What is Deep Disagreement? (original) (raw)
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The Wittgensteinian Theory of Deep Disagreement
The epistemic problem of deep disagreement is whether deep disagreements are subject to rational resolution. Pessimists about deep disagreement argue that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, while optimists deny this. In this paper, I consider the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions. I argue that while several varieties of this view do provide adequate support for pessimism about deep disagreement, not all of them do. [Please see my Synthese paper 'Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology' and my Topoi SI paper 'What is Deep Disagreement?' for the successors to this draft]
The Methodologically Flawed Discussion about Deep Disagreement
Episteme , 2024
Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of the central debates is metaphysical, focusing on the features that make a disagreement deep. Proposals for what makes disagreements deep include theories about hinge propositions and first epistemic principles. In this paper, I criticize this metaphysical discussion by arguing that it is methodologically flawed. Deep disagreement is a technical or semi-technical term, but the metaphysical discussion mistakenly treats it as a common-sense concept to be analyzed and captured by our pre-theoretical intuitions. Since the literature on deep disagreement is subject to this fundamental confusion and deep disagreement is not a helpful umbrella term either, I propose eliminating the notion of deep disagreement from the philosophical discourse. Instead of analyzing the nature of deep disagreement, we should develop theories about different forms of disagreement, including disagreement about hinge propositions and disagreement about epistemic principles, and, in particular, a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement.
Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology
Synthese, 2018
This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general presuppositions of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreement over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that while most versions of hinge epistemology support pessimism about deep disagreement, at least one variety of hinge epistemology, the entitlement theory, does not.
Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement
Topoi, 2021
In this paper we discuss three different kinds of disagreement that have been, or could reasonably be, characterized as deep disagreements. Principle level disagreements are disagreements over the truth of epistemic principles. Sub-principle level deep disagreements are disagreements over how to assign content to schematic norms. Finally, framework-level disagreements are holistic disagreements over meaning not truth, that is over how to understand networks of epistemic concepts and the beliefs those concepts compose. Within the context of each of these kinds of disagreement it is not possible for the parties to the dispute to rationally persuade one another through only offering epistemic reasons for their conflicting points of view. However, in spite of the inability to rationally persuade, we explore how it may nevertheless be possible to rationally navigate each of these varieties of deep disagreement.
WITTGENSTEINIAN HINGE EPISTEMOLOGY AND DEEP DISAGREEMENT
TOPOI, 2018
Deep disagreements concern our most basic and fundamental commitments. Such disagreements seem to be problematic because they appear to manifest epistemic incommensurability in our epistemic systems, and thereby lead to epistemic relativism. This problem is confronted via consideration of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology. On the face of it, this proposal exacerbates the problem of deep disagreements by granting that our most fundamental commitments are essentially arationally held. It is argued, however, that a hinge epistemology, properly understood, does not licence epistemic incommensurability or epistemic relativism at all. On the contrary, such an epistemology in fact shows us how to rationally respond to deep disagreements. It is claimed that if we can resist these consequences even from the perspective of a hinge epistemology, then we should be very suspicious of the idea that deep disagreements in general are as epistemologically problematic as has been widely supposed.
Routledge Handbook to Philosophy of Disagreement
An examination is offered of the nature of deep disagreements, culminating in a tripartite theoretical account of their nature. The relationship between deep disagreements and hinge epistemology is then explored. It is argued that disagreements over one’s hinge commitments would seem to be a paradigm case of deep disagreement, though it is also pointed out that the very idea of hinge disagreement may be hard to make sense of on some versions of hinge epistemology. Nonetheless, insofar as there can be hinge disagreements, it is plausible that they count as deep disagreements. It is further claimed that deep hinge disagreements may be open to resolution—i.e., that accepting the existence of deep hinge disagreements doesn’t entail a commitment to there being epistemically incommensurable epistemic systems. It is finally argued that even if all hinge disagreements are deep disagreements, it is not obvious that all deep disagreements are hinge disagreements.
The Methodological Usefulness of Deep Disagreement
2014
In this paper I begin by examining Fogelin’s account of deep disagreement. My contention is that this account is so deeply flawed as to cast doubt on the possibility that such deep disagreements actually happen. Nevertheless, I contend that the notion of deep disagreement itself is a useful theoretical foil for thinking about argumentation. The second part of this paper makes this case by showing how thinking about deep disagreements from the perspective of rhetoric, Walton- style argumentation theory, computation, and normative pragmatics can all yield insights that are useful no matter what one’s orientation within the study of argu- ment. Thus, I conclude that deep disagreement–even if it were to turn out that there are no real-world occurrences of it to which we can point–is theoretically useful for theorists of argumentation. In this wise, deep disagreement poses a theoretical (and not, as is widely thought, a practical) challenge for argumentation theory not unlike that posed by radical skepticism for traditional epistemology.
Wittgenstein and the logic of deep disagreement
Godden, D. and Brenner, W. (2010). Wittgenstein and the logic of deep disagreement. Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation, 2, 41-80., 2010
In “The logic of deep disagreements” (Informal Logic, 1985), Robert Fogelin claimed that there is a kind of disagreement – deep disagreement – which is, by its very nature, impervious to rational resolution. He further claimed that these two views are attributable to Wittgenstein. Following an exposition and discussion of that claim, we review and draw some lessons from existing responses in the literature to Fogelin’s claims. In the final two sections (6 and 7) we explore the role reason can, and some- times does, play in the resolution of deep disagreements. In doing this we discuss a series of cases, mainly drawn from Wittgenstein, which we take to illustrate the reso- lution of deep disagreements through the use of what we call “rational persuasion.” We conclude that, while the role of argumentation in “normal” versus “deep” disagree- ments is characteristically different, it plays a crucial role in the resolution of both.
Levels of Depth in Deep Disagreement
2016
Since Robert Fogelin introduced the concept of deep disagreement in 1985, several papers on this topic have been published or presented in argumentation theory conferences. Moreover, only one of them introduces techniques for overcoming deep disagreement, and all of them seem to assume that deep disagreement is of only one level of depth. This proposed paper intends to introduce the notion of “levels of depth” in deep disagreement.