The Origin and Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Vision (original) (raw)

FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy

Asia-Pacific Review, 2019

The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) is the most important feature of Japan’s foreign policy under the Abe Administration. One of the most important questions is whether this vision aims to contain a rapidly rising China. Along with the amelioration of the relationship between Japan and China, this diplomatic strategy has been evolved from the quadrilateral security cooperation among leading democracies in this region, namely the US, Japan, Australia, and India, to a more comprehensive regional cooperation. This article regards the latter diplomatic strategic as the “FOIP 2.0” and that there emerges a possible harmony between Japan’s FOIP and China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The " Free and Open Indo-Pacific " Strategy and Japan's Emerging Security Posture An Amorphous Concept

Rising Powers Quarterly , 2018

This article explicates the aims and objectives of the Abe administration's central policy initiative towards the Indo-Pacific region: its " Free and Open Indo-Pacific " (FOIP) strategy, which was officially unveiled in 2016. It argues that whilst the FOIP is talked of as one of the most important organizing ideas in Japan's contemporary foreign policy, there is actually little consensus as to what the FOIP really entails and what it may mean for the country's emerging national security posture. Using a novel analytical framework to test for potential points of contact between the FOIP and three critical strands of Japan's national security (key alliances, the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces outside of territorial defense, and security cooperation with ASEAN nations) the article shows why extant constitutional constraints on the use of the force combined with limited resources given over to defense make it unlikely that Japan will play a more robust role in pursuit of the FOIP's main goal: the maintenance of open seas.

Sino-Japanese Relations: Drivers and Obstacles in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision

China and the Indo-Pacific Maneuvers and Manifestations, 2023

Sino-Japanese relations have developed primarily by separating political and economic relations (Seikei bunri). This bifurcation has become more tenuous in the post-Cold War period as China’s comprehensive power increased. Xi Jinping’s ascension to the position of the Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012 and his more assertive policies in the region has further complicated the traditional Sino-Japanese formula for pragmatic, forward looking relations. To balance the benefits from strong bilateral economic relations with China and growing concerns about an illiberal Pax-Sinica emerging in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan has crafted the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)Vision. This chapter explores Sino-Japanese relations through the prism of FOIP. Key lines of enquiry include: 1) How has Sino-Japanese relations affected the design and implementation of FOIP; 2) How does FOIP reflect Japan’s long standing hedging approach to China; and 3) Does FOIP represents a critical juncture in the Seikei Bunrei formula for bilateral relations. Findings suggest that FOIP remains both an inclusive and exclusive framework to shape the Indo-Pacific region’s rules-based order in-line with the post-WW 2 international order. It leaves windows of opportunity to deepen Sino-Japanese relations while contributing to robust, multilateral institution building to anchor the US in the region and constrain China’s efforts to reshape the region with Chinese characteristics.

Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”: Reality before the Rhetoric?

Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 2017

Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" was announced as recently as November 2016. However, it may be argued that Japan has been acting in accordance with this principle for over a decade in the Indo-Pacific region. While the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and the "quadrilateral" initiative could be called the latest and more visible manifestations of this strategy, they are definitely not the first. This paper explores two core elements of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, namel, regional connectivity and proactive contribution to peace, and highlights Japan's initiatives in this regard in the Indo-Pacific.

The United States' Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy: Challenges for India and Japan

ISAS Insights, 2018

Executive Summary The Donald Trump administration in the United States (US) has expanded its articulation of a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) region by announcing strategic investments and economic cooperation. India and Japan are fundamental to the realisation of the US vision of the region. For India and Japan, however, a deeper commitment to the US vision would depend on several factors. These include the prospects of the FOIP becoming a security-oriented strategy to counter China, as opposed to a regional connectivity programme; avoiding the legitimacy issues encountered by China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); and acquiring an inclusive character. The BRI has been inviting considerable criticism for pushing countries into debt traps and extracting strategic concessions for infrastructure funds. Coupled with developments like the revival of the 'Quad' Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan and the US, the FOIP has the possibility of becoming a security-centric anti-China initiative. This would be to the discomfort of India and Japan, which would hesitate to take sides. Both countries would also wish for greater economic legitimacy and vision of a broader regional economic order from the FOIP, as opposed to it being an initiative for expanding US commercial presence in the region. Notwithstanding announcements of regional infrastructure investments and cooperation efforts, India's repeated emphasis on an 'inclusive' FOIP, Japan's decision to selectively engage with the BRI and their respective geopolitical approaches to the region and strategies towards China, will decide their commitment to the FOIP. However, staying engaged in the FOIP can give both an opportunity of enhancing geo-political and geo-economic contribution through an agenda of regional connectivity.

Japan's 'Indo-Pacific' question: countering China or shaping a new regional order

International Affairs, 2020

Japan's primary objective of the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called ‘tactical hedging’. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future.

JAPAN: COMING UP WITH THE INDO-PACIFIC CONCEPT

INFRASTRUCTURE, IDEAS, AND STRATEGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC, 2019

Dr Rahul Roy-Chaudhury is the Senior Fellow for South Asia at the IISS. He leads the Institute's South Asia research programme, looking at India's neighbourhood foreign and security policies; Pakistan, Afghanistan and regional security; counter-extremism and terrorism; regional nuclear matters; and the Indian navy and the Indian Ocean. Rahul gives select policy-relevant talks and briefings, and regularly organises several 'track 1.5' meetings.

Redirecting Strategic Focus in the Age of the Indo-Pacific

Comparative Connections, 2018

Japan and Southeast Asia faced a new regional dynamic in 2017 following the inauguration of President Donald Trump in the United States and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s accommodative foreign policy toward China. US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Philippines’ unwillingness to discuss the 2016 South China Sea arbitration award forced Japan and some Southeast Asian states to redirect their strategic focus. Most Southeast Asian states increasingly welcome Japan’s regional initiatives in trade, security, and development to fill the vacuum created by these policy shifts. Japan has actively emphasized the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” the geographic scope of which goes well beyond East Asia and covers the entire Pacific Ocean to East Africa. This new strategic focus has revitalized Japan’s cooperation with Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, there are serious challenges that Japan needs to overcome, particularly in clarifying ASEAN’s roles in the strategy.

ISDP Special Paper Japan in the Indo Pacific

Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2022

Japan looks at the Indo-Pacific region through the lens of Southeast Asia and South Asia rather than focusing on only securing natural and energy resources. Japan's priorities have shifted with Tokyo viewing South and Southeast Asia as critical partners in building an Indo-Pacific region with sustainable institutions that are transparent and rules-based. The focus on transparent, rules-based institutions is important not only in the maritime domain but also in trade, the digital economy, commerce and international relations in the region. This policy paper series is based on the discussion that took place in the Yokosuka Council of Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS)’s Indo-Pacific Policy Dialogue series entitled Japan-Southeast Asia cooperation towards a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) on March 24, 2022.