Boran Berčić | University of Rijeka (original) (raw)

Papers in English by Boran Berčić

HUMAN RATIONALITY Festschrift for Nenad Smokrović, 2022

Author argues that statements of the form X is the best, but I prefer Y are not contradictory or ... more Author argues that statements of the form X is the best, but I prefer Y are not contradictory or self-refuting. To show that, one has to distinguish values from preferences. The relation X is better than Y is understood as purely objective two-place relation, while the relation A prefers X to Y is understood as three-place relation with an irreducibly subjective element. Author rejects the idea that values should be inferred from preferences. Author also discusses context relativity and sortal relativity of preferences.

Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2021

In this article author contrasts possibilism (the view that art is about the logically possible a... more In this article author contrasts possibilism (the view that art is about the logically possible and that it cannot be about the impossible) with impossibilism (the view that art can be and sometimes is about the logically impossible as well). Author argues in favor of possibilism. The main insight is that since impossible objects are necessarily non-existent art cannot be about them, it has to be about something that can exist. Also, author formulates fi ve more detailed views about the issue. Further, author discusses related notions like imaginability and conceivability. Author holds that Hume's insight that an object cannot be conceived as non-existent counts in favour of possibilism. Besides, author introduces the distinction between real and apparent content of the work of art, believing that this distinction can be relevant in the discussion between possibilism and impossibilism. In the rest of the article author analyzes several prima facie counterexamples to possibilism (Jean-Luc Picard, Anna Karenina, paradox of patricide, Escher's graphics) and tries to explain them away.

Prolegomena, 2019

In this article author discusses the problem of the future contingents. He wants to show that the... more In this article author discusses the problem of the future contingents. He wants to show that the same problem holds for a number of related cases like decisions, promises, beginnings, birth dates, moral luck, post-mortal harms, etc. The focus of the article is on the question of when and how statements about the future acquire their truth values. Author argues that truth is a relational property that statements acquire when the events that they talk about occur. For this reason, the meanings of statements like I was right! or I knew! should not be taken at their face value but rather reinterpreted according to the proposed theory. Also, several other accounts are criticised and rejected: causal determinism, thin red line, eternalism and realism about the future.

Perspectives on the Self, 2017

Talking about Cogito as a candidate for the foundation of the whole human knowledge, Schlick said... more Talking about Cogito as a candidate for the foundation of the whole human knowledge, Schlick said that: “Such a statement, which does not express anything itself, cannot in any sense serve as the basis of anything.” (Schlick 1934: 218) He argued that it was a mere pseudostatement. Hans Reichen- bach believed that Cogito “is one of the landmarks on the blind alley of traditional philosophy.” (Reichenbach 1938: 261). No other philosophical movement ever criticized Descartes’ Cogito so fiercely as logical positivists did. They criticized it on every occasion they could. (Schlick 1918: 85, 161; Carnap 1928: 261; Carnap 1932: 74; Schlick 1934: 218; Ayer 1936: 62, 187; Weinberg 1936: 184; Schlick 1936: 166; 184; Reichenbach 1938: 261; Von Mises 1939: 173; Reichenbach 1951: 35) This is understandable because they were radical empiricists. They firmly believed that no factual knowledge can be obtained a priori, by reason alone, and Descartes’ Cogito was seen as a raw model of rationalistic philosophy, perhaps of philosophy in general.

Thought Experiments between Nature and Society: A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević, 2017

The idea that nations are social constructs can also be spelled out, so to speak, from the indivi... more The idea that nations are social constructs can also be spelled out, so to speak, from the individual perspective. We can say that:

X is an A, iff he declares himself as an A.

Where x is an individual, A is a nation, and the relation x is an A stands for individual x is of nationality A, or individual x belongs to a nation A, or x is an A. ... This definition can be further developed in the following way:

X is an A iff:
(1) X believes he is an A.
(2) Others believe that x is an A.
(3) X believes that others believe that he is an A.

Etica & Politica, 2016

In his book In A Better World? Public Reason and Biotechnologies Elvio Baccarini discusses (and u... more In his book In A Better World? Public Reason and Biotechnologies Elvio Baccarini discusses (and ultimately rejects) the argument that genetic engineering might deepen the inequalities in the society. However, this argument is grounded on the implicit assumption that financially successful people have certain characteristic C that explains their financial success, and that the lack of this characteristic explains why financially unsuccessful people are financially unsuccessful. This assumption is widely accepted, by Nagel, Rawls, Nozick, and many others. In this article I try to show that this implicit assumption is simply false. There is no such characteristic C. There is no independently identifiable single capability, talent, or asset that explains why rich people are rich and why poor people are poor. Social inequalities cannot be explained as effects of the inegualities in talents.

Anthropology & Philosophy, 2015

In this article author tries to answer a notorious question What is Philosophy? Author argues tha... more In this article author tries to answer a notorious question What is Philosophy? Author argues that philosophy is a reflection about the way in which we justify our beliefs and actions. A normative person inevitably poses a question Am I right? And this is seen as a source of philosophy. Sceptic and amoralist do not have to exist as real people, they are only didactical means. Therefore, philosophy is seen as an meta activity, normative in its nature.

Unpublished, 2015

The main point author wants to show in this article is that the Idle argument for fatalism is uns... more The main point author wants to show in this article is that the Idle argument for fatalism is unsound because its premises are either irrelevant or false. If premises are understood as necessary truths of logic, they fall into bare tautologies or at best into vacuous conceptual truths, while a conclusion is, or at least is supposed to be, a substantial claim about our alleged inability to influence the course of events. In that case premises are irrelevant for the truth of conclusion. On the other hand, if they are understood as empirical claims, they seem to be simply false. Also, author (i) tries to show that in the original Cicero's formulation fatalist begs the question; (ii) tries to precisely explain the difference between the Idle argument and the Sea-battle argument; (iii) wants to show that the Idle argument seems sound because of the ambiguity between empirical and logical reading of the premises; and (iv) show that the fatalism should be understood as an ultimately empirical claim.

Prolegomena 12, 2013

I wish to use this occasion to express gratitude to all the colleagues who participated at the Ja... more I wish to use this occasion to express gratitude to all the colleagues who participated at the Jam Session Conference, held in Rijeka on February 14th and 15th 2013. Since the occasion for the Conference was publication of my book, I feel obliged to comment these interesting and valuable works. In the following comments I will try to point out and comment the central claims of these papers, clarify my own views, and, to the extent it is possible, answer to critiques.

Russell IV, Conference in Philosophy, 2008, Healdsburg, CA, 2008

Proponents of the deontological ethics put special stress on the motives of moral action; moral a... more Proponents of the deontological ethics put special stress on the motives of moral action; moral action, in order to be really moral, must be motivated by moral reasons; my action X can be moral only if it is motivated by my insight that I have to do X. 1 According to this picture, the bare insight that I have to do X is what motivates me to do X; my belief that I have to do X ipso facto is a motive for me to do X. This is the reason why this position is called internalism about moral motivation; motive for doing X is embedded in the belief that that I have to do X; moral motive is internal part of moral belief. 2 The main problem for this position is that it is not clear how beliefs, taken by itself, can be motives for doing anything; what is needed to move us to action are desires or wishes. Beliefs and desires are two completely different sorts of mental states; the essence of a belief is that it corresponds to the world, while the essence of the desire is that the world corresponds to it; they have opposite "direction of fit"; beliefs are directed from world to us, while desires are directed from us to the world. 3 It is often said that beliefs are cognitive states, while desires are conative states. 4 Therefore externalists about moral motivation hold that moral belief can not be a motive for moral action and that we can be moved only by desire, that is, something that is external to a belief, that's why their position is called externalism. The point of externalist critique of internalism is simple and clear; what motivates me to take an aspirin is not a belief that

Croatian Journal of Philosophy VI, 2006

Biennial of Quadrilateral, 2006

In this article author criticially examines the thesis of relativism. He wants to show that the e... more In this article author criticially examines the thesis of relativism. He wants to show that the examples which apparently support relativism do not really support relativism as a normative thesis about truth, knowledge and moral norms; these examples rather support weaker thesis of descriptive relativity. Although we may agree that our knowledge is relative to a certain degree, the really interesting question is whether it should be relative. Several different reactions to the factual relativity are compared: realistic, relativistic, skeptic, and dogmatic. Author tries to show that the realistic response is the only adequate response.

Rationality in Belief and Action, 2006

In this article author critically examines Nozick's view on the nature and method of philosophy. ... more In this article author critically examines Nozick's view on the nature and method of philosophy. Although Nozick believes that philosophy is continuous with science, he nevertheless claims that philosophy differs from science. Author tries to show that this difference should not be understood as difference in kind, but only as difference in degree. Consequently, author tries to show that philosophical theories and explanations share the same nature with scientific ones.

Croatian Journal of Philosophy V, 2005

Synthesis Philosophica 19, 2004

Synthesis Philosophica 29-30, 2000

The author examines a well-known argument against the Principle of verifiability. According to th... more The author examines a well-known argument against the Principle of verifiability. According to the argument, since the Principle itself is neither analytical nor empirically verifiable, it should be rejected as a piece of metaphysical nonsense. The author argues that the argument is not valid; there is no reason why the Principle could not be regarded as definition or as empirical generalization. Also, the fact that we can not decide its logical status can not count as a reason against accepting it. Several related questions are strictly separated; Is the Principle as a matter of fact accepted? If it is accepted, is it accepted as a definition or as an empirical generalization (its logical status)? Why should we accept it (its justification)? Related argument that the Principle can not have normative force because it eliminates norms is discussed and rejected as well. The question about the normative force of the Principle is a question of its justification and should be discussed independently of the question about its logical status.

Acta Analytica 13, 1995

This paper has two main parts. In the first part author exposes two formulations of the alleged p... more This paper has two main parts. In the first part author exposes two formulations of the alleged paradox of tolerance. After the analysis, he draws the conclusion that there is nothing paradoxical in the concept of tolerance. Author also argues that there is no such thing as a "principle of tolerance". In the second part of the paper, three general strategies for the justification of the tolerance are discussed; relativistic, sceptic and falibilistic. It is argued that these strategies are either necessarily untenable or useless.

Realizam, Relativizam, Tolerancija, 1995

Scientific knowledge is usually seen as much better grounded than ethical one. However, in the la... more Scientific knowledge is usually seen as much better grounded than ethical one. However, in the last decade (this paper is written in 1995) a number of authors argue that ethical knowledge is equally well grounded as scientific one. They argue that the realist program in the philosophy of science serves equally well for ethical purposes too; that the very same reasons which are forcing us to interpret scientific claims as literally descriptive are forcing us to interpret moral claims as literally descriptive too. Consequently, scientific realism is seen as a tenable philosophical position iff moral realism is tenable. I shall try to show that their view is thoroughly mistaken; that the reasons for accepting scientific realism are not ipso facto (are not at all) reasons for accepting moral realism.
There are philosophers who call themselves moral realists naturalists (MRNs). Their opponents call them new wave moral realists. New wave moral realists claim that: (1) there are moral facts; (2) we don't have to be now in possession of correct reductive definitions of moral terms; (3) moral claims can be tested against reality; (4) one is justified in assuming the truth of a moral theory; (5) explanations which appeal to moral facts are more general than those which don't; (6) there is independent evidence for moral claims; (7) there are moral observations; (8) theory ladeness of moral claims is not a vicious one; (9) there are moral observations which could confirm moral theory; (10) moral facts can and should be a posteriori identified with nonmoral ones; (11) moral facts are supervenient upon nonmoral ones; (12) moral properties can be conceived on analogy with secondary properties; (13) moral epistemology can be naturalised; (14) moral facts can motivate; (15) the fact that the science itself is value loaded supports the view that there are moral facts. I shall argue that all these claims are false.

Radovi Filozofskog fakulteta u Zadru 7, 1991

The fundamental idea of Platonism is that any such-and-such thing is such-and-such because it par... more The fundamental idea of Platonism is that any such-and-such thing is such-and-such because it participates in the Form of a such-and-such thing. There are a lot of arguments against this view. Four of these arguments arc of regress ad infinitum from. One of these arguments is famous "The third man" argument. In this paper author argues that none of these four arguments is valid. Therefore, platonistic ontology is immune to arguments of this form.

Books in English by Boran Berčić

HUMAN RATIONALITY Festschrift for Nenad Smokrović, 2022

This collection of articles is a tribute to Nenad Smokrović, our friend and colleague from the Ph... more This collection of articles is a tribute to Nenad Smokrović, our friend and colleague from the Philosophy Department. He has been working on human rationality for over 25 years. Consequently, articles in this collection are either directly or indirectly related to this subject matter.
In this volume, 19 authors from Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Italy, Israel, USA, and GB write about human rationality. What human rationality consists in? What is the relationship between its normative aspect (logic) and its descriptive aspect (psychology)? Do people in fact reason according to the laws of logic? What is the nature and the function of reasoning, argumentation, and inference? ... We are publishing this volume in the hope that it will provide further contribution to the research in the field. (Editors)

HUMAN RATIONALITY Festschrift for Nenad Smokrović, 2022

Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2021

Prolegomena, 2019

Perspectives on the Self, 2017

Thought Experiments between Nature and Society: A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević, 2017

X is an A, iff he declares himself as an A.

X is an A iff:
(1) X believes he is an A.
(2) Others believe that x is an A.
(3) X believes that others believe that he is an A.

Etica & Politica, 2016

Anthropology & Philosophy, 2015

Unpublished, 2015

Prolegomena 12, 2013

Russell IV, Conference in Philosophy, 2008, Healdsburg, CA, 2008

Croatian Journal of Philosophy VI, 2006

Biennial of Quadrilateral, 2006

Rationality in Belief and Action, 2006

Croatian Journal of Philosophy V, 2005

Synthesis Philosophica 19, 2004

Synthesis Philosophica 29-30, 2000

Acta Analytica 13, 1995

Realizam, Relativizam, Tolerancija, 1995

Radovi Filozofskog fakulteta u Zadru 7, 1991

HUMAN RATIONALITY Festschrift for Nenad Smokrović, 2022

Perspectives on the Self, 2017

This collection contains seventeen articles on the self and related subjects. All are published h... more This collection contains seventeen articles on the self and related subjects. All are published here for the first time. The collection covers a wide range of topics: metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, philos- ophy of language, history of philosophy (modern and ancient, eastern and western), aesthetics and ethics. This variety explains the title - Perspectives on the Self.
The occasion for the volume was a conference on The Self held on March 31 and April 1 2016 at The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Rijeka, Croatia. This collection is the end product of the activities of a group of philosophers from the Rijeka Department of Philosophy and colleagues who have worked with them. The activity of this group started in the autumn of 2010 as an informal weekly seminar on identity. Philosophers made up the core of the group, although colleagues from the departments of Psychology and Literature also took part.

Praktička ontologija: povodom 70 godina Lina Veljaka, 2022

Na više mjesta u svom opusu Lino Veljak tvrdi da ljudsko postojanje može biti istinito ili neisti... more Na više mjesta u svom opusu Lino Veljak tvrdi da ljudsko postojanje može biti istinito ili neistinito. U tome slijedi Gaju Petrovića i Milana Kangrgu. Ideja je da je naše postojanje istinito akko realiziramo svoje kreativne potencijale. Ovo je svakako lijepa i humana ideja. Međutim, istina je semantička relacija. Ono što može biti istinito ili neistinito jesu rečenice, sudovi ili vjerovanja (semantička istina). Stoga je pitanje je li naše postojanje nešto što može biti istinito ili neistinito (ontološka istina). Načelno, tri su mogućnosti. (1) Semantička i ontološka istina isti su pojam i stoje za isto svojstvo. (2) Semantička istina je istina u primarnom i doslovnom značenju a ontološka istina je istina u sekundarnom i metaforičkom značenju. (3) Iako imaju isti etimološki korijen, i oba izražavaju nekakvo podudaranje, semantička i ontološka istina različiti su pojmovi i stoje za različita svojstva. U ovom članku nastojim pokazati da je (3) točan odgovor, da su istinito i istinsko različiti pojmovi koji stoje za različita svojstva te da se zbog toga ne može govoriti o istinitom postojanju, barem ne u doslovnom značenju.

Radovi znanstvenog centra “Berislav Žarnić”, 2022

Krajem 20. i početkom 21. stoljeća ideja relativizma dobila je novi impetus razvojem u filozofiji... more Krajem 20. i početkom 21. stoljeća ideja relativizma dobila je novi impetus razvojem u filozofiji jezika. John MacFarlane, Max Kölbel, Peter Lasersohn i drugi pokušali su ideju relativizma formulirati na konzistentan, precizan i prihvatljiv način. Zbog novog pristupa njihovi stavovi dobili su naziv novi relativizam ili analitički relativizam (Baghramian i Carter 2020).

Godišnjak za filozofiju, 2016

Argument iz identiteta ili to-je-ono-što-mi-jesmo argument rijetko se eksplicite formulira. Uglav... more Argument iz identiteta ili to-je-ono-što-mi-jesmo argument rijetko se eksplicite formulira. Uglavnom se koriste krnje formulacije kojima se nagovještava nešto što bi trebalo biti očito i samorazumljivo. Ipak, možemo ga izložiti u sljedećih sedam koraka:

Mi činimo X.
X je ono što nas čini onima koji jesmo.
Ako ne budemo činili X nećemo biti oni koji jesmo. 4) Ne biti onaj koji jesi isto je kao i ne biti.
Ako prestanemo činiti X prestat ćemo postojati.
Hoćemo biti, nećemo ne biti.
Zbog toga, da bismo opstali mi moramo činiti X.
U ovom argumentu može se ukazati na barem osam grešaka: 1) trivijal- nost, 2) pretpostavka da su sva svojstva esencijalna, 3) pretpostavka da moraju postojati esencijalna svojstva, 4) brkanje numeričkog i kvalita- tivnog identiteta, 5) pretpostavka da razlika u numeričkom identitetu ovisi o razlici u kvalitativnom identitetu, 6) brkanje epistemičkog i ontološkog identiteta, 7) brkanje stereotipa i esencije, 8) pretpostavka da je gubitak identiteta ravan prestanku postojanja.

Prolegomena, 2014

Autor analizira prilično čestu i popularnu filozofsku tezu da je subjekt aktivan u procesu spozna... more Autor analizira prilično čestu i popularnu filozofsku tezu da je subjekt aktivan u procesu spoznaje. Razlikuje različite smislove te teze i nastoji ukazati na njihove implikacije. Posebno nastoji pokazati da suvremene kognitivističke teorije percepcije ne podržavaju opći filozofski antirealizam već da upravo realizam predstavlja bolji okvir za razumijevanje teorija percepcije. Nastoji pokazati da: 1) Spoznaja nije i ne smije biti projekcija nego jest i treba biti detekcija. 2) Metafora ogledala primjerena je metafora za spoznaju jer dobro izražava naše intuicije o kriteriju točne spoznaje. 3) Subjektivni doprinos u spoznaji nije ništa dobro ni poželjno nego naprosto predstavlja pogrešku koju treba odstraniti. 4) Ono što vidimo nisu naše mentalne reprezentacije stvari, nego same stvari. 5) Potrebno je razlučiti proces spoznaje od sadržaja spoznaje, to jest, to kako spoznajemo od toga što spoznajemo. 6) Um ne sintetizira iskustvo u skladu sa svojim vlastitim pravilima, nego ga resintetizira u skladu s fizičkom stvarnošću koju prikazuje. 7) Spoznajni subjekt je aktivan na (i) voljnom i svjesnom nivou, na (ii) podsvjesnom i automatskom niovu, ali nije i ne smije biti aktivan na (iii) metafizičkom nivou.

Vječno u vremenu, 2010

In this article author argues that religion is not reducible to the decision about the way of lif... more In this article author argues that religion is not reducible to the decision about the way of life. Although theoretical component of religion needs not be the most importan aspect of religion, it is a necessary part of religion. It is not possible to accept any other aspect of religion without accepting its theoretical aspect. Further, theist should not claim that God is incomprehensible because it is irrational to believe in something incomprehensible. For this reason a talk about transcendent God is problematic. Theist has to decide whether his thesis is empirical or transcendental and consequently search for and evaluate possible evidence for his thesis. Although antirealism in the philosophy of religion can be atractive, it is an unstable position which necessarily leads to atheism, therefore, theist has to be realist.

Filozofska istraživanja 115, 2009

Nedostatak kretanja u suvremenim uvjetima življenja je današnja stvarnost i nepobitna činjenica. ... more Nedostatak kretanja u suvremenim uvjetima življenja je današnja stvarnost i nepobitna činjenica. Budući da je tjelesna aktivnost biotička potreba čovjeka, potreban je veći angažman društva u cjelini isto kao i svakog pojedinca koji je dužan voditi brigu o svom tjelesno zdravstvenom statusu. Tjelesna aktivnost ima nezamjenjivu instrumentalnu vrijednost jer predstavlja najbolje sredstvo za postizanje i održanje zdravlja. Pored toga, tjelesna aktivnost ima i intrinzičnu vrijednost zato što omogućava realiziranje i usavršavanje čovjekovih motoričkih znanja i dostignuća. Smatramo da zapostavljanje tjelesno-zdravstvenog aspekta narušava cjelovitost ličnosti, te da stoga svatko ima razloga za redovito tjelesno vježbanje.

Godišnjak za filozofiju , 2009

Filozofska istraživanja 109, 2008

Sažetak U ovome članku autor kritički razmatra ključne elemente etike vrlina. Odbacuje čest stav ... more Sažetak U ovome članku autor kritički razmatra ključne elemente etike vrlina. Odbacuje čest stav da je etika vrlina bolja, jer je u njoj djelatnik usmjeren na sebe, dok je u deontologiji ili konzekvencijalizu usmjeren na druge; u deontologiji postoje dužnosti prema sebi, konzekvencijalizam je simetričan u tom pogledu, jer je vlastito dobro jednako vrijedno kao i tuđe, štoviše, najvažnije vrline su upravo one koje su usmjerene na druge. Ipak, postoji vrsta situacije koja podržava ovaj stav, naime, u okviru konzekvencijalizma čovjek koji postigne da drugi proizvedu 5 jedinica sreće bolji je od čovjeka koji sam proizvede 3 jedinice sreće, dok je u okviru etike vrlina bolji ovaj drugi. Vrlo je zanimljivo pitanje koji je bolji naprosto. Nadalje, pitanje je može li etika vrlina doista bolje objasniti činjenicu da imamo moralne uzore; mi im se divimo zbog njihovih postupaka, a ta se činjenica daleko bolje uklapa u deontologiju ili konzekvencijalizam. Pored toga, budući da vrline ne možemo odrediti neovisno o postupcima do kojih tipično dovode, divljenje prema vrlinama svodi se na divljenje prema postupcima. Ovaj uvid podupire opću tezu članka da su vrline svodive na postupke, to jest, da etika vrlina ne može biti postojati samostalno već da je svodiva na deontologiju ili konzekvencijalizam.

Filozofska istraživanja 110, 2008

In this article the author examines basic intuitions for and aginst utilitarianism, primarily the... more In this article the author examines basic intuitions for and aginst utilitarianism, primarily the problems that utilitarins face within the domain of distributive justice. The clash of intuitions is examined in the idealized situation in which we distribute "mana form haven", that is, in a situation in which merits, needs, property relationships form the past, etc. are irrelevant by assumpition. (10:10; 10:15; 5:25) Even in a such situation, distribution preffered by utilitarianism seems problematic. Inutitions about equality, priority, absolutely and relatively better position, marginal utility, etc. are strong even in the purely abstract situation. It is interesting that utilitarianism is not in conflict with egalitarianism in all possible situations; utilitarian inutitions in conjunction with intuitions about priority and marginal utility in fact have egalitarian consequences.

Filozofska istraživanja 101, 2006

Autor smatra da pitanje o smislu života prvenstveno treba razumjeti kao pitanje o logičkoj strukt... more Autor smatra da pitanje o smislu života prvenstveno treba razumjeti kao pitanje o logičkoj strukturi razloga za djelovanje. Odnosno, pitanje o smislu života u prvome je redu potraga za racionalnom rekonstrukcijom naših praktičnih razloga. Činjenica da se veliki broj naših postupaka može opravdati unutar okvira instrumentalne racionalnosti pokazuje da na kraju lanca opravdanja mora postojati jedan ili više konačnih razloga za djelovanje. Uobičajeni kandidati su sreća, objektivna svrha, briga za druge i slično. Sve navedene odgovore autor odbacuje smatrajući da je okvir instrumentalne racionalnosti u ovome kontekstu pogrešno shvaćen, budući da mnoge stvari koje radimo u našim životima nemaju samo instrumentalnu već i intrinzičnu vrijednost. Autor se opredjeljuje za pluralizam vrijednosti, odbacujući ideju da mora postojati jedan razlog za djelovanje.

Filozofska istraživanja 99, 2005

The starting point of this article is the ontological question: What makes it true that 2+2=4?, t... more The starting point of this article is the ontological question: What makes it true that 2+2=4?, that is, what are the truth makers of mathematical propositions? Of course, the satisfactory theory in the philosophy of mathematics has to answer semantical question: What are mathematical propositions about? Also, epistemological ques- tion: How do we know them?, as well. Author compares five theories in the philoso- phy of mathematics, that is, five accounts of the nature of truth makers in mathe- matical discourse: fictionalism (there are no truth makers because entities of mathe- matics are fictions, though useful fictions); nominalism (mathematical propositions are true by definition, so the truth makers are in the language); physicalism (mathe- matical propositions are inductive generalizations from experience, so, the truth makers are physical facts in the world); conceptualism (mathematics reflects the way we think about things, so, the truth makers are ultimately psychological facts) and Platonism (mathematics is about per se existing mathematical reality).

Godišnjak za filozofiju 1, 2005

Filozofska istraživanja 94-95, 2004

In this article author critically examines well knovvn arguments vvhich purport to show that deat... more In this article author critically examines well knovvn arguments vvhich purport to show that death is not something bad for the person vvho dies, and tries to show that these arguments are not sound, that is, author tries to show that death really is something bad for person vvho died. Author believes that Williams did not shovv that eternal live vvould be unbearable and that death after sufficiently long life vvould be a relief. Furthermore, famous Epicurus’ argument against the fear of death author splits into two related but nevertheless separated arguments, and tries to shovv that the first one is based on false or at least questionable theory of value, vvhile the other one represents a serious intellectual challenge. Different ansvvers to Lucretius’ argument from the asymmetry of past and future nonexistence are exam- ined; author argues that none of these ansvvers is completely satisfactory. Finally, author examines and rejects »mathematical argument« against the fear of death as invalid.

Godišnjak za filozofiju 1, 2004

DETERMINIZAM I SLOBODA VOLJE 1) Determinizam Determinizam je filozofska pozicija prema kojoj je s... more DETERMINIZAM I SLOBODA VOLJE 1) Determinizam Determinizam je filozofska pozicija prema kojoj je sve što se događa determiniramo; svijet u kojem živimo zapravo je veliki strogo determinirani mehanizam. Procesi u prirodi odvijaju se po točno određenim #zakonima: zvijezde se kreću po strogo utvrđenim putanjama, Sunce svaki dan izađe i zađe u točno određeno vrijeme, elementi se spajaju po nužnim zakonima kemije, svjetlost se odbija pod točno određenim kutem, genetski kod organizma određen je genetskim kodom roditelja, itd. I društvo je prožeto pravilnostima: cijene rastu ili padaju u skladu sa zakonom ponude i potražnje, siromaštvo dovodi do političke nestabilnosti, razvoj industrije dovodi ljude u gradove, itd. Ni individualno ponašanje tu nije izuzetak. Mi i naši postupci samo su mali zupčanici u velikom mehanizmu svijeta u kojem živimo. Kao fizička bića ponašamo se u skladu sa zakonima fizike; kao socijalna bića ponašamo se u skladu sa zakonima sociologije; kao psihička bića ponašamo se u skladu sa zakonima psihologije; itd. Stoga je sjećaj da smo mogli učiniti nešto različito od onoga što smo učinili naprosto pogrešan. Naše ponašanje u potpunosti je determiniramo, isto kao i sve drugo u prirodi. Jasno, mnogi zakoni još su nam nepoznati, ali iz dana u dan otkrivamo ih sve više. Doista je pitanje hoćemo li ih ikada sve spoznati. Međutim, zakoni postoje i neumoljivo djeluju na nas, znali mi za njih ili ne. Slučaj ne postoji; ako smatramo da se nešto dogodilo slučajno, to je samo zato što ne znamo dovoljno o mehanizmima koji su doveli do toga događaja. Kada bismo ih poznavali, ne bismo vjerovali da se ikada išta dogodilo slučajno. Isto tako, ako je determinizam istinit nema ni slobode volje; ako je doista sve određeno, osjećaj da odlučujemo i biramo samo je obična iluzija. Vjerujemo da smo u nizu slučajeva mogli učiniti drugačije nego što jesmo, ali to je vjerovanje naprosto pogrešno; ako je determinizam istinit nema mogućnosti izbora. Determinizam, jasno, može izgledati pretjerano i neprihvatljivo. Suočeni s ovako radikalnom tezom, upitat ćemo se: Zar je baš sve određeno? Zar zakoni nemaju izuzetaka? Je li svijet u kojem živimo zaista samo jedan veliki mehanizam? Zar nemamo slobodu volje? Zar baš ni o čemu ne odlučujemo? Međutim, izgleda da smo deterministi u daleko većoj mjeri nego što mislimo. Deterministički način gledanja na stvari uopće nam nije tako stran. Razmotrimo tri intuitivno vrlo prihvatljiva principa koji su u samoj srži determinističke doktrine, to su princip kauzalnosti, princip dovoljnog razloga i princip uniformnosti prirode.-Princip uzročnosti Vjerujemo da sve što se događa ima svoj uzrok. Vjerujemo da svaki Zašto? mora imati svoj Zato! Vjerujemo da se ništa ne događa samo od sebe, naprosto, bez ikakvog uzroka. Stvari ne nastaju ni iz čega, same od sebe. Ovaj princip mišljenja naziva se #princip kauzalnosti ili načelo uzročnosti i glasi: PK: Sve što se događa ima svoj uzrok. Na prvi pogled ovaj princip možda može izgledati apstraktno i udaljeno od svakodnevnog iskustva i razmišljanja. Međutim, on je vrlo rasprostranjen i vrlo duboko ukorijenjen u našem rasuđivanju. On ne odražava samo način na koji razmišljamo o svijetu. Mi vjerujemo da je istinit i o samome svijetu u kojem živimo. 1 Razmotrimo dva primjera koji vrlo uvjerljivo pokazuju

Revija za sociologiju 34, 2003

U ovom članku autor nastoji kritički preispitati osnovne teze falsifikacionističke filozofije zna... more U ovom članku autor nastoji kritički preispitati osnovne teze falsifikacionističke filozofije znanosti Sir Karla Poppera. Naglasak je na Popperovu nastojanju da ustanovi asimetriju izme|u verifikacionizma i falsifikacionizma. Iako je Popper i sam bio jedan od onih koji su smatrali da su teorije prožete opservacijama, bitna je razlika između njegova shvaćanja prožetosti opservacija teorijom i shvaćanja Hansona i Kuhna. Za Poppera opservacije nisu prožete upravo onom teorijom koju trebaju testirati. Razlika u shvaćanju prožetosti opservacija teorijom omogućuje Popperu da konzistentno formulira ideju napretka znanosti i istinolikosti znanstvenih teorija. Izgleda da poznati Wasonov zadatak izbora, usprkos nekim nejasnoćama, ipak pokazuje da smo psihološki skloniji verifikaciji nego falsifikaciji. Objašnjene su Popperove tehničke definicije sadržaja teorije, strogosti testa i eksplanatorne snage teorije. Nadalje, autor nastoji pokazati da Popperov falsifikacionizam predstavlja rješenje poznatog Hemplova paradoksa gavrana. Na tom apstraktnom problemu pokazana je asimetrija verifikacije i falsifikacije. Pored toga, autor nastoji pokazati da Duhemov argument ne predstavlja konkluzivan razlog za odbacivanje Popperova falsifikacionizma, iako ga u izvjesnoj mjeri potkopava.

Theoria 3-4 , 2000

In this article author critically examines the thesis of fatalism and draws a distinction betwee... more In this article author critically examines the thesis of fatalism and draws a distinction between rough and sophisticated version of fatalism. Although these two versions are psychologically and rhetorically closely related, their contents are essentially different. First one is empirical thesis, while the second one is metaphysical. The main problem with the first one is that it is in fact false, while the main problem with the second one is that it is empty. Author also examines two famous fatalistic arguments; the idle argument or the "air raid" argument, and the "sea battle" argument. The main failures of these arguments are: unjustified inference from purely formal to substantial claims; assumption that the statements about future contingent events have their truth value now; and modal fallacy.

Filozofija I, 2012

Smisao života, Smrt, Sudbina, Sloboda volje, Moralna odgovornost, Etika, Društveni ugovor, Vrijed... more Smisao života, Smrt, Sudbina, Sloboda volje, Moralna odgovornost, Etika, Društveni ugovor, Vrijednosti.

Filozofija II, 2012

Znanje, Stvarnost, Um, Bog, Zašto 2+2=4? Što je filozofija?

Filozofija (sažeto e-izdanje), 2012

This book is an introduction to philosophy. (In fact, it is an abbreviated version of larger, two... more This book is an introduction to philosophy. (In fact, it is an abbreviated version of larger, two volumes work.) It contains the following chapters:
- Meaning of Life
- Death
- Destiny
- Free Will
- Moral Responsibility
- Ethics
- Social Contract
- Values
- Knowledge
- Reality
- Mind
- God

PARADOKSI (rukopis), 2003

Ova knjiga posvećena je svima onima kojima nije posvećena ni jedna knjiga. Što je paradoks? Parad... more Ova knjiga posvećena je svima onima kojima nije posvećena ni jedna knjiga. Što je paradoks? Paradoks je argument koji ima (1) prihvatljive premise, (2) prihvatljiv logički slijed konkluzije iz premisa i (3) neprihvatljivu konkluziju. Suočeni s paradoksom, možemo reagirati na tri načina: 1) poricati neku od premisa 2) poricati da konkluzija slijedi iz premisa 3) prihvatiti konkluziju i tvrditi da je zapravo prihvatljiva

Filozofija Bečkog kruga, 2002

This book is a systematic overview of the logical positivism (Philosophy of the Vienna Circle). I... more This book is a systematic overview of the logical positivism (Philosophy of the Vienna Circle). It contains chapters on the principle of verfication and the elimination of metaphysics, detailed formulations of the principle of verfication, critiques of the positivist's programme, positivists' discussion about the nature of truth, nature of knowledge, their analysis of the value statements, linguistic theory of the a priori knowledge, etc.

Znanost i istina, 1995

This book is a defence of scientific realism. It contains chapters on inference to the best expla... more This book is a defence of scientific realism. It contains chapters on inference to the best explanation, underdetermination of sceintific theories, novel predictions, common cause principle, intervening argument, etc. I reject the instrumentalistic construal of scientific theories and argue that the realist construal is the right one.

Realizam, Relativizam, Tolerancija, 1995

The book consists of three large papers. The first one is on moral realism naturalism (new wave m... more The book consists of three large papers. The first one is on moral realism naturalism (new wave moral realism, or Cornell moral realism). I argue that solutions developed in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind cannot be successfully applied in the domain of ethics, and that therefore this position is untenable. The second paper is on moral relativism. I argue that intuitions that support moral relativism cannot be formulated into a consistent position. Finally, I examine several justifications of tolerance and argue that tolerance can be justified only within universalistic framework. Also, I argue that tolerance is not paradoxical.

Filozofska Istrazivanja, May 7, 2023

Autor u ovom članku razmatra pet osnovnih shvaćanja metafizike kao filozofske discipline koja 1) ... more Autor u ovom članku razmatra pet osnovnih shvaćanja metafizike kao filozofske discipline koja 1) proučava najopćenitije karakteristike svega što jest, 2) istražuje biće kao biće, 3) razmatra ono što prelazi okvire iskustva, 4) analizira najopćenitije pojmove i 5) pruža eksplanatornu teoriju. Pored toga, autor razmatra i niz relevantnih ideja i distinkcija, razliku između stvarnosti i pojave, podjelu na pojavnu i znanstvenu sliku svijeta (Wilfrid Sellars), ideju da je filozofija kraljica znanosti (Moritz Schlick), podjelu na deskriptivnu i revizionističku metafiziku (Peter Frederick Strawson), sinoptičko gledište, ideju naturalizirane metafizike itd. Autor prihvaća prvo gledište, ono po kojemu je metafizika shvaćena kao filozofska disciplina koja proučava najopćenitije karakteristike svega što jest, i skukladno tome smatra da se kategorijalna ontologija najbolje uklapa upravo u tu sliku. Autor nakon toga ukratko izlaže najpoznatije kritike metafizike (David Hume, Immanuel Kant i logički pozitivisti), kao i stavove koji su doveli do formiranja suvremene metametafizike (Rudolf Carnap i Willard Van Orman Quine). Naposljetku, autor razmatra verbalizam i trivijalizam te nastoji utvrditi mogu li ove dvije pozicije predstavljati osnovu za eliminaciju metafizike. Autor nastoji pokazati da ove pozicije ne eliminiraju metafiziku, već da radije zadaju okvir za suvremene metafizičke rasprave. Ključne riječi metafizika, ontologija, biće kao biće, stvarnost, pojava, transcendentna stvarnost, kritika metafizike, metametafizika, ontološka obveza, laka ontologija * Ovaj članak napisan je u okviru rada na znanstvenoistraživačkom projektu Metametafizika, Uniri-human-18-239, Sveučilišta u Rijeci.

Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine, Jun 5, 2023

U ovom tekstu autor nastoji prikazati četiri desetljeća aktivnog bavljenja filozofijom u Rijeci. ... more U ovom tekstu autor nastoji prikazati četiri desetljeća aktivnog bavljenja filozofijom u Rijeci. Od izuzetno uspješne i aktivne neformalne grupe entuzijasta iz 1980-ih i 1990-ih, do etabliranog Odsjeka za filozofiju s poslijediplomskim studijem, ljetnim školama, brojnim gostovanjima, itd.

U ovome članku autor kritički razmatra ključne elemente etike vrlina. Odbacuje čest stav da je et... more U ovome članku autor kritički razmatra ključne elemente etike vrlina. Odbacuje čest stav da je etika vrlina bolja, jer je u njoj djelatnik usmjeren na sebe, dok je u deontologiji ili konzekvencijalizu usmjeren na druge; u deontologiji postoje dužnosti prema sebi, konzekvencijalizam je simetričan u tom pogledu, jer je vlastito dobro jednako vrijedno kao i tuđe, štoviše, najvažnije vrline su upravo one koje su usmjerene na druge. Ipak, postoji vrsta situacije koja podržava ovaj stav, naime, u okviru konzekvencijalizma čovjek koji postigne da drugi proizvedu 5 jedinica sreće bolji je od čovjeka koji sam proizvede 3 jedinice sreće, dok je u okviru etike vrlina bolji ovaj drugi. Vrlo je zanimljivo pitanje koji je bolji naprosto. Nadalje, pitanje je može li etika vrlina doista bolje objasniti činjenicu da imamo moralne uzore; mi im se divimo zbog njihovih postupaka, a ta se činjenica daleko bolje uklapa u deontologiju ili konzekvencijalizam. Pored toga, budući da vrline ne možemo odrediti...

Godišnjak za filozofiju ..., 2004

Sažetak U ovom članku autor razmatra osnovne inuticije za i protiv utilitarizma, prvenstveno prob... more Sažetak U ovom članku autor razmatra osnovne inuticije za i protiv utilitarizma, prvenstveno probleme na koje utilitarizam nailazi u domeni distributivne pravednosti. Sukob intuicija razmatra se u idealiziranoj situaciji u kojoj dijelimo »manu s neba«, dakle, u situaciji u kojoj su po pretpostavci irelevantne zasluge, potrebe, vlasnički odnosi iz prošlosti, itd. (10,10; 10,15; 5,25). Čak i u takvoj situaciji distribucija koju preferira utilitarizam izgleda problematična. Inuticije o jednakosti, prioritetu, apsolutno i relativno boljem položaju, marginalnoj korisnosti, itd. jake su i u situaciji u kojoj smo apstrahirali od svih konkretnih okolnosti. Zanimljivo je da utilitarizam nije u svim mogućim situacijama u konfliktu s egalitarizmom; utilitarističke inuticije u konjunkciji s inuticijama o prioritetu i marginalnoj korisnosti zapravo daju egalitarističke posljedice.

U tekstu se razmatraju motivi i argumenti za razlicite pozicije u raspravi. Nastoji se pokazati d... more U tekstu se razmatraju motivi i argumenti za razlicite pozicije u raspravi. Nastoji se pokazati da inkompatibilisticki argument ne predstavlja konkluzivan razlog za prihvacanje inkompatibilizma, te da kompatibilizam ostaje otvorena pozcija u raspravi.

Ovo dvotomno djelo predstavlja sistematski uvod u filozofiju u kojem je detaljno izložen i raspra... more Ovo dvotomno djelo predstavlja sistematski uvod u filozofiju u kojem je detaljno izložen i raspravljen cijeli niz temeljnih filozofskih problema. Iako je izbor tema klasican, izložena su danas aktualna gledista i rasprave suvremenih autora.

Ovo je predgovor zborniku u kojem autor uspoređuje razlicita gledista 17 domacih i inozemnih auto... more Ovo je predgovor zborniku u kojem autor uspoređuje razlicita gledista 17 domacih i inozemnih autora u zborniku te analizira i vrednuje njihovu argumentaciju. Autor smatra da je Olson u pravu kada tvrdi da ljudi ne mogu nastaviti svoje postojanje kao kompjuterska bica te da Olson cini nepotreban ustupak cetvero-dimenzionalizmu. Autor je skeptican prema Yagisawinoj tezi da zamjenica “me” referira iskljucivo na mene osobno dok zamjenica “I” referira na svakoga tko je izgovara.

Autor raspravlja da pitanje o smislu ®ivota prvenstveno treba razumjeti kao pitanje o logièkoj st... more Autor raspravlja da pitanje o smislu ®ivota prvenstveno treba razumjeti kao pitanje o logièkoj strukturi razloga za djelovanje. Odnosno, pitanje o smislu ®ivota u prvome je redu potraga za racionalnom rekonstrukcijom naših praktiènih razloga. Èinjenica da se veliki broj naših djelovanja mo®e opravdati unutar okvira instrumentalne racionalnosti, upuaeuje da na kraju lanca opravdanja mora postojati jedan ili više konaènih razloga za djelovanje. Uobièajeni kandidati su sreaea, objektivna svrha, briga za druge i slièno. Sve navedene odgovore autor odbacuje smatrajuaei da je okvir instrumentalne racionalnosti u ovome kontekstu pogrešno shvaaeen, buduaei da mnoge stvari koje radimo u našim ®ivotima nemaju samo instrumentalnu veae i intrinziènu vrijednost. Autor se opredjeljuje za pluralizam vrijednosti, odbacujuaei ideju da mora postojati jedan razlog za djelovanje.

Simon Blackburn starts his introduction to philosophy Think with a line: “We might say: it all be... more Simon Blackburn starts his introduction to philosophy Think with a line: “We might say: it all began on 10 November 1619.” (Blackburn 1999: 15) On that date Descartes allegedly had a vision and started writing his philosophical system. However, logical positivists did not share Blacburn’s enthusiasm about Descartes’ philosophy. Moritz Schlick was clear about it. Talking about Cogito as a candidate for the foundation of the whole human knowledge, Schlick said that: “Such a statement, which does not express anything itself, cannot in any sense serve as the basis of anything.” (Schlick 1934: 218) He argued that it was a mere pseudostatement. Hans Reichenbach believed that Cogito “is one of the landmarks on the blind alley of traditional philosophy.” (Reichenbach 1938: 261). No other philosophical movement ever criticized Descartes’ Cogito so fiercely as logical positivists did. They criticized it on every occasion they could. (Schlick 1918: 85, 161; Carnap 1928: 261; Carnap 1932: 74; S...

Rad predstavlja multidisciplinarno razmatranje problema smanjenog tjelesnog kretanja i njegovih p... more Rad predstavlja multidisciplinarno razmatranje problema smanjenog tjelesnog kretanja i njegovih posljedica za zdravlje stanovnistva. Raspravlja se o uzrocima koji dovode do marginaliziranja tjelesnog vježbanja u cilju postizanja optimalnog zdravstvenog statusa, kako u sustavu skolstva i akademskog obrazovanja, tako i u provođenju slobodnog vremena. Ovaj pristup nije iscrpljen samo u preskripciji ukljucivanja tjelovježbe u edukacijskim programima ili apologetskog stajalista o nužnosti skladnog funkcioniranja tjelesnih sustava za optimalno zdravlje, nego je svrha rada naglasiti potrebu za promisljanjem i vrednovanjem uloge utjelovljene spoznaje u kontekstu razlicitih fizioloskih, emotivnih, kognitivnih i drustvenih sastavnica ljudskog bica. U radu se predstavlja model emergentnog holizma koji predstavlja plodan znanstveni okvir za promisljanje o navedenim pitanjima.

Autor nastoji pokazati da je uobicajeni argument ocuvanja nacionalnog identiteta zasnovan na logi... more Autor nastoji pokazati da je uobicajeni argument ocuvanja nacionalnog identiteta zasnovan na logickoj pogreski brkanja numerickog i kvalitativnog identiteta.

Autor nastoji pokazati da i kod formiranja religijskih vjerovanja vrijede isti kanoni kao i kod f... more Autor nastoji pokazati da i kod formiranja religijskih vjerovanja vrijede isti kanoni kao i kod formiranja ostalih vjerovanja. Vjerovanje u entitete opravdano je bilo direktnom evidencijom bilo indirektnim zakljucivanjem.

In this article the author criticizes Michael Devitt's Naturalistic Moral Realism, as well as... more In this article the author criticizes Michael Devitt's Naturalistic Moral Realism, as well as that program in general. The author argues the following: moral explanations do not work; the fact that moral features supervene on the non-moral ones does not support the thesis of Realism; moral principles can not be tested like factual ones; Moral Realists Naturalists water down their thesis so much that it ceases to be a form of realism; there are no moral observations in any interesting sense.