it possible to do business successfully in Nigeria without involving employees in corrupt practices? The report draws both on Control Risks’ own experience in Nigeria and on the findings of more than 30 specially conducted interviews with senior executives, lawyers, journalists and officials. We wanted to know what strategies succeeded, and, if they failed, why they failed.

Sceptical assessments remain commonplace, and none of our interviewees could offer a ‘silver bullet’ that would avoid all graft-related problems.

Nevertheless, experience shows that it is possible to avoid corruption with a combination of good management, diplomatic skill and determination verging on bloody-mindedness.

The report presents a distillation of our interviewees’ experiences. We share their view that Nigeria presents a particularly tough business environment. It may not be possible to win every battle. Resisting corruption demands a heavy investment of time, determination and ingenuity.

Nevertheless, we believe that it is possible for companies to face up to corruption in Nigeria, and that this is an essential ingredient of ultimate commercial success.

In this paper we present the design of an ongoing mixed method research assessing the impact of t... more In this paper we present the design of an ongoing mixed method research assessing the impact of the international intervention on stability in north-east Afghanistan. Designing a qualitative / quantitative research measuring changes in stability in the contemporary north-east Afghan context faces significant conceptual and practical challenges. The main thrust of the article is describing these challenges and the solutions we developed to overcome them. The first difficulty relates to the definition of stability. Since stability is not a clearly defined concept in social sciences, we had to develop our own working definition. Relying on social scientific classics we defined stability as being composed of four functional fields: physical security, governance institutions, economic development and the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances.

Following the discussion of stability and the indicators applied to measure performance in the four stability fields, we turn to discussing the practical difficulties associated with the research. The challenges range from dealing with security threats, to problems establishing a semblance of representativity in a country without a reliable census and where the administrative boundaries are not or only insufficiently delineated. Turning to the research itself, we present three tools (stakeholder maps, governance zones and scaled indicators) we developed to describe and measure stability in our target districts (the district level is our central unit of analysis). We then present two district case studies to illustrate the use of these tools. In the last section of our paper we present initial results regarding the relationship between some of our security and governance indicators. The presented results are not conclusive, but rather serve to illustrate how we approach the analysis of our data and what questions we intend to investigate in the future.

… in Osteuropa. Globalisierung und Sonderwege, Köln, Jan 1, 1999

Südosteuropa. Zeitschrift für Politik und Gesellschaft, Jan 1, 2003

Berlin: FU Berlin. Institut für Ethnologie, Schwerpunkt …, Jan 1, 1993

Häußermann, Hartmut/Ingrid Oswald, Zuwanderung …, Jan 1, 1997

Potentials of disorder, Jan 1, 2003

THE SEPARATIST CROATIAN Republic of Herceg-Bosna is an especially opaque phenomenon even taking i... more THE SEPARATIST CROATIAN Republic of Herceg-Bosna is an especially opaque phenomenon even taking into account the usual obscurity of Bosnian events. As fighting erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatian Forces under the command of the Herceg-...

The public and the academic debates about the pros and cons of militias are beset with controvers... more The public and the academic debates about the pros and cons of militias are beset with controversy and tend to ask in general terms whether militias do more good than harm or vice versa. The academic research on militias made significant progress in recent years. However, the conditions under which militias perform better or worse from the perspective of the civilian population are still not well understood. Our paper sets out to explore the factors that contribute to a better or worse performance of militias with regard to civilian wellbeing. We use three waves of quantitative and qualitative survey data from NorthEast Afghanistan to test four hypotheses derived from our qualitative research. The four hypotheses relate to mechanisms which are expected to influence militia behaviour in the sense of making militias less threatening to the civilian population. Using our survey data, we found that the integration of informal local militias into the Afghan Local Police (ALP) was associated with a less threatening behaviour of the militias and a more positive contribution by them to (local) security – as perceived by respondents. We also found that the inclusion of local elders into the vetting procedure of militias (be they informal or formal) has a positive effect on militia performance. Community cohesion and the quality of communal leadership also showed strong correlations with militia behaviour, but their effect was mostly limited to restraining local armed groups (including the Taliban) and making them less threatening. They had only very limited influence on their perceived security contribution. We used extensive qualitative material to explain and contextualise these findings. The report concludes on a set of practical implications for states and international organisations interested in protecting the civilian population from abuses by militias.

During the course of 2015, the number of migrants arriving in Europe more than doubled in compari... more During the course of 2015, the number of migrants arriving in Europe more than doubled in comparison to the previous year. Of those making the journey, Afghans represent the third largest migrant group (14% of registered asylum seekers in the EU), with many choosing Germany as their final destination. This report discusses the causes of this large-scale migration, dividing its drivers into ‘push and pull factors’, and also outlining inhibiting factors. The report is based on field research carried out in four Northern and North-Eastern Afghan cities (Sheberghan, Mazar-e Sharif, Pul-i Khumri and Taloqan). The core of the study comprises 195 guideline interviews with households that have migrant members (61%) as well as with households that do not have migrant members (39%).

The drivers of migration (the push, pull and inhibiting factors) as extracted from 195 guideline interviews conducted in early 2016, explain the growing readiness to leave Afghanistan and to choose Europe (and Germany in particular) as the preferred destination. However, the study found that worsening security and economic prospects, on the one hand, and the stability and welcoming attitude towards migrants in Europe on the other, could not fully explain the dramatic increase in migration beginning in early 2015, and dropping sharply in spring 2016 after the EU-Turkey migrant deal came into effect.

Therefore, the study strongly points to one specific and overlooked driver explaining the significant change in migration dynamics between late 2014 and early 2016, namely a dramatic drop in the financial cost of migration starting in late 2014, and prevailing until early 2016. The cost of migration during this period decreased by approximately 85%, compared to average costs in previous years (from approximately $ 14-17,000 until late 2014 to $ 2,500-3,000 in 2015 and early 2016). The study noted a shift from “smuggler-facilitated” to mostly “self-organised” illegal migration. This shift coincided with a more permissive attitude by authorities in key transit states - most importantly Turkey – in terms of formal and informal administrative and law-enforcement harassment of migrants. The EU-Turkey migrant deal in force since 20 March 2016 seems to have re-established the status quo ante. Since then the costs of illegal migration have significantly risen again (prices are back to approximately 75% of their 2014 levels) and professional smugglers are back in business facilitating illegal migration from Afghanistan to the EU.

This issues paper on subnational governance is developed as part of the Governance Forum Afghanis... more This issues paper on subnational governance is developed as part of the Governance Forum Afghanistan (“Govern4Afg”) programme, an intervention in the Afghan governance sector that aims to promote and facilitate mutual learning and reflection by making and sharing diagnostic observations. The focus of this paper is on the aspects of subnational governance that are part of the state or significantly regulated by state.

This paper has two interconnected, but distinct parts. Part One takes stock of the structural, policy, and legal state of affairs in Afghan subnational governance, underlines the opportunities for improving public service delivery through subnational governance reform, and highlights the challenges, gaps, and areas in need of national deliberation and decision-making. Part Two is dedicated to filling the gap on village and district representation by offering evidence-based conclusions on a potential way forward on the issue. It focuses on the three-tiered structure of development shuras (councils) established under the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, consisting of Community Development Councils, Cluster-Level Development Councils, and District Development Assemblies.

Abstract: Though states frequently attempt to formalise and regulate militias, there has been ver... more Abstract: Though states frequently attempt to formalise and regulate militias, there has been very little research whether such a formalisation can, indeed, improve the performance of militias in terms of greater security provision and reduction of abuses against the population. Using original quantitative and qualitative data from North-East Afghanistan, we show that the integration of unregulated anti-Taliban militias into the Afghan Local Police (ALP) in late 2011 and early 2012 has, indeed, led to an improved performance of these militias in the eyes of the population: fear of militias dropped, while their perceived positive security impact increased when compared to their assessment prior to the establishment of ALP.

Am 22. Juni 2015 griffen Taliban das afghanische Parlament in Kabul an und attackierten damit ern... more Am 22. Juni 2015 griffen Taliban das afghanische Parlament in Kabul an und attackierten damit erneut eine staatliche Einrichtung im Zentrum der politischen Macht. Sechs Monate nach dem Ende des 13-jährigen NATO-Kampfeinsatzes nehmen im Westen Befürchtungen vor einer weiteren Eskalation der Gewalt und einer Machtzunahme der Taliban zu.

Analyse
Seit dem Ende des ISAF-Truppenabzugs kommt es vermehrt zu direkten Kämpfen zwischen afghanischen nationalen Sicherheitskräften und den Taliban. Die objektive Sicherheitssituation für die Bevölkerung hat sich verschlechtert. Dennoch bewerten viele Menschen im Norden des Landes die Folgen des Truppenabzugs Ende 2014/Anfang 2015 optimistischer als noch im Jahr 2012.

Die Anzahl der Gewaltopfer ist seit dem Jahr 2012 landesweit deutlich angestiegen und hat mit 3.699 zivilen Toten und 6.849 Verletzten im Jahr 2014 einen neuen Höchststand erreicht.

Die Zunahme direkter gewaltsamer Auseinandersetzungen zwischen staatlichen Sicherheitskräften, lokalen Milizen und den Taliban erhöhen die Gefahr eines neuen Bürgerkriegs in Afghanistan.

Ungeachtet dieser Entwicklung zeigen Meinungsumfragen aus dem Norden des Landes aus dem Jahr 2012 und von Ende 2014 bzw. Anfang 2015, dass die Befragten mögliche Sicherheitsrisiken des ISAF-Truppenabzugs inzwischen deutlich geringer einschätzen als noch im Jahr 2012.

Die Wahlen und die Regierungsbildung im Jahr 2014, die stärkere Präsenz der afghanischen Sicherheitskräfte und die anhaltende internationale Unterstützung des Landes könnten für die positiveren Einschätzungen der Jahre 2014/2015 verantwortlich sein.

Die jüngste Taliban-Offensive seit April 2015 verdeutlicht aber auch die Volatilität der Sicherheitslage. Es besteht das Risiko, dass diese Entwicklungen die vorsichtig optimistische Stimmung in der Bevölkerung wieder zunichte machen.

Nigeria is one of the most vibrant markets in Africa, with an entrepreneurial business culture an... more Nigeria is one of the most vibrant markets in Africa, with an entrepreneurial business culture and recent reforms in the banking sector that have won international plaudits. Foreign investment historically has been dominated by oil and gas, but has broadened substantially in recent years into finance, private equity, power, telecoms, consumer products and mining.

However, despite Nigeria’s size, and the energy and talents of its people, it has failed to achieve its full potential. The reasons include poor leadership, poor infrastructure and a history of high levels of corruption. The Nigerian market has long been notorious for graft, partly as a result of the country’s reputation as the world leader in financial crime, but also because of the systematic abuse of its oil wealth over several decades by the political class. As a result, many leading investors that might otherwise have flocked to the country have stayed away.

Against this background, this report seeks to answer one simple question: is it possible to do business successfully in Nigeria without involving employees in corrupt practices? The report draws both on Control Risks’ own experience in Nigeria and on the findings of more than 30 specially conducted interviews with senior executives, lawyers, journalists and officials. We wanted to know what strategies succeeded, and, if they failed, why they failed.

Sceptical assessments remain commonplace, and none of our interviewees could offer a ‘silver bullet’ that would avoid all graft-related problems.

Nevertheless, experience shows that it is possible to avoid corruption with a combination of good management, diplomatic skill and determination verging on bloody-mindedness.

The report presents a distillation of our interviewees’ experiences. We share their view that Nigeria presents a particularly tough business environment. It may not be possible to win every battle. Resisting corruption demands a heavy investment of time, determination and ingenuity.

Nevertheless, we believe that it is possible for companies to face up to corruption in Nigeria, and that this is an essential ingredient of ultimate commercial success.

In this paper we present the design of an ongoing mixed method research assessing the impact of t... more In this paper we present the design of an ongoing mixed method research assessing the impact of the international intervention on stability in north-east Afghanistan. Designing a qualitative / quantitative research measuring changes in stability in the contemporary north-east Afghan context faces significant conceptual and practical challenges. The main thrust of the article is describing these challenges and the solutions we developed to overcome them. The first difficulty relates to the definition of stability. Since stability is not a clearly defined concept in social sciences, we had to develop our own working definition. Relying on social scientific classics we defined stability as being composed of four functional fields: physical security, governance institutions, economic development and the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances.

Following the discussion of stability and the indicators applied to measure performance in the four stability fields, we turn to discussing the practical difficulties associated with the research. The challenges range from dealing with security threats, to problems establishing a semblance of representativity in a country without a reliable census and where the administrative boundaries are not or only insufficiently delineated. Turning to the research itself, we present three tools (stakeholder maps, governance zones and scaled indicators) we developed to describe and measure stability in our target districts (the district level is our central unit of analysis). We then present two district case studies to illustrate the use of these tools. In the last section of our paper we present initial results regarding the relationship between some of our security and governance indicators. The presented results are not conclusive, but rather serve to illustrate how we approach the analysis of our data and what questions we intend to investigate in the future.

… in Osteuropa. Globalisierung und Sonderwege, Köln, Jan 1, 1999

Südosteuropa. Zeitschrift für Politik und Gesellschaft, Jan 1, 2003

Berlin: FU Berlin. Institut für Ethnologie, Schwerpunkt …, Jan 1, 1993

Häußermann, Hartmut/Ingrid Oswald, Zuwanderung …, Jan 1, 1997

Potentials of disorder, Jan 1, 2003

THE SEPARATIST CROATIAN Republic of Herceg-Bosna is an especially opaque phenomenon even taking i... more THE SEPARATIST CROATIAN Republic of Herceg-Bosna is an especially opaque phenomenon even taking into account the usual obscurity of Bosnian events. As fighting erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatian Forces under the command of the Herceg-...