Steve Humbert-Droz | Umeå University (original) (raw)
Academic papers by Steve Humbert-Droz
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024
A definition of art attempts to spell out what the word “art” means. In everyday life, we sometim... more A definition of art attempts to spell out what the word “art” means. In everyday life, we sometimes debate whether something qualifies as art: Can video games be considered artworks? Should my 6-year-old painting belong to the same category as Wallis’ Hold House Port Mear Square Island (see picture)? Is the flamboyant Christmas tree at the mall fundamentally different from a Louvre sculpture? Is a banana taped to a wall really art? Definitions of art in analytic philosophy typically answer these questions by proposing necessary and sufficient conditions for an entity x to fall under the category of art.
Defining art is distinct from the ontological question of what kind of entities artworks are (for example, material objects, mental entities, abstractions, universals…). We do not, for example, need to know whether a novel and a sculpture have a distinct ontological status to decide whether they can be called “artworks.”
Definitions of art can be classified into six families. (1) classical views hold that all artworks share certain characteristics that are recognizable within the works themselves (that is, internal properties), such as imitating nature (mimesis), representing and arousing emotions (expressivism), or having a notable form (formalism). A modified version of this last option is enjoying a revival in 21st century philosophy, where art is said (2) to have been produced with the aim of instantiating aesthetic properties (functionalism). Classical definitions initially met with negative reactions, so much so that in the mid-twentieth century, some philosophers advocated (3) skepticism about the possibility of defining art while others critiqued the bias of the current definitions. Taking up the challenge laid out by theses critics, (4) a fourth family of approaches defines art in terms of the relations that artworks enjoy with certain institutions (institutionalism) or historical practices (historicism). (5) A fifth family of approaches proposes to analyze art by focusing on the specific art forms – music, cinema, painting, and so one – rather than on art in general (determinable-determinate definitions). (6) A last family claims that “art” requires to be defined by a disjunctive list of traits, with a few borrowed from classical and relational approaches (disjunctivism).
The Philosophical Quarterly, Dec 20, 2023
Both lay people and philosophers assume that hoping for something implies imagining it. According... more Both lay people and philosophers assume that hoping for something implies imagining it. According to contemporary philosophical accounts of hope, hope involves an element of imagination as input, part, or output of hope. However, there is no systematic view of the interaction between hope and the different processes constituting imagination. In this paper we put forward a view of (i) the kind of imaginings typically triggered by hopeful states, (ii) the nature of the interaction between hope and hopeful imaginings, and (iii) the epistemic value of imagining out of hope. We argue that a paradigmatic output of hope is an immersive kind of cognitive imagination. Additionally, justified hopes constrain our immersive imaginings in such a way as to provide them with a specific epistemic value. Hopeful imaginings are not mere fantasies or wishful thinking; they constitute valuable experiences we can learn from and rely on in planning our future.
According to contemporary philosophical accounts of hope, a hopeful emotion involves an element o... more According to contemporary philosophical accounts of hope, a hopeful emotion involves an element of imagination as input, part, or output of hope. A typical description of a hopeful episode often goes with mental imagery or immersion into the hoped-for scenario: as Ariel is hoping to win the dance competition on Saturday night, he projects himself in the scenario where he visualizes his name appearing on the screen display, quasi-hears the crowd cheering, feels proud, and starts thinking about the national dance competition.
This raises the question: how does hope exactly interact with the processes required to produce a mental image or even an immersive exploration of the desired reality? This is the question we tackle in our paper. Rather than putting forward a new account of the nature of hope, we explore the interactions between hope and the different kinds of imagination.
in Wyatt, J. , Zakkou, J. & Zeman, D. (Eds.), Perspectives on Taste; Routledge, 2022
Past research on folk aesthetics has suggested that most people are subjectivists when it comes t... more Past research on folk aesthetics has suggested that most people are subjectivists when it comes to aesthetic judgment. However, most people also make a distinction between good and bad aesthetic taste. To understand the extent to which these two observations conflict with one another, we need a better understanding of people's everyday concept of aesthetic taste. In this paper, we present the results of a study in which participants drawn from a representative sample of the US population were asked whether they usually distinguish between good and bad taste, how they define them, and whether aesthetic taste can be improved. Those who answered positively to the first question were asked to provide their definition of good and bad taste, while those who answered positively to the third question were asked to detail by what means taste can be improved. Our results suggest that most people distinguish between good and bad taste, and think taste can be improved. People's definitions of good and bad taste were varied, and were torn between very subjectivist conceptions of taste and others that lent themselves to a more objectivist interpretation. Overall, our results suggest that the tension Hume observed in conceptions of aesthetic taste is still present today.
Aesthetic Investigations, Dec 31, 2020
Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional charact... more Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the ‘paradox of fiction’), and has led some philosophers to claim that the emotions we feel for fictional characters are not genuine emotions but rather ‘quasi-emotions’. Since then, the existence of quasi-emotions has been a hotly debated issue. Recently, philosophers and psychologists have proposed to solve this debate by using empirical methods and experimentally studying differences (especially difference in intensity) between ‘real’ and ‘fictional’ emotions. In this paper, our goal is to assess the success of these attempts. We begin by surveying the existing empirical literature and stressing the methodological problems that plague most studies that might seem relevant to the debate, before focusing on recent studies that avoid this pitfall. We then argue that, due to conceptual problems, these studies fail to be relevant to the philosophical debate, and emphasise new directions for future empirical research on the topic.
The Junkyard, Apr 22, 2020
We know, since Descartes (1641), that exercises of sensory imagining (S-imagining) are not purely... more We know, since Descartes (1641), that exercises of sensory imagining (S-imagining) are not purely imagistic: they possess multiple aspects. This much is agreed upon among philosophers but, when the question of the intentionality of S-imaginings arises, agreement seems to unravel.
According to the Two Content View (TCV), S-imagining “has two kinds of content, qualitative content and assigned content” (Kung, 2010:632) – e.g., my image of an apple is about both (i) shapes and colors and (ii) about the fact that it is an apple, rather than a perfect imitation thereof. Advocates of TCV claim that the imagistic content does represent something, but it is not enough to individuate the imagining of an A rather than a B (Kung, 2010; Langland-Hassan, 2015; Martin, 2002; Noordhof, 2002; Peacocke, 1985; Tooming, 2018; White, 1990).
Some, however, have expressed skepticism about TCV. As Sartre claims, “despite some prejudices […] when I produce in myself the image of Pierre, it is Pierre who is the object of my current consciousness.” (1940/2010:4) The intentional object of our S-imaginings is exhausted by a single content treated in a specific way (Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002; Goldman, 2006; Hutto, 2015; Mulligan, 1999; Soteriou, 2013; Stock, n.d.; Wiltsher, 2016,2019).
In the following, (1) I sketch one of the most efficient pleas for the TCV by Peter Langland-Hassan, (2) I give two reasons to doubt the decisiveness of his arguments, and (3) suggest that S-imagining can be captured by the attitude/content distinction.
Art, 2020
Dans cette entrée, après une introduction qui servira de cadre à notre discussion (section 1.), n... more Dans cette entrée, après une introduction qui servira de cadre à notre discussion (section 1.), nous allons présenter et analyser des définitions du concept « Art ». Nous discuterons brièvement les définitions classiques les plus influentes puis nous nous concentrerons sur les principales définitions contemporaines.
Nous verrons pourquoi les définitions classiques sont aujourd'hui considérées comme insatisfaisantes (2.a.), et comment les philosophes, à partir de la seconde moitié du XX ème ont tenté de pallier leurs défauts. Dans les grandes lignes, le problème principal soulevé à l'encontre des théories classiques est qu'elles cherchent toutes l'essence de l'art dans un trait caractéristique qui serait reconnaissable dans les oeuvres elles-mêmes. Les théories contemporaines répondent à ce problème principalement de quatre façons, comme on le verra dans les sections 2.b à 2.d. Les théories sceptiques (2.b.) défendent qu'il est dès lors impossible de définir l'art-qu'on peut au mieux en donner certains caractères typiques, des airs de famille. Les théories relationnalistes (2.c.) défendent que ce qui fait qu'une chose est de l'art est à trouver en dehors de celle-ci, notamment dans les relations qu'elle entretient avec son contexte de création ou de présentation. Les théories néo-classiques (2.d.) continuent à chercher l'essence de l'art dans un trait caractéristique reconnaissable dans les oeuvres elles-mêmes tout en prenant en comptes les réactions sceptiques ou relationnalistes. Enfin, la théorie du 'renvoi de la balle' (2.e.) défend que l'on ne peut pas définir l'art mais seulement des sous-catégories comme la musique, la sculpture, les installations, les performances, etc.
Nous présenterons les avantages et les inconvénients principaux des théories contemporaines. Nous verrons qu’aucune n’est dénuée de problèmes, expliquant pourquoi il n’existe pas de consensus sur une définition de l’art aujourd’hui. Nous verrons également que – à l’exception d’un certain scepticisme qui jette, semble-t-il, trop vite l’éponge – chacune de ces théories amène, par son originalité, à une compréhension nouvelle et plus profonde de cette notion extrêmement complexe qu’est le concept « Art ».
Cova F. & Réhault S. (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics
Testimonies about aphantasia are still surprisingly rare, more than a century after Galton. It is... more Testimonies about aphantasia are still surprisingly rare, more than a century after Galton. It is therefore difficult to understand how a person devoid of (a kind of) imagination actually thinks. In order to outline "what it is like" to be aphantasic, I will start by compiling two qualitative interviews with aphantasics that I will then compare with other testimonies collected in literature and online. The fact that aphantasia is poorly documented may also explain why few philosophers (with the notable exception of Phillips 2014) seem to take this phenomenon seriously – contrary to others phenomena such as blindsight for instance. To redress the balance, the second part of this paper will consider three debates to which aphantasia could contribute.
“Les Opérateurs Epistémiques”, 2014
Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional charact... more Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the ‘paradox of fiction’), and has led some philosophers to claim that the emotions we feel for fictional characters are not genuine emotions but rather ‘quasi-emotions’. Since then, the existence of quasi-emotions has been a hotly debated issue. Recently, philosophers and psychologists have proposed to solve this debate by using empirical methods and experimentally studying differences (especially difference in intensity) between ‘real’ and ‘fictional’ emotions. In this paper, our goal is to assess the success of these attempts. We begin by surveying the existing empirical literature and stressing the methodological problems that plague most studies that might seem relevant to the debate, before focusing on recent studies that avoid this pitfall. We t...
Book Reviews by Steve Humbert-Droz
![Research paper thumbnail of [Review] S. Lepine, "La nature des émotions"](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/118984591/thumbnails/1.jpg)
](Dialectica, 2023
We are now in the age of affectivism (Dukes et al., 2021): while emotions have long been contrast... more We are now in the age of affectivism (Dukes et al., 2021): while emotions have long been contrasted with cognition, they are now seen as a central element of our rational life. Samuel Lepine joins this paradigm, arguing that emotions are cognitive states, source of axiological knowledge, and even an essential component of values.
Lepine’s original contribution consists of an extremely cautious and impressive interweaving of psychological and philosophical discussions of emotions as well as of values. We may take from La nature des émotions a set of entangled statements: (i) emotions are cognitive states distinguished by their evaluative nature; (ii) they are sui generis psychological modes that focus our attention and prepare our body for action; (iii) they are evaluative since we can ascribe a correspondence between the emotion and the value instantiated by the emotion’s intentional object (i.e., correctness conditions); (iv) the correctness and justification conditions of emotions partially depend on the background motivations on which every emotion is based, because (v) values depend on some non-evaluative properties of external objects as well as on the agents’ motivations. These different points fit together to form the most comprehensive introduction to emotions I’ve read since Deonna & Teroni’s The Emotions (2012). Let us examine how.
In her excellent monograph, Margherita Arcangeli offers a defense of supposition as a sui generis... more In her excellent monograph, Margherita Arcangeli offers a defense of supposition as a sui generis kind of imagination. Endorsing a simulationist account of imagination according to which every imaginative attitude simulates/re‐creates a genuine counterpart (visualizing re‐creates visual perception, for instance), she argues against this backdrop that supposition is a re‐creative state of acceptance.
Arcangeli's inquiry concentrates on the most recent literature. She starts by critically examining certain putative features of supposition that place them outside of the realm of imagination (Part I. §1. Phenomenology, §2. Emotionality, §3. Participation). She then explores the positive features of supposition (Part I. §4. Features proper to supposition) and, then, the deflationists' attempts to define supposition in terms of non‐imaginative (Part II. §5. Supposition as non‐imaginative) or imaginative (Part II. §6. Supposition as imaginative) mental states. Through technical and yet crystal‐clear prose, Arcangeli provides what is, in my opinion, the best defense of the imaginative account of supposition to date.
Popular sciences papers by Steve Humbert-Droz
Merci de cette question, qui n’est pas si simple ! Dans un sens, on a l’impression que la colère ... more Merci de cette question, qui n’est pas si simple ! Dans un sens, on a l’impression que la colère est quelque chose qui vient de nous ; de l’autre, la colère semble être une réaction à quelque chose dans le monde. Alors, la colère vient-elle de nous ou nous arrive-t-elle sans que nous n’ayons rien demandé ?
Judith Jarvis Thomson (1929-2020), philosophe américaine parmi les figures les plus marquantes da... more Judith Jarvis Thomson (1929-2020), philosophe américaine parmi les figures les plus marquantes dans l’étude de la normativité et de l’éthique, s’est éteinte ce 20 novembre à l’âge de 91 ans.
Donnez-moi un exemple d'acte qui n'apporte rien à la personne qui le fait. Plus clairement : trou... more Donnez-moi un exemple d'acte qui n'apporte rien à la personne qui le fait. Plus clairement : trouvez un seul exemple valable pour contredire la théorie que tout acte est intéressé (Alf, 46 ans)
Merci Alf pour votre requête. Nous ne sommes pas certains de pouvoir trouver un exemple d'acte désintéressé, mais nous espérons qu'avec un peu d'analyse conceptuelle vous comprendrez pourquoi ce n'est pas aussi terrible que ça en a l'air.
Dans cet article j'analyse le vice politique du gauchisme et du droitisme. A cause de cette malad... more Dans cet article j'analyse le vice politique du gauchisme et du droitisme. A cause de cette maladie infantile de la politique, gauche et droite sont aujourd'hui ridiculisées au point qu'il n'est plus permis de se référer à nos institutions sans recevoir un rire méprisant.
Je définis le gauchisme/droitisme à l'aide de trois conditions nécessaires et suffisantes: 1) son hyper-sensibilités à certaines valeurs qui cause son grand engagement politique; 2) sa double naïveté (manque de maîtrise des raisons pour lesquelles il milite; manque de maîtrise des outils pour répondre aux problèmes qu'il croit percevoir); 3) son attachement exclusif à la valeur paradigmatique de la gauche (l'égalité) ou de la droite (la liberté).
Je présente brièvement la notion mooréenne des unités organiques.
Je présente brièvement l'objet d'étude de la philosophie académique ainsi que les différents cour... more Je présente brièvement l'objet d'étude de la philosophie académique ainsi que les différents courants philosophiques.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024
A definition of art attempts to spell out what the word “art” means. In everyday life, we sometim... more A definition of art attempts to spell out what the word “art” means. In everyday life, we sometimes debate whether something qualifies as art: Can video games be considered artworks? Should my 6-year-old painting belong to the same category as Wallis’ Hold House Port Mear Square Island (see picture)? Is the flamboyant Christmas tree at the mall fundamentally different from a Louvre sculpture? Is a banana taped to a wall really art? Definitions of art in analytic philosophy typically answer these questions by proposing necessary and sufficient conditions for an entity x to fall under the category of art.
Defining art is distinct from the ontological question of what kind of entities artworks are (for example, material objects, mental entities, abstractions, universals…). We do not, for example, need to know whether a novel and a sculpture have a distinct ontological status to decide whether they can be called “artworks.”
Definitions of art can be classified into six families. (1) classical views hold that all artworks share certain characteristics that are recognizable within the works themselves (that is, internal properties), such as imitating nature (mimesis), representing and arousing emotions (expressivism), or having a notable form (formalism). A modified version of this last option is enjoying a revival in 21st century philosophy, where art is said (2) to have been produced with the aim of instantiating aesthetic properties (functionalism). Classical definitions initially met with negative reactions, so much so that in the mid-twentieth century, some philosophers advocated (3) skepticism about the possibility of defining art while others critiqued the bias of the current definitions. Taking up the challenge laid out by theses critics, (4) a fourth family of approaches defines art in terms of the relations that artworks enjoy with certain institutions (institutionalism) or historical practices (historicism). (5) A fifth family of approaches proposes to analyze art by focusing on the specific art forms – music, cinema, painting, and so one – rather than on art in general (determinable-determinate definitions). (6) A last family claims that “art” requires to be defined by a disjunctive list of traits, with a few borrowed from classical and relational approaches (disjunctivism).
The Philosophical Quarterly, Dec 20, 2023
Both lay people and philosophers assume that hoping for something implies imagining it. According... more Both lay people and philosophers assume that hoping for something implies imagining it. According to contemporary philosophical accounts of hope, hope involves an element of imagination as input, part, or output of hope. However, there is no systematic view of the interaction between hope and the different processes constituting imagination. In this paper we put forward a view of (i) the kind of imaginings typically triggered by hopeful states, (ii) the nature of the interaction between hope and hopeful imaginings, and (iii) the epistemic value of imagining out of hope. We argue that a paradigmatic output of hope is an immersive kind of cognitive imagination. Additionally, justified hopes constrain our immersive imaginings in such a way as to provide them with a specific epistemic value. Hopeful imaginings are not mere fantasies or wishful thinking; they constitute valuable experiences we can learn from and rely on in planning our future.
According to contemporary philosophical accounts of hope, a hopeful emotion involves an element o... more According to contemporary philosophical accounts of hope, a hopeful emotion involves an element of imagination as input, part, or output of hope. A typical description of a hopeful episode often goes with mental imagery or immersion into the hoped-for scenario: as Ariel is hoping to win the dance competition on Saturday night, he projects himself in the scenario where he visualizes his name appearing on the screen display, quasi-hears the crowd cheering, feels proud, and starts thinking about the national dance competition.
This raises the question: how does hope exactly interact with the processes required to produce a mental image or even an immersive exploration of the desired reality? This is the question we tackle in our paper. Rather than putting forward a new account of the nature of hope, we explore the interactions between hope and the different kinds of imagination.
in Wyatt, J. , Zakkou, J. & Zeman, D. (Eds.), Perspectives on Taste; Routledge, 2022
Past research on folk aesthetics has suggested that most people are subjectivists when it comes t... more Past research on folk aesthetics has suggested that most people are subjectivists when it comes to aesthetic judgment. However, most people also make a distinction between good and bad aesthetic taste. To understand the extent to which these two observations conflict with one another, we need a better understanding of people's everyday concept of aesthetic taste. In this paper, we present the results of a study in which participants drawn from a representative sample of the US population were asked whether they usually distinguish between good and bad taste, how they define them, and whether aesthetic taste can be improved. Those who answered positively to the first question were asked to provide their definition of good and bad taste, while those who answered positively to the third question were asked to detail by what means taste can be improved. Our results suggest that most people distinguish between good and bad taste, and think taste can be improved. People's definitions of good and bad taste were varied, and were torn between very subjectivist conceptions of taste and others that lent themselves to a more objectivist interpretation. Overall, our results suggest that the tension Hume observed in conceptions of aesthetic taste is still present today.
Aesthetic Investigations, Dec 31, 2020
Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional charact... more Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the ‘paradox of fiction’), and has led some philosophers to claim that the emotions we feel for fictional characters are not genuine emotions but rather ‘quasi-emotions’. Since then, the existence of quasi-emotions has been a hotly debated issue. Recently, philosophers and psychologists have proposed to solve this debate by using empirical methods and experimentally studying differences (especially difference in intensity) between ‘real’ and ‘fictional’ emotions. In this paper, our goal is to assess the success of these attempts. We begin by surveying the existing empirical literature and stressing the methodological problems that plague most studies that might seem relevant to the debate, before focusing on recent studies that avoid this pitfall. We then argue that, due to conceptual problems, these studies fail to be relevant to the philosophical debate, and emphasise new directions for future empirical research on the topic.
The Junkyard, Apr 22, 2020
We know, since Descartes (1641), that exercises of sensory imagining (S-imagining) are not purely... more We know, since Descartes (1641), that exercises of sensory imagining (S-imagining) are not purely imagistic: they possess multiple aspects. This much is agreed upon among philosophers but, when the question of the intentionality of S-imaginings arises, agreement seems to unravel.
According to the Two Content View (TCV), S-imagining “has two kinds of content, qualitative content and assigned content” (Kung, 2010:632) – e.g., my image of an apple is about both (i) shapes and colors and (ii) about the fact that it is an apple, rather than a perfect imitation thereof. Advocates of TCV claim that the imagistic content does represent something, but it is not enough to individuate the imagining of an A rather than a B (Kung, 2010; Langland-Hassan, 2015; Martin, 2002; Noordhof, 2002; Peacocke, 1985; Tooming, 2018; White, 1990).
Some, however, have expressed skepticism about TCV. As Sartre claims, “despite some prejudices […] when I produce in myself the image of Pierre, it is Pierre who is the object of my current consciousness.” (1940/2010:4) The intentional object of our S-imaginings is exhausted by a single content treated in a specific way (Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002; Goldman, 2006; Hutto, 2015; Mulligan, 1999; Soteriou, 2013; Stock, n.d.; Wiltsher, 2016,2019).
In the following, (1) I sketch one of the most efficient pleas for the TCV by Peter Langland-Hassan, (2) I give two reasons to doubt the decisiveness of his arguments, and (3) suggest that S-imagining can be captured by the attitude/content distinction.
Art, 2020
Dans cette entrée, après une introduction qui servira de cadre à notre discussion (section 1.), n... more Dans cette entrée, après une introduction qui servira de cadre à notre discussion (section 1.), nous allons présenter et analyser des définitions du concept « Art ». Nous discuterons brièvement les définitions classiques les plus influentes puis nous nous concentrerons sur les principales définitions contemporaines.
Nous verrons pourquoi les définitions classiques sont aujourd'hui considérées comme insatisfaisantes (2.a.), et comment les philosophes, à partir de la seconde moitié du XX ème ont tenté de pallier leurs défauts. Dans les grandes lignes, le problème principal soulevé à l'encontre des théories classiques est qu'elles cherchent toutes l'essence de l'art dans un trait caractéristique qui serait reconnaissable dans les oeuvres elles-mêmes. Les théories contemporaines répondent à ce problème principalement de quatre façons, comme on le verra dans les sections 2.b à 2.d. Les théories sceptiques (2.b.) défendent qu'il est dès lors impossible de définir l'art-qu'on peut au mieux en donner certains caractères typiques, des airs de famille. Les théories relationnalistes (2.c.) défendent que ce qui fait qu'une chose est de l'art est à trouver en dehors de celle-ci, notamment dans les relations qu'elle entretient avec son contexte de création ou de présentation. Les théories néo-classiques (2.d.) continuent à chercher l'essence de l'art dans un trait caractéristique reconnaissable dans les oeuvres elles-mêmes tout en prenant en comptes les réactions sceptiques ou relationnalistes. Enfin, la théorie du 'renvoi de la balle' (2.e.) défend que l'on ne peut pas définir l'art mais seulement des sous-catégories comme la musique, la sculpture, les installations, les performances, etc.
Nous présenterons les avantages et les inconvénients principaux des théories contemporaines. Nous verrons qu’aucune n’est dénuée de problèmes, expliquant pourquoi il n’existe pas de consensus sur une définition de l’art aujourd’hui. Nous verrons également que – à l’exception d’un certain scepticisme qui jette, semble-t-il, trop vite l’éponge – chacune de ces théories amène, par son originalité, à une compréhension nouvelle et plus profonde de cette notion extrêmement complexe qu’est le concept « Art ».
Cova F. & Réhault S. (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics
Testimonies about aphantasia are still surprisingly rare, more than a century after Galton. It is... more Testimonies about aphantasia are still surprisingly rare, more than a century after Galton. It is therefore difficult to understand how a person devoid of (a kind of) imagination actually thinks. In order to outline "what it is like" to be aphantasic, I will start by compiling two qualitative interviews with aphantasics that I will then compare with other testimonies collected in literature and online. The fact that aphantasia is poorly documented may also explain why few philosophers (with the notable exception of Phillips 2014) seem to take this phenomenon seriously – contrary to others phenomena such as blindsight for instance. To redress the balance, the second part of this paper will consider three debates to which aphantasia could contribute.
“Les Opérateurs Epistémiques”, 2014
Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional charact... more Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the ‘paradox of fiction’), and has led some philosophers to claim that the emotions we feel for fictional characters are not genuine emotions but rather ‘quasi-emotions’. Since then, the existence of quasi-emotions has been a hotly debated issue. Recently, philosophers and psychologists have proposed to solve this debate by using empirical methods and experimentally studying differences (especially difference in intensity) between ‘real’ and ‘fictional’ emotions. In this paper, our goal is to assess the success of these attempts. We begin by surveying the existing empirical literature and stressing the methodological problems that plague most studies that might seem relevant to the debate, before focusing on recent studies that avoid this pitfall. We t...
Dialectica, 2023
We are now in the age of affectivism (Dukes et al., 2021): while emotions have long been contrast... more We are now in the age of affectivism (Dukes et al., 2021): while emotions have long been contrasted with cognition, they are now seen as a central element of our rational life. Samuel Lepine joins this paradigm, arguing that emotions are cognitive states, source of axiological knowledge, and even an essential component of values.
Lepine’s original contribution consists of an extremely cautious and impressive interweaving of psychological and philosophical discussions of emotions as well as of values. We may take from La nature des émotions a set of entangled statements: (i) emotions are cognitive states distinguished by their evaluative nature; (ii) they are sui generis psychological modes that focus our attention and prepare our body for action; (iii) they are evaluative since we can ascribe a correspondence between the emotion and the value instantiated by the emotion’s intentional object (i.e., correctness conditions); (iv) the correctness and justification conditions of emotions partially depend on the background motivations on which every emotion is based, because (v) values depend on some non-evaluative properties of external objects as well as on the agents’ motivations. These different points fit together to form the most comprehensive introduction to emotions I’ve read since Deonna & Teroni’s The Emotions (2012). Let us examine how.
In her excellent monograph, Margherita Arcangeli offers a defense of supposition as a sui generis... more In her excellent monograph, Margherita Arcangeli offers a defense of supposition as a sui generis kind of imagination. Endorsing a simulationist account of imagination according to which every imaginative attitude simulates/re‐creates a genuine counterpart (visualizing re‐creates visual perception, for instance), she argues against this backdrop that supposition is a re‐creative state of acceptance.
Arcangeli's inquiry concentrates on the most recent literature. She starts by critically examining certain putative features of supposition that place them outside of the realm of imagination (Part I. §1. Phenomenology, §2. Emotionality, §3. Participation). She then explores the positive features of supposition (Part I. §4. Features proper to supposition) and, then, the deflationists' attempts to define supposition in terms of non‐imaginative (Part II. §5. Supposition as non‐imaginative) or imaginative (Part II. §6. Supposition as imaginative) mental states. Through technical and yet crystal‐clear prose, Arcangeli provides what is, in my opinion, the best defense of the imaginative account of supposition to date.
Merci de cette question, qui n’est pas si simple ! Dans un sens, on a l’impression que la colère ... more Merci de cette question, qui n’est pas si simple ! Dans un sens, on a l’impression que la colère est quelque chose qui vient de nous ; de l’autre, la colère semble être une réaction à quelque chose dans le monde. Alors, la colère vient-elle de nous ou nous arrive-t-elle sans que nous n’ayons rien demandé ?
Judith Jarvis Thomson (1929-2020), philosophe américaine parmi les figures les plus marquantes da... more Judith Jarvis Thomson (1929-2020), philosophe américaine parmi les figures les plus marquantes dans l’étude de la normativité et de l’éthique, s’est éteinte ce 20 novembre à l’âge de 91 ans.
Donnez-moi un exemple d'acte qui n'apporte rien à la personne qui le fait. Plus clairement : trou... more Donnez-moi un exemple d'acte qui n'apporte rien à la personne qui le fait. Plus clairement : trouvez un seul exemple valable pour contredire la théorie que tout acte est intéressé (Alf, 46 ans)
Merci Alf pour votre requête. Nous ne sommes pas certains de pouvoir trouver un exemple d'acte désintéressé, mais nous espérons qu'avec un peu d'analyse conceptuelle vous comprendrez pourquoi ce n'est pas aussi terrible que ça en a l'air.
Dans cet article j'analyse le vice politique du gauchisme et du droitisme. A cause de cette malad... more Dans cet article j'analyse le vice politique du gauchisme et du droitisme. A cause de cette maladie infantile de la politique, gauche et droite sont aujourd'hui ridiculisées au point qu'il n'est plus permis de se référer à nos institutions sans recevoir un rire méprisant.
Je définis le gauchisme/droitisme à l'aide de trois conditions nécessaires et suffisantes: 1) son hyper-sensibilités à certaines valeurs qui cause son grand engagement politique; 2) sa double naïveté (manque de maîtrise des raisons pour lesquelles il milite; manque de maîtrise des outils pour répondre aux problèmes qu'il croit percevoir); 3) son attachement exclusif à la valeur paradigmatique de la gauche (l'égalité) ou de la droite (la liberté).
Je présente brièvement la notion mooréenne des unités organiques.
Je présente brièvement l'objet d'étude de la philosophie académique ainsi que les différents cour... more Je présente brièvement l'objet d'étude de la philosophie académique ainsi que les différents courants philosophiques.
Fantasy: its nature, norms and value, 2024
Both lay people and philosophers assume that hoping for something implies imagining it (Bovens 1... more Both lay people and philosophers assume that hoping for something implies imagining it (Bovens 1999, 2021). According to a popular account, hoping is typically constituted by fantasizing about a possible outcome (Martin 2011, 2013). This idea, while promising, doesn’t align with two widespread views on hope. First, contrary to wishes, we cannot hope appropriately about anything - e.g., outcomes we believe impossible (Milona & Stockdale 2018; Wheatley 1958). Second, contrary to mere fantasizing, hopeful imagining is supposed to possess an epistemic power (Martin 2013: 88).
In this talk, I argue with Martin that hope paradigmatically involves an instance of cognitive imagination. However, rather than framing hope as involving "free-play" fantasy, I contend that hopeful imagination operates under constraints (Kind 2016, 2018). The cognitive base of hope (i.e., the states on which the hopeful feeling is based) provides the type of constraint that allows hopeful imaginings to have epistemic value. Finally, I contrast hope and wishes, providing arguments to distinguish them (contra Martin 2011 and Kind 2016). While hopeful imagining relies on both a conative and cognitive base, wishful imagining mainly relies on conative states.
Talk on sensory imagination and its impact on affects. The talk explores how aphantasia challenge... more Talk on sensory imagination and its impact on affects. The talk explores how aphantasia challenges the idea that most of our emotions in literary fictions (or about possible scenarios) are possible through mental images.
When mental images pop in our mind or when we decide to create mental images, we may distinguish ... more When mental images pop in our mind or when we decide to create mental images, we may distinguish two aspects of the whole experience: the phenomenal (or imagistic) aspect and the interpretive (or stipulative) aspect. As many philosophers point out, a mere phenomenal experience is not sufficient to determine what mental images are about (see Descartes, 1641; Fodor, 1975; Wittgenstein, 1953). Experiencing cake-like features is not sufficient to determine whether I imagine a cake, a wax cake, or my brother’s birthday (via the symbolic image of a cake). Both phenomenal and interpretive aspects are necessary to determine the intentionality of mental images.
The default view on mental images assumes that these two aspects are a combination of two kinds of content - aka the Double Content View (Arcangeli, 2019; Langland-Hassan, 2015, 2016, 2020; Peacocke, 1985; Kung, 2010; Tooming, 2018). The core idea is that the two contents can exist relatively autonomously: arguably, the same "imagistic content" (or phenomenal experience) can be accompanied by different interpretations or "non-imagistic contents" – this is the multiple-use thesis (Noordhof, 2002).
The Double Content View has rarely been challenged. In this talk, I will join its few critics (e.g., Hutto, 2015; Wiltsher, 2016; 2019; Stock, n.d.) and argue in favor of the idea that mental images possess only one kind of intentional content - i.e., its interpretive aspect. That is the Single Content View. After criticizing the multiple-use thesis, I argue that the phenomenal aspect is better captured not as a kind of representational content but as a way (or mode) of processing a single content - as originally suggested by Jean-Paul Sartre (1940).
According to the default position in aesthetics, aesthetic properties are partially grounded on p... more According to the default position in aesthetics, aesthetic properties are partially grounded on perceptual properties, which we access through our senses. Literary artworks seem to challenge this perceptual view. In response to this, Advocates of the perceptual view argue that we access the aesthetic properties of literary artworks through perceptual imagination.
In this paper, my purpose is to put pressure on the perceptual view enriched by perceptual imagination. I do so by focusing on an "extreme" case; the phenomenon of aphantasia – i.e. the inability to create and entertain mental images.
Drawing from reports of aphantasics subjects on "what it is like" for them to read literature, and given their manifest ability to be caught up by some (though not all) aspects of literary artworks, I conclude that they can access some aesthetic properties – narrative properties. Such properties, however, can be accessed/appreciated without resorting to perception or perceptual imagination.
Models and simulations are widely used in science offering methods complementary to experiments a... more Models and simulations are widely used in science offering methods complementary to experiments and hypothesis testing. Philosophers of science are attempting to answer the following related questions. What are models? How do scientists generate knowledge with models? How do scientists build and use models? There is a variety of alternative accounts that can be roughly classified as representational, teleological, epistemic. In all of these cases, the existence of an intentional agent is explicitly or implicitly postulated.
Our aim is to expose the problems of overcharged definitions of models, provide an alternative deflationary account and show how it contributes to clarify the notion of imagination under constraints deployed in scientific contexts.
It is not the imagination that clarifies what models are but rather model relations that characterise the notion of imagination under constraints.
There is a growing consensus that imagination is not only a matter of mental images. In particula... more There is a growing consensus that imagination is not only a matter of mental images. In particular, some scholars have argued that supposing is a kind of imagination on the same footing as sensorily imagining. This suggests that our capacity to suppose constitutes a psychological faculty that is irreducible to an already known form of imagination or to a combination of other psychological faculties.
In this talk, I will criticize three “simulationist” accounts, which have it that our capacity to suppose constitutes such a faculty because it simulates/recreates a genuine faculty. The first account is by Mulligan (1999), according to whom supposing simulates judging; the second is by Currie & Ravenscroft (2002), for whom supposing simulates believing; the third and final one is by Arcangeli (2011; forthcoming), who argues that supposing simulates accepting.
By using the mode/content distinction put forward by Searle (1983) and others, I will suggest that the capacity to suppose fails to (i) fulfil the conditions for being a psychological faculty because of its content oriented nature, and (ii) that the simulationist account cannot integrate supposition without losing in explanatory power.
I will finally defend that supposition can be considered as a deliberative strategy that is imaginative only by analogy.
Contemporary discussions about imagination make room for a non-visual aspect of imagination, prop... more Contemporary discussions about imagination make room for a non-visual aspect of imagination, propositional (or cognitive) imagination. Following Kendall Walton, literature calls “make-believe” (or “belief-like imagining”) this hidden face of imagination which seems to recreate some properties of beliefs. Make-believe is used to explain our engagement in fiction, our pretending in games, mindreading and hypothetical deductions.
Many philosophers have presented make-believe as an attitude/mode which recreates the epistemic aspect of a belief, namely its inferential role in cognition: “The idea is that instead of adding P as a belief I can add it ‘in imagination’, and since imagination preserves the inferential patterns of belief, I can then see whether a new imagining, Q, emerges as reasonable in light of this.” (Currie & Ravenscroft 2002: 12-13); “It is this capacity of imaginings to mirror the inferential patterns of belief that makes fictional storytelling possible.” (idem, 13) – the same idea can be found in Nichols & Stich’s single code theory.
My claim will be that the inferential role is neither a distinctive nor an essential property of imagination. I will defend that belief-like imagining is essentially a recreation of the phenomenal aspect of belief. This claim paves the way for a unification of modes of imagination under the recreation of an embodied experience, as Roger Scruton brought it to light: “Imagination is a species of thought, involving distinctive features that recur even when the thought is as it were 'embodied' in an experience, as in imagery and 'seeing as'. We might say that it is a characteristic of imagination that it is liable to this kind of embodiment in experience” (Scruton 1974: 113).
Peut-on aller plus loin? • Darwin: « Lorsque nous observons un oiseau mâle déployer de manière él... more Peut-on aller plus loin? • Darwin: « Lorsque nous observons un oiseau mâle déployer de manière élaborée ses gracieux plumets ou ses splendides couleurs devant la femelle, alors que d'autres oiseaux, qui ne sont pas ainsi décorés, ne font aucun étalage de ce genre, il est impossible de douter que la femelle admire la beauté de son partenaire masculin. » Nous ne considérons pas le paon comme un artiste parce qu'il a fait pousser sa queue. Et nous ne considérons pas les oiseaux comme des artistes pour les nids qu'ils construisent, bien que nombre d'entre eux soient des "oeuvres d'art" dans le sens où ils sont le fruit d'un savoir-faire extraordinaire. Je pense que nous devrions considérer les tonnelles des bowers comme équivalentes. En d'autres termes, les tonnelles font partie de ce que l'on appelle le phénotype étendudes produits des gènes de la créature qui définissent l'organisme et qui vont au-delà de son corps-et non des artefacts que la créature fabrique. [...] Nous devrions penser que la tonnelle est pour lui ce que le plumage et les parures élaborées des oiseaux de paradis mâles sont pour eux... (Davies, The Artful Species, 2012: 33). La tentation darwiniste-l'art se réduit à un avantage pour la survie du groupe • Cette fonction n'est pas spécifique à l'art : le sport et la religion confèrent le même avantage (Scruton, 2009, 31) • Même si l'art a conféré un avantage à la survie du groupe, ça ne fait pas partie du sens (meaning) de l'art pour les humains (idem, 32) On peut faire la même théorie évolutive sur l'amour ou l'existence des cours de Justice, cela ne nous renseigne pas sur nos raisons de célébrer l'amour et de favoriser l'existence des cours de
Scheler vs Nietzsche sur l'amour chrétien
Introduction aux théories des émotions basiques, de la théorie du core affect, et de la théorie d... more Introduction aux théories des émotions basiques, de la théorie du core affect, et de la théorie des appraisals
Sigmund Freud et la psychanalyse ne sont pas des sujets d'étude inintéressants en philosophie de ... more Sigmund Freud et la psychanalyse ne sont pas des sujets d'étude inintéressants en philosophie de l'esprit contemporaine. Voici pourquoi.
Cours 2la nature des idées L2-analyse d'une oeuvre Steve Humbert-Droz La nature des idees 3. Reto... more Cours 2la nature des idées L2-analyse d'une oeuvre Steve Humbert-Droz La nature des idees 3. Retour à Locke Une position intermédiaire • Comme chez Descartes, les idées sont des entités mentales / internes à l'esprit du sujet (à l'inverse de Malebranche, donc). • En revanche, les idées semblent bel et bien être pour Locke des objets mentaux. Ex. les idées intermédiaires entre le monde et la pensée; les idées sont perçues par la pensée ➢ Annonce du débat concernant l'innéisme: on acquière les idées (par les sens externes ou internes) ! Locke utilise parfois «avoir une idée» («having an idea») ➢ Imagisme: contrairement à Descartes, Locke semble considérer que les idées sont toujours « imagistiques » (des expériences de perception ou des images mentales) Exemples d'idées: blancheur, froideur, rondeur, dureté, douceur, mouvement, homme, elephant, armée, meurtre Idées et conscience 4. Percevons-nous toujours nos idées? Source des idées: la perception Sensation: perception des qualités sensibles Réflexion: perception des opérations de notre âme A. La perception est la source de la conscience B. Lorsque l'on n'est ni conscient de qualités sensibles ni conscients d'opération de l'âme, alors il est inutile de postuler que nous avons des idées «inconscientes» Les idées simples et complexes 1. Les idées simples Ne ressemble pas aux qualités secondes; ressemble aux qualités premières S'identifient par un critère phénoménologique Combinaison idées simples en une seule complexe Joindre (relier) des idées simples Séparer les idées simples les unes des autres Dans les bonnes circonstances, claires et distinctes Pas toujours claires et distinctes Deux grands principes Compositionalisme • Locke considère les idées comme appartenant à deux classes, simples et complexes. • Les idées complexes étant analysables en composants simples. Empirisme Disposition à produire des idées particulières Ce n'est donc pas une faculté nue qui consiste dans la seule possibilité de les entendre: c'est une disposition, une aptitude, une préformation, qui détermine notre âme et qui fait qu'elles peuvent en être tirées. Tout comme il y a de la différence entre les figures qu'on donne à la pierre ou au marbre indifféremment et entre celles que ses veines marquent déjà ou sont disposées à marquer si l'ouvrier en profite. (NE I.i.11) • J. Bennett (2001): Si p est une vérité nécessaire et que S découvre que p, alors S se rend compte d'une connaissance que p qu'il possédait déjà. ➢ Conséquence: énormément d'idées sont innées avec ce principe. ! Confusion flagrante des connaissances nécessaires et des connaissances innées ! Confusion possible entre connaissances a priori et connaissance innées Réponse de Locke Car si les hommes peuvent ignorer ou révoquer en doute ce qui est inné, c'est en vain qu'on nous parle de Principes innés, et qu'on en veut faire voir la nécessité. Bien loin qu'ils puissent servir à nous instruire de la vérité et de la certitude des choses, comme on le prétend, nous nous trouverons dans le même état d'incertitude avec ces Principes, que s'ils n'étaient point en nous. (I.ii.13) • Soit ces principes sont connus Donc-> empiriquement refutable • Soit ils sont seulement connaissables. Donc-> Vrai de tous les principes et n'identifie pas les plus « basiques » ou « innés » Les vraies erreurs de Locke • Locke a injustement tendance à supposer que l'innéisme doit être une explication de dernier recours, intrinsèquement inférieur à toutes les alternatives. • Locke ne prend pas au sérieux les dispositions innées et ne s'attaque qu'aux théories les plus fortes. • Parfois, ses attaques ressemblent à de la moqueries (personne ne pense que les enfants connaissent des propositions mathématiques en naissant) ➢ Leçon: bienséance philosophique-> même si on a raison sur le principe, il vaut mieux être trop généreux avec son adversaire que pas assez! Noam Chomsky L'innéisme est de retour La grammaire générative L'idée fondamentale consiste à ne pas se contenter d'une description superficielle des langues naturelles, mais de construire une 'grammaire générative': Par 'grammaire générative', j'entends une description de la compétence tacite du locuteurrécepteur qui sous-tend sa performance actuelle en ce qui concerne la production et la perception (compréhension) de ce qui est dit. (1966: 75) • Le retour de l'innéisme les nourrissons humains ne pourraient pas acquérir leur langue maternelle aussi rapidement qu'ils le font en écoutant le fragmenté et imparfaitement conversation articulée de leurs aînés à moins qu'ils ne « sachent » déjà certaines règles élémentaires de structure linguistique. ➢ Pour Chomsky, c'est cette compétence sous-jacente qui devrait constituer l'objet de la linguistique. Leibniz: ces cas particuliers sont fondés sur ces principes généraux. L'absence de consentement universel: Aucun principe n'est universellement accepté par les adultes. Or, si des principes étaient innés, ils devraient être acceptés par tous. Donc ... L'absence de transparence: S'il y avait des principes innés, chacun devrait en être conscient. Or, les enfants et les « idiots » ne peuvent avoir accès à ces principes. Donc ... Le besoin d'enseignement: Si certaines vérités étaient innées, elles n'auraient pas besoin d'être enseignées. Cependant, les candidates les plus plausibles sont enseignées. Donc ... Pourquoi cela ne pourrait-il avoir encore une autre cause, telle que serait celle-ci, que l'âme peut avoir cette chose en elle-même sans qu'on s'en soit aperçu? car puisqu'une connaissance acquise peut être cachée par la mémoire, comme vous en convenez, pourquoi la nature ne pourrait-elle pas y avoir aussi caché quelque connaissance originale? Faut-il que tout ce qui est naturel à une substance qui se connaît s'y connaisse d'abord actuellement? (NE I.i.5) Locke: KK-thesis: si vous savez que p, alors vous savez que vous savez que p K(p)-> K(K(p)) Leibniz: certaines connaissances innées peuvent être cachées et ne se révéler que via certains stimuli. Le décalage temporel: Les vérités soi-disant innées ne sont pas apprises immédiatement. Elles constituent un stade ultérieur de développement et ne peuvent être innées. Le besoin d'enseignement: Si certaines vérités étaient innées, elles n'auraient pas besoin d'être enseignées. Cependant, les candidates les plus plausibles sont enseignées. Donc ... Le surpeuplement: S'il y avait des idées innées, il y en aurait bien trop (une infinité) pour que l'innéisme soit plausible. ➢ A l'inverse, peu de philosophes reconnaissent qu'un tel sentiment accompagne l'imagination (ex., Sartre, 1940; Husserl, 1898). Retour sur ce que nous avons vu en cours Sur les idées ➢Au mieux on peut faire comme l'aveugle qui compare le rouge au son d'une trompette (p.642
Séminaire de philosophie morale (BA)
Introduction à la philosophie de l'esprit (2018) Séance sur H. Frankfurt (1969) "partis contraire... more Introduction à la philosophie de l'esprit (2018) Séance sur H. Frankfurt (1969) "partis contraires et responsabilité morale"
Introduction à la philosophie de l'esprit (2017, 2018) Séance sur N. Arpaly & T. Schroeder (19... more Introduction à la philosophie de l'esprit (2017, 2018)
Séance sur N. Arpaly & T. Schroeder (1999) "Eloge, blâme et moi intégral"
Introduction à la philosophie de l'esprit (2017, 2018) Séance sur F. Dretske (2006) "Perceptio... more Introduction à la philosophie de l'esprit (2017, 2018)
Séance sur F. Dretske (2006) "Perception without Awarness"
Introduction à la philosophie de l'esprit (2018) Séance sur J. Deonna & F. Teroni (2015) "Emot... more Introduction à la philosophie de l'esprit (2018)
Séance sur J. Deonna & F. Teroni (2015) "Emotions as Attitudes"
Philosophie des valeurs (2018) Séance sur les unités organiques en esthétique
A table given to students during an introduction to logic.
My project of understanding the concept of intelligence through the lens of imagination should fo... more My project of understanding the concept of intelligence through the lens of imagination should follow these two horns: (A) to clarify the definitions and desiderata for intelligence by using tools developed in the literature on imagination and (B) to determine the specific relationship between imagination and intelligence.
In order to explain our evaluative judgments that a work of art or an artefact similar to a work ... more In order to explain our evaluative judgments that a work of art or an artefact similar to a work of art (such as Christmas trees, children drawings,…) has either a whole negative aesthetic value despite the positive value of all (or some of) its parts, or a whole positive aesthetic value in virtue of the negative value of all (or some of) its parts, I argue for an organic unity account (Moore 1903; 1922; Hurka 1998; Brown 2007) inspired by the Gestaltist tradition (eg. Ingarden 1945; 1963; Kuhns 1960, Dufrenne 1966).
It seems obvious in Aesthetics, more than in other domains, that simply summing the values of each part of an artwork leads to conceptual absurdity (see, for instance, Lemos 2009). But the remaining question showed up by this truism stayed relatively not discussed in the literature. Why a Chrismas tree, which every Christmas bulb is intrinsically beauty, can appear as intrinsically ugly? How In waiting Godot which is written with a poor vocabulary, repetitive lines, inconsistent psychology of the characters, and without a straight end can be considered as a masterpiece?
In this dissertation, I argue firstly that works of art and lookalike artifacts (i.e. artistic expressions) are unified by the type of intention we can attribute to the author (Levinson 1996; Livingston 2005). Secondly, considering the mereological phenomena described above, I reject the so-called “particularism” in Aesthetics as a satisfaing explanation - a thesis according to which the value of each part varies depending on the context or the genre of an artwork (eg. Isenberg 1949; Sibley 1959; Dancy 1999; McKeever & Ridge 2011; Livingston 2009). I purpose, then, an holist and organicist account inspired by Roman Ingarden according to whom 1) the value of the parts of an artwork (or an artistic expression) does not vary with the context and 2) the difference between the value of the parts and the value of the whole is due to the success (or the failure) of vehiculing the unifying intention.
---
Pour expliquer les cas où nous jugeons qu'une oeuvre d'art ou qu'un artefact similaire à une oeuvre d'art (tel que les sapins de Noël, les dessins d’enfants, etc.) possède soit une valeur esthétique intrinsèque négative malgré la valeur positive de toutes (ou de la plupart) de ses parties, soit une valeur esthétique intrinsèque positive en vertu de la valeur négative de toutes (ou de la plupart) de ses parties, j'avance une thèse organisicste (Moore 1903; 1922; Hurka 1998; Brown 2007) inspirée de la tradition gestaltiste (ex. Ingarden 1945; 1963; Kuhns 1960; Dufrenne 1966).
Il semble évident en esthétique, plus que dans tout autre domaines, que la simple sommation des valeurs des parties d'une oeuvre mène à des absurdités (voir, par ex., Lemos 2009). Mais, pourquoi un sapin de Noël, dont chaque boule qui le compose est intrisèquement jolie, peut-il apparaitre comme intrinsèquement affreux? Et comment En attendant Godot écrit dans un vocabulaire bas, comportant des dialogues répétitifs, des personnages psychologiquement inconsistants et dont l'histoire ne se termine même pas complétement peut-il être considéré comme un chef-d'oeuvre?
Dans cette dissertation, j’avance, dans un premier temps, que les œuvres d’art et les artefacts qui leur ressemblent (i.e. expressions artistiques) sont unifiés par le type d’intention que l’on peut attribuer à leur auteur (Levinson 1996; Livingston 2005). Dans un second temps, considérant le phénomène méréologique étrange cité ci-dessus, je rejette le particularisme esthétique comme explication viable - soit la thèse selon lequel la valeur des parties varient en fonction du contexte ou du genre d'une oeuvre (ex. Isenberg 1949; Sibley 1956; Dancy 1999; McKeever & Ridge 2011; Livingston 2009). Je propose enfin une lecture holiste et organiciste inspirée de Roman Ingarden selon lequel 1) la valeur des parties d’une œuvre ou d’une expression sont invariables selon le contexte et 2) la différence entre la valeur des parties et la valeur du tout est due à la réussite (ou non) de la conduite de l’intention esthétique unificatrice.
Dans ce travail je commence par présenter la distinction entre intentionnalisme fort (représentat... more Dans ce travail je commence par présenter la distinction entre intentionnalisme fort (représentationalisme) et faible avant d’exposer l’argument de la transparence qu’invoquent les représentationalistes contre leurs adversaires. Dans un second temps, je considère les principes auxquels souscrivent les représentationalistes et qui permet à l’argument de la transparence d’éviter les objections qui lui sont faites. Je donnerai toutefois un exemple de perception qui remplit parfaitement les conditions de la transparence, mais qui n’est pas (ou plutôt, seulement faiblement) transparent. Enfin, j’esquisserai une alternative au représentationalisme différente de la thèse des qualia qui met en avant la distinction opérée par Searle entre mode psychologique et contenu intentionnel.
La surprise, bien que souvent associée au domaine des émotions, pose de nombreux soucis aux théor... more La surprise, bien que souvent associée au domaine des émotions, pose de nombreux soucis aux théoriciens des émotions qui se sont penchés dessus. La surprise, en effet, ne semble pas toujours intentionnelle et sa valence semble varier selon les contextes. De plus, une définition naïve de la surprise comme « réaction face à ce qui est inattendu » a comme conséquence le fait que nous soyons surpris dès l’instant où nous n’avons pas prévu que p ; ainsi, tels les très jeunes enfants ou les candides, nous serions constamment surpris par tout ce qui nous entoure.
Le but de ce travail est de régler ces questions en distinguant deux formes de surprises ne se réduisant pas à l’opposition surprise/étonnement, mais à une surprise conceptuelle : la surprise-quoi, catégorie d’émotions partageant le même objet formel (l’étrangeté) ; et à une surprise non-conceptuelle : la surprise-ha, alerte non-intentionnelle qui ne se déclenche que contingentement en réaction à un phénomène inattendu mais qui précède très souvent la surprise-quoi