Massimiliano Simons | Maastricht University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

Papers by Massimiliano Simons

Vi que nao ha Natureza Que Natureza nao existe, Que ha montes, vales, planicies, Que ha arvores, ... more Vi que nao ha Natureza Que Natureza nao existe, Que ha montes, vales, planicies, Que ha arvores, flores, ervas, Que ha rios e pedras, Mas que nao ha um todoa que isso pertenca, Que um conjunto real e verdadeiro E uma doenca das nossas ideias. A Natureza e partes sem um todo Isto e talvez o tal misterio de que falam.

Philosophy Today, 2023

In his essay Down to Earth (2018), the French philosopher Bruno Latour proposes a hypothesis that... more In his essay Down to Earth (2018), the French philosopher Bruno Latour proposes a hypothesis that connects a number of contemporary issues, ranging from climate denialism to deregulation and growing inequality. While his hypothesis, that the elites act as if they live in another world and are leaving the rest of the world behind, might seem like a conspiracy theory, I will argue that there is a way to make sense of this hypothesis. To do so, I will turn to two other authors, Timothy Mitchell and Shoshana Zuboff, to highlight the kind of logic that Latour seems to have in mind. In the final section, I will propose to capture the commonalities of these authors through the concept of shifting reciprocities and will return to Latour's political plea to define one's territories, reinterpreted as reciprocities.

Pro-Fil: An Internet Journal of Philosophy, 2021

Within science fiction the topic of 'first contact' is a popular theme. How will an encounter wit... more Within science fiction the topic of 'first contact' is a popular theme. How will an encounter with aliens unfold? Will we succeed in communicating with them? Although such questions are present in the background of many science fiction novels, they are not always explicitly dealt with and even if so, often in a poor way. In this article, I will introduce a typology of five dominant types of solutions to the problem of first contact in science fiction works. The first four solutions are the more dominant, but also the least interesting ones. There is a fifth category that addresses the question of first contact in a more interesting way, exemplified by the work of Stanisław Lem. This fifth option defines itself as a critique of the four previous categories, or of their shared assumption of what Lem (1967) has called 'the myth of cognitive universality'. Lem is sceptical of the common optimism that first contact will always be successful. In books such as Solaris (1961), His Master's Voice (1967) and Fiasco (1986), humanity makes first contact with an alien phenomenon, but fails to comprehend the phenomenon. Fundamentally, it will be argued that Lem's work shows that in such an encounter we will typically not only lack the right answers to our questions, but that we also often lack the correct questions: we simply do not have the right categories or instruments to even recognize, let alone meaningfully interrogate, the alien phenomenon. The article ends with an exploration of the implications of Lem's pessimism and whether it is the most plausible option for first contact. Moreover, the article will draw some lessons for philosophy of science, by exploring the parallel with the confrontation of novel or deviant phenomena in science. Lem's work is helpful here because it succeeds in articulating what has not always been appreciated in the philosophy of science, namely that the right questions by which to interrogate scientific phenomena are not given, but that their articulation always requires work.

Bruno Latour, in a similar vein, has described Serres as the anti-Bachelard.2 Within this context... more Bruno Latour, in a similar vein, has described Serres as the anti-Bachelard.2 Within this context the project of Bachelard is described as a naive belief in the rationality of science or as a misguided project to purify science from all non-scientific elements. For instance, in his own work, Latour, inspired by Serres, uses Bachelard as the perfect illustration of the paradox of modernity he is attacking:

The philosophy of Louis Althusser is often contrasted with the ideas of Michel Foucault. At first... more The philosophy of Louis Althusser is often contrasted with the ideas of Michel Foucault. At first sight, the disagreement seems to be about the concept of ideology: while Althusser seems to be a huge advocate of the use of the concept, Foucault apparently dislikes and avoids the concept altogether. However, I argue in this article that this reading is only superficial and that it obscures the real debate between these two authors. Althusser, especially in his recently posthumously published Sur la reproduction (1995), appears to agree on many points with Foucault. The real dispute lies not in the concept of ideology, but in its connection with its counterpart, namely ‘science’. Both Althusser and Foucault were in a way epistemologists, focusing on the question of how sciences develop and how scientific practice works. Focusing on their shared background in the French epistemology, with authors such as Gaston Bachelard and Jean Cavaillès, the real discussion appears to be about wheth...

Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie, 2020

The central claim of this article is that post-truth requires a political and socio-economical pe... more The central claim of this article is that post-truth requires a political and socio-economical perspective, rather than a moral or epistemological one. The article consists of two parts. The first part offers a critical examination of the dominant analyses of post-truth in terms of shifting standards of the origin and the evaluation of facts. Moreover, the claim that postmodernism is the cause of post-truth is examined and refuted. In the second part an alternative perspective is developed, centring around the notion of gatekeepers. Rather than linking post-truth to bullshit and postmodernism, it should be understood as a symptom of a contemporary shift in the gatekeepers of truth and knowledge. Knowledge and truth are always mediated in society through the hands of gatekeeping institutions such as journalism or science. Post-truth is a symptom of a broader transformation of the gatekeeping institutions of our current society. It therefore requires a political philosophy of these in...

with the concrete, of mind and object. This relation signifies the knowledge of an isolated syste... more with the concrete, of mind and object. This relation signifies the knowledge of an isolated system. Science “determines objective structures,” as we have seen above. A new, different mode of knowledge must therefore be developed to open the isolated systems to one another. This interor super-scientific knowledge is, according to Simondon, universal technological knowledge (savoir technologique universel): Within the operational inter-scientific if not supra-scientific compatibility a mode of relation to the object is discovered, which is no longer scientific but technical. The technical subject-object relation is richer than the scientific relation. The latter is abstract and concerns a limit case of an object not modified by the realization of consciousness and without relation to the world (isolated system). The technical relation on the contrary considers the object in its concrete totality of its aspects, in its relation with the subject of knowledge and the world. The no-man’s ...

This chapter discusses the Do-It-Yourself biology movement, also known as biohacking. DIY biology... more This chapter discusses the Do-It-Yourself biology movement, also known as biohacking. DIY biology engages in biological research outside scientific institutions, even though many of those concerned have academic credentials. It is not at all ‘against’ science, but dislikes the ways in which scientific institutions straightjacket science. The chapter maps how DIY biology is informed by the anti-institutional ethos of the countercultural computer hacker movement and its ideals of democratic openness, open source, sharing of resources, and decentralization. It dreams of liberating science from its institutional entrapments, of democratizing research by making it accessible to everyone, and of reawakening the sheer spirit of pleasure, fun, and creativity held to lie at the heart of science. The dream of DIY biology is one of ‘science without scientists,’

Philosophy Today

It is commonly accepted that technology and society have always been intertwined. The question is... more It is commonly accepted that technology and society have always been intertwined. The question is rather how we should understand that relation. This introduction to the special issue ‘Technology and Society’ gives a brief overview of the history of the questions related to this intertwinement. The special issue consists of six essays, emanating from presentations at the 2019 conference on Technology and Society at the Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven. It was organized by the Working Group on Philosophy of Technology (WGPT), whose aim is to promote philosophy of technology at the KU Leuven, but also more broadly in Belgium.

Synthetic biology aims to synthesize novel biological systems or redesign existing ones. The fiel... more Synthetic biology aims to synthesize novel biological systems or redesign existing ones. The field has raised numerous philosophical questions, but most especially what is novel to this field. In this article I argue for a novel take, since the dominant ways to understand synthetic biology’s specificity each face problems. Inspired by the examination of the work of a number of chemists, I argue that synthetic biology differentiates itself by a new regime of articulation, i.e. a new way of articulating the questions and phenomena it wants to address. Instead of describing actual existing biological systems, the field aims to describe biological possibilities. In the second part I corroborate this hypothesis through a comparison between early research in the field of the origins of life and contemporary synthetic biologists, who are not so much interested in the historical origin of life on Earth, but rather in a universal biology of the possible origins of any life whatsoever.

Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy

In this article, two different claims about nature are discussed. On the one hand, environmental ... more In this article, two different claims about nature are discussed. On the one hand, environmental philosophy has forced us to reflect on our position within nature. We are not the masters of nature as was claimed before. On the other hand there are the recent developments within synthetic biology. It claims that, now at last, we can be the masters of nature we have never been before. The question is then raised how these two claims must be related to one another. Rather than stating that they are completely irreconcilable, I will argue for a dialogue aimed to discuss the differences and similarities. The claim is that we should not see it as two successive temporal phases of our relation to nature, but two tendencies that can coexist.

Perspectives on Science, 2022

Raymond Aron was a student of Léon Brunschvicg, a representative of French historical epistemolog... more Raymond Aron was a student of Léon Brunschvicg, a representative of French historical epistemology. This article explores Aron's relation to this tradition through three claims. First of all, it contests that Raymond Aron's philosophy of history constituted a complete break with this tradition. Secondly, resituating Aron in this tradition is valuable, because it highlights how Aron's own philosophy of history is to be understood as a normative project, seen as an alternative to that of Brunschvicg. Finally, Aron's philosophy can still hold valuable lessons for present-day historical epistemology and history and philosophy of science in general.

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2021

This article examines how minimal genome research mobilizes philosophical concepts such as minima... more This article examines how minimal genome research mobilizes philosophical concepts such as minimality and essentiality. Following a historical approach the article aims to uncover what function this terminology plays and which problems are raised by them. Specifically, four historical moments are examined, linked to the work of Harold J. Morowitz, Mitsuhiro Itaya, Eugene Koonin and Arcady Mushegian, and J. Craig Venter. What this survey shows is a historical shift away from historical questions about life or descriptive questions about specific organisms towards questions that explore biological possibilities: what are possible forms of minimal genomes, regardless of whether they exist in nature?

Moreover, it highlights a fundamental ambiguity at work in minimal genome research between a universality claim and a standardization claim: does a minimal genome refer to the minimal gene set for any organism whatsoever? Or does it refer rather to a gene set that will provide stable, robust and predictable behaviour, suited for biotechnological applications? Two diagnoses are proposed for this ambiguity: a philosophical diagnosis of how minimal genome research either misunderstands the ontology of biological entities or philosophically misarticulates scientific practice. Secondly, a historical diagnosis that suggests that this ambiguity is part of a broader shift towards technoscience.

Philosophical Inquiries, 2021

Ian Hacking’s Representing and Intervening (1983) is often credited to be one of the first works ... more Ian Hacking’s Representing and Intervening (1983) is often credited to be one of the first works that focused on the role of experimentation in philosophy of science, initiating a movement which is sometimes called the “philosophy of experiment” (Hacking, 1988) or “new experimentalism” (Ackermann, 1989). Moreover, in the 1980s, a number of other movements and scholars also started to focus on the role of experimentation and instruments in science, ranging from science studies (Pickering, 1984; Shapin & Schaffer, 1985; Latour, 1987), Hans Radder (1984) and postphenomenology (Ihde, 1979). A philosophical study of experiments seems thus to be an invention of the 1980s, with Hacking being one of its central figures.

This article aims to assess this historical claim by Hacking and others. First of all, from a broader perspective on the history of philosophy, this invention narrative is incorrect, since experiment has been a topic for philosophers before, ranging from Ernst Mach (1905), Pierre Duhem (1906), Hugo Dingler (1928) to Gaston Bachelard (1934). Secondly, also a possible reassessment of this historical claim in the form of a rediscovery narrative, where Hacking and others merely rediscovered the work of these earlier authors is also problematized. The conclusion, nonetheless, is not that Hacking made no relevant contribution whatsoever to the philosophy of experiment nor that the hype around experiments in the 1980s should be dismissed as historically uninformed. Rather, it leads to a reevaluation of how to assess the history of the philosophy of experiment and Hacking’s position in it.

Instead of looking at experimentation as a fixed research object that is either present or not in the work of specific authors, such an essentialist thesis about experiments should be abandoned in favour of a contextualist narrative that rather asks the questions in what way experimentation becomes a philosophical problem for certain authors and for what purpose. This also enables us to resituate Hacking’s philosophy of experiment, which should not be evaluated solely on the fact whether he was the first to talk about experiments or not, but rather in relation to the specific debates in which he was intervening with these claims. Hacking’s claims, such as his experimental argument for the reality of theoretical entities, therefore, will be situated within his debates with the sociology of science (Bloor, 1976; Collins, 1985), Bruno Latour’s constructivism (Latour, 1987; 1999) and the Science Wars (Hacking, 1999).Ian Hacking’s Representing and Intervening (1983) is often credited to be one of the first works that focused on the role of experimentation in philosophy of science, initiating a movement which is sometimes called the “philosophy of experiment” (Hacking, 1988) or “new experimentalism” (Ackermann, 1989). Moreover, in the 1980s, a number of other movements and scholars also started to focus on the role of experimentation and instruments in science, ranging from science studies (Pickering, 1984; Shapin & Schaffer, 1985; Latour, 1987), Hans Radder (1984) and postphenomenology (Ihde, 1979). A philosophical study of experiments seems thus to be an invention of the 1980s, with Hacking being one of its central figures.

HYLE – International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry, 2021

Synthetic biology aims to synthesize novel biological systems or redesign existing ones. The fiel... more Synthetic biology aims to synthesize novel biological systems or redesign existing ones. The field has raised numerous philosophical questions, but most especially what is novel to this field. In this article I argue for a novel take, since the dominant ways to understand synthetic biology's specificity each face problems. Inspired by the examination of the work of a number of chemists, I argue that synthetic biology differentiates itself by a new regime of articulation, i.e. a new way of articulating the questions and phenomena it wants to address. Instead of describing actual existing biological systems, the field aims to describe biological possibilities. In the second part I corroborate this hypothesis through a comparison between early research in the field of the origins of life and contemporary synthetic biologists, who are not so much interested in the historical origin of life on Earth, but rather in a universal biology of the possible origins of any life whatsoever.

Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science , 2021

In this paper, we investigate how the life and work of Louis Rougier relate to the broader politi... more In this paper, we investigate how the life and work of Louis Rougier relate to the broader political dimension of logical empiricist philosophy. We focus on three practical projects of Rougier in the 1930s and 1940s. First, his attempts to integrate French-speaking philosophers into an international network of scientific philosophers by organizing two Unity of Science conferences in Paris. Second, his role in the renewal of liberalism through the organization of the Walter Lippmann Colloquium. Third, Rougier’s attempts at political negotiations between Great Britain and the Vichy regime during the Second World War. These activities of Rougier in the 1930s and 1940s have so far never been discussed as part of a unified project on Rougier’s part. Based on our investigations of these practical projects of Rougier, we argue that Rougier’s relation to logical empiricist philosophers should primarily be understood on the level of action. Rougier’s projects aimed to proliferate the concrete improvement of society and the lives of its citizens by expunging all metaphysical questions and speculations from the sphere of social discourse. Rougier conceived logical empiricist philosophers as allies to achieve such practical effects in society.

A recurrent theme in the characterization of synthetic biology is the role of engineering. This t... more A recurrent theme in the characterization of synthetic biology is the role of engineering. This theme is widespread in the accounts of scholars studying this field and the biologists working in it, in those of the biologists themselves, as well as in policy documents. The aim of this article is to open this black-box of engineering that is supposed to influence and change contemporary life sciences. Too often, both synthetic biologists and their critics assume a very narrow understanding of what engineering is about, resulting in an unfruitful debate about whether synthetic biology possesses genuine engineering method-ologies or not. By looking in more detail to the diversity of engineering conceptions in debates concerning synthetic biology, a richer perspective can be developed. In this article, I will examine five influential ways in which engineering is understood in these debates, namely engineering as applied science, as rational methodology, context-sensitive practice, cunning activity or design. The claim is first of all thus to argue that engineering must not be seen as something stable or characterized by a fixed essence. It rather has multiple meanings and interpretations. Secondly, the claim is that most of the debates on synthetic biology cannot be indifferent towards the question which conception of engineering is at play, since the specific questions and concerns that pop up depend to a great extent on the precise conception of engineering one has in account. Many of the existing debates around synthetic biology can thus be reinterpreted and readdressed once one is aware of which conception of engineering is at play.

Several sociologists of science have mobilized secularization metaphors to describe developments ... more Several sociologists of science have mobilized secularization metaphors to describe developments in the study of science. Similar to how secularization refers to a decreasing status of religion and God as a transcendent factor in society, the secularization of science refers to an abandonment of Science as something "sacred" and Nature as transcendent. This article aims to explore these secu-larization metaphors, by arguing for a parallel between how sociologists and philosophers of religion differ and how similar disagreements between sociologists of science and the work of Bruno Latour exist, whose work should rather be linked with that of other philosophers, such as Michel Serres and Isabelle Stengers.

The aim of this chapter is to show how Francophone philosophy of science, or what is called Frenc... more The aim of this chapter is to show how Francophone philosophy of science, or what is called French (historical) epistemology, embodies a interconnectedness between history and philosophy of science. Moreover, a novel approach to what constitutes French epistemology will be developed here, going beyond a purely historical survey or a reevaluation of a range of concepts found in this tradition.7 The aim is instead to highlight two methodological principles at work in French epistemology that are often in tension with one another, but are not recognized as such in the literature. This will be done in the first section of the chapter by highlighting some general characteristics of French epistemology and subsequently elaborating these two principles. First of all, there is a primacy of science over philosophy: for French epistemologists scientific practices, and not philosophy, should provide the relevant categories by which these practices can be understood. Secondly, at the same time, French thinkers feel the obligation to make a normative judgement about the history of science.8 The foundation for such normative judgements remains disputed, especially in the light of the first principle.
In the second section of this chapter, this tension will be illustrated by one of French epistemology’s central figures, namely Gaston Bachelard. Both principles are present in his work: the primacy of science over philosophy in his ‘surrationalism’, with his normative judgements about the history of science being present in his distinction between lapsed and sanctioned history. The third and final part of this chapter will further argue that these principles are still at work in contemporary Francophone philosophers such as Michel Serres, Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers, a fact neglected within the literature. Their work must be understood as still being loyal to the principle of the primacy of science, but as dealing with the normative question in a rather different way. This novel approach, that I will call ‘judging obligations’, will be illustrated through the work of Stengers.

Philosophy Today, 2023

Pro-Fil: An Internet Journal of Philosophy, 2021

Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie, 2020

Philosophy Today

Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy

Perspectives on Science, 2022

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2021

Philosophical Inquiries, 2021

HYLE – International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry, 2021

Synthetic biology aims to synthesize novel biological systems or redesign existing ones. The fiel... more Synthetic biology aims to synthesize novel biological systems or redesign existing ones. The field has raised numerous philosophical questions, but most especially what is novel to this field. In this article I argue for a novel take, since the dominant ways to understand synthetic biology's specificity each face problems. Inspired by the examination of the work of a number of chemists, I argue that synthetic biology differentiates itself by a new regime of articulation, i.e. a new way of articulating the questions and phenomena it wants to address. Instead of describing actual existing biological systems, the field aims to describe biological possibilities. In the second part I corroborate this hypothesis through a comparison between early research in the field of the origins of life and contemporary synthetic biologists, who are not so much interested in the historical origin of life on Earth, but rather in a universal biology of the possible origins of any life whatsoever.

Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science , 2021

De Uil van Minerva, 2021

Is de positie van wetenschap tanend in onze maatschappij? Dreigt wetenschappelijk onderzoek gecor... more Is de positie van wetenschap tanend in onze maatschappij? Dreigt wetenschappelijk onderzoek gecorrumpeerd te worden door economische belangen? Falen de huidige wetenschappelijke instituten in hun taak objectieve en repliceerbare kennis voort te brengen? Om zinvolle antwoorden te krijgen op deze vragen kan je helaas niet bij de doorsnee wetenschapsfilosoof terecht. Ergens in de 20e-eeuwse geschiedenis lijkt wetenschapsfilosofie de ambitie te hebben opgegeven om een politieke en maatschappijkritische taak op zich te nemen. De genealogie van die gemiste kans vraagt om een apart historisch onderzoek. Toch zijn er ook studies die instrumenten aanreiken om iets met deze onderwerpen te doen. Zij kunnen de weg tonen naar de mogelijkheid van een alternatieve, relevantere wetenschapsfilosofie. Uit de recente literatuur pluk ik drie van deze studies. In haar recentste boek Why Trust Science? (2019) lijkt de historica Naomi Oreskes het eerste vraagstuk aan te gaan. De filosoof Hans Radder focust in zijn boek From Commodification to the Common Good (2019) dan weer op de vraag naar de commodificatie van wetenschap. Ten slotte geeft historicus Alex Csiszar in The Scientific Journal (2018) een interessante geschiedenis van een van de interne mechanismes van wetenschap, namelijk het wetenschappelijk tijdschrift.

This article argues that pseudoscience lacks an adequate philosophical analysis. Using conspiracy... more This article argues that pseudoscience lacks an adequate philosophical analysis. Using conspiracy theories as a case study, it is claimed that such an analysis needs to go beyond a mere epistemological approach. In the first part, it is shown that the existing philosophical literature shares the assumption that conspiracy theories are primarily deficient scientific hypotheses. This claim is contested, because such an approach can only understand what conspiracy theories fail to be, but not what they are and why people tend to endorse them. To develop an alternative, the second part starts from recent sociology of science, applied to conspiracy theories, that claims that both true and false theories are in need of a symmetrical social explanation. However, this opens the path to relativism, because no significant difference between scientific and conspiracy theories exists anymore. In the third section an alternative view is offered in which an analysis of conspiracy theories is possible without abandoning such a significant difference. Moreover, the claim is made that within conspiracy theories the truth value is not the only nor most dominant element at stake, but rather the symbolic structures of meaning are important. The aim of conspiracy theories, and perhaps pseudoscience in general, is then not to know facts about the world, but rather to offer a meaningful framework to live in.

In een opiniestuk pleit Patrick Loobuyck ervoor dat hij zonder schaamte wil vliegen in tijden van... more In een opiniestuk pleit Patrick Loobuyck ervoor dat hij zonder schaamte wil vliegen in tijden van klimaatcrisis. Te vaak, aldus de auteur, verzakken ecologische discussies in moreel vingerwijzen en het aanpraten van een slecht geweten. Zo'n individueel gedrag kan nooit de oplossing zijn, want is te kleinschalig en ineffectief. Hij pleit er dus voor dat we allemaal collectief realiseren dat we individuen zijn. Volgens Loobuyck moeten we eerder inspelen op wat hij, in navolging van de filosoof John Rawls, de basisstructuren van onze maatschappij noemt. Niet stoppen met vliegen, maar een CO2-taks. We moeten naar een maatschappij waarin mensen, ondanks hun persoonlijke voorkeuren, toch het goede doen omdat de juiste incentives en structuren aanwezig zijn. Een louter individueel perspectief is inderdaad niet de oplossing. Loobuyck is in die boodschap noch nieuw noch alleen, en je vindt het in uitgewerkte varianten ook in het werk van diverse auteurs, gaande van Naomi Klein, Ludo De Witte tot Matthias Lievens en Anneleen Kenis. De klimaatcrisis speelt op wereldschaal en een keer minder douchen of eens de trein nemen in plaats van het vliegtuig lost het probleem niet op. We hebben veel sympathie voor dit punt, maar vrezen dat dit uitmondt in een te sterke tegenstelling tussen het individuele en het collectieve-iets wat in de analyse van Klein, De Witte, Lievens en Kenis niet het geval is. Daarom is het nuttig een aantal spanningen en problemen op tafel te leggen en een pleidooi te houden om, geïnspireerd door de klimaatcrisis, een filosofische analyse uit te werken van een concept dat hierbij vaak gebezigd, maar zelden onderzocht wordt, namelijk dat van activisme.

Het ongeluk maakt zich van de ziel meester en stempelt haar tot op de bodem met zijn slavenmerk. -

Onder de filosofen is Auguste Comte zeker een van minst populaire. Dat echter niet omwille van de... more Onder de filosofen is Auguste Comte zeker een van minst populaire. Dat echter niet omwille van de afkeer die hij opwekt, maar eerder wegens een gebrek aan interesse. Comte wordt beschouwd als een saai filosofisch figuur, die men hoogstens uit historisch oogpunt even noemt om de leemte in het 19e-eeuwse Franse denklandschap op te vullen of als een ietwat geforceerde antagonist in hedendaagse debatten. Zijn positivisme is niet enkel saai, maar zou ook elke metafysische magie bij voorbaat uitsluiten, en dus eender welke interessante filosofie. Ik wil betogen dat dit beeld geheel verkeerd is. Sterker nog, Comte heeft juist de deur opengezet voor een van de meest interessante metafysische pistes van onze tijd. Twee dingen zullen hier beargumenteerd worden. Allereerst dat het positivisme van Comte onterecht een slechte reputatie heeft, aangezien het vaak verkeerd begrepen wordt. Ten tweede dat zijn voorgeschreven metafysisch dieet aan de grondslag ligt van het aanboren van een nieuwe metafysische ader, namelijk die aan het werk binnen de wetenschappen zelf. Zijn dissidente volgelingen, gaande van Gaston Bachelard tot Michel Serres, zetten de poort open voor een nieuw soort metafysica. Net wanneer de filosofen hun metafysische ambities een halt toe roepen, komt er ruimte om in te zien dat wetenschappelijke praktijken altijd al een interne metafysische productie hebben gehad.

Verrassend misschien voor filosofen buiten Frankrijk, maar in Parijs is wetenschap altijd een obj... more Verrassend misschien voor filosofen buiten Frankrijk, maar in Parijs is wetenschap altijd een object van filosofische reflectie geweest – niet in de vorm van de analytische wetenschapsfilosofie zoals die buiten Frankrijk wordt onderwezen, maar onder de noemer van historische epistemologie, of soms ook wel kortweg épistémologie genoemd. Epistemologie wordt dan ook niet opgevat als de studie van kennis in het algemeen, maar van de wetenschappelijke kennis. Het is met andere woorden dus een vorm van Franse, continentale wetenschapsfilosofie.

Louis Althusser’s most famous works are probably Pour Marx (1965) and Lire le Capital (1965). In ... more Louis Althusser’s most famous works are probably Pour Marx (1965) and Lire le Capital (1965). In these works Althusser gives a radical, antihumanistic rereading of Marxism. And although he made some major changes in his theories during his later life, to one ‘thesis’ he remained loyal: Marxism is a science which opens up the ‘continent of history’. This however seems to be a rather strange claim, because Marxism seems to satisfy none of the traditional conditions of scientificity. So, how can Althusser make this claim? To make his claim plausible, it seems to be necessary to draw on an often forgotten tradition in French philosophy, namely ‘French epistemology’, and particularly the work of Gaston Bachelard. Using Bachelard’s writings on the ‘epistemological break’ and ‘epistemological obstacles’ a plausible reading of Althusser’s claim seems to be possible, but it raises problems as well: Bachelard’s work seems to be applicable above all on the ‘exact sciences’, such as chemistry, while Althusser’s intention is to apply it on the human sciences as well, namely the science of history and economics. So, to what extent does Althusser's claim remain tenable?

Foucault offers us an innovative way to understand power and resistance, but a philosophy which m... more Foucault offers us an innovative way to understand power and resistance, but a philosophy which merely focuses on humans. Starting from the work of authors such as Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, however, it is possible to ask: can there be a theory of the resistance of things as well? In the work of these authors the idea is present that agency should not be limited to humans alone, but that the non-humans which are involved in the networks can possess agency as well. The idea that things are just ‘passive objects’ is the outcome of a far-reaching disciplining of the things. So things can play a crucial role in both the constitution of power relations and in the case of resistance. I will illustrate this throughout a brief examination of two concrete examples: the case of the ecological crisis by using the work of Bruno Latour; and secondly the case of mnemotechnics in the current crisis of capitalism through the work of Bernard Stiegler. I will argue that these examples show us the feasibility of redefining politics, following Latour, as the ‘progressive composition of our common world.'

Synthetic biology is a new scientific field that gained prominence from the early 2000s. It has b... more Synthetic biology is a new scientific field that gained prominence from the early 2000s. It has been defined as the engineering of biology and the promises that it holds are enormous. The aim of this thesis is to understand the practices of synthetic biologists philosophically: what are synthetic biologists actually aiming for and how does it differ from other and earlier approaches to biology? The main focus is on the idea that synthetic biology aims to construct, synthetize and design biological systems. What do these terms entail and how do they differ from other scientific practices? This thesis explores these questions through four chapters. The first chapter deals with the different conceptions of constructivism in philosophy of science, namely the idea that science does not describe, but constructs its object. It offers a classification of the different programs that have been developed under this banner, as well as an origin story of these constructivist claims. One form of constructivism, which I call constructive realism, is defended and elaborated, mainly through an examination of the work of Bruno Latour. It is a form of constructivism that concerns not so much the construction of cognitive beliefs, but one concerned with material interventions and transformations of the world. Constructive realism is perhaps better dissociated from forms of social constructionism, and linked to claims found in French epistemologists, such as Gaston Bachelard, or in philosophers of experiment, such as Ian Hacking. If constructive realism is indeed a tenable position, how should we then face the challenge of synthetic biology? In order to meet this challenge, the second chapter introduces the conceptual distinction between regimes of articulation and regimes of purification. Construction must be understood not only as a practice of constructing beliefs or theories that answer specific questions (what I call purification), but also as constructing novel phenomena and data domains that shape new questions to be asked (what I call articulation). Moreover, such a conceptual distinction offers us a new normative framework, inspired by Vinciane Despret: science can be criticized, not only for giving poor answers, but also for asking poor questions. These conceptual tools are subsequently mobilized to argue that the specificity of synthetic biology resides in a novel regime of articulation: it differs from earlier episodes in biology by articulating new data domains and therefore enabling radically new questions to be asked. The third chapter explores this shift through the history of the life sciences, more particularly the history of molecular biology. Following Evelyn Fox Keller, a strong scepticism towards formal and mathematical proofs in early experimental and molecular biology must be acknowledged. This was a result of seeing nature as a trickster, an unpredictable 'raven' that always produced new surprises. The specific mechanisms of biological cells were a product of contingent evolutionary histories that escape prediction by formal approaches. The chapter argues that this has shifted in recent decades, mainly due to the development of genomics and the Human Genome Project. Within these new developments, formal approaches became feasible and attractive, mainly due to the different nature of data to be considered. Through an examination of the cases of systems biology, Artificial Life and synthetic biology, I argue that within these novel disciplines a different attitude towards contingency and complexity is maintained: one that neither ignores nor celebrates, but rather acknowledges complexity precisely in order to surpass it. This is what I call the postcomplex regime of articulation. By taking the case of the transformation of the question on the origins of life as exemplary, the claim is defended that these postcomplex life sciences are interested in articulating a universal biology rather than the particular, contingent 'terrestrial' biology. Life can only be understood by going beyond the particular and the messy towards the universal and the necessary. Here biology and engineering finally meet. For in this shift towards more formal and abstract approaches, an engineering angle becomes visible and feasible. To understand this process, chapter four sketches the parallel and the all-too-often-forgotten history of engineering. For engineering has a history of its own; it was not just waiting outside of history to enter the scene. Too often engineering and its history have been ignored at the cost of a focus on theory and science. This final chapter, therefore, develops two claims. First of all, engineering is understood as a specific attitude, namely one where it is not nature who is the trickster, but rather the engineers: they possess what one could call mētis, or a cunning spirit. The aim of the engineer, exemplified by Odysseus and his Trojan Horse, is that of tricking the opponent into doing things that he was not 'intended' to do. In the case of synthetic biology, this opponent is biological nature. Secondly, more recent shifts in 20th century engineering are examined, which center around the question of how to situate this mētis in a range of practices that aspire to be scientific. Since the 1970s, I argue, the notion of design has offered a promising way out: design science, although contested in content, could offer a mold in which this mētis could be shaped as a respectable scientific approach. A number of recent graduates, trained according to these new engineering curricula, became the key players in synthetic biology. As a Trojan Horse, mētis was smuggled into biology by means of the augmented status of design science. Nature as a raven-trickster, however, was mostly thrown out in this process. In the epilogue, finally, I highlight some alternative voices in biology, both in ethology and in fields more akin to synthetic biology, such as biomimicry and metagenomics. Moreover, I spell out some further consequences of the views that I develop in this thesis, mainly concerning the broader concept of technoscience and the political dimension of articulation and purification.

Het werk van Louis Althusser is vandaag de dag grotendeels vergeten. Het verdwijnen van de intere... more Het werk van Louis Althusser is vandaag de dag grotendeels vergeten. Het verdwijnen van de interesse in het werk van Althusser lijkt te wijten aan zijn strikt marxistisch discours en met name zijn centrale stelling dat het marxisme een wetenschap is. Voor velen vandaag de dag is zo’n stelling onhoudbaar. In deze thesis heb ik geprobeerd die centrale stelling inzichtelijk te maken door een onderzoek in te stellen naar de grond van waaruit Althusser deze claim maakt, en waarbij de centrale vraag dan ook is: wat bedoelt Althusser met ‘wetenschap’? Secundaire literatuur verwijst voornamelijk naar de psychoanalyse of het werk van Baruch Spinoza als inspiratiebron, maar zoiets lijkt enkel het begrip ‘ideologie’ inzichtelijk te maken, maar niet ‘wetenschap’. Om te begrijpen wat Althusser onder ‘wetenschap’ verstaat, moet men beroep doen op een andere inspiratiebron: de Franse epistemologie en met name Gaston Bachelard.

Het is vanuit het werk van Bachelard dat men Althusser kan begrijpen en vooral via een cruciaal concept: de coupure épistémologique. Om Althusser te begrijpen moet men dus eerst begrijpen wat Bachelard onder ‘wetenschap’ verstaat. Dit is het thema van het eerste deel van deze thesis. Het tweede deel bespreekt het werk van Althusser zelf, in twee fases: in de eerste fase definieert Althusser het historisch materialisme als een wetenschap en filosofie als ‘theorie van de theoretische praktijk’. De taak van de filosofie is begrijpen hoe theoretische praktijken, zowel de wetenschappen als de filosofie, in de maatschappij functioneren.

Vanaf 1967 ziet men zich een verschuiving in het werk van Althusser voordoen. Die verschuiving betreft vooral Althussers begrip van filosofie. Hij blijft trouw aan het concept ‘wetenschap’ van Bachelard. Filosofie wordt gedefinieerd als ‘theoretische klassenstrijd’: de marxistische filosofie moet de strijd aanbinden met de concurrerende filosofieën en ideologieën die hun visies aan de wetenschappen willen opdringen om hen in te schakelen in de reproductie van machtsverhoudingen. De filosofie heeft de taak om deze ideologieën te ontmaskeren en zo de wetenschappelijke ‘continenten’ de nodige ruimte te bieden om zich relatief autonoom, dat wil zeggen volgens hun eigen rationaliteit, te ontwikkelen. In die zin kan men filosofie typeren als epistemologische platentektoniek.

Het laatste deel bestaat uit een poging om tot een wetenschapsfilosofie’ van Althusser te komen, die sterk geïnspireerd is op de Franse epistemologie. Vooral vier concepten staan centraal: object – theorie – methode – praktijk. Het zijn stuk voor stuk noodzakelijke elementen voor elke wetenschap. Ook Althussers eigen claim kan in dit licht worden beschouwd: het marxisme zelf bezit wel een object en theorie, maar geen praktijk. Toch kan het marxisme nog een rol spelen, namelijk als ‘negatieve’
wetenschap die kritiek kan leveren.

Is een ‘sociologie van de natuur’ mogelijk? Dat wil zeggen: een sociologisch begrip dat verder re... more Is een ‘sociologie van de natuur’ mogelijk? Dat wil zeggen: een sociologisch begrip dat verder reikt dan culturele representaties van die natuur. Dat is de vraag die uit het werk van Michel Serres naar voren komt. Onze confrontatie met de klimaatproblematiek, toont volgens hem aan dat we onze conditie niet meer kunnen begrijpen zonder ook de wereld zelf in ogenschouw te nemen. We moeten overgaan van een ‘sociaal contract’, met enkel oog voor mensen, naar een ‘contract met de natuur’, waarin ook de dingen een plaats krijgen. Deze thesis tracht de mogelijkheid van zo’n contract met de natuur te onderzoeken aan de hand van de wetenschapssociologie. Ook wetenschappelijke feiten lijken immers te ontsnappen aan een sociologische analyse, want ze worden gekenmerkt door de afwezigheid van elke sociale verkleuring. Ware theorieën verspreiden zich omdat ze rationeel zijn, terwijl onware theorieën hoogstens aanhang vinden door sociale factoren, zoals ideologie. In deel II wordt ingegaan op het ‘sterke programma’ binnen de wetenschapssociologie, dat deze asymmetrie bekritiseert. Daartegenover plaatst het een symmetrieprincipe: ware en onware theorieën moeten op gelijkwaardige wijze verklaard worden. De inhoud van de wetenschap staat zo ook open voor sociologische analyse. Doch de natuur zelf wordt nog buitengesloten, aangezien het finaal om sociale representaties van de natuur gaat, een natuur die zelfs niet voor de wetenschap toegankelijk is. Een volgende stap wordt gezet in het werk van de Franse socioloog Bruno Latour en staat centraal in deel III: hij neemt zowel mensen als niet-mensen, maatschappij en natuur, op in zijn analyse. Vanuit een reeks wetenschapssociologische studies stelt hij dat het probleem de begrippen maatschappij/natuur zelf zijn, aangezien deze zo worden ingevuld dat ze elkaar bij voorbaat uitsluiten. Als men de wetenschapspraktijk echt wil begrijpen, moet men realiseren dat het steeds gaat om hybride vormen: noch natuur noch maatschappij, maar beide tegelijk. Het zijn noch subjecten noch objecten, maar ‘quasiobjecten’.
112
In deel IV wordt gekeken hoe Latour dit vervolgens toepast op de klimaatkwestie. Zijn stelling is dat het binnen de politieke ecologie niet gaat om het feit dat men nu eindelijk de natuur opneemt in de samenleving, maar eerder dat men beseft dat dit klassiek begrip van de natuur onhoudbaar is. De klimaatcrisis toont dat we de natuur niet meer kunnen opnemen als een externe, passieve factor. We worden daarentegen geconfronteerd met een enorme wetenschappelijke onzekerheid: wat de natuur juist zal doen, en uit wat ze juist bestaat, is niet meer duidelijk. Het onderscheid tussen natuur en maatschappij kan men dus niet meer maken, althans niet op voorhand. Daartegenover plaats Latour het idee van een ‘collectief’. De identiteit van dit collectief is niet bij voorbaat gegeven, kan zowel mensen als niet-mensen bevatten, en wordt via een reeks procedures bepaald binnen wat Latour het ‘parlement van de dingen’ noemt. Latours ‘parlement van de dingen’ kan beschouwd worden als een invulling van Serres’ contract met de natuur. In die zin is een sociologie van de natuur mogelijk, maar enkel via de herdenking van het begrippenpaar maatschappij/natuur. De identiteit van de natuur (en van de maatschappij) ligt nooit op voorhand vast, maar moet bepaald worden binnen het collectief waartegen het zich ook altijd kan verzetten. In die zin, is het wellicht gepaster te spreken van een sociologie van het onbehangen de natuur.

Synthetische biologie zet de vraag naar wat 'natuurlijk' is weer op de kaart. Je kan die vraag ec... more Synthetische biologie zet de vraag naar wat 'natuurlijk' is weer op de kaart. Je kan die vraag echter ook afdoen als irrelevant: er bestaat tegenwoordig niets natuurlijks, want alles is beïnvloed door de mens. Zo'n stellingname miskent echter het belang van het onderscheid tussen natuurlijk en onnatuurlijk en ziet niet in dat dit het debat niet overstijgt – zoals het lijkt te doen- maar eerder zelf de kant van de voorstanders van synthetische biologie.

Synthetisch biologen ontwerpen en herontwerpen cellen. Hun biologische modules steken zo eenvoudi... more Synthetisch biologen ontwerpen en herontwerpen cellen.
Hun biologische modules steken zo eenvoudig in elkaar
dat je er ook als leek thuis mee aan de slag kan, om
antibiotica te maken bijvoorbeeld.

Deze tekst biedt een blik op het landschap van DIY biologie of Do-It-Yourself Biology in Vlaanderen en Nederland, met een focus op ReaGent.

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

Part I, Chapter 2 Alexandra Argamakova "Modeling Scientific Development: Lessons from Th... more Part I, Chapter 2 Alexandra Argamakova "Modeling Scientific Development: Lessons from Thomas Kuhn" in "The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive Transformation" (2018), edited by Moti Mizrahi. ----- More than 50 years after the publication of Thomas Kuhn's seminal book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, this volume assesses the adequacy of the Kuhnian model in explaining certain aspects of science, particularly the social and epistemic aspects of science. One argument put forward is that there are no good reasons to accept Kuhn's incommensurability thesis, according to which scientific revolutions involve the replacement of theories with conceptually incompatible ones. Perhaps, therefore, it is time for another "decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed." Only this time, the image of science that needs to be transformed is the Kuhnian one. Does the Kuhnian image of science provide an adequate model of scientific practice? If we abandon the Kuhnian picture of revolutionary change and incommensurability, what consequences would follow from that vis-a-vis our understanding of scientific knowledge as a social endeavour? The essays in this collection continue this debate, offering a critical examination of the arguments for and against the Kuhnian image of science as well as their implications for our understanding of science as a social and epistemic enterprise.

De Uil van Minerva

kunnen we landen? Politieke oriëntatie in het Nieuwe Klimaatregime, Vertaling Rokus Hofstede, Oct... more kunnen we landen? Politieke oriëntatie in het Nieuwe Klimaatregime, Vertaling Rokus Hofstede, Octavo Publicaties (EPO distributie) 2018, 132 p., ISBN 9789490334253, € 19.50 Het thema van post-waarheid heeft snel weerklank gekregen in talloze filosofische traktaten. Bruno Latour wil daar met dit kleine pamflet zijn bijdrage aan toevoegen. Dat hij zich daartoe verleid voelt is niet verwonderlijk, want het thema hangt intrinsiek samen met zijn filosofie. In eerdere werken zoals We zijn nooit modern geweest en Oog in oog met Gaia riep Latour al op om zaken zoals wetenschappelijke feiten te politiseren. Dat deed hij vanuit het argument dat deze feiten in het geheim altijd al een politieke lading meedroegen, maar dat tot dusver enkel tegenstanders, zoals de klimaatontkenners, dat erkenden. Willen we wetenschappelijke instituten echt beschermen, moeten we hun politieke dimensie expliciet erkennen en versterken.

De Uil van Minerva

Binnen de huidige identiteitspolitiek staan essenties op het spel: een strijd om wat het betekent... more Binnen de huidige identiteitspolitiek staan essenties op het spel: een strijd om wat het betekent man, vrouw, wit of zwart te zijn. Filosofisch zijn essenties echter hoogst problematisch. Volgens sommigen moeten deze 'politieke heethoofden' dan ook eens te rade gaan bij filosofen om in te zien dat ze windmolens aan het bekampen zijn. Paul Cortois trekt een andere conclusie in zijn nieuwste boek, Symbolische essenties. Volgens hem moeten we het geloof in essenties serieus nemen zonder te vervallen in een geloof dat deze essenties ook echt bestaan. Cortois beoogt dus binnen het klassieke filosofische debat tussen essentialisten en sociaal constructivisten (hoofdstuk 1), een alternatief te ontwikkelen, een symbolisch essentialisme. Deze positie wil noch vervallen in een ontologisch essentialisme, noch miskennen hoe de vraag rond essenties "zich onvermijdelijk en waarachtig aan ieder mens opdringt" (24). Wat Cortois binnenbrengt in deze discussie is een fundamenteel antropologisch gegeven, namelijk dat ongeacht of essenties bestaan of slechts een maatschappelijke constructie zijn, mensen er niet onverschillig tegenover kunnen staan. De auteur onderschrijft dus een vorm van sociaal constructionisme, maar enkel op voorwaarde dat er tegelijkertijd enkele fundamentele correcties worden doorgevoerd. In de eerste plaats gaat het om de erkenning van een hiërarchisch onderscheid tussen verschillende soorten distincties die sociaal geconstrueerd worden. Op z'n minst zijn er twee te onderscheiden niveaus, namelijk een reeks fundamentele en coördinerende distincties ('symbolische essenties') en daarnaast allerlei secundaire distincties die op de eerste groep steunen. Sociaal constructionisme maakt dit onderscheid traditioneel niet en reduceert de coördinerende distincties foutief tot alledaagse constructies, waardoor de eigenheid ervan niet gevat wordt. Over wat voor distincties gaat het? Het vierde hoofdstuk tracht daar een encyclopedisch antwoord op te bieden. Maar in feite is Cortois vooral geïnteresseerd in onderscheidingen zoals mens-dier, vrouw-man, leven-dood (Hoofdstuk 2), vrede-oorlog, gelovig-ongelovig en liefde-haat (Hoofdstuk 3). Hij beweert niet dat deze distincties vastliggen noch dat alle culturen dezelfde onderscheidingen belangrijk vinden. Eerder gaat het om wat men -met enig risico -een vorm van 'formeel conservatisme' kan noemen: elke cultuur wordt getypeerd door een reeks coördinerende distincties die zich opdringen en niet

Review of The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a DecisiveTransformation?edited by Moti Mizrahi,... more Review of The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a DecisiveTransformation?edited by Moti Mizrahi, Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 2018, vi + 224pp., ISBN 9781786603401, US$120.00, £80.00 (hardback)

Recensie van Bruno Latour, Oog in oog met Gaia: Acht lezingen over het Nieuwe Klimaatregime. Vert... more Recensie van Bruno Latour, Oog in oog met Gaia: Acht lezingen over het Nieuwe Klimaatregime. Vertaling Rokus Hofstede en Katrien Vandenberghe, Amsterdam, Uitgeverij Octavo (EPO distributie), 2017, 432 pp, € 27,50, ISBN 9789490334239

Hoe bespreekt men een tekst die ongeveer zo oud is als jezelf? Het boek Hoe overleven we de vrijh... more Hoe bespreekt men een tekst die ongeveer zo oud is als jezelf? Het boek Hoe overleven we de vrijheid? van Herman De Dijn werd oorspronkelijk in 1994 gepubliceerd, maar is nu heruitgegeven naar aanleiding van het verschijnen van een nieuw boek van De Dijn, namelijk Vloeibare waarden (2014). Het is aangevuld met een nieuw voorwoord en nabeschouwing, waarin de auteur vooral reflecteert op hoe de situatie sindsdien geëvolueerd is en enkele extra reflecties over het transhumanisme (bij auteurs als Houllebecq of Hottois) toevoegt. Toch voelt het boek niet zo oud en kon het evengoed vandaag geschreven zijn. Dat het jongere lezers nog kan aanspreken alsof het pas verschenen is, geeft aan dat het niets van zijn actualiteit verloren heeft.

Keynote speakers Cristina Chimisso (The open university) Dominique Lecourt (Universté Paris Dider... more Keynote speakers Cristina Chimisso (The open university) Dominique Lecourt (Universté Paris Diderot-Paris 7) Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte) Aims and scope of the conference: Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) must be considered as one of the most prominent philosophers of French philosophy of the first half of the 20 th century. Especially during the 1960s and 70s, Bachelard's work was widely read and his ideas influenced a wide array of authors including Canguilhem, Simondon, Barthes, Foucault and Bourdieu. Moreover, his quarrels with Bergson and phenomenology

Massimiliano Simons | Maastricht University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (original) (raw)

Papers by Massimiliano Simons